unkin-agent
20077f1029
The haproxy edge holds its own DMZ VIP, a second public entry point alongside traefik-external that must be firewalled and DNS'd separately. Traefik can front it with TLS passthrough, leaving haproxy's certs and backends untouched. - Add a `traefik-external` Gateway: HTTP :80 plus Passthrough TLS :443. - TLSRoute the 12 `fe_https.map` hostnames to haproxy:443; HTTPRoute 301s :80. - Make the Service ClusterIP on 443 only, releasing 198.18.199.1. - Drop `fe_http`, `be_letsencrypt` and `fe_http.map`; certs are DNS-01 only. Client IP now reads as a Traefik pod — the Gateway provider cannot emit PROXY protocol to a TLSRoute backend. `sessionAffinity` goes too (it would pin Traefik pods, not clients); SRVNAME cookies keep persistence. Reviewed-on: #492 Co-authored-by: unkin-agent <unkin-agent@unkin.net> Co-committed-by: unkin-agent <unkin-agent@unkin.net>
20 lines
525 B
YAML
20 lines
525 B
YAML
---
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apiVersion: v1
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kind: Service
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metadata:
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name: haproxy
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namespace: haproxy
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spec:
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type: ClusterIP
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# Reached only by the external Traefik's TLS-passthrough TLSRoute, so the
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# peer address here is a Traefik pod, not the client. sessionAffinity is
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# deliberately absent: keyed on ClientIP it would pin whole Traefik pods,
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# not clients. Backend persistence rests on the per-backend SRVNAME cookie.
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selector:
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app: haproxy
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ports:
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- name: https
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port: 443
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protocol: TCP
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targetPort: https
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