2b39450ae2
## Why All Authentik OIDC logins (ArgoCD, Grafana, Rancher, LiteLLM, NetBox) fail with `invalid_request` / "The request is otherwise malformed". Authentik 2026.5 added an explicit `grant_types` allow-list to the OAuth2 provider (model default = empty list). Our module never set it, so every provider has `grant_types = []`, and `authorize.py` rejects the authorization_code grant (`if self.grant_type not in self.provider.grant_types`) before any user auth. ## Change - modules/authentik: add a `grant_types` field to the `providers_oauth2` variable, defaulting to `["authorization_code", "refresh_token"]` (the standard confidential web-app set), and wire it into `authentik_provider_oauth2`. ## Plan `0 to add, 5 to change, 0 to destroy` — each existing oauth2 provider's `grant_types` goes `[] -> ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"]`; no other attributes change. Baseline plan (pre-change) was clean (no netbox/state drift). Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015ur3i7D2azsMAWTSVABApv
117 lines
4.6 KiB
Terraform
117 lines
4.6 KiB
Terraform
variable "groups" {
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type = map(object({
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name = string
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is_superuser = optional(bool, false)
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# PKs of existing parent groups. These must be literal group PKs, not keys
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# into this map: authentik_group cannot reference itself.
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parents = optional(list(string), null)
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attributes = optional(map(string), {})
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}))
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default = {}
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}
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# Two-tier RBAC. Permission groups (akP-*) are the atomic units mapped to app
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# roles and bound to applications for access. Role groups (akR-*) are what users
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# are assigned to; each nests permission groups via `parents`, so a member of a
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# role is an effective member of every permission it grants (Authentik membership
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# propagates child -> parent). Split into two variables/resources so roles can
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# reference permission group ids without the authentik_group self-reference error.
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# The group name is the map key (the config filename); no `name` field needed.
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variable "permission_groups" {
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type = map(object({
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# slug of the oauth2 application this permission grants *access* to; when set,
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# a policy binding is created gating that app to this group (and its children).
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application = optional(string, null)
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attributes = optional(map(string), {})
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}))
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default = {}
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}
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variable "role_groups" {
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type = map(object({
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# keys into var.permission_groups that this role nests (becomes its parents).
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permissions = optional(list(string), [])
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is_superuser = optional(bool, false)
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attributes = optional(map(string), {})
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}))
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default = {}
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}
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variable "providers_saml" {
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type = map(object({
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name = string
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authorization_flow = string
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invalidation_flow = string
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acs_url = string
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sp_binding = optional(string, "redirect")
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audience = optional(string, "")
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name_id_mapping = optional(string, null)
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signing_kp = optional(string, null)
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}))
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default = {}
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}
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variable "providers_oauth2" {
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type = map(object({
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name = string
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authorization_flow = string # flow slug, resolved to id via data.authentik_flow
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invalidation_flow = string # flow slug, resolved to id via data.authentik_flow
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client_type = optional(string, "confidential")
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client_id = string
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# client_secret is never committed. Point at a Vault kv-v2 secret whose
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# `client_secret` key holds the value (seeded out of band); TF reads it.
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client_secret_vault = optional(object({
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mount = string
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path = string
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}), null)
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# Managed identifiers of scope property mappings (e.g.
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# goauthentik.io/providers/oauth2/scope-openid). Resolved to ids.
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scope_mappings = optional(list(string), [])
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# OAuth2 grant types the provider permits. Authentik 2026.5 added this as an
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# explicit allow-list on the provider (models default = empty); an empty list
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# rejects every authorize request with "invalid_request / The request is
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# otherwise malformed". Default to the standard confidential web-app set so
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# authorization_code (login) and refresh_token (offline access) work.
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grant_types = optional(list(string), ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"])
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# allowed_redirect_uris is list(map(string)); the API always stores a
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# redirect_uri_type key, so it must be set here or every plan drifts.
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redirect_uris = optional(list(object({
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matching_mode = optional(string, "strict")
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url = string
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redirect_uri_type = optional(string, "authorization")
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})), [])
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signing_key = optional(string, null)
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access_token_validity = optional(string, "minutes=10")
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# Optional app-role claim computed from (hierarchical) group membership: emit
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# `claim` = the first matching rule's role, else `default`. The app requests
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# `claim` as a scope and reads it (e.g. LiteLLM GENERIC_USER_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE).
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# rules are evaluated in order, so list highest privilege first.
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role_mappings = optional(object({
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claim = string
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default = string
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rules = list(object({
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group = string # permission group name (akP-*)
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role = string # app role value
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}))
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}), null)
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}))
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default = {}
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}
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variable "providers_ldap" {
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type = map(object({
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name = string
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bind_flow = string
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unbind_flow = string
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base_dn = string
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certificate = optional(string, null)
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tls_server_name = optional(string, null)
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uid_start_number = optional(number, 2000)
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gid_start_number = optional(number, 4000)
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search_mode = optional(string, "direct")
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bind_mode = optional(string, "direct")
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mfa_support = optional(bool, true)
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}))
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default = {}
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}
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