The initial scaffold left three holes the review caught. CI only checked
gofmt and go vet, so golangci-lint and the pre-commit hooks were advisory
rather than enforced. The HTTP server bounded only the header read, so a
slow or stalled peer could hold a connection indefinitely. And the browser
got no content-security policy at all, leaving the SPA's same-origin
assumption unenforced.
Add golangci-lint and pre-commit hook steps to the existing pre-commit
workflow, mirroring the estate's images so the required context name stays
ci/woodpecker/pr/pre-commit.
Bound the server with ReadTimeout, WriteTimeout, and IdleTimeout, keeping
the write budget generous enough for the poster proxy's streamed responses.
Stamp Content-Security-Policy, X-Content-Type-Options, and Referrer-Policy
onto every response from a single middleware wrapping the root handler.
Assert the headers across the API, UI, assets, probes, and rejections.
Guard the CSP's no-unsafe-inline assumption with a ui test that fails if a
shipped asset grows an inline script, style block, or event handler.
Extend the make pre-commit target to match the widened CI checks.
Single Go binary serving the API and an embedded keyboard-first UI for
promoting fafflix titles into the cheeztv kids tree via hardlinks.
- internal/library: hardlink sync, idempotent re-runs, drift reporting,
strict single-path-element name validation as the traversal guard
- internal/arr: minimal sonarr/radarr v3 client with a 60s list cache and
a key-brokered poster proxy
- internal/auth: server-side Authentik group enforcement on every route
- internal/server: library JSON API, art proxy, health probes, SPA
- ui: two-tile landing page, fuzzy-filtered title list, detail panel
- Makefile, Dockerfile, .woodpecker pipelines, pre-commit config
unkin-agent