## Why
teabot's implementer and reviewer bot users should mint **ephemeral, scoped Gitea tokens** on demand rather than holding standing personal access tokens — Gitea tokens never expire on their own, so a leak lasts until someone notices. This registers and mounts the new `vault-plugin-secrets-gitea` engine (released v0.1.0) and declares its roles, mirroring the rancher engine wiring.
## Change
- Register the plugin in the catalog (`config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-gitea.yaml`), pinned to the released v0.1.0 binary `sha256 8f67fbc216effada5fd7399888a710b62fad83be0b31761a439e7dec3d56509b` (sha256 of `/opt/openbao-plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-gitea` from the released `openbao-plugin-secrets-gitea-0.1.0` RPM).
- Add `gitea_secret_backend` + `gitea_secret_backend_role` modules and wire them through `config.hcl`, `environments/au/syd1/terragrunt.hcl`, and `modules/vault_cluster` variables/main, using the `giteavaultsecret` provider from the `terraform-unkin` registry (v0.1.0).
- Mount the engine at `gitea/` against `https://git.unkin.net`; seeded site-admin credentials are read from KV (`service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/gitea/config`, keys `admin_username`/`admin_password`) — not stored in git.
- **The seed is consumed create-only**: `lifecycle ignore_changes` on `admin_username`/`admin_password` means the engine reads the KV seed only when first creating `gitea/config`. After `rotate-root` diverges the live password from the seed, a later apply never pushes the stale seed back.
- Add roles with conservative, minimal scopes (write: implies read:):
- `teabot-implementer` — `write:repository`, `write:issue` (clone/push, open PRs, comment).
- `teabot-reviewer` — `read:repository`, `write:issue` (read diffs, post PR reviews/comments).
- TTLs: `ttl` 1h / `max_ttl` 4h on both roles.
## The site-admin bot + KV seed are now provisioned by Terraform (no manual gap)
Per Ben's review, creating the site-admin bot and seeding its credential is no longer a manual step:
- **terraform-git #46** creates the `gitea-vault-admin` site-admin bot and writes its generated password **once** to `kv/service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/gitea/config` (create-only KV write; never updated).
- **terraform-vault #102** grants terraform-git write access to that KV path.
## Ordering (merge + apply)
1. **puppet-prod #498** — installs the plugin binary on the vault nodes (Puppet must run).
2. **terraform-vault #100** (`benvin/gitea-deployer-access`) — deployer access to the gitea mount.
3. **terraform-vault #102** (`benvin/gitea-kv-writer`) — terraform-git KV write grant.
4. **terraform-git #46** (`benvin/gitea-vault-admin`) — creates the bot + seeds KV.
5. **This PR** — mounts the engine (reads the seed) and declares roles.
Files here are disjoint from #100 and #102 (no conflict).
**CI note:** the plan for this PR may hard-fail in CI if the plugin isn't yet registered/installed or the KV seed isn't present in the plan's target. If CI plan fails for that ordering reason, that is expected — do not force; apply only once steps 1–4 are live.
## Remaining manual step (one, ordered)
After this PR's first apply, run `vault write -f gitea/config/rotate-root` so the standing seed password is replaced by one only Vault holds. (On future binary upgrades, bump the RPM version in puppet-prod and the catalog `sha256` here together, then `vault write sys/plugins/reload/backend plugin=vault-plugin-secrets-gitea`.)
https://claude.ai/code/session_015ur3i7D2azsMAWTSVABApv
Reviewed-on: #101
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
terraform-git's apply (pipeline 108) still fails: pipeline 107 actually wrote the seed but the post-create metadata read 403'd, so terraform tainted the resource — recovery is replace (delete+create), and delete was deliberately not granted. Withholding delete doesn't provide the write-once property anyway (that's lifecycle ignore_changes in terraform-git); it just breaks taint recovery and destroy.
- add delete on the kv data path for the gitea config seed
- add delete on the matching kv metadata path (full destroy support)
After merge+apply, restart the terraform-git apply once more — it will replace the tainted seed and go green, unblocking #101.
Reviewed-on: #104
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
terraform-git's main apply still fails after the skip_child_token fix (tfgit #48): the vault_kv_secret_v2 seed resource reads the kv-v2 metadata path during plan/apply, and the grant added in #102 covered kv/data only — Vault returns 403 on GET kv/metadata/.../secret_backend/gitea/config (terraform-git pipeline 107). This is the last blocker before the KV seed lands and terraform-vault #101 can apply.
- add read on kv/metadata/service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/gitea/config to the terraform-git seed policy
Reviewed-on: #103
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
## Why
terraform-git now provisions the `gitea-vault-admin` site-admin bot and writes its generated password to `kv/service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/gitea/config` (as `admin_username` + `admin_password`) so the gitea secrets engine can consume it at creation time. The `woodpecker_terraform_git` / `terraform_git` identity has no write access to that KV path, so its apply would 403 without this grant.
The deployer that *reads* the seed already has read access via `policies/kv/service/vault/secret_backends_read.yaml` (`kv/data/service/vault/+/+/secret_backend/*`), so only the write side is added here.
## Change
- Add `policies/kv/service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/gitea/config_write.yaml` granting `create`/`read`/`update` on the gitea config KV path to the `terraform_git` approle and `woodpecker_terraform_git` k8s role.
## Ordering
Merge + apply this before the terraform-git `benvin/gitea-vault-admin` PR applies (which performs the write). Files are disjoint from the other gitea terraform-vault PRs (#100, #101).
https://claude.ai/code/session_015ur3i7D2azsMAWTSVABApv
Reviewed-on: #102
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
## Why
The forthcoming `gitea_secret_backend` + role configuration (separate PR, `benvin/gitea-secret-engine`) is applied by terraform-vault under the deployment identity (`tf_vault` approle / `woodpecker_terraform_vault` k8s role). That identity has no access to the `gitea/` mount yet, so writing the engine's config and roles would 403. This mirrors `policies/rancher/admin.yaml`.
## Change
- Add `policies/gitea/admin.yaml` granting the deployer:
- create/read/update/delete on `gitea/config`
- create/update on `gitea/config/rotate-root` (write-only rotation trigger)
- full manage + list on `gitea/roles/*` (and list on `gitea/roles`)
- Deliberately excludes `gitea/creds/*` — minting tokens is for consumers, not the deployer.
- No new catalog or mount grant: plugin registration is already covered by the shared, sudo-protected wildcard in `policies/sys/plugins/catalog/admin.yaml`, and mounting uses the deployer's existing `sys/mounts/*` access — same as the rancher engine.
## Order
Merge and apply this **before** the `benvin/gitea-secret-engine` PR, so the deployer can write the engine config/roles on that apply.
https://claude.ai/code/session_015ur3i7D2azsMAWTSVABApv
Reviewed-on: #100
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
## Why
CI installs vault by shelling out to `dnf install vault -y`. That reads
metadata for every enabled repo (appstream/baseos/crb/epel/ha) and downloads
the 169MB vendored vault RPM from the `unkin` repo on **every** plan/apply run
(~39s per job measured in `almalinux9-opentofu:20260606`).
## Change
- Replace `dnf install vault -y` with a pinned `curl` of the upstream vault zip
from the artifactapi `hashicorp-releases` remote proxy, extracted with the
image's `python3` (`python3 -m zipfile`) to `/usr/local/bin/vault`.
- Pin the version via a new `VAULT_VERSION` env var (`1.20.0`); bump the var to
upgrade.
## Speedup
Measured in `git.unkin.net/unkin/almalinux9-opentofu:20260606`:
| approach | time |
|---|---|
| `dnf install vault -y` (current) | ~39s |
| `dnf --disablerepo='*' --enablerepo=unkin` (still pulls 169MB RPM) | ~9s |
| curl zip from artifactapi + python extract (this PR) | ~6.6s |
~32s saved per plan/apply job. The zip is cached by artifactapi after first
fetch (warm ~3s).
## Caveats
- Assumes the `almalinux9-opentofu` image ships `curl` + `python3` (both
present in `:20260606`).
- Relies on the existing artifactapi `hashicorp-releases` generic remote whose
patterns already allow `vault/.*vault_.*_linux_amd64.zip`.
---------
Co-authored-by: benvin <neotheo@gmail.com>
Reviewed-on: #99
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
The new **terragrunt-enc** repo manages all encapi ENC data (statuses, roles, node classifications) via Terraform/Terragrunt and needs its own Vault/Consul plumbing, mirroring terraform-git and terraform-incus. This supersedes the dual-write approach in terraform-incus PR #39; the equivalent terraform-incus grant (PR #97) is being closed, so the encapi-token grant is created fresh here for the new approle.
Changes:
- Add approle role `terraform_enc` and k8s auth role `woodpecker_terraform_enc` (bound to the `terraform-enc` ServiceAccount in the `woodpecker` namespace) for CI auth.
- Add consul secret backend role `terraform-enc` plus its ACL rules granting `write` on `infra/terraform/enc/` (its terragrunt state prefix), and a policy letting both auth roles read `consul_root/au/syd1/creds/terraform-enc`.
- Grant both auth roles read on `kv/data/kubernetes/namespace/encapi/default/environment` (the ENCAPI_WRITE_TOKEN) so `make apply` can write to encapi via the encapi provider.
Reviewed-on: #98
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
## Why
v0.1.0 of the rancher plugin minted non-functional tokens — it returned `status.value` (the secret fragment) instead of `status.bearerToken` (`ext/<name>:<secret>`), so every cred and every root rotation 401'd against Rancher. Fixed in plugin v0.1.1 (PR #2, released).
## Changes
- `config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-rancher.yaml` sha256 → v0.1.1 binary `9e597cd9…d5955` (verified against both v0.1.1 RPMs). Re-registers the catalog entry so OpenBao launches the fixed binary.
## Deploy coordination
1. Puppet installs the v0.1.1 RPM on the vault nodes (separate puppet-prod PR).
2. Merge this → apply re-registers the catalog with the new sha.
3. `vault plugin reload -plugin=vault-plugin-secrets-rancher` so the running plugin swaps to v0.1.1 (its sha must match this catalog entry).
---------
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <neotheo@gmail.com>
Reviewed-on: #96
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
## Why
Deploy the new Rancher token secrets engine into the cluster (the last of the 4 wiring PRs), mirroring the litellm/gpg pattern. Users can then `vault read rancher/creds/<role>` for short-lived, cluster-scoped Rancher tokens, backed by a seeded admin token the engine auto-rotates before Rancher's 90-day cap.
## Changes
- Add `rancher_secret_backend` module — mount + config via the ranchervaultsecret provider (rancher_url `https://rancher.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net`).
- Add `rancher_secret_backend_service_account` module — seeds an auto-rotated token (90d TTL / 45d rotation); the seed token is read from KV, not git.
- Add `rancher_secret_backend_role` module + a `ci` role (1h/8h, cluster+TTL scoped).
- Wire `config.hcl` discovery, module variables, `main.tf` blocks, terragrunt inputs, and the `rancher` provider in `root.hcl`.
- Config: `config/rancher_secret_backend/rancher.yaml`, `.../service_account/rancher/admin.yaml`, `.../role/rancher/ci.yaml`.
## Prerequisite
Populate `kv/service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/rancher/service_account/admin` with a live Rancher admin token (keys: `token`, optional `token_name`) **before** apply, exactly as litellm's `master_key` is seeded in KV.
## Merge order
Part 4 of 4 (last). Requires: puppet install (#483) → deployer policy (#91) → plugin import (#92) → this. The `plan` needs the KV seed present, so seed KV first.
---------
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <neotheo@gmail.com>
Reviewed-on: #93
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Bring the litellm plugin under terraform management like the gpg one, using the new plugin-import module (#89).
## Why
The litellm plugin was registered **manually** before terraform owned the catalog. If we just add it to `config/plugins/`, the first apply tries to *create* a catalog entry that already exists and fails. So its state must be imported first.
## Changes
- Add `config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-litellm.yaml` (`sha256` = released **v0.1.1** openbao binary from the RPM Puppet installs).
## Manual pre-step (before apply)
Import the existing registration into state, and verify the sha matches the live catalog:
```sh
cd environments/au/syd1
# confirm the live sha first:
bao read sys/plugins/catalog/secret/vault-plugin-secrets-litellm
# import into state:
terragrunt import \
'module.plugin["vault-plugin-secrets-litellm"].vault_plugin.this' \
secret/vault-plugin-secrets-litellm
```
If the live sha differs from the yaml, update the yaml to match (or expect a benign re-register to the on-disk v0.1.1 sha). Needs the deployer's plugin-catalog access (#88, already merged).
Reviewed-on: #90
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
## Why
Register the released v0.1.0 rancher secrets plugin so the engine can be mounted. Uses the existing config/plugins discovery + plugin module (added for gpg in #89). Mirrors #90 (litellm import).
## Changes
- Add `config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-rancher.yaml` (`type: secret`, `command: vault-plugin-secrets-rancher`, `sha256` pinned to the released binary `d2b17f45…ec574a`, verified against both the vault and openbao v0.1.0 RPMs).
## Merge order
Part 2 of 4. Requires the binary on disk (puppet-prod install) and the deployer policy (#91). Merge before the backend PR.
---------
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <neotheo@gmail.com>
Reviewed-on: #92
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
## Why
Wiring the new Rancher token secrets engine into Vault. The deployer registers the plugin (sudo-protected `sys/plugins/catalog`) and configures the engine via the ranchervaultsecret provider, so it needs catalog + engine-path access. Mirrors #88 (gpg).
## Changes
- Add `policies/rancher/admin.yaml` granting the `tf_vault` approle and `woodpecker_terraform_vault` k8s role: catalog sudo on `vault-plugin-secrets-rancher`, and manage on `rancher/{config,service-accounts,roles}`.
## Merge order
Part 1 of 4. Merge before the plugin-import and backend PRs so apply doesn't 403. (Puppet install + this policy first, then import, then backend.)
---------
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <neotheo@gmail.com>
Reviewed-on: #91
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Complete the deploy of the [vault-plugin-secrets-gpg](https://git.unkin.net/unkin/vault-plugin-secrets-gpg) engine. Puppet ([puppet-prod #480](unkin/puppet-prod#480)) installs the `openbao-plugin-secrets-gpg` RPM onto the OpenBao nodes; this registers that binary in the plugin catalog and enables the secrets engine so `gpg/` is actually usable.
- Add a `gpg_secret_backend` module using the standard `hashicorp/vault` provider (already required at 5.6.0): `vault_plugin` (catalog register with a pinned sha256) + `vault_mount` (enable at the mount path).
- Wire it through `vault_cluster` (new `gpg_secret_backend` variable + module block) and the config discovery (`config.hcl` group + syd1 terragrunt input), mirroring `litellm_secret_backend`.
- Add `config/gpg_secret_backend/gpg.yaml` mounting at `gpg/` and pinning the released v0.1.0 binary sha256 (`0e92d740…a7b20`, extracted from the published RPM). Puppet installs the RPM floating, so this sha must be bumped in lockstep on any plugin upgrade or OpenBao rejects the binary.
Validated locally with `tofu validate` + `tofu fmt`. Granting non-root access to `gpg/*` (auth roles + policies) is a follow-up scoped to whoever consumes the engine (e.g. passv from CI).
Reviewed-on: #87
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
## Why
Applying the gpg mount (#87) needs two grants the deployer (`tf_vault` approle / `woodpecker_terraform_vault` k8s role) doesn't have. terraform-vault **registers the plugin itself** (`vault_plugin` → `sys/plugins/catalog`, a sudo-protected path) and **manages keys** via the gpgvaultsecret provider (`gpg/keys/*`). The deployer already has `sys/mounts/*` but neither of these, so apply would 403 on the plugin registration and on `gpg/keys` writes — the same failure mode as #84.
## Changes
- Add `policies/gpg/admin.yaml` granting:
- `create/read/update/delete/sudo` on `sys/plugins/catalog/secret/vault-plugin-secrets-gpg` — to **import** (register/deregister) the plugin.
- full management of `gpg/keys/*` (+ `gpg/keys` list) — to **manage keys**.
- assigned to `tf_vault` (approle) + `woodpecker_terraform_vault` (k8s/au/syd1), mirroring `policies/litellm/admin.yaml` (#84).
Should merge/apply **before** #87 so the deployer can register the plugin and create the `pass` key.
Reviewed-on: #88
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Split plugin catalog registration out of the per-engine backend modules into its own concern (previously bundled into #87's gpg_secret_backend).
## Changes
- New generic `plugin` module (`vault_plugin`: type/name/command/sha256/plugin_version) that imports a binary into the catalog.
- New `config/plugins/` discovery group (filename = catalog name = mount type), wired through `vault_cluster` (`plugins` variable + module) and the syd1 environment.
- `config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-gpg.yaml` pins the released v0.1.0 binary sha256 (`0e92d740…a7b20`, from the published RPM). Puppet installs the RPM floating, so bump this in lockstep on upgrade.
Any engine now registers its plugin by dropping a file in `config/plugins/`; its `*_secret_backend` module just mounts the registered type.
Needs the deployer's plugin-catalog access (#88). Merge order: **#88 → this → #87**.
Reviewed-on: #89
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
## Why
The new `terraform-rancher` repo (manages Rancher's Authentik OIDC auth via the rancher2 provider) needs Vault auth + Consul state, mirroring the terraform-authentik runner (#78/#81/#82).
## Change
- `AppRole/terraform_rancher` + k8s auth role `woodpecker_terraform_rancher` (SA terraform-rancher in the woodpecker ns).
- Consul secret-backend role + ACL policy (`resources/secret_backend/consul_root/au/syd1/terraform-rancher.hcl`) granting write to the `infra/terraform/rancher/` state prefix.
- Vault policies: read the Rancher admin API token (`kv/service/terraform/rancher`) and the keycloakoidc client secret (`kv/kubernetes/namespace/cattle-system/default/oauth-credentials`), plus the consul_root state creds.
Scoped the OAuth read to the `cattle-system` path specifically (rather than the `+` wildcard the authentik policy uses) since the Rancher runner only needs its own app's secret.
## Validation
pre-commit (terragrunt-hcl-fmt + yamllint) passed. CI plan will confirm.
Reviewed-on: #86
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
## Why
Applying the newly-merged litellm mount (#83) failed at apply time with:
```
Error: failed to write litellm config
URL: PUT https://vault.service.consul:8200/v1/litellm/config
Code: 403. * permission denied
```
The deployer identity (`tf_vault` approle / `woodpecker_terraform_vault` k8s role) can enable the mount via `sys/mounts/admin`, but no policy grants it access to the engine's own data paths, so writing the config and roles is denied.
## Changes
- Add `policies/litellm/admin.yaml` granting `create`/`read`/`update`/`delete` on `litellm/config` and `litellm/roles/*` (plus `read`/`list` on `litellm/roles`), assigned to the same auth roles as the other secret-engine admin policies (`tf_vault`, `woodpecker_terraform_vault`).
## Note
The policy attaches to the deployer's auth roles, so it takes effect on the next token issuance — a re-run of the apply (fresh Vault login) will have the permission and can write `litellm/config` and the roles.
Reviewed-on: #84
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
## Why
The `vault-plugin-secrets-litellm` engine (mints LiteLLM virtual keys) is registered in Vault, but nothing in this repo declared its mount, config, or roles. This wires in the companion `litellm` provider (`git.unkin.net/unkin/litellmvaultsecret`) so the mount is managed as code alongside the other secret backends.
## Changes
- Add `litellm_secret_backend` module that mounts the engine and writes its config (`base_url`, `request_timeout_seconds`); reads the sensitive `master_key` from KV at `kv/service/vault/<country>/<region>/secret_backend/<path>`, matching the consul/kubernetes backend convention.
- Add `litellm_secret_backend_role` module that manages roles (`models`, `max_budget`, `key_alias_prefix`, `ttl`/`max_ttl` in seconds, `metadata`).
- Register both modules in `vault_cluster` `main.tf` and add typed variables in `variables.tf`.
- Discover `litellm_secret_backend[_role]` YAML in `config.hcl` and pass the maps through the terragrunt inputs.
- Declare the `litellm` provider (pinned `0.1.0`) and a `provider "litellm"` block in the generated root `backend.tf`.
- Add example config for the `litellm` mount and a sample `team-a` role.
## Notes
- Requires the `master_key` KV secret to exist at `kv/service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/litellm` before apply (the module reads it, does not create it).
- Assumes provider `git.unkin.net/unkin/litellmvaultsecret` `0.1.0` is published to the artifactapi `terraform-unkin` registry.
Reviewed-on: #83
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
## Why
terraform-authentik's provider needs an Authentik API token (`TF_VAR_authentik_token`), now sourced from Vault at `kv/service/terraform/authentik` (Makefile wiring in terraform-authentik #2). The CI role needs read access to that path.
## Change
Extend `policies/kv/service/terraform/authentik.yaml` to also grant read on `kv/data/service/terraform/authentik` for the `terraform_authentik` approle + `woodpecker_terraform_authentik` k8s role.
Reviewed-on: #82
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
## Why
terraform-authentik now reads OAuth2 client secrets from Vault (`data.vault_kv_secret_v2`) rather than committing them (terraform-authentik #2). But the `terraform_authentik` approle / `woodpecker_terraform_authentik` k8s role only had the consul-creds policy, so `plan` fails with permission denied on the grafana oauth path.
## Change
Add `policies/kv/service/terraform/authentik.yaml` granting read on `kv/data/kubernetes/namespace/+/default/oauth-credentials` for both the approle and the woodpecker k8s role.
Reviewed-on: #81
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Add Kubernetes auth roles, AppRole configs, Consul secret backend roles, Consul ACL policies, and Vault kv read policies for terraform-sonarr, terraform-radarr, and terraform-prowlarr.
Reviewed-on: #79
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
## Summary
- K8s auth role for Woodpecker CI (`terraform-authentik` SA in `woodpecker` namespace)
- AppRole for local terraform runs
- Consul secret backend role (`terraform-authentik`, TTL 120/300)
- Consul ACL policy for `infra/terraform/authentik/` key prefix
- Vault policy granting both auth methods access to Consul creds
Reviewed-on: #78
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
enable the terraform-artifactapi system to manage its state in consul
using dynamic credentials from kubernetes ci jobs in woodpecker
---------
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Reviewed-on: #77
## Summary
- Add read policy for kv/data/service/gitea/webhook/* path
- Assigned to terraform_git approle and woodpecker_terraform_git k8s auth role
- Webhook URLs are stored in Vault KV and read at plan/apply time
## Test plan
- [ ] Verify terragrunt plan succeeds for terraform-git after merge
Reviewed-on: #75
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
- add approle for terraform-git
- add policy to read gitadmin token
- update access to the terraform-git consul token
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Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Reviewed-on: #74
## Summary
- Add K8s auth role woodpecker_terraform_git for CI pipeline authentication
- Add consul secret backend role terraform-git for consul state storage tokens
- Add consul ACL policy granting write access to infra/terraform/git/ key prefix
- Add vault policy for reading consul creds at consul_root/au/syd1/creds/terraform-git
## Test plan
- [ ] Verify terragrunt plan succeeds
- [ ] Verify consul ACL policy is created correctly
- [ ] Verify K8s auth role can authenticate from woodpecker namespace
Reviewed-on: #73
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
unkinben
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