Files
artifactapi/internal/tfsign/signer.go
T
unkinben 936cf8846a
ci/woodpecker/tag/docker Pipeline was successful
feat: serve local terraform repos as a provider registry (#102)
## Why

Local terraform repos already served the Terraform **network mirror** protocol, but consuming that requires every user to add a `provider_installation { network_mirror }` block to `~/.terraformrc`. A `source = "artifactapi.k8s.../ns/type"` address instead triggers the **provider registry** protocol (service discovery at `/.well-known/terraform.json` + GPG-signed SHA256SUMS), which returned 404 — hence *"does not offer a provider registry."*

Local repos are meant to be the real thing, so this makes a terraform local repo a first-class provider registry: `terraform init` installs from a bare source address with no client config.

## What

- Serve `/.well-known/terraform.json` service discovery and the `providers.v1` endpoints under `/terraform/v1/providers`: `versions`, `download/{os}/{arch}`, `sha256sums`, `sha256sums.sig`.
- Map the Terraform **namespace** segment to the artifactapi **repo name**; locate the provider by **type**. `download_url` points back at the existing `/api/v1/local/...` path.
- Generate `SHA256SUMS` per version and sign it with a GPG key loaded from `TF_SIGNING_KEY_PATH` (optional `TF_SIGNING_KEY_PASSPHRASE`); advertise the public key + key id in the download response. **No key → registry stays disabled (endpoints 404)**, so behaviour is unchanged until the signing secret is present.
- New `internal/tfsign` (key load + detached signing, via `x/crypto/openpgp`) and `internal/api/terraform` (registry handler). Export `ParseProviderZip` for reuse.
- `TF_PROVIDER_PROTOCOLS` (default `5.0,6.0`) sets the advertised plugin protocols.
- README section documenting usage.

## Consumer

```hcl
terraform {
  required_providers {
    artifactapi = {
      source  = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/artifactapi"
      version = "0.1.2"
    }
  }
}
```

## Tests

- `internal/tfsign`: sign + verify round-trip, disabled/missing-key paths.
- `internal/api/terraform`: dockerised full flow (discovery → versions → download → sha256sums → sig), verifying the signature against the advertised public key.

## Follow-ups (separate PRs)

- **argocd-apps**: mount the signing K8s secret into the api deployment + set `TF_SIGNING_KEY_PATH`. The `/` HTTPRoute already routes `/.well-known` and `/terraform` to the API, so no gateway change is needed.
- Image/version bump once tagged.

## Note

Anchored the `terraform/` gitignore to the repo root (`/terraform/`) so it stops matching `internal/*/terraform/`. This surfaced `internal/provider/terraform/terraform_extra_test.go`, which had been silently untracked — now committed.

Reviewed-on: #102
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
2026-07-03 18:55:35 +10:00

174 lines
5.1 KiB
Go

// Package tfsign loads a GPG signing key and produces the detached signatures
// the Terraform provider registry protocol requires over SHA256SUMS files.
package tfsign
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"fmt"
"os"
"strings"
"golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp"
"golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/armor"
)
// KeyStore persists a generated signing key. *database.DB satisfies it.
type KeyStore interface {
GetSigningKey(ctx context.Context, purpose string) (armor, keyID string, found bool, err error)
InsertSigningKeyIfAbsent(ctx context.Context, purpose, armor, keyID string) error
}
// LoadOrCreate returns a signer for purpose, generating and persisting a new key
// the first time it is needed. It is safe across replicas: a lost insert race
// just re-reads whichever key won.
func LoadOrCreate(ctx context.Context, store KeyStore, purpose string) (*Signer, error) {
armored, _, found, err := store.GetSigningKey(ctx, purpose)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if !found {
newArmor, keyID, err := Generate()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := store.InsertSigningKeyIfAbsent(ctx, purpose, newArmor, keyID); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if armored, _, _, err = store.GetSigningKey(ctx, purpose); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
return LoadArmored(armored, "")
}
// Signer holds a decrypted GPG entity and exposes what the registry download
// response needs: a detached signature, the armored public key, and the key ID.
type Signer struct {
entity *openpgp.Entity
publicASCII string
keyID string
}
// Load reads an armored private key from path, decrypting it with passphrase if
// the key is protected. A blank path returns (nil, nil): a nil *Signer means the
// caller should fall back to another source (e.g. a DB-stored key).
func Load(path, passphrase string) (*Signer, error) {
if path == "" {
return nil, nil
}
data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("open signing key: %w", err)
}
return fromArmor(string(data), passphrase, path)
}
// LoadArmored builds a signer from an in-memory armored private key, e.g. one
// read from the database. A blank key returns (nil, nil).
func LoadArmored(armored, passphrase string) (*Signer, error) {
if armored == "" {
return nil, nil
}
return fromArmor(armored, passphrase, "stored key")
}
// Generate creates a fresh signing keypair and returns the armored private key
// (to persist) and its uppercase key id.
func Generate() (armoredPrivateKey, keyID string, err error) {
entity, err := openpgp.NewEntity("artifactapi terraform registry", "provider signing", "artifactapi@localhost", nil)
if err != nil {
return "", "", err
}
var buf bytes.Buffer
w, err := armor.Encode(&buf, openpgp.PrivateKeyType, nil)
if err != nil {
return "", "", err
}
if err := entity.SerializePrivate(w, nil); err != nil {
return "", "", err
}
if err := w.Close(); err != nil {
return "", "", err
}
return buf.String(), strings.ToUpper(entity.PrimaryKey.KeyIdString()), nil
}
func fromArmor(armored, passphrase, src string) (*Signer, error) {
keyring, err := openpgp.ReadArmoredKeyRing(strings.NewReader(armored))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("read signing key: %w", err)
}
if len(keyring) == 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("signing key (%s) contains no entities", src)
}
entity := keyring[0]
if entity.PrivateKey == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("signing key (%s) has no private key material", src)
}
if entity.PrivateKey.Encrypted {
if err := decrypt(entity, passphrase); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
pub, err := armorPublicKey(entity)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &Signer{
entity: entity,
publicASCII: pub,
keyID: entity.PrimaryKey.KeyIdString(),
}, nil
}
// decrypt unlocks the entity's private key and all subkeys with the passphrase.
func decrypt(entity *openpgp.Entity, passphrase string) error {
pw := []byte(passphrase)
if err := entity.PrivateKey.Decrypt(pw); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("decrypt signing key: %w", err)
}
for _, sub := range entity.Subkeys {
if sub.PrivateKey != nil && sub.PrivateKey.Encrypted {
_ = sub.PrivateKey.Decrypt(pw)
}
}
return nil
}
func armorPublicKey(entity *openpgp.Entity) (string, error) {
var buf bytes.Buffer
w, err := armor.Encode(&buf, openpgp.PublicKeyType, nil)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
if err := entity.Serialize(w); err != nil {
return "", err
}
if err := w.Close(); err != nil {
return "", err
}
return buf.String(), nil
}
// Sign returns a binary detached signature over message, matching the
// SHA256SUMS.sig format Terraform verifies.
func (s *Signer) Sign(message []byte) ([]byte, error) {
var buf bytes.Buffer
if err := openpgp.DetachSign(&buf, s.entity, bytes.NewReader(message), nil); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return buf.Bytes(), nil
}
// PublicKeyArmor returns the ASCII-armored public key for the registry's
// signing_keys response.
func (s *Signer) PublicKeyArmor() string { return s.publicASCII }
// KeyID returns the 16-hex-char uppercase key ID Terraform matches against the
// signature's issuer.
func (s *Signer) KeyID() string { return strings.ToUpper(s.keyID) }