unkin-agent
6380270ac6
- discover worktrees from `git worktree list` on each source checkout, not only the worktree root, so hand-made ones, stale registrations and orphaned directories are classified too - normalise each candidate to its main checkout, so a linked worktree in the source root cannot offer up the repo's real checkout - keep locked, mid-rebase and detached-with-unique-commits worktrees, whose removal would destroy state nothing else holds - name the retained branch in every unproven verdict - add --no-fetch, --json, --include-unmanaged and --include-keep
211 lines
11 KiB
Markdown
211 lines
11 KiB
Markdown
# AGENTS.md
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## Project Overview
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This repo ships several Gitea-automation CLIs in one RPM (`agent-tools`). They
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act as an agent user (`unkin-agent` by default) by minting a scoped Gitea token
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from Vault, so actions are attributed to the agent rather than to whoever runs
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the tool. Setting `AGENT_LOGIN` selects a different agent identity, so a service
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like repospawner can run these tools as itself.
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- **`agentpr`** — create pull requests and post PR comments as `unkin-agent`
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(fixes the "tea posts as Ben" attribution problem). Subcommands:
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`pr create`, `pr comment`, `whoami`.
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- **`watchpr`** — poll one or more PRs and exit when a tracked PR changes
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meaningfully: it merges/closes, gets a new non-agent comment, its CI fails,
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or it loses mergeability. Benign transitions (CI pending→success, the agent's
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own comments) are ignored.
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- **`agentws`** — manage per-branch git worktrees for `unkin-agent`. Clones
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repos into the source root (`~/src/prodenv/<repo>`), creates worktrees under
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the worktree root (`~/.cache/agentws/<repo>__<branch>`), and authenticates
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clone/fetch/push via an ephemeral credential helper. Subcommands: `new`,
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`list`, `rm`, `prune`, `clean`, `token`, `credential`.
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All tools are separate `main` packages under `cmd/` and share the
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`internal/agent` package (Vault AppRole login, Gitea REST client, PR-ref
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parsing, watch-state comparison, git worktree helpers).
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## Structure
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```
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cmd/agentpr/main.go # agentpr CLI (pr create / pr comment / whoami)
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cmd/watchpr/main.go # watchpr CLI (poll + meaningful-change exit)
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cmd/agentws/main.go # agentws CLI (new / list / rm / clean / token / credential)
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cmd/agentws/prune.go # agentws prune (classify worktrees, remove the safe ones)
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cmd/agentvault/main.go # agentvault CLI (seed-outpost / seed-oauth)
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internal/agent/ # shared plumbing:
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token.go # env config + in-process Gitea-token cache
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vault.go # AppRole login + read the gitea creds path
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gitea.go # Gitea REST client (PR create/get, comments, status, whoami)
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parse.go # owner/repo#N and owner/repo parsing
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watch.go # PRState snapshot + MeaningfulChange comparison
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git.go # git worktree/clone/fetch helpers (os/exec, no go-git)
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vaultkv.go # AppRole-authenticated Vault client + KV-v2 read/write
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authentik.go # Authentik REST client (outpost search, token view_key)
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seedoutpost.go # seed-outpost flow (Authentik token -> Vault KV)
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seedoauth.go # seed-oauth flow (oauth2-proxy credential set in Vault KV)
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go.mod # module git.unkin.net/unkin/agent-tools
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Makefile # build / test / lint / completions / rpm / version-bump
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packaging/nfpm.yaml # nfpm spec (envsubst-templated) for the RPM (all binaries)
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scripts/build-rpm.sh # generates completions + packages the RPM with nfpm
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.woodpecker/ # CI: build, test, pre-commit (PR) + release (tag)
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dist/ # build output: binaries, completions, RPM (not committed)
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```
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Every binary is a separate `main` package, so `make build` builds each with its
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own `-o` (a single `go build ./...` can't emit multiple mains to one file).
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## Token acquisition (shared)
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All tools call `agent.GiteaToken()`, which (once per process):
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1. AppRole login: `POST $VAULT_ADDR/v1/auth/approle/login` with `role_id` only
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(no `secret_id`) → `client_token`.
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2. `GET $VAULT_ADDR/v1/<creds path>` with `X-Vault-Token` → `.data.token`, where
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the creds path is `GITEA_CREDS_PATH` if set, else `gitea/creds/$AGENT_LOGIN`
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(so unset env still reads `gitea/creds/unkin-agent`).
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Config via env (all have defaults):
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| Variable | Default | Purpose |
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|---|---|---|
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| `VAULT_ADDR` | `https://vault.service.consul:8200` | Vault/OpenBao address |
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| `AGENT_APPROLE_ROLE_ID` | built-in default | AppRole role_id (overridable) |
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| `GITEA_URL` | `https://git.unkin.net` | Gitea base URL |
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| `AGENT_LOGIN` | `unkin-agent` | agent identity: selects `gitea/creds/<login>`; login whose comments watchpr ignores; agentws git identity |
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| `GITEA_CREDS_PATH` | `gitea/creds/$AGENT_LOGIN` | Vault path minting the Gitea token (wins over `AGENT_LOGIN`) |
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| `AGENTWS_SRC_ROOT` | `~/src/prodenv` | agentws source-of-truth checkout root |
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| `AGENTWS_ROOT` | `~/.cache/agentws` | agentws worktree root |
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| `AGENTWS_OWNER` | `unkin` | Gitea org that owns agentws-managed repos |
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| `AUTHENTIK_URL` | `https://identity.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net` | Authentik base URL (`agentvault`) |
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### agentws git auth (ephemeral credential helper)
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Gitea tokens are ~1h ephemeral, so `agentws` never bakes one into a remote URL
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or config. `agentws token` prints a fresh token; `agentws credential get`
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implements the git credential protocol (reads the key=value request on stdin,
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and for the configured Gitea host only emits `username=$AGENT_LOGIN` +
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`password=<fresh token>`). `agentws new` wires this per worktree — it enables
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`extensions.worktreeConfig` on the repo once, then writes `user.name`,
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`user.email` and `credential.helper = !<agentws> credential` to the
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**per-worktree** config so the shared checkout's identity/config is untouched.
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Clone/fetch pass the same helper transiently via `-c credential.helper=...`.
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Worktrees are created FROM `~/src/prodenv/<repo>` (`git worktree add`) so agent
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branches are visible in Ben's main checkout; `rm`/`clean` fetch there afterwards
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to keep the default branch current.
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## Build
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```bash
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make build # -> dist/agentpr, dist/watchpr, dist/agentws, dist/agentvault (CGO disabled, static)
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```
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Requires Go 1.21+. Dependency: `github.com/spf13/cobra` (CLI).
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## Packaging (RPM)
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```bash
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make rpm # build all binaries + package into dist/*.rpm via nfpm
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```
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`scripts/build-rpm.sh` generates bash/zsh/fish completions from the built
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binaries and bundles them alongside `/usr/bin/agentpr`, `/usr/bin/watchpr`,
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`/usr/bin/agentws` and `/usr/bin/agentvault`.
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On a `v*` tag the release pipeline builds the RPM and `PUT`s it to the
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artifactapi `rpm-internal` repo, then cuts a Gitea release.
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## Shell completions
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Cobra provides a `completion` subcommand for each binary
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(`agentpr completion bash`, etc.). The RPM installs them to the standard system
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paths (`/usr/share/bash-completion/completions/`,
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`/usr/share/zsh/site-functions/`, `/usr/share/fish/vendor_completions.d/`).
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## Testing
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```bash
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make test # go test -v -race ./...
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```
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`internal/agent` covers PR-ref parsing, the `MeaningfulChange` table (benign vs
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alerting transitions), request-body construction, and the Vault+Gitea client
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against `httptest` servers (fake AppRole login + gitea creds + PR create /
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comment / whoami / status). No live Vault/Gitea access is required for tests.
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## agentvault seed-outpost
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`agentvault seed-outpost --outpost <name> --dest-path <kv/path>` does the whole
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flow in-process:
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1. AppRole login (shared `approleLogin`), then KV-v2 read of
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`kv/service/authentik/agent-api-token` (field `token`, falling back to
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`api_token`).
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2. `GET /api/v3/outposts/instances/?search=<name>` — Authentik's `search` is a
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substring match, so the exact `name` is re-checked client-side.
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3. `GET /api/v3/core/tokens/<token_identifier>/view_key/` for the key.
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4. KV-v2 write to `--dest-path` under `--dest-key` (default `token`).
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Only the outpost name, token identifier, dest path and new KV version are
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printed. Errors are wrapped per stage (login / read denied / outpost missing /
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view_key / write denied) via the `ErrVaultDenied`, `ErrVaultNotFound` and
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`ErrOutpostNotFound` sentinels.
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## agentvault seed-oauth
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`agentvault seed-oauth --path <kv/path> --client-id <id>` makes a KV-v2 path
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hold a complete oauth2-proxy credential set, in-process:
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1. AppRole login (shared `approleLogin`), then a KV-v2 read via
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`ReadKVOptional` — a 404 or a deleted version means "empty", not an error,
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so the first seed of a path works.
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2. Desired keys are computed over the existing map: `client_id` from the flag
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(`kept`/`created`/`updated`), `client_secret` and `cookie_secret` generated
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from 32 `crypto/rand` bytes only when absent or when `--rotate` is set
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(`kept`/`created`/`rotated`). `cookie_secret` is base64url so it decodes to
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exactly the 32 bytes oauth2-proxy demands; `client_secret` is standard
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base64.
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3. Any other key on the path is carried through unchanged (`preserved`), which
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is why the write goes through `WriteKVAny` rather than `WriteKV`.
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4. The write is skipped entirely when nothing changed; the command then prints
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`version: unchanged`.
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Only key names, per-key actions and the new KV version are printed. Errors are
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wrapped per stage (login / read denied / write denied) via `ErrVaultDenied`.
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## Gotchas
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- `watchpr` exits 0 with no output changes on `--once` (just prints state).
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- Gitea tokens expire in ~1h, shorter than a watch: the client re-mints once on a
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401/403 and replays the request. If the fresh token is rejected too, `watchpr`
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exits non-zero rather than polling blind.
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- `watchpr` polls anonymously when no token can be minted (public repos work
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fine); only a real 401/403 reaches for Vault.
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- The token cache is process-wide (mutex-guarded); `RefreshGiteaToken` replaces
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it. Tests call the unexported `fetchGiteaToken` to avoid the cache.
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- `agentvault` never puts a secret in an error string: Vault decode failures and
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Authentik `view_key` responses are reported without their bodies, and
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`seed-oauth` reports key names only.
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- `--rotate` regenerates the `client_secret` too, which then no longer matches
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the IdP provider unless that is rotated alongside.
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- `agentws prune` is a dry run unless `--yes`. It matches a branch to its PR on
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`head.label`: Gitea rewrites `head.ref` to `refs/pull/<n>/head` once the branch
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is deleted, which merging does, so `head.ref` matching misses every merged PR.
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Git signals (`merge-base --is-ancestor`, `git cherry`) are authoritative and
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offline-safe; an unreachable Gitea only means no branch gets deleted without
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git proof. A PR's state never authorises a branch delete on its own — HEAD
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must be contained in the PR's head commit or in `origin/<branch>`, otherwise
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the worktree goes and the branch stays. `origin/<branch>` is only evidence when
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this run's pruning fetch succeeded; a failed fetch leaves stale tracking refs,
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so those verdicts fall back to keeping the branch.
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- `agentws prune` discovers worktrees from the worktree root *and* from
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`git worktree list` on each source checkout, merging the two so git's own
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`locked`/`prunable` flags reach entries the directory scan already found.
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Removing a worktree is only safe because the local branch keeps its commits, so
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the cases with no branch to fall back on are kept: a detached HEAD carrying
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commits on no remote, a locked checkout, or one with a sequencer operation
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half-finished (`rebase-merge`, `MERGE_HEAD`, `CHERRY_PICK_HEAD`, …). A directory
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whose backing repo is gone is deleted outright, but only ever inside the
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worktree root.
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- CI "combined status" comes from `/commits/{sha}/status`; an empty head SHA
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yields an empty state without an API call.
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