Add `tomswall agent`: it pulls this device's compiled config from tomswallapi, differentially applies it, and reports the applied generation. It caches the last known-good config and, when the control plane is unreachable, keeps applying that cache — it never fails closed. - internal/agent: rendered-config types, HTTP client (fetch + status report), on-disk cache, on-device DNS resolver for dns sets (honors the device's configured resolver, fail-safe on lookup failure), and the pull-apply-report loop behind a mockable Applier. - Translate the interface-agnostic, address-matched rendered model into native tomswall config using the "all:<cidr>" any-interface source/dest form, reusing the existing differential engine. Named-set members are inlined as concrete addresses (native nft set references are a tracked follow-up). - cmd/tomswall: wire the `agent` subcommand (flags + TOMSWALL_* env, --once). - Unit tests: translation, cache, and the don't-fail-closed fallback loop. - Add DESIGN.md documenting the control-plane architecture.
20 KiB
tomswall control plane — design
Status: draft / theory-craft. No implementation yet.
This document specifies a fleet control plane for tomswall: a central, Terraform-managed API that lets you declare zones, address groups, and firewall policy once and have every device in a routed estate enforce a provably consistent posture. tomswall itself remains the per-host nftables engine; this adds an orchestration layer above the fleet.
1. Motivation
Today each tomswall host owns a complete, independent tomswall.yaml — its own
zones, interfaces, policy, and rules. In an estate of many firewalls and routers
that is unmanageable: a single logical intent ("hosts in zone A may reach zone B
on tcp/22") has to be hand-translated into per-hop rules on every device along
every possible path.
The control plane inverts this. You declare the intent once; the API compiles
it into the concrete rules each device needs and serves each device its rendered
config. A connection that crosses several firewalls —
src → rt1 → rt2 → rt3 → dest — is expressed as a single rule.
Key environment facts this design is built around:
- Internal routing is dynamic (FRR) with ECMP — paths are not stable and cannot be pinned.
- NAT happens only at the edge; the internal core is purely routed.
- Devices fall into two classes: routers (FRR core) and firewalls (zone boundary enforcement).
2. Terminology
| term | meaning |
|---|---|
| zone | A fleet-global named network segment (a set of subnets). Replaces per-host zones. |
| subzone | A zone nested inside a parent zone; its subnets must be ⊂ the parent's. |
| address group | A fleet-global named set of addresses → materialized as an nftables named set (ipset). Population source is static, dns, or asn. |
| fabric | A routing domain: a group of routers (and the firewall edges attached to it) that share an FRR routing fabric. |
| binding | A per-device mapping of a global zone to that device's local interface(s). The only legitimately host-specific object. |
| intent / rule | A fleet-global source → dest policy statement, matched on zones and/or address groups. |
| generation | A monotonic version stamp on rendered config; devices report the generation they have applied. |
3. Architecture
terraform ──▶ tomswallapi ◀── peers with FRR (BGP-LS / BMP)
│ · inventory + topology (devices, zones, fabrics, bindings)
│ · match/address-group model (static/dns/asn ipsets)
│ · compiler: intents → per-device tomswall.yaml
│ · reachability validation from routing state
│ · per-device config + set-delta feed (authenticated)
▼
fw-a rt1 rt2 rt3 fw-b ── each runs `tomswall agent`:
pull config → differential apply → report generation
+ on-device resolver maintains dns ipsets
Three moving parts:
tomswallapi— the control plane. Stores the model (Postgres, per the house stack), peers with FRR for routing/reachability, compiles intents into per-device configs, and serves them.tomswall agent— a new pull mode on the existing binary. Periodically fetches its rendered config, runs the existing differentialapply, maintains dns-backed ipsets via an on-device resolver, and reports its applied generation.- FRR peering — the API consumes routing state (BGP-LS for topology, BMP / route monitoring for prefix reachability) so it can validate that a zone's subnet really originates where its firewall claims, and scope which routers an intent must touch.
4. Data model: two layers
The founding constraint:
Every host may have a different zone→interface mapping, but all share the same zones, address groups, policies, and rules.
That splits the model into two layers with a hard wall between them.
4.1 Global layer (defined once, byte-identical everywhere)
zones · subzones · address_groups · portgroups · policies · rules ·
blrules · conntrack · secmarks · vars · fabrics.
None of these ever names an interface. The rule zone-a → zone-b tcp/22 is
the same object on every device.
4.2 Device layer (the only per-host freedom)
class (router/firewall) · fabric membership · per-device settings overrides ·
resolver config · and the binding table (zone → interface(s)).
The rendered per-device tomswall.yaml = global rules projected through that
device's binding table. Same intent, different local interface resolution:
GLOBAL (shared): rule zone-a → zone-b tcp/22 accept
zones zone-a=10.1.0.0/24 zone-b=10.4.0.0/24
fw-a bindings: zone-a → eth1 ; <core> → bond0 (fabric "core")
fw-b bindings: zone-b → ens5 ; <core> → ens4 (fabric "core")
rt3: no zone bindings ; fabric "core"
zone-a is attached on fw-a (resolved via its eth1 binding) but remote on
fw-b and rt3 (resolved purely by subnet match on the core side). That asymmetry is
fine because the compiled rule is interface-agnostic (§7).
5. Device classes and fabrics
- firewall — a zone boundary. Zones "live" on firewall interfaces; a firewall enforces with default-drop between zones and is where the real policy edge sits.
- router — an FRR core member belonging to a fabric. Enforces interface-agnostically (any interface, address-matched) because ECMP means the path is not pinnable.
A fabric is a routing domain with an enforce_on_routers flag:
enforce_on_routers = false(transparent transit) — routers route freely for internal ranges and rely on conntrack; only boundary firewalls enforce the intent. Fewest rules; no in-core containment.enforce_on_routers = true(defense-in-depth) — every router in the fabric also carries the intent as an interface-agnostic permit with default-drop transit. Every hop is a checkpoint; contains a compromised core node.
Per-fabric choice lets a small trusted core run transparent while a larger or multi-tenant core runs defense-in-depth.
6. The match model
Source and dest use a shorewall-style grammar. Each direction is a comma-list of elements; within an element a zone gates the selector (AND); across elements the list is a union (OR).
element := zone # bare zone — the zone-to-zone base case
| zone ":" selector # zone AND selector (selector must be paired)
selector := "+" ipset # named address group (static / dns / asn)
| "&" fqdn-group # (fqdn groups are just dns-typed ipsets; "+" also accepted)
source = "loc, net:+asn_cloudflare, dmz:+partner_api"
# loc OR (net AND asn_cloudflare) OR (dmz AND partner_api)
Rules:
- Bare zone → legal.
loc → net, the zone-to-zone base case. zone:+selector→ legal. The selector must always be paired with a zone.- Bare selector → rejected at plan time. No floating
+ipset/asn:without a zone.
Why the pairing is structural, not cosmetic: an internet-facing zone like net
has no finite subnet — it is "everything else" — so it can never stand as a clean
address match on its own. Pairing supplies the missing halves: the zone gives
direction/interface, the selector gives concrete addresses.
rule: loc → net:+asn_cloudflare tcp/443
edge fw render: oif=<net-iface> daddr @asn_cloudflare tcp dport 443 accept
# zone `net` → the internet-facing binding;
# asn_cloudflare → the actual prefixes to match
Internal zones (which have subnets) may stand bare; internet/edge zones effectively require a selector.
7. Compilation
7.1 Interface-agnostic, address-matched rules (the ECMP unlock)
Because FRR picks paths dynamically and load-balances across ECMP, rules must
not be compiled to per-hop iif/oif. Every device carries the same rule
matched on saddr ∈ source, daddr ∈ dest, proto, port in the forward chain, on
any interface:
rule: zone-a (10.1.0.0/24 @ fw-a) → zone-b (10.4.0.0/24 @ fw-b) tcp/22
fw-a (firewall): forward saddr 10.1.0.0/24 daddr 10.4.0.0/24 tcp dport 22 accept
rt1…N (routers): forward saddr 10.1.0.0/24 daddr 10.4.0.0/24 tcp dport 22 accept
fw-b (firewall): forward saddr 10.1.0.0/24 daddr 10.4.0.0/24 tcp dport 22 accept
- Return traffic needs no rules. Each device is independently stateful, so
every hop's own
ct state established,related accepthandles the reply. Only the forward direction is emitted. - ECMP and asymmetric routing just work — flow #1 may go rt1→rt3, flow #2 rt1→rt2→rt3, and the return may take a third path; every device it touches already permits the 5-tuple and holds its own conntrack state.
7.2 Over-approximation is safe → no exact path computation
Because rules are interface-agnostic and stateful, programming a permit on a router the traffic never crosses just leaves an unused rule. So the compiler never needs FRR's actual chosen path — only which fabric(s) could carry A↔B, which is coarse and static-friendly. FRR peering (§3) is used to narrow the router set (and to validate zone origins), not to pin a path.
7.3 nftables set / map form for scale
Every zone and address group is a named nft set (flags interval for CIDRs).
Rules reference sets by name. Where many intents land on the same core routers,
compile into sets / verdict maps keyed on (saddr, daddr, proto, dport) rather
than long linear chains, so match cost stays sub-linear. zone:+ipset compiles to
a conjunction of two set lookups (ip saddr @z_zone and ip saddr @g_ipset);
a multi-element list becomes multiple rule lines sharing a verdict.
The critical property: membership is the only thing that churns; rules are stable. Adding/removing an address is a set-element op — no rule reload, no chain rebuild, existing connections preserved.
8. Address groups (ipsets)
An address group is always an nftables named set. What differs is only how its members are populated:
| type | member source | resolved where | refresh |
|---|---|---|---|
static |
explicit CIDRs/IPs | API (constant) | n/a |
dns |
FQDNs → A/AAAA | on-device resolver | per record TTL |
asn |
ASN(s) → prefixes via iplocate | central API | configurable, default 24h |
8.1 ASN groups
An ASN group is defined once, globally, and materializes a set named by
convention asn_<isp> (friendly) or asn_<number>. An ISP may own several ASNs;
one group merges them into one set. Rules reference it like any ipset —
net:+asn_cloudflare — there is no special asn: selector token.
resource "tomswall_address_group" "asn_cloudflare" {
type = "asn"
asns = ["13335", "209242"]
refresh = "24h" # default; configurable per group / globally
} # → materializes nft set asn_cloudflare
Expansion is centralized: the API holds a single iplocate key (in Vault), calls the ASN data-type endpoint, caches prefixes per ASN, refreshes on the TTL, and ships prefix deltas as set-element ops. Devices never call iplocate. ASN membership is therefore fleet-uniform.
8.2 DNS groups and the per-host resolver
DNS groups resolve on-device, so each site honors its own split-horizon / geo-DNS view. The resolver used follows a precedence chain:
per-device resolver override → fleet default_resolver → system /etc/resolv.conf
resource "tomswall_device" "fw_a" { resolver = ["10.1.0.53", "10.1.0.54"] }
# global: default_resolver = ["10.0.0.53"] (or "system")
A device in site A resolves vpn.corp against site A's resolver and populates
its own set from that view; site B may legitimately differ. DNS membership is
not guaranteed fleet-uniform — only the rules and set names are. Record TTL is
used as the nft element timeout, so stale entries self-evict and the resolver
refreshes before expiry.
8.3 Set lifecycle notes
- v4 and v6 members are held in parallel family sets (or inet-family sets).
- Element deltas (
nft add/delete element) are a separate, lighter feed than rule rollout; they never bump the rule generation.
9. NAT / masquerade / netmap / policy — full parity
The control plane is a superset of the tomswall config model, never a lossy
subset: the rendered per-device output is a full tomswall.yaml, so anything
tomswall can express is reachable. Every section is a typed, first-class
resource — there is no raw-YAML escape hatch. Sections are handled in one of
three tiers:
- Global-compiled — defined once, projected identically to every relevant
device:
policy(default posture),rules,portgroups,zones/subzones,blrules,conntrack,secmarks,vars. - Global-intent, device-resolved — defined once against zones; each device
resolves to its own interfaces via its binding table:
snat/masquerade,netmap,nat(1:1). Example:masquerade source=loc egress=netlands only on devices that bind bothlocandnet(i.e. edge firewalls); interior routers have nonetbinding and skip it automatically. - Per-device — declared against a device (or a selector):
host,provider,rtrules,route,tunnel,stopped_rule,proxy_arp/ndp,arp_rule,maclist,accounting,mangle,tc_*.
10. Terraform resource catalog
Fleet / topology
tomswall_device— name,class(router/firewall),fabric, per-devicesettingsoverrides,resolvertomswall_fabric— routing domain,enforce_on_routerstomswall_binding— zone→interface map (per device+zone)tomswall_settings— global defaults (address_family, log_level, ip_forwarding, table_name)
Global-compiled
tomswall_zone— subnets,parent(subzones)tomswall_address_group— ipset;type= static/dns/asntomswall_portgrouptomswall_policy— default zone→zone posture,prioritytomswall_rule— thezone:+ipset/&fqdnintentstomswall_blruletomswall_conntracktomswall_secmarktomswall_var
Global-intent, device-resolved
tomswall_snat— masquerade/SNAT (auto-scopes to devices binding both zones)tomswall_netmap— anchored subnet↔subnettomswall_nat— 1:1 static, bound to the device holding the public IP
Per-device (device reference or a class/fabric/all selector)
tomswall_hosttomswall_providertomswall_routing_rule(rtrules)tomswall_routetomswall_tunneltomswall_stopped_ruletomswall_proxy_arp/tomswall_proxy_ndptomswall_arp_ruletomswall_maclisttomswall_accountingtomswall_mangletomswall_tc_device/tomswall_tc_class/tomswall_tc_filter/tomswall_tc_interface/tomswall_tc_priority
Data sources
tomswall_device_config— renderedtomswall.yamlpreview for a device- rule fanout preview — which devices an intent will touch (surfaced in
plan)
Per-device resources accept either a single device or a selector so common
objects (a shared static route, a provider) are declared once, preserving the
define-once ethos even in the local tier.
11. Agent protocol
tomswall agent (or a systemd timer invoking a pull) does:
- Pull its rendered config by
device_idfrom the API (authenticated). - Write it to a local cache file.
- Run the existing differential
apply(compute diff vs live nftables, apply only the delta atomically; never tears the firewall down). - Maintain dns ipsets via the on-device resolver (add/delete elements on TTL).
- Report the applied
generationback to the API.
11.1 Do not fail closed
On API-unreachable: keep the cache, re-apply it (idempotent no-op), never flush to deny. Existing rules ride through control-plane outages untouched; only changes require the API. This is a deliberate availability choice.
11.2 Rollout & convergence
A rule spanning several devices rolls out as each device pulls independently. Mid-rollout the connection is blocked at whichever hop has not yet pulled — i.e. fail-closed for adds (safe). Config is generation-stamped and devices report the generation applied, giving a fleet-wide "converged / N behind" view.
11.3 tomswall engine changes required
- A pull/agent mode (
tomswall agent, orsource: httpin the config loader). - The interface-agnostic rule form (match
saddr/daddrwith noiif/oif). - Resolver config and on-device dns-set maintenance.
- Ownership tags (resource-id + generation as nft comments) so
purge/ foreign-rule detection never fights control-plane-managed content.
12. Invariants (validated at plan time)
- Zones/policies/rules/groups are global-only. A device may bind a zone to an interface; it may never define one. No local zone namespace.
- Subnet→zone is globally unique. Every subnet belongs to exactly one zone fleet-wide; no overlaps. (Ambiguous saddr/daddr matching otherwise.)
- Every zone in a rule must be resolvable on every enforcing device — either locally bound (attached) or remote-reachable via its fabric. Unresolvable → rejection, not a silent gap. FRR reachability proves this.
- Each zone is anchored at ≥1 firewall interface — the API knows where every zone physically enters the fabric, cross-checked against FRR-advertised origins.
- A firewall must bind every directly-connected zone. A connected subnet with no zone identity is rejected/flagged (checked against FRR-reported prefixes). Zones the device does not attach are implicitly remote — no verbose "not here" declarations needed.
- Subzones nest by containment — a subzone's subnet ⊂ its parent's; hierarchy is global.
- Interface names appear only in the binding table. An interface name leaking into any global object → rejection.
- A selector never appears without a zone.
zone:+ipset/zone:&fqdnonly; bare+ipset/asn:→ rejection. Bare zones remain legal. - The zone in a pair supplies direction/interface; the selector supplies
addresses — this is what lets no-subnet zones (
net, edge) participate. - Every tomswall section is a typed resource. No raw-YAML passthrough; nothing bypasses validation.
- Config is generation-stamped; devices report the generation applied.
13. Fail-safe semantics
- Resolution failure keeps last-good membership. An iplocate outage or DNS SERVFAIL must never empty a set. (Matches the agent's don't-fail-closed stance.)
- A genuinely-empty group (NXDOMAIN, ASN with no prefixes) makes its rule inert and is logged/flagged — never "match everything." An unresolvable source/dest disables its rule loudly, never opens it.
- Adds fail closed, the control plane fails open. Partial rollout blocks new flows until every hop converges; a dead API leaves the last-good posture running.
14. Security / auth
- Agents authenticate to the API (mTLS or Vault-issued per-device tokens, per the house pattern).
- The iplocate API key and any resolver credentials live in Vault.
- The API is the single source of truth; state in Postgres.
- Compiled objects carry ownership tags so the on-device engine can distinguish control-plane content from local/foreign rules.
15. Open questions / future work
- FRR integration depth — BGP-LS (topology) vs BMP / route monitoring (prefix reachability) vs a lighter agent-reported FIB. Start with what proves zone origin and fabric membership; deepen as needed.
- Set-union match ergonomics — whether multi-element source/dest compiles to multiple rule lines or a merged interval set; membership churn is handled at the member-set level regardless.
- NAT along non-edge paths — out of scope by assumption (routed core, edge-only NAT). Revisit only if internal translation is ever introduced.
- Multi-tenancy — whether fabrics/zones need tenant scoping for RBAC.