Guardrails on ASN group refresh deltas #18

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opened 2026-07-26 17:08:34 +10:00 by benvin · 0 comments
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Problem. ASN expansion pipes third-party data (iplocate) directly into
fleet-wide permit rules. A bad upstream dataset, an account compromise, or an
actual BGP hijack reflected in the DB silently rewrites who
net:+asn_cloudflare admits — at whatever hour the 24h refresh fires.

Proposal.

  • Per-refresh delta cap: if membership changes by more than N% or M prefixes,
    hold the update, keep last-good (consistent with §13 fail-safe semantics),
    and alert.
  • Log every refresh with added/removed counts; expose the last delta per group
    via the API for dashboards.
  • Optional allow-list of expected prefix ranges per group for the paranoid
    tier.

Acceptance. A refresh returning a wildly different prefix set does not
reach any device without operator acknowledgement.

**Problem.** ASN expansion pipes third-party data (iplocate) directly into fleet-wide *permit* rules. A bad upstream dataset, an account compromise, or an actual BGP hijack reflected in the DB silently rewrites who `net:+asn_cloudflare` admits — at whatever hour the 24h refresh fires. **Proposal.** - Per-refresh delta cap: if membership changes by more than N% or M prefixes, hold the update, keep last-good (consistent with §13 fail-safe semantics), and alert. - Log every refresh with added/removed counts; expose the last delta per group via the API for dashboards. - Optional allow-list of expected prefix ranges per group for the paranoid tier. **Acceptance.** A refresh returning a wildly different prefix set does not reach any device without operator acknowledgement.
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