diff --git a/.pre-commit-config.yaml b/.pre-commit-config.yaml index 646cd65..03a38a4 100644 --- a/.pre-commit-config.yaml +++ b/.pre-commit-config.yaml @@ -22,3 +22,12 @@ repos: "-d {extends: relaxed, rules: {line-length: disable}, ignore: chart}", "-s", ] + - repo: local + hooks: + - id: vault-yaml-tests + name: vault yaml definitions pass their unit tests + entry: python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -t . + language: python + additional_dependencies: [pyyaml, pydantic] + pass_filenames: false + always_run: true diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 2aab8c3..da57e04 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -.PHONY: init plan apply format +.PHONY: init plan apply format test VAULT_AUTH_METHOD ?= approle VAULT_K8S_ROLE ?= woodpecker_terraform_vault @@ -28,6 +28,9 @@ apply: init @$(call vault_env) && \ terragrunt run --all --parallelism 2 --non-interactive apply +test: + @uv run --with pyyaml --with pydantic python -m unittest discover -s tests -t . + format: @echo "Formatting OpenTofu files..." @tofu fmt -recursive . diff --git a/policies/gpg/admin.yaml b/policies/gpg/admin.yaml index 23d7955..bc962dd 100644 --- a/policies/gpg/admin.yaml +++ b/policies/gpg/admin.yaml @@ -1,20 +1,8 @@ -# Allow the vault deployer to import the gpg plugin and manage its OpenPGP keys. -# -# terraform-vault registers the plugin itself (vault_plugin -> sys/plugins/catalog, -# a sudo-protected path) and manages keys via the gpgvaultsecret provider, so the -# deployer needs catalog access on top of the mount access it already has -# (sys/mounts/*). Without this, apply 403s on the plugin registration and on -# gpg/keys writes. +# Allow the vault deployer to manage the gpg mount's OpenPGP keys via the +# gpgvaultsecret provider. Registering the plugin itself is a sys/plugins/catalog +# grant, carried by policies/sys/plugins/catalog/admin.yaml. --- rules: - # Import / register (and deregister) the gpg plugin in the catalog. - - path: "sys/plugins/catalog/secret/vault-plugin-secrets-gpg" - capabilities: - - create - - read - - update - - delete - - sudo # Manage keys (create/rotate/config/delete) in the gpg mount. - path: "gpg/keys/*" capabilities: diff --git a/policies/identity/group-alias/admin.yaml b/policies/identity/group-alias/admin.yaml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..437c8f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/policies/identity/group-alias/admin.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +# Allow the deployer to manage the identity group aliases that map external OIDC +# group membership (the ak_groups claim) onto the Vault groups managed under +# policies/identity/group/. Both endpoints are needed: create posts to +# identity/group-alias, subsequent reads and updates address +# identity/group-alias/id/. +--- +rules: + - path: "identity/group-alias" + capabilities: + - create + - update + - path: "identity/group-alias/*" + capabilities: + - create + - update + - read + - delete + - list + +auth: + approle: + - tf_vault + k8s/au/syd1: + - woodpecker_terraform_vault diff --git a/policies/identity/group/admin.yaml b/policies/identity/group/admin.yaml index d077a51..524decf 100644 --- a/policies/identity/group/admin.yaml +++ b/policies/identity/group/admin.yaml @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -# Allow the deployer to manage external identity groups and their aliases, which -# is how OIDC group membership (the ak_groups claim) maps onto Vault policies. -# Both the collection endpoints and the per-id endpoints are needed: create posts -# to identity/group, subsequent reads and updates address identity/group/id/. +# Allow the deployer to manage the external identity groups that OIDC group +# membership (the ak_groups claim) maps onto Vault policies through. Both the +# collection endpoint and the per-id endpoints are needed: create posts to +# identity/group, subsequent reads and updates address identity/group/id/. --- rules: - path: "identity/group" @@ -15,21 +15,6 @@ rules: - read - delete - list - - path: "identity/group-alias" - capabilities: - - create - - update - - path: "identity/group-alias/*" - capabilities: - - create - - update - - read - - delete - - list - - path: "identity/lookup/group" - capabilities: - - create - - update auth: approle: diff --git a/policies/identity/lookup/group/admin.yaml b/policies/identity/lookup/group/admin.yaml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e56e5a3 --- /dev/null +++ b/policies/identity/lookup/group/admin.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +# Allow the deployer to look up an identity group by name, which is how it +# resolves the group it is about to update under policies/identity/group/. +--- +rules: + - path: "identity/lookup/group" + capabilities: + - create + - update + +auth: + approle: + - tf_vault + k8s/au/syd1: + - woodpecker_terraform_vault diff --git a/policies/kv/kubernetes/namespace/+/default/oauth-credentials/read.yaml b/policies/kv/kubernetes/namespace/+/default/oauth-credentials/read.yaml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e6c7451 --- /dev/null +++ b/policies/kv/kubernetes/namespace/+/default/oauth-credentials/read.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +# Allow the Terraform Authentik runner to read the OAuth2/OIDC client secret that +# backs an authentik provider, in whichever namespace the target service lives +# (the module's data.vault_kv_secret_v2). The literal + is a Vault single-segment +# wildcard: one oauth-credentials secret per onboarded namespace. +--- +rules: + - path: "kv/data/kubernetes/namespace/+/default/oauth-credentials" + capabilities: + - read + +auth: + approle: + - terraform_authentik + k8s/au/syd1: + - woodpecker_terraform_authentik diff --git a/policies/kv/kubernetes/namespace/cattle-system/default/oauth-credentials/read.yaml b/policies/kv/kubernetes/namespace/cattle-system/default/oauth-credentials/read.yaml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e89ed59 --- /dev/null +++ b/policies/kv/kubernetes/namespace/cattle-system/default/oauth-credentials/read.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +# Allow the Terraform Rancher runner to read the OAuth2/OIDC client secret backing +# the Rancher keycloakoidc AuthConfig (the same secret Authentik sets on the +# provider). +--- +rules: + - path: "kv/data/kubernetes/namespace/cattle-system/default/oauth-credentials" + capabilities: + - read + +auth: + approle: + - terraform_rancher + k8s/au/syd1: + - woodpecker_terraform_rancher diff --git a/policies/kv/service/terraform/enc-encapi-environment.yaml b/policies/kv/kubernetes/namespace/encapi/default/environment/read.yaml similarity index 100% rename from policies/kv/service/terraform/enc-encapi-environment.yaml rename to policies/kv/kubernetes/namespace/encapi/default/environment/read.yaml diff --git a/policies/kv/kubernetes/namespace/logging/default/vlogs-oauth-credentials/read.yaml b/policies/kv/kubernetes/namespace/logging/default/vlogs-oauth-credentials/read.yaml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..02aba75 --- /dev/null +++ b/policies/kv/kubernetes/namespace/logging/default/vlogs-oauth-credentials/read.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +# Allow the Terraform Authentik runner to read the vlogs OIDC client secret. It is +# a second OIDC client in an already-onboarded namespace, so it cannot use the +# one-per-namespace oauth-credentials path. +--- +rules: + - path: "kv/data/kubernetes/namespace/logging/default/vlogs-oauth-credentials" + capabilities: + - read + +auth: + approle: + - terraform_authentik + k8s/au/syd1: + - woodpecker_terraform_authentik diff --git a/policies/kv/service/terraform/authentik.yaml b/policies/kv/service/terraform/authentik.yaml index 09ba06a..80a96a5 100644 --- a/policies/kv/service/terraform/authentik.yaml +++ b/policies/kv/service/terraform/authentik.yaml @@ -1,20 +1,11 @@ -# Allow the Terraform Authentik runner to read: -# - its own Authentik API token (provider auth), and -# - OAuth2/OIDC client secrets that back authentik providers (per target -# service's kv namespace path, via the module's data.vault_kv_secret_v2). +# Allow the Terraform Authentik runner to read its own Authentik API token +# (provider auth). The OAuth2/OIDC client secrets backing authentik providers are +# granted per secret under policies/kv/kubernetes/namespace/. --- rules: - path: "kv/data/service/terraform/authentik" capabilities: - read - - path: "kv/data/kubernetes/namespace/+/default/oauth-credentials" - capabilities: - - read - # Second OIDC client in an already-onboarded namespace, so it cannot use the - # one-per-namespace oauth-credentials path above. - - path: "kv/data/kubernetes/namespace/logging/default/vlogs-oauth-credentials" - capabilities: - - read auth: approle: diff --git a/policies/kv/service/terraform/rancher.yaml b/policies/kv/service/terraform/rancher.yaml index 30352ab..c3f069b 100644 --- a/policies/kv/service/terraform/rancher.yaml +++ b/policies/kv/service/terraform/rancher.yaml @@ -1,15 +1,11 @@ -# Allow the Terraform Rancher runner to read: -# - its own Rancher admin API token (rancher2 provider auth), and -# - the OAuth2/OIDC client secret backing the Rancher keycloakoidc AuthConfig -# (same secret Authentik sets on the provider). +# Allow the Terraform Rancher runner to read its own Rancher admin API token +# (rancher2 provider auth). The OAuth2/OIDC client secret backing the Rancher +# keycloakoidc AuthConfig is granted under policies/kv/kubernetes/namespace/. --- rules: - path: "kv/data/service/terraform/rancher" capabilities: - read - - path: "kv/data/kubernetes/namespace/cattle-system/default/oauth-credentials" - capabilities: - - read auth: approle: diff --git a/policies/sys/mounts-tune/admin.yaml b/policies/sys/mounts-tune/admin.yaml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ad27986 --- /dev/null +++ b/policies/sys/mounts-tune/admin.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +# Allow the deployer to read and tune the configuration of a mounted secret +# engine. sys/mounts-tune is the tuning endpoint beside the mount management +# granted by policies/sys/mounts/admin.yaml. +--- +rules: + - path: "sys/mounts-tune/*" + capabilities: + - update + - read + +auth: + approle: + - tf_vault + k8s/au/syd1: + - woodpecker_terraform_vault diff --git a/policies/sys/mounts/admin.yaml b/policies/sys/mounts/admin.yaml index 6c3c938..98b2649 100644 --- a/policies/sys/mounts/admin.yaml +++ b/policies/sys/mounts/admin.yaml @@ -8,10 +8,6 @@ rules: - delete - read - list - - path: "sys/mounts-tune/*" - capabilities: - - update - - read - path: "sys/mounts" capabilities: - read diff --git a/policies/sys/policy/admin.yaml b/policies/sys/policies/admin.yaml similarity index 100% rename from policies/sys/policy/admin.yaml rename to policies/sys/policies/admin.yaml diff --git a/tests/__init__.py b/tests/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e69de29 diff --git a/tests/test_policies.py b/tests/test_policies.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e2fc47c --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_policies.py @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +"""Validate the Vault policy definitions under policies/.""" +import unittest +from pathlib import Path, PurePosixPath +from typing import Literal + +import yaml +from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, Field, ValidationError + +REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent + +# kv-v2 inserts one of these directly after the mount; it is not part of the scope. +KV_API_SEGMENTS = {"data", "metadata", "delete", "undelete", "destroy"} + + +class Rule(BaseModel): + model_config = ConfigDict(extra="forbid") + + path: str = Field(min_length=1) + capabilities: list[ + Literal["create", "read", "update", "patch", "delete", "list", "sudo", "deny"] + ] = Field(min_length=1) + + +class Policy(BaseModel): + model_config = ConfigDict(extra="forbid") + + rules: list[Rule] = Field(min_length=1) + auth: dict[str, list[str]] + + +def policy_files(): + return sorted(REPO_ROOT.glob("policies/**/*.yaml")) + + +def escaping_scope(policy_file, rule_path): + """The policy directory a rule path reaches outside of, or None when in scope.""" + parts = PurePosixPath(policy_file).parts + # a policy at the policies/ root is located at the root, so its scope is the whole tree + scope = PurePosixPath(*parts[parts.index("policies") + 1:]).parent + path = PurePosixPath(rule_path) + if len(path.parts) > 1 and path.parts[1] in KV_API_SEGMENTS: + path = PurePosixPath(path.parts[0], *path.parts[2:]) + return None if path.is_relative_to(scope) else str(scope) + + +class PolicyFileTests(unittest.TestCase): + def setUp(self): + self.files = policy_files() + self.assertTrue(self.files, f"no policy files discovered under {REPO_ROOT}/policies") + + def test_schema(self): + for f in self.files: + with self.subTest(path=f.relative_to(REPO_ROOT).as_posix()): + Policy.model_validate(yaml.safe_load(f.read_text())) + + def test_paths(self): + for f in self.files: + rel = f.relative_to(REPO_ROOT).as_posix() + for rule in yaml.safe_load(f.read_text()).get("rules") or []: + rule_path = rule.get("path") + with self.subTest(path=rel, rule=rule_path): + self.assertIsNotNone(rule_path, "rule has no path") + scope = escaping_scope(rel, rule_path) + self.assertIsNone(scope, f'rule path "{rule_path}" escapes policy scope "{scope}"') + + +class RuleScopeTests(unittest.TestCase): + """The scope rule against fixtures, so a clean tree cannot hide a broken check.""" + + def test_in_scope(self): + for policy_file, rule_path in [ + ("policies/sys/mounts/admin.yaml", "sys/mounts"), + ("policies/sys/mounts/admin.yaml", "sys/mounts/*"), + ("policies/rundeck/rundeck.yaml", "rundeck/data/*"), + ("policies/rundeck/rundeck.yaml", "rundeck/metadata/*"), + ("policies/kv/service/authentik/oidc-vault/read.yaml", "kv/data/service/authentik/oidc-vault"), + ("policies/kv/service/vault/read.yaml", "kv/data/service/vault/+/+/auth_backend/*"), + ("policies/kubernetes/au/admin.yaml", "kubernetes/au/+/config"), + ("policies/global-root.yaml", "*"), # a root-level policy is scoped to the whole tree + ]: + with self.subTest(policy=policy_file, rule=rule_path): + self.assertIsNone(escaping_scope(policy_file, rule_path)) + + def test_escapes(self): + for policy_file, rule_path, scope in [ + ("policies/sys/thing/admin.yaml", "sys/thing-tune/*", "sys/thing"), + ("policies/kv/foo/bar/baz.yaml", "kv/data/foo/baz/bar", "kv/foo/bar"), + ("policies/kv/service/vault/au/syd1/ghp/w.yaml", "kv/data/service/vault/+/+/ghp/config", "kv/service/vault/au/syd1/ghp"), + ]: + with self.subTest(policy=policy_file, rule=rule_path): + self.assertEqual(escaping_scope(policy_file, rule_path), scope) + + def test_schema_rejects_malformed(self): + auth = {"approle": ["tf_vault"]} + rule = {"path": "kv/data/x", "capabilities": ["read"]} + for doc in [ + {"auth": auth}, # no rules + {"rules": [], "auth": auth}, # empty rules + {"rules": [{"capabilities": ["read"]}], "auth": auth}, # rule without a path + {"rules": [{"path": "kv/data/x", "capabilities": []}], "auth": auth}, # rule without capabilities + {"rules": [{"path": "kv/data/x", "capabilities": ["write"]}], "auth": auth}, # not a Vault capability + {"rules": [rule]}, # no auth + {"rules": [rule], "auth": auth, "rulez": []}, # typo'd top-level key + ]: + with self.subTest(doc=doc), self.assertRaises(ValidationError): + Policy.model_validate(doc)