## Why
Anonymous GitHub is capped at 60 requests/hour and cannot read private repositories. A machine credential usable by a free (non-enterprise) account is needed to lift the request budget to ~5000/hr and to read private-repo release assets.
Builds on the background syncer (#108, now merged to `master`); this diff is the auth changes only.
## How
- Add `internal/githubauth`: a process-wide GitHub credential delivered via env/secret, applied by default to every outbound GitHub request (releases scan, ranged asset-header GETs, and the generic-github byte proxy for private assets).
- Support two modes:
- **PAT** — `GITHUB_TOKEN` sent as `Authorization: Bearer <token>`.
- **GitHub App** — `GITHUB_APP_ID` + `GITHUB_APP_INSTALLATION_ID` + private key (`GITHUB_APP_PRIVATE_KEY` inline PEM or `GITHUB_APP_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH`). Mint a short-lived RS256 JWT with stdlib `crypto/rsa` (no new dependency), exchange it at `POST /app/installations/{id}/access_tokens` for a ~1h installation token, cache it, and single-flight a refresh a few minutes before expiry.
- Inject at the two GitHub call paths: the rpm github provider header builder (releases + ranged fetches) and the generic provider `AuthHeaders` (byte proxy, github.com hosts only; the pre-signed `objects.githubusercontent.com` redirect deliberately gets no Authorization).
- Honor precedence: a remote's own `username`/`password` overrides the server credential; no credential configured stays anonymous (current behavior).
- Fail closed at startup on partial App configuration (e.g. App id without a private key); a token-and-App conflict is also rejected.
- Never persist the credential to the DB, return it from an API, or log it (token-exchange failures never echo the response body).
- Read config via the existing `getenv` convention; document PAT vs App setup, the free-account fine-grained PAT scopes (Contents:read + Metadata:read), precedence, and the rate-limit implication.
## Rate limit
Authenticated requests share the syncer's single global limiter — no second limiter is added. A token raises the effective GitHub ceiling (~5000/hr vs ~60/hr), so the limiter defaults stay safe.
## Tests
`internal/githubauth` and `internal/provider/{rpm,generic}`:
- PAT attaches the correct `Authorization` header to releases + asset-header requests.
- App mints a valid RS256 JWT (verified against the app public key), exchanges it at a mocked endpoint, reuses the cached token without re-exchanging, refreshes near expiry, and single-flights concurrent callers.
- Per-remote credential overrides the server credential (rpm + generic).
- No credential → no `Authorization` header, requests still succeed anonymously.
- ETag/304 flow still works with auth attached.
- The credential does not appear in a remote's serialized JSON.
- Config validation: no-config is anonymous; partial App config and token/App conflict both error.
Verified fail-before/pass-after for the injection tests. `gofmt -l`, `go build ./...`, `go vet ./...`, `go test ./...` all clean (26 packages).
Reviewed-on: #109
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Raises statement coverage of the core packages (all of `internal/` except the interactive `tui/`, plus `pkg/`) from **8.7% to 90.1%**.
## Approach
- **Pure-go unit tests** for all providers, virtual mergers, classifier, config, auth, models, and the API client (httptest).
- **Testcontainers-backed** tests (new `internal/testsupport` helper: Postgres/Redis/MinIO, Ryuk disabled) for database, storage, cache, the proxy engine, the GC, and a full-stack `server` test that drives the whole HTTP API. These `t.Skip` when Docker is absent so `go test` still runs locally without it.
## Measuring
```
go test -coverpkg=./internal/...,./pkg/... -coverprofile=cover.out ./internal/... ./pkg/...
grep -v /internal/tui/ cover.out | go tool cover -func=/dev/stdin | tail -1 # 90.1%
```
Run with `-p 1` (containers are heavy).
## Notes
- The interactive `tui/` package and `cmd/main` are excluded from the target per the agreed scope.
- Some defensive error branches are covered via fault injection (closed DB pool, killing MinIO mid-upload).
Reviewed-on: #98
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
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