109ba2ce27
ci/woodpecker/tag/docker Pipeline was successful
## Why Anonymous GitHub is capped at 60 requests/hour and cannot read private repositories. A machine credential usable by a free (non-enterprise) account is needed to lift the request budget to ~5000/hr and to read private-repo release assets. Builds on the background syncer (#108, now merged to `master`); this diff is the auth changes only. ## How - Add `internal/githubauth`: a process-wide GitHub credential delivered via env/secret, applied by default to every outbound GitHub request (releases scan, ranged asset-header GETs, and the generic-github byte proxy for private assets). - Support two modes: - **PAT** — `GITHUB_TOKEN` sent as `Authorization: Bearer <token>`. - **GitHub App** — `GITHUB_APP_ID` + `GITHUB_APP_INSTALLATION_ID` + private key (`GITHUB_APP_PRIVATE_KEY` inline PEM or `GITHUB_APP_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH`). Mint a short-lived RS256 JWT with stdlib `crypto/rsa` (no new dependency), exchange it at `POST /app/installations/{id}/access_tokens` for a ~1h installation token, cache it, and single-flight a refresh a few minutes before expiry. - Inject at the two GitHub call paths: the rpm github provider header builder (releases + ranged fetches) and the generic provider `AuthHeaders` (byte proxy, github.com hosts only; the pre-signed `objects.githubusercontent.com` redirect deliberately gets no Authorization). - Honor precedence: a remote's own `username`/`password` overrides the server credential; no credential configured stays anonymous (current behavior). - Fail closed at startup on partial App configuration (e.g. App id without a private key); a token-and-App conflict is also rejected. - Never persist the credential to the DB, return it from an API, or log it (token-exchange failures never echo the response body). - Read config via the existing `getenv` convention; document PAT vs App setup, the free-account fine-grained PAT scopes (Contents:read + Metadata:read), precedence, and the rate-limit implication. ## Rate limit Authenticated requests share the syncer's single global limiter — no second limiter is added. A token raises the effective GitHub ceiling (~5000/hr vs ~60/hr), so the limiter defaults stay safe. ## Tests `internal/githubauth` and `internal/provider/{rpm,generic}`: - PAT attaches the correct `Authorization` header to releases + asset-header requests. - App mints a valid RS256 JWT (verified against the app public key), exchanges it at a mocked endpoint, reuses the cached token without re-exchanging, refreshes near expiry, and single-flights concurrent callers. - Per-remote credential overrides the server credential (rpm + generic). - No credential → no `Authorization` header, requests still succeed anonymously. - ETag/304 flow still works with auth attached. - The credential does not appear in a remote's serialized JSON. - Config validation: no-config is anonymous; partial App config and token/App conflict both error. Verified fail-before/pass-after for the injection tests. `gofmt -l`, `go build ./...`, `go vet ./...`, `go test ./...` all clean (26 packages). Reviewed-on: #109 Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net> Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
208 lines
5.2 KiB
Go
208 lines
5.2 KiB
Go
package githubauth
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto"
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"crypto/rand"
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"crypto/rsa"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"crypto/x509"
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/json"
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"encoding/pem"
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"fmt"
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"testing"
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"time"
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)
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func testRSAKeyPEM(t *testing.T) string {
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t.Helper()
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key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("generate key: %v", err)
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}
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der := x509.MarshalPKCS1PrivateKey(key)
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return string(pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "RSA PRIVATE KEY", Bytes: der}))
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}
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// appFixture serves the installation-token exchange endpoint, records requests,
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// verifies the presented JWT against the app public key, and returns tokens with
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// a controllable expiry.
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type appFixture struct {
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srv *httptest.Server
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pub *rsa.PublicKey
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mu sync.Mutex
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exchanges int
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lastJWT string
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expiresAt func() time.Time
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tokenSeq int
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}
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func newAppFixture(t *testing.T, pemKey string) *appFixture {
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t.Helper()
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block, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(pemKey))
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key, err := x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(block.Bytes)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("parse test key: %v", err)
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}
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f := &appFixture{
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pub: &key.PublicKey,
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expiresAt: func() time.Time { return time.Now().Add(time.Hour) },
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}
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mux := http.NewServeMux()
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mux.HandleFunc("/app/installations/456/access_tokens", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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auth := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
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jwt := strings.TrimPrefix(auth, "Bearer ")
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f.mu.Lock()
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f.exchanges++
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f.lastJWT = jwt
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f.tokenSeq++
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seq := f.tokenSeq
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exp := f.expiresAt()
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f.mu.Unlock()
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
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json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{
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"token": fmt.Sprintf("ghs_installation_%d", seq),
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"expires_at": exp.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
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})
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})
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f.srv = httptest.NewServer(mux)
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t.Cleanup(f.srv.Close)
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return f
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}
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func (f *appFixture) verifyJWT(t *testing.T) {
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t.Helper()
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f.mu.Lock()
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jwt := f.lastJWT
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f.mu.Unlock()
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parts := strings.Split(jwt, ".")
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if len(parts) != 3 {
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t.Fatalf("jwt not three-part: %q", jwt)
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}
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signingInput := parts[0] + "." + parts[1]
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sig, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[2])
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("decode sig: %v", err)
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}
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digest := sha256.Sum256([]byte(signingInput))
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if err := rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(f.pub, crypto.SHA256, digest[:], sig); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("jwt signature invalid: %v", err)
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}
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var claims struct {
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Iss string `json:"iss"`
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Iat int64 `json:"iat"`
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Exp int64 `json:"exp"`
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}
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cb, _ := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[1])
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if err := json.Unmarshal(cb, &claims); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("decode claims: %v", err)
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}
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if claims.Iss != "123" {
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t.Fatalf("iss = %q, want 123", claims.Iss)
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}
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if claims.Exp-claims.Iat > int64((10*time.Minute)/time.Second) {
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t.Fatalf("jwt lifetime exceeds 10m: iat=%d exp=%d", claims.Iat, claims.Exp)
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}
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if claims.Iat > time.Now().Unix() {
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t.Fatalf("iat not backdated: %d", claims.Iat)
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}
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}
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func newAppCred(t *testing.T, f *appFixture, pemKey string) *appCredential {
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t.Helper()
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c, err := newAppCredential(Options{
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AppID: "123",
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InstallationID: "456",
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PrivateKeyPEM: pemKey,
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apiBaseURL: f.srv.URL,
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httpClient: f.srv.Client(),
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})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("newAppCredential: %v", err)
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}
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return c
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}
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func TestApp_MintsJWTAndExchangesForInstallationToken(t *testing.T) {
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pemKey := testRSAKeyPEM(t)
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f := newAppFixture(t, pemKey)
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c := newAppCred(t, f, pemKey)
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tok, err := c.Token(context.Background())
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("token: %v", err)
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}
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if tok != "ghs_installation_1" {
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t.Fatalf("token = %q, want ghs_installation_1", tok)
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}
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if f.exchanges != 1 {
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t.Fatalf("exchanges = %d, want 1", f.exchanges)
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}
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f.verifyJWT(t)
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}
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func TestApp_CachesInstallationToken(t *testing.T) {
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pemKey := testRSAKeyPEM(t)
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f := newAppFixture(t, pemKey)
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c := newAppCred(t, f, pemKey)
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for i := 0; i < 5; i++ {
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if _, err := c.Token(context.Background()); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("token: %v", err)
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}
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}
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if f.exchanges != 1 {
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t.Fatalf("exchanges = %d, want 1 (token should be cached)", f.exchanges)
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}
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}
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func TestApp_RefreshesNearExpiry(t *testing.T) {
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pemKey := testRSAKeyPEM(t)
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f := newAppFixture(t, pemKey)
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// Token expires within refreshSkew, so every call must re-exchange.
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f.expiresAt = func() time.Time { return time.Now().Add(2 * time.Minute) }
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c := newAppCred(t, f, pemKey)
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t1, err := c.Token(context.Background())
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("token 1: %v", err)
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}
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t2, err := c.Token(context.Background())
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("token 2: %v", err)
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}
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if f.exchanges != 2 {
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t.Fatalf("exchanges = %d, want 2 (near-expiry token must refresh)", f.exchanges)
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}
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if t1 == t2 {
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t.Fatalf("expected a fresh token after refresh, both = %q", t1)
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}
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}
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func TestApp_ConcurrentTokenSingleFlights(t *testing.T) {
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pemKey := testRSAKeyPEM(t)
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f := newAppFixture(t, pemKey)
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c := newAppCred(t, f, pemKey)
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var wg sync.WaitGroup
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for i := 0; i < 20; i++ {
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wg.Add(1)
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go func() {
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defer wg.Done()
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if _, err := c.Token(context.Background()); err != nil {
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t.Errorf("token: %v", err)
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}
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}()
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}
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wg.Wait()
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if f.exchanges != 1 {
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t.Fatalf("exchanges = %d, want 1 (concurrent calls must coalesce)", f.exchanges)
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}
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}
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