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Author SHA1 Message Date
unkin-agent 297168a398 Revert "Put the artifactapi web UI behind Authentik oauth2-proxy (#456)"
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This reverts commit c98d88c197.

The artifactapi web UI has been down since #456 merged: /ui/ and /oauth2/
both return 503 "no available server", Traefik's response for a Service
with no ready endpoints, so the oauth2-proxy pod is not becoming ready.
The machine API surface (/version, /api/v2/health, /v2/,
/.well-known/terraform.json) is unaffected and still returns 200.

Rolling back restores unauthenticated access to the UI at /ui, served
directly by the ui Service exactly as before.

- Point the api-route /ui rule back at the ui Service and drop the
  /oauth2 rule.
- Remove the oauth2-proxy ConfigMap, Deployment, Service and VMPodScrape.
- Remove the oauth-credentials VaultStaticSecret.

The apps/base/artifactapi tree is byte-identical to 520da44, the commit
immediately before #456. Nothing that landed since is touched.
2026-09-07 22:29:17 +10:00
32 changed files with 19 additions and 840 deletions
+1 -28
View File
@@ -1,21 +1,4 @@
---
# Path split between the authenticated UI and the unauthenticated machine API.
# Longest matching prefix wins, so the two UI rules take precedence over "/".
#
# AUTHENTICATED (oauth2 Service -> oauth2-proxy -> ui Service):
# /oauth2 oauth2-proxy sign_in / start / callback / sign_out
# /ui the human-facing SPA
#
# NOT AUTHENTICATED (artifactapi Service, unchanged):
# /api/v1/{remote,local,virtual}/* package proxy reads (yum/dnf, pip, ...)
# /api/v2/remotes|virtuals|locals/* management API + the UI's own XHR calls
# /api/v2/remotes/{name}/files/* CI publish uploads (PUT) and downloads
# /v2/* Docker Registry V2 (containerd, buildah)
# /terraform/v1/providers/* Terraform provider registry
# /.well-known/terraform.json Terraform service discovery
# /health, /version, / probes and the redirect to /ui/
# Those clients cannot complete a browser OIDC flow, so they must never be
# routed through oauth2-proxy.
apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: HTTPRoute
metadata:
@@ -39,17 +22,7 @@ spec:
- backendRefs:
- group: ""
kind: Service
name: oauth2
port: 80
weight: 1
matches:
- path:
type: PathPrefix
value: /oauth2
- backendRefs:
- group: ""
kind: Service
name: oauth2
name: ui
port: 80
weight: 1
matches:
-2
View File
@@ -12,8 +12,6 @@ resources:
- gateway.yaml
- httproute.yaml
- namespace.yaml
- oauth2-proxy-configmap.yaml
- oauth2-proxy-deployment.yaml
- redis-deployment.yaml
- services.yaml
- ui-deployment.yaml
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
---
# Non-secret oauth2-proxy configuration (client_id/secret/cookie_secret come
# from the oauth-credentials Secret).
#
# SCOPE: this proxy fronts the artifactapi web UI ONLY. The HTTPRoute sends just
# /ui and /oauth2 here; every machine surface (/api/v1, /api/v2, /v2 docker
# registry, /terraform, /.well-known/terraform.json, /health, /version, /) goes
# straight to the api Service and is NOT authenticated. yum/dnf, containerd
# registry mirrors, docker/buildah, terraform init and Woodpecker publish steps
# cannot complete a browser OIDC flow, so they must never reach this container.
# Its only upstream is the ui Service -- there is deliberately no api upstream.
apiVersion: v1
kind: ConfigMap
metadata:
name: artifactapi-oauth2-env
namespace: artifactapi
data:
OAUTH2_PROXY_HTTP_ADDRESS: "0.0.0.0:4180"
OAUTH2_PROXY_METRICS_ADDRESS: "0.0.0.0:44180"
OAUTH2_PROXY_PROVIDER: "oidc"
# Publicly-trusted Authentik host: the authorize step is a browser redirect,
# so the issuer must present a cert every user's browser already trusts (the
# k8s host serves an internal-CA cert). Slug from terraform-authentik.
OAUTH2_PROXY_OIDC_ISSUER_URL: "https://identity.unkin.net/application/o/artifactapi/"
OAUTH2_PROXY_REDIRECT_URL: "https://artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/oauth2/callback"
OAUTH2_PROXY_UPSTREAMS: "http://ui.artifactapi.svc.cluster.local:80/"
OAUTH2_PROXY_SCOPE: "openid email profile ak_groups"
# Populate session.Groups from the Authentik hierarchical ak_groups claim.
OAUTH2_PROXY_OIDC_GROUPS_CLAIM: "ak_groups"
OAUTH2_PROXY_ALLOWED_GROUPS: "akP-artifactapi-admin"
OAUTH2_PROXY_PASS_USER_HEADERS: "true"
OAUTH2_PROXY_EMAIL_DOMAINS: "*"
# Authentik hardcodes email_verified=false in the id_token; authorization is
# enforced via ak_groups, so accepting the unverified email is safe.
OAUTH2_PROXY_INSECURE_OIDC_ALLOW_UNVERIFIED_EMAIL: "true"
OAUTH2_PROXY_COOKIE_SECURE: "true"
OAUTH2_PROXY_COOKIE_DOMAINS: "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net"
OAUTH2_PROXY_WHITELIST_DOMAINS: "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net"
OAUTH2_PROXY_REVERSE_PROXY: "true"
OAUTH2_PROXY_CODE_CHALLENGE_METHOD: "S256"
OAUTH2_PROXY_SKIP_PROVIDER_BUTTON: "true"
# Back-channel discovery/token calls resolve the issuer inside the cluster,
# where it is served under the internal unkin.net CA rather than the publicly
# trusted cert the browser sees. Trust the bundle the combine-certs init
# container assembles, as every other oauth2-proxy in the estate does.
OAUTH2_PROXY_PROVIDER_CA_FILES: "/etc/ssl/combined/ca-certificates.crt"
@@ -1,136 +0,0 @@
---
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: oauth2
namespace: artifactapi
annotations:
configmap.reloader.stakater.com/auto: "true"
secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: "oauth-credentials,vault-ca-cert"
spec:
replicas: 2
selector:
matchLabels:
app: oauth2
strategy:
rollingUpdate:
maxUnavailable: 1
type: RollingUpdate
template:
metadata:
labels:
app: oauth2
spec:
serviceAccountName: default
automountServiceAccountToken: false
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 65532
runAsGroup: 65532
fsGroup: 65532
seccompProfile:
type: RuntimeDefault
initContainers:
# The Authentik issuer is served behind the internal unkin.net CA;
# combine the system roots with it so oauth2-proxy's OIDC HTTP client
# trusts the discovery endpoint.
- name: combine-certs
image: docker.io/library/alpine:3
imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
command:
- sh
- -c
- cat /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt /custom-ca/ca.crt > /combined-certs/ca-certificates.crt
volumeMounts:
- name: vault-ca-cert
mountPath: /custom-ca
readOnly: true
- name: combined-certs
mountPath: /combined-certs
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
capabilities:
drop:
- ALL
resources:
requests:
cpu: 50m
memory: 32Mi
limits:
cpu: 200m
memory: 64Mi
containers:
- name: oauth2-proxy
image: quay.io/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy:v7.15.3
imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
ports:
- containerPort: 4180
name: http
protocol: TCP
- containerPort: 44180
name: metrics
protocol: TCP
envFrom:
- configMapRef:
name: artifactapi-oauth2-env
optional: false
env:
- name: OAUTH2_PROXY_CLIENT_ID
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: oauth-credentials
key: client_id
- name: OAUTH2_PROXY_CLIENT_SECRET
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: oauth-credentials
key: client_secret
- name: OAUTH2_PROXY_COOKIE_SECRET
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: oauth-credentials
key: cookie_secret
livenessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /ping
port: http
initialDelaySeconds: 10
periodSeconds: 30
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 3
readinessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /ready
port: http
initialDelaySeconds: 5
periodSeconds: 10
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 3
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
capabilities:
drop:
- ALL
volumeMounts:
- name: combined-certs
mountPath: /etc/ssl/combined
readOnly: true
resources:
requests:
cpu: 50m
memory: 64Mi
limits:
cpu: 500m
memory: 256Mi
volumes:
- name: vault-ca-cert
secret:
secretName: vault-ca-cert
items:
- key: ca.crt
path: ca.crt
- name: combined-certs
emptyDir: {}
restartPolicy: Always
-20
View File
@@ -16,26 +16,6 @@ spec:
sessionAffinity: None
type: ClusterIP
---
# Authenticated front door for the web UI only: api-route sends /ui and /oauth2
# here, oauth2-proxy authenticates and forwards to the ui Service. Every other
# path reaches the api Service above directly and stays unauthenticated.
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: oauth2
namespace: artifactapi
spec:
internalTrafficPolicy: Cluster
ports:
- name: http
port: 80
protocol: TCP
targetPort: http
selector:
app: oauth2
sessionAffinity: None
type: ClusterIP
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
@@ -32,26 +32,3 @@ spec:
refreshAfter: 5m
type: kv-v2
vaultAuthRef: default
---
# Authentik OIDC client for the artifactapi UI front door (client_id,
# client_secret, cookie_secret). Seeded out of band at
# kv/kubernetes/namespace/artifactapi/default/oauth-credentials; the default
# k8s auth role already grants the artifactapi/default ServiceAccount read on
# kv/data/kubernetes/namespace/{{sa_namespace}}/{{sa_name}}/*, so no
# terraform-vault change is needed. Consumed by the oauth2 Deployment.
apiVersion: secrets.hashicorp.com/v1beta1
kind: VaultStaticSecret
metadata:
name: oauth-credentials
namespace: artifactapi
spec:
destination:
create: true
name: oauth-credentials
overwrite: true
hmacSecretData: true
mount: kv
path: kubernetes/namespace/artifactapi/default/oauth-credentials
refreshAfter: 5m
type: kv-v2
vaultAuthRef: default
-14
View File
@@ -14,17 +14,3 @@ spec:
podMetricsEndpoints:
- port: metrics
path: /metrics
---
# Scrape the UI oauth2-proxy (:44180), which exposes sign-in/authz counters.
apiVersion: operator.victoriametrics.com/v1beta1
kind: VMPodScrape
metadata:
name: oauth2
namespace: artifactapi
spec:
selector:
matchLabels:
app: oauth2
podMetricsEndpoints:
- port: metrics
path: /metrics
+6 -21
View File
@@ -64,12 +64,8 @@ spec:
archive_mode: "on"
archive_timeout: 5min
dynamic_shared_memory_type: posix
effective_cache_size: 1536MB
effective_cache_size: 256MB
full_page_writes: "on"
# Replicas report their oldest xmin to the primary, so multi-second reads on
# a hot standby stop exhausting max_standby_streaming_delay and being
# cancelled. Retained-dead-tuple cost is negligible on a ~155MB database.
hot_standby_feedback: "on"
log_destination: csvlog
log_directory: /controller/log
log_filename: postgres
@@ -81,12 +77,7 @@ spec:
max_parallel_workers: "16"
max_replication_slots: "16"
max_worker_processes: "16"
# A pg_stat_statements.* parameter is what makes CNPG treat the extension as
# managed and run CREATE EXTENSION in every database; preloading alone does
# not create it.
pg_stat_statements.max: "10000"
pg_stat_statements.track: top
shared_buffers: 512MB
shared_buffers: 128MB
shared_memory_type: mmap
ssl_max_protocol_version: TLSv1.3
ssl_min_protocol_version: TLSv1.3
@@ -95,9 +86,6 @@ spec:
wal_log_hints: "on"
wal_receiver_timeout: 5s
wal_sender_timeout: 5s
# CNPG merges this with the libraries it manages itself.
shared_preload_libraries:
- pg_stat_statements
syncReplicaElectionConstraint:
enabled: false
primaryUpdateMethod: restart
@@ -117,16 +105,13 @@ spec:
updateInterval: 30
resources:
limits:
# 500m is a 50ms CFS quota per 100ms period, exhausted by bursts even at
# ~0.01 cores average, so every query pays throttle latency.
cpu: "2"
cpu: 500m
# 512Mi OOMKilled replicas under load (shared_buffers 128MB +
# max_connections 200 leave no headroom) — see incident 2026-07-28.
# shared_buffers 512MB needs the same headroom multiple, hence 2Gi.
memory: 2Gi
requests:
cpu: 500m
memory: 1Gi
requests:
cpu: 50m
memory: 512Mi
smartShutdownTimeout: 180
startDelay: 3600
stopDelay: 1800
-32
View File
@@ -37,22 +37,6 @@ spec:
name: authentik
sectionName: https
rules:
- backendRefs:
- group: ""
kind: Service
name: authentik-server
port: 80
weight: 1
filters:
- type: URLRewrite
urlRewrite:
path:
type: ReplaceFullPath
replaceFullPath: /application/o/token/
matches:
- path:
type: Exact
value: /application/o/token
- backendRefs:
- group: ""
kind: Service
@@ -102,22 +86,6 @@ spec:
name: authentik-internal
sectionName: https
rules:
- backendRefs:
- group: ""
kind: Service
name: authentik-server
port: 80
weight: 1
filters:
- type: URLRewrite
urlRewrite:
path:
type: ReplaceFullPath
replaceFullPath: /application/o/token/
matches:
- path:
type: Exact
value: /application/o/token
- backendRefs:
- group: ""
kind: Service
-1
View File
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ resources:
- redis-deployment.yaml
- redis-pvc.yaml
- redis-service.yaml
- server-vmpodscrape.yaml
- vaultauth.yaml
- vaultstaticsecret.yaml
- vmpodscrape.yaml
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
---
# Scrape the authentik server's django_prometheus endpoint (:9300). Picked up
# by the observability VMAgent (selectAllByDefault).
apiVersion: operator.victoriametrics.com/v1beta1
kind: VMPodScrape
metadata:
name: authentik-server
namespace: authentik
spec:
selector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: authentik
app.kubernetes.io/component: server
podMetricsEndpoints:
- port: metrics
path: /metrics
+1 -1
View File
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ spec:
runAsNonRoot: true
containers:
- name: operator
image: artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/docker-internal/bind-operator:v0.2.7
image: artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/docker-internal/bind-operator:v0.2.6
args:
- --metrics-bind-address=:8080
- --health-probe-bind-address=:8081
+1 -1
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ resources:
- namespace.yaml
# CRDs are pulled from the bind-operator repo at the matching tag rather than
# vendored here, so they never drift from the operator.
- https://git.unkin.net/unkin/bind-operator/raw/tag/v0.2.7/config/crd/install.yaml
- https://git.unkin.net/unkin/bind-operator/raw/tag/v0.2.6/config/crd/install.yaml
- rbac.yaml
- agent-dns-rbac.yaml
- deployment.yaml
+1 -1
View File
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ data:
</key>
<value>
<PluginConfiguration>
<OidEndpoint>https://identity.unkin.net/application/o/jellyfin/</OidEndpoint>
<OidEndpoint>https://identity.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/application/o/jellyfin/</OidEndpoint>
<OidClientId>jellyfin</OidClientId>
<OidSecret>@@CLIENT_SECRET@@</OidSecret>
<Enabled>true</Enabled>
+2
View File
@@ -13,4 +13,6 @@ spec:
targetPort: http
selector:
app: cheeztv
# Pin each client to one replica to reduce transcode-session churn/takeover.
sessionAffinity: ClientIP
type: ClusterIP
+1 -3
View File
@@ -4,8 +4,6 @@ kind: StatefulSet
metadata:
name: cheeztv
namespace: cheeztv
annotations:
configmap.reloader.stakater.com/auto: "true"
spec:
# HA: two replicas coordinate transcode session ownership through Valkey and
# resume each other's HLS segments off the shared RWX transcode PVC. Stable
@@ -164,7 +162,7 @@ spec:
readOnly: true
containers:
- name: cheeztv
image: artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/docker-internal/jellyfin-ha:v0.3.3
image: artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/docker-internal/jellyfin-ha:v0.2.0
imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
ports:
- name: http
+1 -1
View File
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ data:
</key>
<value>
<PluginConfiguration>
<OidEndpoint>https://identity.unkin.net/application/o/jellyfin/</OidEndpoint>
<OidEndpoint>https://identity.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/application/o/jellyfin/</OidEndpoint>
<OidClientId>jellyfin</OidClientId>
<OidSecret>@@CLIENT_SECRET@@</OidSecret>
<Enabled>true</Enabled>
+2
View File
@@ -13,4 +13,6 @@ spec:
targetPort: http
selector:
app: fafflix
# Pin each client to one replica to reduce transcode-session churn/takeover.
sessionAffinity: ClientIP
type: ClusterIP
+1 -3
View File
@@ -4,8 +4,6 @@ kind: StatefulSet
metadata:
name: fafflix
namespace: fafflix
annotations:
configmap.reloader.stakater.com/auto: "true"
spec:
# HA: two replicas coordinate transcode session ownership through Valkey and
# resume each other's HLS segments off the shared RWX transcode PVC. Stable
@@ -164,7 +162,7 @@ spec:
readOnly: true
containers:
- name: fafflix
image: artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/docker-internal/jellyfin-ha:v0.3.3
image: artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/docker-internal/jellyfin-ha:v0.2.0
imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
ports:
- name: http
+1 -1
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ spec:
- name: pdbmux
# Image is published by the pdbmux repo's .woodpecker/docker.yaml on
# a v* tag. It only exists after that tag is cut (see PR merge gates).
image: artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/docker-internal/pdbmux:v0.4.0
image: artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/docker-internal/pdbmux:v0.2.0
imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
ports:
- containerPort: 8080
@@ -99,23 +99,6 @@ spec:
- mountPath: /docker-custom-entrypoint.d/post-startup/additional-ruby-gems.sh
name: additional-ruby-gems
subPath: additional-ruby-gems.sh
- mountPath: /configmaps/auth.conf
name: compiler-auth-conf
subPath: auth.conf
- mountPath: /docker-custom-entrypoint.d/pre-default/10-auth-conf.sh
name: compiler-auth-conf-seed
subPath: 10-auth-conf.sh
- mountPath: /docker-custom-entrypoint.d/pre-default/20-vault-helpers.sh
name: compiler-vault-helpers-seed
subPath: 20-vault-helpers.sh
- mountPath: /opt/certmanager/config.yaml
name: certmanager-config
subPath: certmanager.yaml
readOnly: true
- mountPath: /opt/sshsignhost/config.yaml
name: sshsignhost-config
subPath: sshsignhost.yaml
readOnly: true
initContainers:
- name: copy-configmaps
image: busybox:1.35
@@ -213,38 +196,7 @@ spec:
echo "$EXPECTED encapic" | sha256sum -c -
install -m 0755 encapic /opt/bin/encapic
# Puppet shells out to these two from generate() during catalog
# compilation: profiles::pki::vault runs certmanager and
# profiles::ssh::sign runs sshsignhost.
install_release() {
name=$1
version=$2
asset="$name-linux-amd64"
base="https://git.unkin.net/unkin/$name/releases/download/$version"
curl -fsSL -o "$name" "$base/$asset"
curl -fsSL -o "$name.checksums" "$base/checksums.txt"
# checksums.txt covers every release asset; pick the line for the
# one we downloaded and verify it under our local filename.
expected=$(awk -v a="$asset" '$NF == a || $NF == "*"a {print $1}' "$name.checksums")
if [ -z "$expected" ]; then
echo "no checksum for $asset in $version checksums.txt" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "$expected $name" | sha256sum -c -
install -m 0755 "$name" "/opt/bin/$name"
}
install_release certmanager v0.2.0
install_release sshsignhost v0.1.0
echo "Shared binaries setup completed"
resources:
limits:
cpu: 300m
memory: 256Mi
requests:
cpu: 100m
memory: 64Mi
volumeMounts:
- mountPath: /opt/bin/
name: puppet-shared-bins
@@ -282,22 +234,5 @@ spec:
configMap:
name: additional-ruby-gems
defaultMode: 0755
- name: compiler-auth-conf
configMap:
name: compiler-auth.conf
- name: compiler-auth-conf-seed
configMap:
name: compiler-auth-conf-seed
defaultMode: 0755
- name: compiler-vault-helpers-seed
configMap:
name: compiler-vault-helpers-seed
defaultMode: 0755
- name: certmanager-config
configMap:
name: certmanager-config
- name: sshsignhost-config
configMap:
name: sshsignhost-config
strategy:
type: RollingUpdate
-25
View File
@@ -54,31 +54,6 @@ configMapGenerator:
- resources/compiler/puppetdb.conf
options:
disableNameSuffixHash: true
- name: compiler-auth.conf
files:
- resources/compiler/auth.conf
options:
disableNameSuffixHash: true
- name: compiler-auth-conf-seed
files:
- resources/compiler/10-auth-conf.sh
options:
disableNameSuffixHash: true
- name: compiler-vault-helpers-seed
files:
- resources/compiler/20-vault-helpers.sh
options:
disableNameSuffixHash: true
- name: certmanager-config
files:
- resources/compiler/certmanager.yaml
options:
disableNameSuffixHash: true
- name: sshsignhost-config
files:
- resources/compiler/sshsignhost.yaml
options:
disableNameSuffixHash: true
- name: additional-ruby-gems
files:
- resources/additional-ruby-gems.sh
@@ -6,6 +6,4 @@ echo "Installing additional Ruby gems..."
/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/gem install ipaddr
/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/gem install hiera-eyaml
/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/gem install toml
# Under set -e a failed install kills the entrypoint post-startup hooks, taking down an already-serving compiler.
/opt/puppetlabs/bin/puppetserver gem install toml
echo "Additional Ruby gems installed successfully"
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/bash
set -euo pipefail
SRC=/configmaps/auth.conf
DST=/etc/puppetlabs/puppetserver/conf.d/auth.conf
# Copied rather than mounted: the entrypoint chowns conf.d and rewrites auth.conf,
# both of which fail on a read-only configmap mount and abort container startup.
if [ ! -s "$SRC" ]; then
echo "FATAL: $SRC missing or empty; refusing to start on the image default auth.conf" >&2
exit 1
fi
cp "$SRC" "$DST"
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/bash
set -euo pipefail
BIN_DIR=/opt/bin
CA=/opt/vault-ca-cert.crt
if [ ! -s "$CA" ]; then
echo "FATAL: $CA missing or empty; certmanager and sshsignhost cannot verify Vault" >&2
exit 1
fi
# profiles::pki::vault and profiles::ssh::sign shell out to fixed /usr/local/bin
# paths from generate(); the binaries ship on the shared PVC, and /usr/local/bin
# lives in the image. Wrappers rather than symlinks because neither binary reads
# a CA path from its config: SSL_CERT_FILE scopes the internal CA to these two
# processes instead of the puppetserver JVM's own trust store.
for bin in certmanager sshsignhost; do
if [ ! -x "$BIN_DIR/$bin" ]; then
echo "FATAL: $BIN_DIR/$bin missing; generate() would abort every catalog compile" >&2
exit 1
fi
cat > "/usr/local/bin/$bin" <<WRAPPER
#!/bin/sh
SSL_CERT_FILE=$CA
export SSL_CERT_FILE
exec $BIN_DIR/$bin "\$@"
WRAPPER
chmod 0755 "/usr/local/bin/$bin"
done
@@ -1,320 +0,0 @@
# Copied into conf.d at startup by 10-auth-conf.sh; the entrypoint then appends the
# admin API cache rule and re-renders the result, so the running file is not byte-identical.
authorization: {
version: 1
rules: [
{
# Allow nodes to retrieve their own catalog
match-request: {
path: "^/puppet/v3/catalog/([^/]+)$"
type: regex
method: [get, post]
}
allow: "$1"
sort-order: 500
name: "puppetlabs v3 catalog from agents"
},
{
# Allow catalog-diff to retrieve catalogs on behalf of others.
# sort-order 400 must stay lower than the puppetlabs deny that follows: rules
# sort by [sort-order, name] and the first match wins.
match-request: {
path: "^/puppet/v4/catalog/?$"
type: regex
method: post
}
allow: "catalog-diff.main.unkin.net"
sort-order: 400
name: "unkin v4 catalog for catalog-diff"
},
{
# Allow services to retrieve catalogs on behalf of others
match-request: {
path: "^/puppet/v4/catalog/?$"
type: regex
method: post
}
deny: "*"
sort-order: 500
name: "puppetlabs v4 catalog for services"
},
{
# Allow nodes to retrieve the certificate they requested earlier
match-request: {
path: "/puppet-ca/v1/certificate/"
type: path
method: get
}
allow-unauthenticated: true
sort-order: 500
name: "puppetlabs certificate"
},
{
# Allow all nodes to access the certificate revocation list
match-request: {
path: "/puppet-ca/v1/certificate_revocation_list/ca"
type: path
method: get
}
allow-unauthenticated: true
sort-order: 500
name: "puppetlabs crl"
},
{
# Allow nodes to request a new certificate
match-request: {
path: "/puppet-ca/v1/certificate_request"
type: path
method: [get, put]
}
allow-unauthenticated: true
sort-order: 500
name: "puppetlabs csr"
},
{
# Allow nodes to renew their certificate
match-request: {
path: "/puppet-ca/v1/certificate_renewal"
type: path
method: post
}
# this endpoint should never be unauthenticated, as it requires the cert to be provided.
allow: "*"
sort-order: 500
name: "puppetlabs certificate renewal"
},
{
# Allow the CA CLI to access the certificate_status endpoint
match-request: {
path: "/puppet-ca/v1/certificate_status"
type: path
method: [get, put, delete]
}
allow: {
extensions: {
pp_cli_auth: "true"
}
}
sort-order: 500
name: "puppetlabs cert status"
},
{
match-request: {
path: "^/puppet-ca/v1/certificate_revocation_list$"
type: regex
method: put
}
allow: {
extensions: {
pp_cli_auth: "true"
}
}
sort-order: 500
name: "puppetlabs CRL update"
},
{
# Allow the CA CLI to access the certificate_statuses endpoint
match-request: {
path: "/puppet-ca/v1/certificate_statuses"
type: path
method: get
}
allow: {
extensions: {
pp_cli_auth: "true"
}
}
sort-order: 500
name: "puppetlabs cert statuses"
},
{
# Allow authenticated access to the CA expirations endpoint
match-request: {
path: "/puppet-ca/v1/expirations"
type: path
method: get
}
allow: "*"
sort-order: 500
name: "puppetlabs CA cert and CRL expirations"
},
{
# Allow the CA CLI to access the certificate clean endpoint
match-request: {
path: "/puppet-ca/v1/clean"
type: path
method: put
}
allow: {
extensions: {
pp_cli_auth: "true"
}
}
sort-order: 500
name: "puppetlabs cert clean"
},
{
# Allow the CA CLI to access the certificate sign endpoint
match-request: {
path: "/puppet-ca/v1/sign"
type: path
method: post
}
allow: {
extensions: {
pp_cli_auth: "true"
}
}
sort-order: 500
name: "puppetlabs cert sign"
},
{
# Allow the CA CLI to access the certificate sign all endpoint
match-request: {
path: "/puppet-ca/v1/sign/all"
type: path
method: post
}
allow: {
extensions: {
pp_cli_auth: "true"
}
}
sort-order: 500
name: "puppetlabs cert sign all"
},
{
# Allow unauthenticated access to the status service endpoint
match-request: {
path: "/status/v1/services"
type: path
method: get
}
allow-unauthenticated: true
sort-order: 500
name: "puppetlabs status service - full"
},
{
match-request: {
path: "/status/v1/simple"
type: path
method: get
}
allow-unauthenticated: true
sort-order: 500
name: "puppetlabs status service - simple"
},
{
match-request: {
path: "/puppet/v3/environments"
type: path
method: get
}
allow: "*"
sort-order: 500
name: "puppetlabs environments"
},
{
# Allow nodes to access all file_bucket_files. Note that access for
# the 'delete' method is forbidden by Puppet regardless of the
# configuration of this rule.
match-request: {
path: "/puppet/v3/file_bucket_file"
type: path
method: [get, head, post, put]
}
allow: "*"
sort-order: 500
name: "puppetlabs file bucket file"
},
{
# Allow nodes to access all file_content. Note that access for the
# 'delete' method is forbidden by Puppet regardless of the
# configuration of this rule.
match-request: {
path: "/puppet/v3/file_content"
type: path
method: [get, post]
}
allow: "*"
sort-order: 500
name: "puppetlabs file content"
},
{
# Allow nodes to access all file_metadata. Note that access for the
# 'delete' method is forbidden by Puppet regardless of the
# configuration of this rule.
match-request: {
path: "/puppet/v3/file_metadata"
type: path
method: [get, post]
}
allow: "*"
sort-order: 500
name: "puppetlabs file metadata"
},
{
# Allow nodes to retrieve only their own node definition
match-request: {
path: "^/puppet/v3/node/([^/]+)$"
type: regex
method: get
}
allow: "$1"
sort-order: 500
name: "puppetlabs node"
},
{
# Allow nodes to store only their own reports
match-request: {
path: "^/puppet/v3/report/([^/]+)$"
type: regex
method: put
}
allow: "$1"
sort-order: 500
name: "puppetlabs report"
},
{
# Allow nodes to update their own facts
match-request: {
path: "^/puppet/v3/facts/([^/]+)$"
type: regex
method: put
}
allow: "$1"
sort-order: 500
name: "puppetlabs facts"
},
{
match-request: {
path: "/puppet/v3/static_file_content"
type: path
method: get
}
allow: "*"
sort-order: 500
name: "puppetlabs static file content"
},
{
match-request: {
path: "/puppet/v3/tasks"
type: path
}
allow: "*"
sort-order: 500
name: "puppet tasks information"
},
{
# Deny everything else. This ACL is not strictly
# necessary, but illustrates the default policy
match-request: {
path: "/"
type: path
}
deny: "*"
sort-order: 999
name: "puppetlabs deny all"
}
]
}
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
---
vault:
addr: https://vault.service.consul:8200
auth_method: kubernetes
k8s_mount: k8s/au/syd1
k8s_role: puppet_certmanager
jwt_path: /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token
mount_point: pki_int
role_name: servers_default
output_path: /tmp/certmanager
tls_skip_verify: false
timeout: 30s
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
---
vault:
addr: https://vault.service.consul:8200
auth_method: kubernetes
k8s_mount: k8s/au/syd1
k8s_role: puppet_sshsigner
jwt_path: /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token
mount_point: sshca
role_name: signhost
tls_skip_verify: false
timeout: 30s
-1
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ resources:
- serviceaccount_mediamark_ci.yaml
- serviceaccount_plugin_docker_buildx.yaml
- serviceaccount_jellyfin_ha_src.yaml
- serviceaccount_jellyfin_plugin_sso.yaml
- serviceaccount_repospawner_ci.yaml
- serviceaccount_terraform_artifactapi.yaml
- serviceaccount_terraform_authentik.yaml
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: ServiceAccount
metadata:
name: jellyfin-plugin-sso
namespace: woodpecker
+1 -1
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ agent:
WOODPECKER_MAX_WORKFLOWS: "8"
WOODPECKER_BACKEND_K8S_PRIORITY_CLASS: power
WOODPECKER_BACKEND_K8S_STORAGE_CLASS: cephrbd-fast-delete
WOODPECKER_BACKEND_K8S_VOLUME_SIZE: 20Gi
WOODPECKER_BACKEND_K8S_VOLUME_SIZE: 10G
WOODPECKER_BACKEND_K8S_STORAGE_RWX: false
# Required from woodpecker 3.16.0 (GHSA-qf34-295c-26v8): step-level
# serviceAccountName is gated behind this agent flag (default false).
@@ -26,10 +26,6 @@ data:
issuer: https://identity.unkin.net/application/o/argocd/
clientID: argocd
clientSecret: $argocd-oidc:client_secret
# The Authentik client is public (the iOS app can't hold a secret), so
# Authentik no longer enforces clientSecret; PKCE replaces it as the
# protection against authorization-code interception.
enablePKCEAuthentication: true
# identity.unkin.net now serves the LetsEncrypt *.unkin.net wildcard, so the
# stock image trust store validates it; no rootCA pin.
requestedScopes: