Merge pull request 'Source the CA from /ca_chain, not from issuance' (#2) from benvin/ca-chain-endpoint into master

Reviewed-on: #2

AGENTS.md

@@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ cmd/certmanager/main.go       # CLI (flattened: the positional arg is the comman
 cmd/certmanager/main_test.go  # end-to-end tests against an httptest Vault stub
 test/integration/             # end-to-end tests against a real Vault dev server
 internal/config/              # YAML config: parsing, defaults, validation
-internal/pki/                 # issue request/response + the JSON output shape
+internal/pki/                 # issue + ca_chain requests and the output shapes
-internal/vault/               # authenticated HTTP client (approle, kubernetes)
+internal/vault/               # HTTP client: approle, kubernetes, unauthenticated
 Makefile                      # build / test / lint / completions / version bump
 .goreleaser.yaml              # single release driver: binaries + RPM + Gitea release
 scripts/integration-test.sh   # runs the integration test against a Vault dev server
@@ -46,7 +46,12 @@ dist/                         # build output: binaries, RPM, checksums (not comm
   wires it to the real streams and `os.Exit`. Cobra runs with `SilenceUsage` and
   `SilenceErrors` so nothing reaches stderr unless the run failed.
 - **Flat CLI**: the root command takes `common_name` positionally
-  (`cobra.ExactArgs(1)`). Only `completion` and `help` are subcommands.
+  (`cobra.ExactArgs(1)`). `ca`, `completion` and `help` are the only
+  subcommands; `--config` is persistent so `ca` shares it.
+- **`ca` is unauthenticated**: `GET {addr}/v1/{mount}/ca_chain` sends no
+  `X-Vault-Token` and loads the config through `config.LoadCA`, which requires
+  only `vault.addr`. The body is parsed as PEM, never sniffed — Vault labels it
+  `application/pkix-cert`. It prints raw PEM: Puppet uses it as file content.
 - **`parseList`** splits comma lists, trims whitespace, drops empty tokens.
 - **`config.Load`** applies defaults (`auth_method: approle`, `jwt_path`) then
   `Validate()`, which names the offending key and rejects an unknown
@@ -59,8 +64,10 @@ dist/                         # build output: binaries, RPM, checksums (not comm
 
 ## Deliberate deviations from the Python script
 
-- Emits `ca_certificate`; the Python did not, so Puppet's
+- The CA is served by `certmanager ca` from the mount's `/ca_chain`, not welded
-  `/etc/pki/tls/vault/ca_certificate.crt` was silently never populated.
+  to issuance. `issuing_ca` is the intermediate only, and deriving the CA from
+  an issue response would pin CA rotation to each node's 90 day renewal.
+- `full_chain` is leaf first; the Python put the issuer first.
 - `output_path` is read from under `vault:` where it is actually written. The
   Python declared it at the top level but read it from the unwrapped `vault`
   dict, so it never resolved.

README.md

@@ -19,7 +19,8 @@ failure path exits non-zero.
 ## Usage
 
 ```
-certmanager <common_name> [flags]
+certmanager <common_name> [flags]   # issue a certificate
+certmanager ca [flags]              # print the CA chain
 ```
 
 | Flag | Short | Type | Default | Description |
@@ -31,6 +32,12 @@ certmanager <common_name> [flags]
 | `--json` | | bool | `false` | Print the certificate data as JSON |
 | `--config` | | path | `/opt/certmanager/config.yaml` | Config file location |
 
+`ca` takes `--config` plus:
+
+| Flag | Short | Type | Default | Description |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `--mount` | `-m` | string | `vault.mount_point` | PKI mount to read |
+
 Comma lists are split on `,`, whitespace-trimmed, and empty tokens dropped.
 
 ### JSON output
@@ -39,15 +46,15 @@ Comma lists are split on `,`, whitespace-trimmed, and empty tokens dropped.
 {
   "certificate": "<PEM leaf>",
   "private_key": "<PEM key>",
-  "full_chain": "<issuing_ca PEM>\n<certificate PEM>",
+  "full_chain": "<certificate PEM>\n<issuing_ca PEM>"
-  "ca_certificate": "<issuing_ca PEM>"
 }
 ```
 
-`ca_certificate` is new. `profiles::pki::vault` writes
+`full_chain` is leaf first, the order every TLS server expects.
-`$cert_data['ca_certificate']` to `/etc/pki/tls/vault/ca_certificate.crt`, but
+
-the Python never emitted the key, so Puppet saw `undef` and the file was never
+The CA is not part of this document. It is estate-wide and public, so binding
-populated.
+it to a node's issuance would pin CA distribution to that node's renewal cycle;
+`certmanager ca` fetches it instead.
 
 ### File output
 
@@ -58,12 +65,40 @@ Without `--json` the certificate is written under `vault.output_path`
 |---|---|
 | `<output_path>/<common_name>/certificate.crt` | Signed certificate |
 | `<output_path>/<common_name>/private.key` | Private key (mode 0600) |
-| `<output_path>/<common_name>/full_chain.crt` | Issuing CA + certificate |
+| `<output_path>/<common_name>/full_chain.crt` | Certificate + issuing CA |
-| `<output_path>/<common_name>/ca_certificate.crt` | Issuing CA certificate |
 
-With `-c` the same four files are written into
+With `-c` the same three files are written into
 `<output_path>/<common_name>.zip`.
 
+## The `ca` subcommand
+
+```
+certmanager ca [--mount <pki_mount>] [--config <path>]
+```
+
+Prints the mount's CA chain to stdout as raw PEM — not JSON, because Puppet
+uses it as file content directly:
+
+```puppet
+file { '/etc/pki/tls/vault/ca_certificate.crt':
+  content => generate('/usr/local/bin/certmanager', 'ca'),
+}
+```
+
+It reads `GET {addr}/v1/{mount}/ca_chain` unauthenticated: no AppRole login, no
+Kubernetes login, no token header. A config carrying only `addr` and
+`mount_point` is enough, and `--mount` overrides the configured mount.
+
+`/ca_chain` returns the intermediate **and** the root, unlike `issuing_ca` or
+`/ca/pem`, which return the intermediate alone. An intermediate-only `CAfile`
+is not self-sufficient: strict path builders that require a chain to a
+self-signed root reject it.
+
+The endpoint advertises `application/pkix-cert` while serving PEM, so the body
+is parsed rather than sniffed. A non-200, an empty body or anything that is not
+a PEM certificate chain exits non-zero with the cause on stderr and nothing on
+stdout.
+
 ## Configuration
 
 YAML, everything nested under `vault:`. The path is baked in at build time
@@ -74,11 +109,11 @@ YAML, everything nested under `vault:`. The path is baked in at build time
 | `addr` | yes | | e.g. `https://vault.service.consul:8200` |
 | `auth_method` | no | `approle` | `approle` or `kubernetes` |
 | `mount_point` | yes | | e.g. `pki_int` |
-| `role_name` | yes | | e.g. `servers_default` |
+| `role_name` | iff issuing | | e.g. `servers_default` |
-| `role_id` | iff `approle` | | |
+| `role_id` | iff `approle` and issuing | | |
-| `approle_path` | iff `approle` | | e.g. `approle` |
+| `approle_path` | iff `approle` and issuing | | e.g. `approle` |
-| `k8s_mount` | iff `kubernetes` | | e.g. `k8s/au/syd1` |
+| `k8s_mount` | iff `kubernetes` and issuing | | e.g. `k8s/au/syd1` |
-| `k8s_role` | iff `kubernetes` | | e.g. `puppet_certmanager` |
+| `k8s_role` | iff `kubernetes` and issuing | | e.g. `puppet_certmanager` |
 | `jwt_path` | no | `/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token` | |
 | `output_path` | no | `.` | Non-JSON output directory |
 | `tls_skip_verify` | no | `true` | Set `false` once every node trusts the CA |
@@ -95,6 +130,8 @@ vault:
   output_path: /tmp/certmanager
 ```
 
+`ca` requires only `addr` and a mount; every auth key above is optional for it.
+
 AppRole logs in with `role_id` only — the Vault role sets
 `bind_secret_id: false`. Kubernetes reads the JWT from `jwt_path` and posts it
 with `k8s_role`. A missing, unreadable or empty JWT, a rejected login, or an
@@ -115,7 +152,9 @@ make release-snapshot  # goreleaser: binaries, tar.gz and RPM into dist/
 
 `make integration-test` starts a `hashicorp/vault` dev container with
 docker/podman, provisions a PKI mount and an approle role, then runs the built
-binary with the exact argv Puppet uses and asserts on the issued certificate.
+binary with the exact argv Puppet uses and asserts on the issued certificate. A
+root mount signs an intermediate so the CA chain under test is the two
+certificate shape production serves.
 Point it at an existing dev server with `CERTMANAGER_IT_VAULT_ADDR`
 (`VAULT_ADDR` is deliberately ignored — the test writes to the PKI mount).
 

cmd/certmanager/main.go

@@ -79,13 +79,64 @@ func rootCmd() *cobra.Command {
 		},
 	}
 
-	cmd.Flags().StringVar(&cfgFile, "config", config.DefaultPath(), "path to config.yaml")
+	// Persistent so the ca subcommand shares it; the positional form keeps
+	// parsing --config exactly as before.
+	cmd.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&cfgFile, "config", config.DefaultPath(), "path to config.yaml")
 	cmd.Flags().StringVarP(&altNames, "alt-names", "a", "", "comma-separated DNS subject alternative names")
 	cmd.Flags().StringVarP(&ipSans, "ip-sans", "i", "", "comma-separated IP subject alternative names")
 	cmd.Flags().IntVarP(&expiryDays, "expiry-days", "e", 365, "certificate validity in days")
 	cmd.Flags().BoolVarP(&compress, "compress", "c", false, "write the certificate, key and chain into a zip file")
 	cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&jsonOut, "json", false, "print the certificate data as JSON instead of writing files")
 
+	cmd.AddCommand(caCmd(&cfgFile))
+
+	return cmd
+}
+
+// caCmd prints the mount's CA chain. Distributing the CA this way decouples it
+// from certificate issuance, so a CA rotation reaches every node on the next
+// catalog compile instead of waiting out a 90 day renewal cycle.
+func caCmd(cfgFile *string) *cobra.Command {
+	var mount string
+
+	cmd := &cobra.Command{
+		Use:           "ca",
+		Short:         "Print the PKI mount's CA chain (intermediate and root) as PEM",
+		Args:          cobra.NoArgs,
+		SilenceUsage:  true,
+		SilenceErrors: true,
+		RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
+			cfg, err := config.LoadCA(*cfgFile)
+			if err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+
+			mountPoint := cfg.Vault.MountPoint
+			if mount != "" {
+				mountPoint = mount
+			}
+			if mountPoint == "" {
+				return fmt.Errorf("vault.mount_point is required (or pass --mount)")
+			}
+
+			client, err := vault.NewUnauthenticated(cfg.Vault)
+			if err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+
+			// The chain is fully validated before a byte reaches stdout: a
+			// half-written document would break the catalog compile.
+			chain, err := pki.FetchCAChain(client, mountPoint)
+			if err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+			_, err = io.WriteString(cmd.OutOrStdout(), chain)
+			return err
+		},
+	}
+
+	cmd.Flags().StringVarP(&mount, "mount", "m", "", "PKI mount to read (default: vault.mount_point)")
+
 	return cmd
 }
 
@@ -123,7 +174,6 @@ func writeFiles(outputPath, commonName string, compress bool, cert *pki.Certific
 		{"certificate.crt", cert.Certificate, 0o644},
 		{"private.key", cert.PrivateKey, 0o600},
 		{"full_chain.crt", cert.FullChain, 0o644},
-		{"ca_certificate.crt", cert.CACertificate, 0o644},
 	}
 
 	if compress {

cmd/certmanager/main_test.go

@@ -3,9 +3,16 @@ package main
 import (
 	"archive/zip"
 	"bytes"
+	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/elliptic"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"crypto/x509/pkix"
 	"encoding/json"
+	"encoding/pem"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
+	"math/big"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
 	"os"
@@ -27,6 +34,12 @@ type stubOptions struct {
 	k8sStatus     int
 	issueStatus   int
 	issueDelay    time.Duration
+
+	caStatus int
+	// caBody overrides the CA chain response; caBodySet distinguishes an
+	// intentional empty body from "unset".
+	caBody    string
+	caBodySet bool
 }
 
 type capture struct {
@@ -34,11 +47,50 @@ type capture struct {
 	authBody  map[string]any
 	issueBody map[string]any
 	token     string
+
+	caPath      string
+	caRequested bool
+	// caToken records the header verbatim; the CA endpoint must be called
+	// without one.
+	caToken    string
+	caTokenSet bool
+	// chain is the PEM the stub serves from /ca_chain.
+	chain string
+}
+
+// caChainPEM is a real two certificate PEM chain, since the ca path parses what
+// Vault returns rather than trusting the content type.
+func caChainPEM(t *testing.T) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	return selfSignedPEM(t, "test intermediate") + selfSignedPEM(t, "test root")
+}
+
+func selfSignedPEM(t *testing.T, cn string) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("generate key: %v", err)
+	}
+	tmpl := &x509.Certificate{
+		SerialNumber:          big.NewInt(time.Now().UnixNano()),
+		Subject:               pkix.Name{CommonName: cn},
+		NotBefore:             time.Now().Add(-time.Hour),
+		NotAfter:              time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour),
+		IsCA:                  true,
+		BasicConstraintsValid: true,
+		KeyUsage:              x509.KeyUsageCertSign,
+	}
+	der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, tmpl, tmpl, &key.PublicKey, key)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("create certificate: %v", err)
+	}
+	return string(pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: der}))
 }
 
 func newVaultStub(t *testing.T, opts stubOptions) (*httptest.Server, *capture) {
 	t.Helper()
-	got := &capture{}
+	defaultChain := caChainPEM(t)
+	got := &capture{chain: defaultChain}
 
 	decode := func(r *http.Request) map[string]any {
 		var m map[string]any
@@ -83,6 +135,26 @@ func newVaultStub(t *testing.T, opts stubOptions) (*httptest.Server, *capture) {
 		}}
 		_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(resp)
 	})
+	mux.HandleFunc("/v1/pki_int/ca_chain", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		got.caRequested = true
+		got.caPath = r.URL.Path
+		got.caToken = r.Header.Get("X-Vault-Token")
+		_, got.caTokenSet = r.Header["X-Vault-Token"]
+
+		if s := orOK(opts.caStatus); s != http.StatusOK {
+			w.WriteHeader(s)
+			_, _ = fmt.Fprint(w, `{"errors":["unsupported path"]}`)
+			return
+		}
+		body := opts.caBody
+		if !opts.caBodySet {
+			body = defaultChain
+		}
+		// Vault advertises pkix-cert while serving PEM; the stub does too, so
+		// nothing downstream may sniff the content type.
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/pkix-cert")
+		_, _ = io.WriteString(w, body)
+	})
 
 	srv := httptest.NewTLSServer(mux)
 	t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
@@ -140,8 +212,7 @@ func TestRunJSONGolden(t *testing.T) {
 
 	want := `{"certificate":"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nLEAF\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----",` +
 		`"private_key":"-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\nKEY\n-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----",` +
-		`"full_chain":"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nCA\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nLEAF\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----",` +
+		`"full_chain":"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nLEAF\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nCA\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----"}` + "\n"
-		`"ca_certificate":"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nCA\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----"}` + "\n"
 	if stdout.String() != want {
 		t.Errorf("stdout mismatch\n got: %q\nwant: %q", stdout.String(), want)
 	}
@@ -151,11 +222,18 @@ func TestRunJSONGolden(t *testing.T) {
 	if err := json.Unmarshal(stdout.Bytes(), &parsed); err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("stdout is not valid JSON: %v", err)
 	}
-	if parsed["ca_certificate"] != testCA {
+	if _, ok := parsed["ca_certificate"]; ok {
-		t.Errorf("ca_certificate = %q, want issuing_ca", parsed["ca_certificate"])
+		t.Error("ca_certificate must not be emitted; the CA comes from the ca subcommand")
 	}
-	if parsed["full_chain"] != testCA+"\n"+testCert {
+	if len(parsed) != 3 {
-		t.Errorf("full_chain = %q", parsed["full_chain"])
+		t.Errorf("document has %d keys, want exactly 3: %v", len(parsed), parsed)
+	}
+	// Leaf first, issuer after -- asserted as an ordering, not a membership.
+	if parsed["full_chain"] != testCert+"\n"+testCA {
+		t.Errorf("full_chain = %q, want leaf then issuing CA", parsed["full_chain"])
+	}
+	if strings.Index(parsed["full_chain"], "LEAF") > strings.Index(parsed["full_chain"], "\nCA\n") {
+		t.Errorf("full_chain puts the CA ahead of the leaf: %q", parsed["full_chain"])
 	}
 
 	if got.token != "s.testtoken" {
@@ -357,10 +435,12 @@ func TestRunWritesFiles(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 	want := map[string]string{
-		"certificate.crt":    testCert,
+		"certificate.crt": testCert,
-		"private.key":        testKey,
+		"private.key":     testKey,
-		"full_chain.crt":     testCA + "\n" + testCert,
+		"full_chain.crt":  testCert + "\n" + testCA,
-		"ca_certificate.crt": testCA,
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(out, "host.example.com", "ca_certificate.crt")); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		t.Errorf("ca_certificate.crt must no longer be written by the issue path (stat err = %v)", err)
 	}
 	for name, body := range want {
 		got, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(out, "host.example.com", name))
@@ -401,7 +481,7 @@ func TestRunCompress(t *testing.T) {
 	for _, f := range zr.File {
 		names = append(names, f.Name)
 	}
-	wantNames := []string{"certificate.crt", "private.key", "full_chain.crt", "ca_certificate.crt"}
+	wantNames := []string{"certificate.crt", "private.key", "full_chain.crt"}
 	if !reflect.DeepEqual(names, wantNames) {
 		t.Errorf("zip entries = %v, want %v", names, wantNames)
 	}
@@ -448,3 +528,244 @@ func TestCompletionSubcommand(t *testing.T) {
 		})
 	}
 }
+
+// authlessConfig carries only addr and mount_point: the CA chain endpoint is
+// public, so the ca subcommand must not need auth keys to be present.
+func authlessConfig(t *testing.T, addr string, extra ...string) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	return writeConfig(t, "vault:\n"+
+		"  addr: "+addr+"\n"+
+		"  mount_point: pki_int\n"+
+		strings.Join(extra, ""))
+}
+
+func TestRunCAPrintsChain(t *testing.T) {
+	srv, got := newVaultStub(t, stubOptions{})
+	cfg := authlessConfig(t, srv.URL)
+
+	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
+	if code := run([]string{"ca", "--config", cfg}, &stdout, &stderr); code != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, stderr = %q", code, stderr.String())
+	}
+
+	if got.caPath != "/v1/pki_int/ca_chain" {
+		t.Errorf("requested path = %q, want /v1/pki_int/ca_chain", got.caPath)
+	}
+	// Unauthenticated: the header must be absent, not merely empty.
+	if got.caTokenSet {
+		t.Errorf("X-Vault-Token must not be sent to the CA endpoint, got %q", got.caToken)
+	}
+	if got.issueBody != nil {
+		t.Error("the ca subcommand must not issue a certificate")
+	}
+
+	want := strings.TrimSpace(got.chain) + "\n"
+	if stdout.String() != want {
+		t.Errorf("stdout = %q, want the PEM chain %q", stdout.String(), want)
+	}
+	if n := strings.Count(stdout.String(), "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----"); n != 2 {
+		t.Errorf("stdout carries %d certificates, want 2", n)
+	}
+	if stderr.Len() != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("stderr = %q, want empty", stderr.String())
+	}
+}
+
+// "ca" is the subcommand, never a common name to issue for.
+func TestRunCAIsNotTreatedAsACommonName(t *testing.T) {
+	srv, got := newVaultStub(t, stubOptions{})
+	cfg := approleConfig(t, srv.URL)
+
+	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
+	if code := run([]string{"ca", "--config", cfg}, &stdout, &stderr); code != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, stderr = %q", code, stderr.String())
+	}
+	if !got.caRequested {
+		t.Error("the CA chain endpoint was never called")
+	}
+	if got.issueBody != nil {
+		t.Errorf("issuance was attempted for common name %v", got.issueBody["common_name"])
+	}
+	if got.authPath != "" {
+		t.Errorf("the ca subcommand logged in at %q; it must not authenticate", got.authPath)
+	}
+}
+
+// The positional issue form must keep parsing unchanged now that a subcommand
+// sits alongside it.
+func TestRunPositionalFormStillParses(t *testing.T) {
+	srv, got := newVaultStub(t, stubOptions{})
+	cfg := approleConfig(t, srv.URL)
+
+	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
+	if code := run(puppetArgs(cfg), &stdout, &stderr); code != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, stderr = %q", code, stderr.String())
+	}
+	if got.issueBody["common_name"] != "host.example.com" {
+		t.Errorf("common_name = %v", got.issueBody["common_name"])
+	}
+	if got.caRequested {
+		t.Error("the issue path must not call the CA chain endpoint")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRunCAMountFlagOverridesConfig(t *testing.T) {
+	srv, got := newVaultStub(t, stubOptions{})
+	cfg := writeConfig(t, "vault:\n  addr: "+srv.URL+"\n")
+
+	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
+	if code := run([]string{"ca", "--config", cfg, "--mount", "pki_int"}, &stdout, &stderr); code != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, stderr = %q", code, stderr.String())
+	}
+	if got.caPath != "/v1/pki_int/ca_chain" {
+		t.Errorf("requested path = %q", got.caPath)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRunCASuccessWritesNothingToStderr(t *testing.T) {
+	srv, _ := newVaultStub(t, stubOptions{})
+	cfg := authlessConfig(t, srv.URL)
+
+	r, w, err := os.Pipe()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("pipe: %v", err)
+	}
+	orig := os.Stderr
+	os.Stderr = w
+
+	var stdout bytes.Buffer
+	code := run([]string{"ca", "--config", cfg}, &stdout, os.Stderr)
+
+	os.Stderr = orig
+	if err := w.Close(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("close pipe: %v", err)
+	}
+	captured, err := io.ReadAll(r)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read pipe: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if code != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("exit code = %d", code)
+	}
+	if len(captured) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("stderr must be byte-empty on the ca success path, got %q", captured)
+	}
+	if stdout.Len() == 0 {
+		t.Error("stdout is empty")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRunCAFailures(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name    string
+		opts    stubOptions
+		config  func(t *testing.T, addr string) string
+		args    func(cfg string) []string
+		wantErr string
+	}{
+		{
+			name:    "vault rejects the request",
+			opts:    stubOptions{caStatus: http.StatusForbidden},
+			config:  func(t *testing.T, addr string) string { return authlessConfig(t, addr) },
+			wantErr: "vault returned 403",
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "mount does not exist",
+			opts:    stubOptions{caStatus: http.StatusNotFound},
+			config:  func(t *testing.T, addr string) string { return authlessConfig(t, addr) },
+			wantErr: "vault returned 404",
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "empty body",
+			opts:    stubOptions{caBody: "", caBodySet: true},
+			config:  func(t *testing.T, addr string) string { return authlessConfig(t, addr) },
+			wantErr: "empty CA chain",
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "whitespace only body",
+			opts:    stubOptions{caBody: "\n  \n", caBodySet: true},
+			config:  func(t *testing.T, addr string) string { return authlessConfig(t, addr) },
+			wantErr: "empty CA chain",
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "body is not PEM",
+			opts:    stubOptions{caBody: "<html>nope</html>", caBodySet: true},
+			config:  func(t *testing.T, addr string) string { return authlessConfig(t, addr) },
+			wantErr: "not a PEM certificate chain",
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "PEM block is not a certificate",
+			opts:    stubOptions{caBody: "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\nAAAA\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n", caBodySet: true},
+			config:  func(t *testing.T, addr string) string { return authlessConfig(t, addr) },
+			wantErr: `not a CERTIFICATE`,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "PEM certificate is corrupt",
+			opts:    stubOptions{caBody: "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nAAAA\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n", caBodySet: true},
+			config:  func(t *testing.T, addr string) string { return authlessConfig(t, addr) },
+			wantErr: "parse certificate 1",
+		},
+		{
+			name: "missing config file",
+			config: func(t *testing.T, _ string) string {
+				return filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "nope.yaml")
+			},
+			wantErr: "open config",
+		},
+		{
+			name: "config without addr",
+			config: func(t *testing.T, _ string) string {
+				return writeConfig(t, "vault:\n  mount_point: pki_int\n")
+			},
+			wantErr: "vault.addr is required",
+		},
+		{
+			name: "no mount anywhere",
+			config: func(t *testing.T, addr string) string {
+				return writeConfig(t, "vault:\n  addr: "+addr+"\n")
+			},
+			wantErr: "vault.mount_point is required",
+		},
+		{
+			name: "vault is unreachable",
+			config: func(t *testing.T, _ string) string {
+				return authlessConfig(t, "https://127.0.0.1:1", "  timeout: 200ms\n")
+			},
+			wantErr: "GET pki_int/ca_chain",
+		},
+		{
+			name: "ca takes no positional arguments",
+			config: func(t *testing.T, addr string) string {
+				return authlessConfig(t, addr)
+			},
+			args:    func(cfg string) []string { return []string{"ca", "extra", "--config", cfg} },
+			wantErr: "unknown command",
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range tests {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			srv, _ := newVaultStub(t, tc.opts)
+			cfg := tc.config(t, srv.URL)
+			args := []string{"ca", "--config", cfg}
+			if tc.args != nil {
+				args = tc.args(cfg)
+			}
+
+			var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
+			code := run(args, &stdout, &stderr)
+
+			if code == 0 {
+				t.Fatalf("exit code = 0, want non-zero (stdout %q)", stdout.String())
+			}
+			// A half-written PEM would be spliced into the catalog.
+			if stdout.Len() != 0 {
+				t.Errorf("stdout must stay empty on failure, got %q", stdout.String())
+			}
+			if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), tc.wantErr) {
+				t.Errorf("stderr = %q, want it to mention %q", stderr.String(), tc.wantErr)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

internal/config/config.go

@@ -85,6 +85,31 @@ func (v VaultConfig) RequestTimeout() (time.Duration, error) {
 
 // Load reads, parses, defaults and validates the config file at path.
 func Load(path string) (*Config, error) {
+	cfg, err := parse(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if err := cfg.Vault.Validate(); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid config %q: %w", path, err)
+	}
+	return cfg, nil
+}
+
+// LoadCA reads the config for the CA chain path. That endpoint is public, so
+// only vault.addr is required: a config carrying no auth method, no role and no
+// credentials still loads.
+func LoadCA(path string) (*Config, error) {
+	cfg, err := parse(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if err := cfg.Vault.ValidateCA(); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid config %q: %w", path, err)
+	}
+	return cfg, nil
+}
+
+func parse(path string) (*Config, error) {
 	f, err := os.Open(path)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("open config %q: %w", path, err)
@@ -102,13 +127,21 @@ func Load(path string) (*Config, error) {
 	if cfg.Vault.JWTPath == "" {
 		cfg.Vault.JWTPath = DefaultJWTPath
 	}
-
-	if err := cfg.Vault.Validate(); err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid config %q: %w", path, err)
-	}
 	return &cfg, nil
 }
 
+// ValidateCA rejects a config that could not reach the CA chain endpoint. It
+// deliberately ignores every auth key: the endpoint is unauthenticated.
+func (v VaultConfig) ValidateCA() error {
+	if v.Addr == "" {
+		return fmt.Errorf("vault.addr is required")
+	}
+	if _, err := v.RequestTimeout(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
 // Validate rejects a config that could not produce a certificate, naming the
 // key at fault. It never falls back from one auth method to another.
 func (v VaultConfig) Validate() error {

internal/config/config_test.go

@@ -125,3 +125,63 @@ func TestDefaultPath(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("DefaultPath() = %q, want the Puppet-managed path", got)
 	}
 }
+
+// The CA chain endpoint is unauthenticated, so a config with nothing but addr
+// and mount_point has to load.
+func TestLoadCAWithoutCredentials(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg, err := LoadCA(writeConfig(t, "vault:\n  addr: https://vault.service.consul:8200\n  mount_point: pki_int\n"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("LoadCA: %v", err)
+	}
+	if cfg.Vault.Addr != "https://vault.service.consul:8200" {
+		t.Errorf("addr = %q", cfg.Vault.Addr)
+	}
+	if cfg.Vault.MountPoint != "pki_int" {
+		t.Errorf("mount_point = %q", cfg.Vault.MountPoint)
+	}
+	if cfg.Vault.RoleID != "" || cfg.Vault.RoleName != "" {
+		t.Errorf("LoadCA invented credentials: %+v", cfg.Vault)
+	}
+}
+
+// Load, by contrast, still demands everything issuance needs.
+func TestLoadRejectsWhatLoadCAAccepts(t *testing.T) {
+	path := writeConfig(t, "vault:\n  addr: https://vault.service.consul:8200\n  mount_point: pki_int\n")
+	if _, err := Load(path); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("Load accepted a config with no role_name or credentials")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoadCAErrors(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name    string
+		body    string
+		wantErr string
+	}{
+		{"no addr", "vault:\n  mount_point: pki_int\n", "vault.addr is required"},
+		{"bad timeout", "vault:\n  addr: https://v:8200\n  timeout: soon\n", "not a valid duration"},
+		{"negative timeout", "vault:\n  addr: https://v:8200\n  timeout: -5s\n", "must be positive"},
+	}
+	for _, tc := range tests {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			_, err := LoadCA(writeConfig(t, tc.body))
+			if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tc.wantErr) {
+				t.Errorf("error = %v, want it to mention %q", err, tc.wantErr)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoadCAMissingFile(t *testing.T) {
+	_, err := LoadCA(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "absent.yaml"))
+	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "open config") {
+		t.Errorf("error = %v, want an open failure", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// An unknown auth_method is fatal for issuance but irrelevant to the CA path.
+func TestLoadCAIgnoresAuthMethod(t *testing.T) {
+	if _, err := LoadCA(writeConfig(t, "vault:\n  addr: https://v:8200\n  auth_method: ldap\n  mount_point: pki_int\n")); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("LoadCA: %v", err)
+	}
+}

internal/pki/pki.go

@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 package pki
 
 import (
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"encoding/pem"
 	"fmt"
 	"strings"
 
@@ -10,10 +12,9 @@ import (
 // CertificateResponse is the JSON document printed with --json and consumed by
 // parsejson() in profiles::pki::vault. Field order fixes the key order.
 type CertificateResponse struct {
-	Certificate   string `json:"certificate"`
+	Certificate string `json:"certificate"`
-	PrivateKey    string `json:"private_key"`
+	PrivateKey  string `json:"private_key"`
-	FullChain     string `json:"full_chain"`
+	FullChain   string `json:"full_chain"`
-	CACertificate string `json:"ca_certificate"`
 }
 
 type issueRequest struct {
@@ -48,10 +49,58 @@ func IssueCert(client *vault.Client, mountPoint, roleName, commonName string, al
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("vault returned no certificate data for %q", commonName)
 	}
 
+	// Leaf first: every TLS server that reads full_chain.crt expects the end
+	// entity certificate ahead of the issuers.
 	return &CertificateResponse{
-		Certificate:   resp.Data.Certificate,
+		Certificate: resp.Data.Certificate,
-		PrivateKey:    resp.Data.PrivateKey,
+		PrivateKey:  resp.Data.PrivateKey,
-		FullChain:     resp.Data.IssuingCA + "\n" + resp.Data.Certificate,
+		FullChain:   resp.Data.Certificate + "\n" + resp.Data.IssuingCA,
-		CACertificate: resp.Data.IssuingCA,
 	}, nil
 }
+
+// FetchCAChain returns the mount's CA chain as PEM. /ca_chain is public and
+// estate-wide: it needs no token, no role and no per-node context, which is why
+// it is fetched here rather than derived from an issue response. It carries the
+// root as well as the intermediate, so the result stands alone as a CAfile for
+// path builders that insist on a self-signed anchor.
+func FetchCAChain(client *vault.Client, mountPoint string) (string, error) {
+	path := fmt.Sprintf("%s/ca_chain", mountPoint)
+	body, err := client.Get(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+
+	// The endpoint advertises application/pkix-cert while serving PEM, so the
+	// body is parsed rather than sniffed.
+	chain := strings.TrimSpace(string(body))
+	if chain == "" {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("GET %s: vault returned an empty CA chain", path)
+	}
+	n, err := countCertificates(chain)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("GET %s: %w", path, err)
+	}
+	if n == 0 {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("GET %s: response is not a PEM certificate chain", path)
+	}
+	return chain + "\n", nil
+}
+
+func countCertificates(chain string) (int, error) {
+	rest := []byte(chain)
+	count := 0
+	for {
+		var block *pem.Block
+		block, rest = pem.Decode(rest)
+		if block == nil {
+			return count, nil
+		}
+		if block.Type != "CERTIFICATE" {
+			return 0, fmt.Errorf("PEM block %d is a %q, not a CERTIFICATE", count+1, block.Type)
+		}
+		if _, err := x509.ParseCertificate(block.Bytes); err != nil {
+			return 0, fmt.Errorf("parse certificate %d: %w", count+1, err)
+		}
+		count++
+	}
+}

internal/pki/pki_test.go

@@ -1,13 +1,22 @@
 package pki_test
 
 import (
+	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/elliptic"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"crypto/x509/pkix"
 	"encoding/json"
+	"encoding/pem"
 	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"math/big"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
 	"reflect"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
+	"time"
 
 	"git.unkin.net/unkin/certmanager/internal/config"
 	"git.unkin.net/unkin/certmanager/internal/pki"
@@ -68,14 +77,17 @@ func TestIssueCert(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 	want := &pki.CertificateResponse{
-		Certificate:   "CERT",
+		Certificate: "CERT",
-		PrivateKey:    "KEY",
+		PrivateKey:  "KEY",
-		FullChain:     "CA\nCERT",
+		FullChain:   "CERT\nCA",
-		CACertificate: "CA",
 	}
 	if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
 		t.Errorf("IssueCert = %+v, want %+v", got, want)
 	}
+	// Leaf first: asserted as an order, not as membership.
+	if got.FullChain != got.Certificate+"\n"+"CA" {
+		t.Errorf("full_chain = %q, want the leaf ahead of the issuing CA", got.FullChain)
+	}
 }
 
 func TestIssueCertSendsEmptySANFields(t *testing.T) {
@@ -124,16 +136,163 @@ func TestIssueCertEmptyPayload(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestCertificateResponseJSONKeyOrder(t *testing.T) {
 	b, err := json.Marshal(&pki.CertificateResponse{
-		Certificate:   "CERT",
+		Certificate: "CERT",
-		PrivateKey:    "KEY",
+		PrivateKey:  "KEY",
-		FullChain:     "CA\nCERT",
+		FullChain:   "CERT\nCA",
-		CACertificate: "CA",
 	})
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("Marshal: %v", err)
 	}
-	want := `{"certificate":"CERT","private_key":"KEY","full_chain":"CA\nCERT","ca_certificate":"CA"}`
+	want := `{"certificate":"CERT","private_key":"KEY","full_chain":"CERT\nCA"}`
 	if string(b) != want {
 		t.Errorf("JSON = %s, want %s", b, want)
 	}
 }
+
+// newCAServer serves the CA chain endpoint and records what the client sent.
+func newCAServer(t *testing.T, h http.HandlerFunc) (*vault.Client, *caCapture) {
+	t.Helper()
+	got := &caCapture{}
+	srv := httptest.NewTLSServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		got.method = r.Method
+		got.path = r.URL.Path
+		_, got.tokenSet = r.Header["X-Vault-Token"]
+		if strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/login") {
+			got.loggedIn = true
+		}
+		h(w, r)
+	}))
+	t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
+
+	c, err := vault.NewUnauthenticated(config.VaultConfig{Addr: srv.URL})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("vault.NewUnauthenticated: %v", err)
+	}
+	return c, got
+}
+
+type caCapture struct {
+	method   string
+	path     string
+	tokenSet bool
+	loggedIn bool
+}
+
+func testChainPEM(t *testing.T) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	return testCertPEM(t, "intermediate") + testCertPEM(t, "root")
+}
+
+func testCertPEM(t *testing.T, cn string) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("generate key: %v", err)
+	}
+	tmpl := &x509.Certificate{
+		SerialNumber:          big.NewInt(time.Now().UnixNano()),
+		Subject:               pkix.Name{CommonName: cn},
+		NotBefore:             time.Now().Add(-time.Hour),
+		NotAfter:              time.Now().Add(time.Hour),
+		IsCA:                  true,
+		BasicConstraintsValid: true,
+		KeyUsage:              x509.KeyUsageCertSign,
+	}
+	der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, tmpl, tmpl, &key.PublicKey, key)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("create certificate: %v", err)
+	}
+	return string(pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: der}))
+}
+
+func TestFetchCAChain(t *testing.T) {
+	chain := testChainPEM(t)
+	c, got := newCAServer(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		// Vault labels the PEM body application/pkix-cert.
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/pkix-cert")
+		_, _ = io.WriteString(w, chain)
+	})
+
+	out, err := pki.FetchCAChain(c, "pki_int")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("FetchCAChain: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if got.method != http.MethodGet {
+		t.Errorf("method = %q, want GET", got.method)
+	}
+	if got.path != "/v1/pki_int/ca_chain" {
+		t.Errorf("path = %q", got.path)
+	}
+	if got.tokenSet {
+		t.Error("X-Vault-Token must not be sent to the CA chain endpoint")
+	}
+	if got.loggedIn {
+		t.Error("the CA chain path must not authenticate")
+	}
+	if out != strings.TrimSpace(chain)+"\n" {
+		t.Errorf("chain = %q, want %q", out, chain)
+	}
+	if n := strings.Count(out, "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----"); n != 2 {
+		t.Errorf("chain carries %d certificates, want 2", n)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestFetchCAChainFailures(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name    string
+		handler http.HandlerFunc
+		wantErr string
+	}{
+		{
+			name: "non-200",
+			handler: func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+				w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)
+				_, _ = io.WriteString(w, `{"errors":["permission denied"]}`)
+			},
+			wantErr: "vault returned 403",
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "empty body",
+			handler: func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {},
+			wantErr: "empty CA chain",
+		},
+		{
+			name: "not PEM",
+			handler: func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+				_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "definitely not a certificate")
+			},
+			wantErr: "not a PEM certificate chain",
+		},
+		{
+			name: "wrong PEM type",
+			handler: func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+				_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\nAAAA\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n")
+			},
+			wantErr: "not a CERTIFICATE",
+		},
+		{
+			name: "corrupt certificate",
+			handler: func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+				_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nAAAA\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n")
+			},
+			wantErr: "parse certificate 1",
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range tests {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			c, _ := newCAServer(t, tc.handler)
+			out, err := pki.FetchCAChain(c, "pki_int")
+			if err == nil {
+				t.Fatalf("FetchCAChain succeeded, want an error (got %q)", out)
+			}
+			if out != "" {
+				t.Errorf("a failing FetchCAChain must return no chain, got %q", out)
+			}
+			if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tc.wantErr) {
+				t.Errorf("error = %v, want it to mention %q", err, tc.wantErr)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

internal/vault/client.go

@@ -17,6 +17,9 @@ import (
 // maxErrorBody caps how much of a Vault error response is quoted back.
 const maxErrorBody = 2048
 
+// maxBody caps a GET response; the CA chain is a handful of kilobytes.
+const maxBody = 1 << 20
+
 // Client is an authenticated Vault HTTP client.
 type Client struct {
 	addr  string
@@ -28,22 +31,11 @@ type Client struct {
 // Client. An unknown method, or a failure of the selected method, is an error:
 // there is no fallback between methods.
 func New(cfg config.VaultConfig) (*Client, error) {
-	timeout, err := cfg.RequestTimeout()
+	c, err := newClient(cfg)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 
-	transport := &http.Transport{
-		TLSClientConfig:       &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: cfg.SkipTLSVerify()}, //nolint:gosec // defaults to the Python script's verify=False; flip vault.tls_skip_verify to enable
-		TLSHandshakeTimeout:   timeout,
-		ResponseHeaderTimeout: timeout,
-	}
-
-	c := &Client{
-		addr: strings.TrimRight(cfg.Addr, "/"),
-		http: &http.Client{Transport: transport, Timeout: timeout},
-	}
-
 	switch cfg.AuthMethod {
 	case config.AuthMethodAppRole:
 		err = c.loginAppRole(cfg)
@@ -59,6 +51,31 @@ func New(cfg config.VaultConfig) (*Client, error) {
 	return c, nil
 }
 
+// NewUnauthenticated returns a Client that performs no login and holds no
+// token. The PKI CA endpoints are public, so the CA chain is reachable from a
+// config that carries no credentials at all.
+func NewUnauthenticated(cfg config.VaultConfig) (*Client, error) {
+	return newClient(cfg)
+}
+
+func newClient(cfg config.VaultConfig) (*Client, error) {
+	timeout, err := cfg.RequestTimeout()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	transport := &http.Transport{
+		TLSClientConfig:       &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: cfg.SkipTLSVerify()}, //nolint:gosec // defaults to the Python script's verify=False; flip vault.tls_skip_verify to enable
+		TLSHandshakeTimeout:   timeout,
+		ResponseHeaderTimeout: timeout,
+	}
+
+	return &Client{
+		addr: strings.TrimRight(cfg.Addr, "/"),
+		http: &http.Client{Transport: transport, Timeout: timeout},
+	}, nil
+}
+
 func (c *Client) loginAppRole(cfg config.VaultConfig) error {
 	// The Vault role sets bind_secret_id: false, so role_id alone logs in.
 	payload := map[string]string{"role_id": cfg.RoleID}
@@ -105,6 +122,36 @@ func (c *Client) fetchToken(authPath string, payload any) (string, error) {
 	return result.Auth.ClientToken, nil
 }
 
+// Get sends a GET to a Vault path and returns the raw body undecoded. The
+// X-Vault-Token header is omitted entirely when the client holds no token.
+func (c *Client) Get(path string) ([]byte, error) {
+	url := fmt.Sprintf("%s/v1/%s", c.addr, path)
+	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(context.Background(), http.MethodGet, url, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if c.token != "" {
+		req.Header.Set("X-Vault-Token", c.token)
+	}
+
+	resp, err := c.http.Do(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("GET %s: %w", path, err)
+	}
+	defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
+
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+		detail, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxErrorBody))
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("GET %s: vault returned %d: %s", path, resp.StatusCode, strings.TrimSpace(string(detail)))
+	}
+
+	body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxBody))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("GET %s: read response: %w", path, err)
+	}
+	return body, nil
+}
+
 // Post sends an authenticated POST to a Vault path and decodes the response.
 func (c *Client) Post(path string, payload, out any) error {
 	return c.post(path, c.token, payload, out)

internal/vault/client_test.go

@@ -259,3 +259,70 @@ func TestTLSVerificationCanBeEnabled(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatal("New succeeded against a self-signed server with verification enabled")
 	}
 }
+
+func TestNewUnauthenticatedDoesNotLogIn(t *testing.T) {
+	var paths []string
+	srv := newServer(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		paths = append(paths, r.URL.Path)
+		if _, ok := r.Header["X-Vault-Token"]; ok {
+			t.Errorf("X-Vault-Token sent to %s", r.URL.Path)
+		}
+		_, _ = fmt.Fprint(w, "PEM")
+	})
+
+	// No auth_method, no role_id, no JWT path: the CA chain endpoint is public.
+	c, err := vault.NewUnauthenticated(config.VaultConfig{Addr: srv.URL})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("NewUnauthenticated: %v", err)
+	}
+	body, err := c.Get("pki_int/ca_chain")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Get: %v", err)
+	}
+	if string(body) != "PEM" {
+		t.Errorf("body = %q", body)
+	}
+	if len(paths) != 1 || paths[0] != "/v1/pki_int/ca_chain" {
+		t.Errorf("requests = %v, want a single GET of the chain", paths)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestGetSendsTheTokenWhenAuthenticated(t *testing.T) {
+	var token string
+	srv := newServer(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		if strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/login") {
+			_, _ = fmt.Fprint(w, `{"auth":{"client_token":"s.token"}}`)
+			return
+		}
+		token = r.Header.Get("X-Vault-Token")
+		_, _ = fmt.Fprint(w, "PEM")
+	})
+
+	c, err := vault.New(baseConfig(srv.URL))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("New: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := c.Get("pki_int/ca_chain"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Get: %v", err)
+	}
+	if token != "s.token" {
+		t.Errorf("X-Vault-Token = %q", token)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestGetSurfacesTheStatusAndBody(t *testing.T) {
+	srv := newServer(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
+		_, _ = fmt.Fprint(w, `{"errors":["unsupported path"]}`)
+	})
+
+	c, err := vault.NewUnauthenticated(config.VaultConfig{Addr: srv.URL})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("NewUnauthenticated: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := c.Get("pki_int/ca_chain"); err == nil ||
+		!strings.Contains(err.Error(), "vault returned 404") ||
+		!strings.Contains(err.Error(), "unsupported path") {
+		t.Errorf("error = %v, want the status and Vault's message", err)
+	}
+}

test/integration/certmanager_test.go

@@ -19,12 +19,18 @@ import (
 	"path/filepath"
 	"slices"
 	"strings"
+	"sync"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 )
 
 const (
-	pkiMount    = "pki"
+	// Dev-mode Vault has no PKI of its own, and a single root mount would make
+	// the CA chain one self-signed certificate -- which would not exercise the
+	// intermediate + root shape production serves. So a root mount signs an
+	// intermediate, and certificates are issued from the intermediate.
+	rootMount   = "pki_root"
+	pkiMount    = "pki_int"
 	pkiRole     = "puppet"
 	approlePath = "approle"
 	approleRole = "certmanager"
@@ -123,18 +129,59 @@ func vaultReq(t *testing.T, method, path string, payload any, okErrors ...string
 	return out
 }
 
-// setupVault provisions the PKI mount, issuing role, policy and approle role,
+// setupVault provisions the mounts, issuing role, policy and approle role,
-// returning the role_id certmanager will authenticate with.
+// returning the role_id certmanager will authenticate with. Provisioning runs
+// once per process: re-signing the intermediate would add issuers and make the
+// mount's CA chain non-deterministic.
 func setupVault(t *testing.T) string {
 	t.Helper()
+	setupOnce.Do(func() { setupRoleID = provisionVault(t) })
+	if setupRoleID == "" {
+		t.Fatal("vault provisioning failed")
+	}
+	return setupRoleID
+}
 
+var (
+	setupOnce   sync.Once
+	setupRoleID string
+)
+
+func provisionVault(t *testing.T) string {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	vaultReq(t, http.MethodPost, "sys/mounts/"+rootMount,
+		map[string]any{"type": "pki", "config": map[string]any{"max_lease_ttl": "87600h"}},
+		"path is already in use")
 	vaultReq(t, http.MethodPost, "sys/mounts/"+pkiMount,
 		map[string]any{"type": "pki", "config": map[string]any{"max_lease_ttl": "87600h"}},
 		"path is already in use")
 
-	vaultReq(t, http.MethodPost, pkiMount+"/root/generate/internal", map[string]any{
+	root := vaultReq(t, http.MethodPost, rootMount+"/root/generate/internal", map[string]any{
-		"common_name": certDomain + " integration CA",
+		"common_name": certDomain + " integration root CA",
 		"ttl":         "87600h",
+		"key_type":    "rsa",
+		"key_bits":    2048,
+	})
+	rootPEM := dataString(t, root, "certificate")
+
+	csr := vaultReq(t, http.MethodPost, pkiMount+"/intermediate/generate/internal", map[string]any{
+		"common_name": certDomain + " integration intermediate CA",
+		"key_type":    "rsa",
+		"key_bits":    2048,
+	})
+
+	signed := vaultReq(t, http.MethodPost, rootMount+"/root/sign-intermediate", map[string]any{
+		"csr":         dataString(t, csr, "csr"),
+		"common_name": certDomain + " integration intermediate CA",
+		"ttl":         "43800h",
+		"format":      "pem",
+	})
+
+	// Appending the root to the signed intermediate is what makes /ca_chain
+	// serve both certificates.
+	vaultReq(t, http.MethodPost, pkiMount+"/intermediate/set-signed", map[string]any{
+		"certificate": dataString(t, signed, "certificate") + "\n" + rootPEM,
 	})
 
 	vaultReq(t, http.MethodPost, pkiMount+"/roles/"+pkiRole, map[string]any{
@@ -172,6 +219,16 @@ func setupVault(t *testing.T) string {
 	return roleID
 }
 
+func dataString(t *testing.T, resp map[string]any, key string) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	data, _ := resp["data"].(map[string]any)
+	v, _ := data[key].(string)
+	if v == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("vault returned no data.%s", key)
+	}
+	return v
+}
+
 // buildBinary compiles certmanager with the config path baked in, so the test
 // can invoke it with exactly the argv Puppet's generate() uses -- no --config.
 func buildBinary(t *testing.T, dir, configPath string) string {
@@ -263,11 +320,17 @@ func TestIssueCertificateAgainstVault(t *testing.T) {
 	if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(stdout), &doc); err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("stdout is not JSON: %v\n%s", err, stdout)
 	}
-	for _, key := range []string{"certificate", "private_key", "full_chain", "ca_certificate"} {
+	for _, key := range []string{"certificate", "private_key", "full_chain"} {
 		if doc[key] == "" {
 			t.Errorf("JSON key %q is missing or empty", key)
 		}
 	}
+	if _, ok := doc["ca_certificate"]; ok {
+		t.Error("ca_certificate must not be emitted; the CA comes from the ca subcommand")
+	}
+	if len(doc) != 3 {
+		t.Errorf("document has %d keys, want exactly 3: %v", len(doc), keysOf(doc))
+	}
 
 	cert := parseCert(t, doc["certificate"])
 	if cert.Subject.CommonName != commonName {
@@ -290,16 +353,173 @@ func TestIssueCertificateAgainstVault(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("certificate lifetime %v, want ~%dd", lifetime, expiryDays)
 	}
 
-	ca := parseCert(t, doc["ca_certificate"])
+	// full_chain is leaf first: asserted as an order, not as membership.
-	if !ca.IsCA {
+	chain := parseChain(t, doc["full_chain"])
-		t.Errorf("ca_certificate is not a CA certificate")
+	if len(chain) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("full_chain carries %d certificates, want leaf + issuing CA", len(chain))
 	}
-	if err := cert.CheckSignatureFrom(ca); err != nil {
+	if !chain[0].Equal(cert) {
-		t.Errorf("certificate is not signed by ca_certificate: %v", err)
+		t.Errorf("full_chain starts with %q, want the leaf %q", chain[0].Subject.CommonName, commonName)
 	}
-	if !strings.Contains(doc["full_chain"], strings.TrimSpace(doc["certificate"])) ||
+	if !chain[1].IsCA {
-		!strings.Contains(doc["full_chain"], strings.TrimSpace(doc["ca_certificate"])) {
+		t.Errorf("full_chain[1] (%q) is not a CA certificate", chain[1].Subject.CommonName)
-		t.Errorf("full_chain does not contain both the leaf and the issuing CA")
+	}
+	if err := chain[0].CheckSignatureFrom(chain[1]); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("full_chain is not leaf-then-issuer: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestCAChainAgainstVault is the reason the CA no longer rides along with
+// issuance: this runs with no credentials at all.
+func TestCAChainAgainstVault(t *testing.T) {
+	waitForVault(t)
+	roleID := setupVault(t)
+
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	cfg := writeConfig(t, dir, roleID)
+	bin := buildBinary(t, dir, cfg)
+
+	code, stdout, stderr := runCertmanager(t, bin, "ca")
+	if code != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("exit code %d, stderr: %s", code, stderr)
+	}
+	if stderr != "" {
+		t.Errorf("stderr must be empty on success, got %q", stderr)
+	}
+
+	// Puppet reads this through generate() too, so it must be the PEM and
+	// nothing else.
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(stdout, "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----") {
+		t.Fatalf("stdout is not a PEM document: %q", stdout)
+	}
+
+	chain := parseChain(t, stdout)
+	if len(chain) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("CA chain carries %d certificates, want intermediate + root", len(chain))
+	}
+	intermediate, root := chain[0], chain[1]
+
+	if !intermediate.IsCA || !root.IsCA {
+		t.Errorf("both chain entries must be CA certificates: %v, %v", intermediate.IsCA, root.IsCA)
+	}
+	// The root anchors the chain: self-issued and self-signed. issuing_ca alone
+	// would not be, which is what breaks strict path builders.
+	if root.Subject.String() != root.Issuer.String() {
+		t.Errorf("chain[1] subject %q != issuer %q, so it is not the root", root.Subject, root.Issuer)
+	}
+	if err := root.CheckSignatureFrom(root); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("chain[1] is not self-signed: %v", err)
+	}
+	if intermediate.Subject.String() == intermediate.Issuer.String() {
+		t.Errorf("chain[0] %q is self-issued; expected the intermediate", intermediate.Subject)
+	}
+
+	// Issue a leaf and verify it against the chain the ca subcommand returned.
+	_, issued, stderr := runCertmanager(t, bin,
+		commonName,
+		"--alt-names", shortName+","+altName,
+		"--ip-sans", ipSAN1+","+ipSAN2,
+		"--expiry-days", fmt.Sprint(expiryDays),
+		"--json",
+	)
+	var doc map[string]string
+	if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(issued), &doc); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("issue stdout is not JSON: %v (stderr %q)", err, stderr)
+	}
+	leaf := parseCert(t, doc["certificate"])
+
+	if err := leaf.CheckSignatureFrom(intermediate); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("chain[0] did not sign the issued leaf: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// The openssl verify equivalent: anchor on the root, bridge with the
+	// intermediate, both taken from the ca output alone.
+	roots := x509.NewCertPool()
+	roots.AddCert(root)
+	inters := x509.NewCertPool()
+	inters.AddCert(intermediate)
+	if _, err := leaf.Verify(x509.VerifyOptions{
+		Roots:         roots,
+		Intermediates: inters,
+		DNSName:       commonName,
+		KeyUsages:     []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageAny},
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("leaf does not validate against the ca chain: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// The CA chain endpoint is public, so a config with no auth keys must work.
+func TestCAChainNeedsNoCredentials(t *testing.T) {
+	waitForVault(t)
+	roleID := setupVault(t)
+
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	bin := buildBinary(t, dir, writeConfig(t, dir, roleID))
+
+	authless := filepath.Join(dir, "authless.yaml")
+	body := fmt.Sprintf("vault:\n  addr: %s\n  mount_point: %s\n", vaultAddr(), pkiMount)
+	if err := os.WriteFile(authless, []byte(body), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("write config: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	code, stdout, stderr := runCertmanager(t, bin, "ca", "--config", authless)
+	if code != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("exit code %d, stderr: %s", code, stderr)
+	}
+	if stderr != "" {
+		t.Errorf("stderr must be empty on success, got %q", stderr)
+	}
+	if len(parseChain(t, stdout)) != 2 {
+		t.Errorf("credential-free ca output is not the two certificate chain: %q", stdout)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCAChainFailsCleanlyForAnUnknownMount(t *testing.T) {
+	waitForVault(t)
+	roleID := setupVault(t)
+
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	bin := buildBinary(t, dir, writeConfig(t, dir, roleID))
+
+	code, stdout, stderr := runCertmanager(t, bin, "ca", "--mount", "pki_does_not_exist")
+	if code == 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected a non-zero exit, stdout: %s", stdout)
+	}
+	if stdout != "" {
+		t.Errorf("stdout must be empty on failure, got %q", stdout)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(stderr, "certmanager:") {
+		t.Errorf("stderr should carry the cause, got %q", stderr)
+	}
+}
+
+func keysOf(m map[string]string) []string {
+	out := make([]string, 0, len(m))
+	for k := range m {
+		out = append(out, k)
+	}
+	slices.Sort(out)
+	return out
+}
+
+func parseChain(t *testing.T, data string) []*x509.Certificate {
+	t.Helper()
+	var out []*x509.Certificate
+	rest := []byte(data)
+	for {
+		var block *pem.Block
+		block, rest = pem.Decode(rest)
+		if block == nil {
+			return out
+		}
+		if block.Type != "CERTIFICATE" {
+			t.Fatalf("PEM block %d is a %q", len(out)+1, block.Type)
+		}
+		cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(block.Bytes)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("parse certificate %d: %v", len(out)+1, err)
+		}
+		out = append(out, cert)
 	}
 }