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merge into: unkin/terraform-vault:benvin/ghp-vault
Branches Tags
unkin/terraform-vault:master unkin/terraform-vault:benvin/arrstack-secret-engine unkin/terraform-vault:benvin/ghp-vault unkin/terraform-vault:benvin/rename-terraform-infra unkin/terraform-vault:benvin/certmanager-clouddns-kv unkin/terraform-vault:benvin/terraform-incus-encapi-token unkin/terraform-vault:benvin/litellm-secrets-engine unkin/terraform-vault:feature/forgebot-vault-access
..
pull from: unkin/terraform-vault:benvin/litellm-secrets-engine
Branches Tags
unkin/terraform-vault:master unkin/terraform-vault:benvin/arrstack-secret-engine unkin/terraform-vault:benvin/ghp-vault unkin/terraform-vault:benvin/rename-terraform-infra unkin/terraform-vault:benvin/certmanager-clouddns-kv unkin/terraform-vault:benvin/terraform-incus-encapi-token unkin/terraform-vault:benvin/litellm-secrets-engine unkin/terraform-vault:feature/forgebot-vault-access

2 Commits
benvin/ghp-vault .. benvin/litellm-secrets-engine

Author SHA1 Message Date
unkinben ecee4b4432 fix: grant vault deployer access to manage the litellm engine 
Applying the litellm mount failed with 403 permission denied on
PUT litellm/config: the deployer identity (tf_vault approle /
woodpecker_terraform_vault k8s role) could enable the mount via
sys/mounts/admin but had no policy covering the engine's own data paths.

Add a litellm/admin policy granting create/read/update/delete on
litellm/config and litellm/roles/*, assigned to the same auth roles as the
other secret-engine admin policies.
 2026-07-07 00:23:20 +10:00
unkinben 9e2c21131f feat: manage litellm secrets engine via terraform-provider-litellmvaultsecret
ci/woodpecker/pr/plan Pipeline was successful
Details
ci/woodpecker/pr/pre-commit Pipeline was successful
Details 
The vault-plugin-secrets-litellm engine mints LiteLLM virtual keys and is
now registered in Vault, but nothing declared its mount/config or roles in
this repo. Wire in the companion litellm provider so the mount is managed
as code alongside the other secret backends.

- Add litellm_secret_backend module: mounts the engine and writes its
  config (base_url, request_timeout_seconds); reads master_key from KV
- Add litellm_secret_backend_role module: manages roles (models,
  max_budget, key_alias_prefix, ttl/max_ttl seconds, metadata)
- Register both modules in vault_cluster main.tf and variables.tf
- Discover litellm_secret_backend[_role] YAML in config.hcl and pass them
  through terragrunt inputs
- Declare the litellm provider (litellmvaultsecret) and
  a provider block in the generated root backend.tf
- Add example config for the litellm mount and a sample role
 2026-07-07 00:15:07 +10:00
106 changed files with 5 additions and 2274 deletions
Expand all files Collapse all files
.woodpecker/apply.yaml
+1 -2
View File
@@ -7,9 +7,8 @@ steps:
image: git.unkin.net/unkin/almalinux9-opentofu:20260606
environment:
VAULT_AUTH_METHOD: kubernetes
VAULT_VERSION: "1.20.0"
commands:
- curl -fsSL -o /tmp/vault.zip "https://artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/api/v1/remote/hashicorp-releases/vault/$${VAULT_VERSION}/vault_$${VAULT_VERSION}_linux_amd64.zip" && python3 -m zipfile -e /tmp/vault.zip /tmp/ && install -m0755 /tmp/vault /usr/local/bin/vault && rm -f /tmp/vault.zip /tmp/vault /tmp/LICENSE.txt
- dnf install vault -y
- make plan
- make apply
backend_options:
.woodpecker/plan.yaml
+1 -2
View File
@@ -6,9 +6,8 @@ steps:
image: git.unkin.net/unkin/almalinux9-opentofu:20260606
environment:
VAULT_AUTH_METHOD: kubernetes
VAULT_VERSION: "1.20.0"
commands:
- curl -fsSL -o /tmp/vault.zip "https://artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/api/v1/remote/hashicorp-releases/vault/$${VAULT_VERSION}/vault_$${VAULT_VERSION}_linux_amd64.zip" && python3 -m zipfile -e /tmp/vault.zip /tmp/ && install -m0755 /tmp/vault /usr/local/bin/vault && rm -f /tmp/vault.zip /tmp/vault /tmp/LICENSE.txt
- dnf install vault -y
- make plan
backend_options:
kubernetes:
config/auth_approle_role/approle/agents.yaml
-6
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@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
token_ttl: 3600
token_max_ttl: 14400
bind_secret_id: false
token_bound_cidrs:
- "10.10.12.200/32"
use_deterministic_role_id: true
config/auth_approle_role/approle/terraform_enc.yaml
-9
View File
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
token_ttl: 120
token_max_ttl: 120
bind_secret_id: false
token_bound_cidrs:
- "10.10.12.200/32"
- "198.18.25.102/32"
- "198.18.26.91/32"
- "198.18.27.40/32"
use_deterministic_role_id: true
config/auth_approle_role/approle/terraform_rancher.yaml
-9
View File
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
token_ttl: 120
token_max_ttl: 120
bind_secret_id: false
token_bound_cidrs:
- "10.10.12.200/32"
- "198.18.25.102/32"
- "198.18.26.91/32"
- "198.18.27.40/32"
use_deterministic_role_id: true
config/auth_kubernetes_role/k8s/au/syd1/ghp.yaml
-7
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@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
bound_service_account_names:
- ghp
bound_service_account_namespaces:
- ghp
token_ttl: 600
token_max_ttl: 600
audience: vault
config/auth_kubernetes_role/k8s/au/syd1/logging_logarchiver.yaml
-7
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@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
bound_service_account_names:
- logarchiver
bound_service_account_namespaces:
- logging
token_ttl: 600
token_max_ttl: 600
audience: vault
config/auth_kubernetes_role/k8s/au/syd1/woodpecker_terraform_enc.yaml
-7
View File
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
bound_service_account_names:
- terraform-enc
bound_service_account_namespaces:
- woodpecker
token_ttl: 600
token_max_ttl: 600
audience: https://kubernetes.default.svc.cluster.local
config/auth_kubernetes_role/k8s/au/syd1/woodpecker_terraform_infra.yaml
-7
View File
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
bound_service_account_names:
- terraform-infra
bound_service_account_namespaces:
- woodpecker
token_ttl: 600
token_max_ttl: 600
audience: https://kubernetes.default.svc.cluster.local
config/auth_kubernetes_role/k8s/au/syd1/woodpecker_terraform_rancher.yaml
-7
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@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
bound_service_account_names:
- terraform-rancher
bound_service_account_namespaces:
- woodpecker
token_ttl: 600
token_max_ttl: 600
audience: https://kubernetes.default.svc.cluster.local
config/config.hcl
-68
View File
@@ -198,73 +198,5 @@ locals {
})
if startswith(file_path, "litellm_secret_backend_role/")
}
plugins = {
for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml") => merge(content, {
name = trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml")
})
if startswith(file_path, "plugins/")
}
gpg_secret_backend = {
for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml") => content
if startswith(file_path, "gpg_secret_backend/")
}
gpg_key = {
for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
trimsuffix(replace(file_path, "gpg_key/", ""), ".yaml") => merge(content, {
name = trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml")
backend = dirname(replace(file_path, "gpg_key/", ""))
})
if startswith(file_path, "gpg_key/")
}
rancher_secret_backend = {
for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml") => content
if startswith(file_path, "rancher_secret_backend/")
}
rancher_secret_backend_service_account = {
for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
trimsuffix(replace(file_path, "rancher_secret_backend_service_account/", ""), ".yaml") => merge(content, {
name = trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml")
backend = dirname(replace(file_path, "rancher_secret_backend_service_account/", ""))
})
if startswith(file_path, "rancher_secret_backend_service_account/")
}
rancher_secret_backend_role = {
for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
trimsuffix(replace(file_path, "rancher_secret_backend_role/", ""), ".yaml") => merge(content, {
name = trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml")
backend = dirname(replace(file_path, "rancher_secret_backend_role/", ""))
})
if startswith(file_path, "rancher_secret_backend_role/")
}
gitea_secret_backend = {
for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml") => content
if startswith(file_path, "gitea_secret_backend/")
}
gitea_secret_backend_role = {
for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
trimsuffix(replace(file_path, "gitea_secret_backend_role/", ""), ".yaml") => merge(content, {
name = trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml")
backend = dirname(replace(file_path, "gitea_secret_backend_role/", ""))
})
if startswith(file_path, "gitea_secret_backend_role/")
}
netbox_secret_backend = {
for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml") => content
if startswith(file_path, "netbox_secret_backend/")
}
netbox_secret_backend_role = {
for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
trimsuffix(replace(file_path, "netbox_secret_backend_role/", ""), ".yaml") => merge(content, {
name = trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml")
netbox_username = trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml")
backend = dirname(replace(file_path, "netbox_secret_backend_role/", ""))
})
if startswith(file_path, "netbox_secret_backend_role/")
}
}
}
config/consul_secret_backend_role/consul_root/au/syd1/terraform-enc.yaml
-5
View File
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
consul_roles:
- terraform-enc
ttl: 120
max_ttl: 300
datacenters: []
config/consul_secret_backend_role/consul_root/au/syd1/terraform-infra.yaml
-5
View File
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
consul_roles:
- terraform-infra
ttl: 120
max_ttl: 300
datacenters: []
config/consul_secret_backend_role/consul_root/au/syd1/terraform-rancher.yaml
-5
View File
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
consul_roles:
- terraform-rancher
ttl: 120
max_ttl: 300
datacenters: []
config/gitea_secret_backend/gitea.yaml
-11
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@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
# Mounts the gitea token secrets engine at "gitea" and writes its config.
# The seeded site-admin credentials are sensitive and read from KV, not stored
# here:
# kv/service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/gitea/config
# -> keys: admin_username (required), admin_password (required)
# Populate that KV path with a purpose-built Gitea site-admin bot (2FA disabled)
# BEFORE applying, then run `vault write -f gitea/config/rotate-root` after the
# first apply so only Vault holds the admin password.
description: "Gitea ephemeral scoped access token engine"
gitea_url: "https://git.unkin.net"
request_timeout_seconds: 30
config/gitea_secret_backend_role/gitea/teabot-implementer.yaml
-17
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@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
# Role minting ephemeral tokens for the teabot-implementer bot user.
# The implementer clones/pushes code and opens pull requests, so it gets write
# on repositories (clone + push + PR create) and write on issues (PR/issue
# comments). Read is implied by write. No admin/org/user-write scopes.
# read:user is required because tea (and most API clients) validate the login
# via GET /api/v1/user, which 403s without it (verified against a minted token).
# Reading gitea/creds/teabot-implementer mints a lease-bound token deleted from
# Gitea on revoke/expiry.
---
username: teabot-implementer
scopes:
- write:repository
- write:issue
- read:user
token_name_prefix: vault-teabot-implementer
ttl: 3600 # 1h
max_ttl: 14400 # 4h
config/gitea_secret_backend_role/gitea/teabot-reviewer.yaml
-17
View File
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
# Role minting ephemeral tokens for the teabot-reviewer bot user.
# The reviewer reads code and posts pull-request reviews/comments, so it gets
# read on repositories (fetch diffs) and write on issues (PR reviews + issue/PR
# comments). No repository-write, admin, org, or user-write scopes.
# read:user is required because tea (and most API clients) validate the login
# via GET /api/v1/user, which 403s without it (verified against a minted token).
# Reading gitea/creds/teabot-reviewer mints a lease-bound token deleted from
# Gitea on revoke/expiry.
---
username: teabot-reviewer
scopes:
- read:repository
- write:issue
- read:user
token_name_prefix: vault-teabot-reviewer
ttl: 3600 # 1h
max_ttl: 14400 # 4h
config/gitea_secret_backend_role/gitea/unkin-agent.yaml
-20
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@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
# Role minting ephemeral tokens for the unkin-agent bot user -- the shared
# identity Ben's AI coding agents use to submit work. The agent clones/pushes
# code and opens pull requests, so it gets write on repositories (clone + push +
# PR create) and write on issues (PR/issue comments). Read is implied by write.
# No admin/org/user-write scopes, so it can never merge via API privilege; merge
# is blocked separately by branch protection (merge whitelist = Owners).
# read:user is required because tea (and most API clients) validate the login
# via GET /api/v1/user, which 403s without it.
# Reading gitea/creds/unkin-agent mints a lease-bound token deleted from Gitea
# on revoke/expiry. Consumed by the "agents" AppRole (see
# policies/gitea/creds/unkin-agent.yaml).
---
username: unkin-agent
scopes:
- write:repository
- write:issue
- read:user
token_name_prefix: vault-unkin-agent
ttl: 3600 # 1h
max_ttl: 14400 # 4h
config/gpg_key/gpg/logarchive.yaml
-8
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@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
# config/gpg_key/gpg/logarchive.yaml
# OpenPGP key in the gpg engine for the logarchiver service. The private key
# stays in Vault; logarchiver reads only the exported public key
# (gpg/keys/logarchive) to encrypt archived logs, and retrieval delegates
# decryption back to gpg/decrypt/logarchive. Key name = "logarchive", backend = "gpg".
algorithm: rsa-4096
identity: "logarchive <logarchive@unkin.net>"
exportable: false
config/gpg_key/gpg/pass.yaml
-7
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@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
# config/gpg_key/gpg/pass.yaml
# An OpenPGP key in the gpg engine for password-store (passv). The private key
# stays in Vault; clients import the exported public key to encrypt and delegate
# decryption to gpg/decrypt/pass. Key name = "pass", backend = "gpg".
algorithm: rsa-4096
identity: "pass <pass@unkin.net>"
exportable: false
config/gpg_secret_backend/gpg.yaml
-4
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@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
# config/gpg_secret_backend/gpg.yaml
# Mounts the gpg secrets engine at "gpg". The plugin itself is registered in the
# catalog separately (see config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-gpg.yaml).
description: "GPG/OpenPGP secrets engine (sign/verify/encrypt/decrypt)"
config/kubernetes_secret_backend_role/kubernetes/au/syd1/agent-certs.yaml
-4
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@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
allowed_kubernetes_namespaces:
- "cert-manager"
kubernetes_role_type: "Role"
extra_labels: {}
config/kubernetes_secret_backend_role/kubernetes/au/syd1/agent-dhcp.yaml
-4
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@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
allowed_kubernetes_namespaces:
- "dhcp-system"
kubernetes_role_type: "Role"
extra_labels: {}
config/kubernetes_secret_backend_role/kubernetes/au/syd1/agent-dns.yaml
-4
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@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
allowed_kubernetes_namespaces:
- "bind-system"
service_account_name: "agent-dns"
extra_labels: {}
config/kubernetes_secret_backend_role/kubernetes/au/syd1/agent-storage.yaml
-4
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@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
allowed_kubernetes_namespaces:
- "cephrgw-system"
kubernetes_role_type: "Role"
extra_labels: {}
config/litellm_secret_backend/litellm.yaml
+1 -1
View File
@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
# The master key is sensitive and read from KV, not stored here:
# kv/service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/litellm -> key "master_key"
description: "LiteLLM dynamic virtual keys"
base_url: "https://litellm.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net"
base_url: "http://litellm.litellm.svc:4000"
request_timeout_seconds: 30
config/litellm_secret_backend_role/litellm/opus47.yaml
-9
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@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
---
models:
- claude-opus-4-7
max_budget: 5
ttl: 3600 # seconds (1h)
max_ttl: 86400 # seconds (24h)
metadata:
team: testuser
env: prod
config/netbox_secret_backend/netbox.yaml
-48
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@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
# Mounts the netbox token secrets engine at "netbox" and writes its config.
# The seeded NetBox admin token is sensitive and read from KV, not stored here:
# kv/service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/netbox/config
# -> key: admin_token (required) the SINGLE static admin credential
#
# admin_token must be a BARE NetBox token with NO scheme prefix: do not prepend
# "Bearer " or "Token ". NetBox infers the version from the value's nbt_ prefix,
# so one bare token authenticates under either scheme; the plugin adds the keyword
# itself. A prefixed value yields a malformed header + 403.
#
# Populate admin_token with a purpose-built NetBox superuser token (add_user +
# add_token + grant_token, or superuser) BEFORE applying, then run
# `vault write -f netbox/config/rotate` after the first apply so only Vault holds
# the live admin token.
#
# Only ONE static admin token exists. netbox_user_management does NOT re-read this
# token; instead the engine mints it a short-lived user-admin token per apply from
# netbox/roles/vault-user-mgmt (see user_mgmt_username below), so rotating
# admin_token never breaks user management. Set user_mgmt_username to the
# pre-existing NetBox superuser the static admin_token belongs to (or another
# superuser). Leaving it unset falls back to using admin_token directly, which is
# only a bootstrap/degraded path and breaks after rotation.
#
# Bootstrap ordering: the vault-user-mgmt role must exist before the netbox
# provider is configured from its creds, so on a brand-new backend apply the mount
# + role first (e.g. `tofu apply -target=...netbox_secret_backend
# -target=...netbox_user_mgmt_role`) once, then apply normally.
#
# token_version 2 is the NetBox 4.6.5 default and requires API_TOKEN_PEPPERS to
# be configured on the NetBox server; set token_version: 1 here if the server
# has no peppers. token_version does NOT change how the plugin authenticates its
# own calls (that scheme comes from the admin_token value's nbt_ prefix); it only
# sets the version of the per-user tokens the engine mints. It must still MATCH
# the admin_token kind: nbt_ v2 token -> token_version 2; bare v1 token -> 1.
#
# The mount uses ignore_changes=[token], so editing KV alone does NOT reach the
# live mount. To push a corrected/rotated admin token into a running mount:
# vault write netbox/config token=<BARE_TOKEN>
# (netbox_url/token_version are preserved on a partial update). Do NOT -replace
# the mount to force a re-read - that recreates it and drops all roles/config.
description: "NetBox ephemeral scoped API token engine"
netbox_url: "https://netbox.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net"
token_version: 2
request_timeout_seconds: 30
# Set to the pre-existing NetBox superuser admin_token belongs to, to mint the
# user-management credential dynamically (recommended). Until set, user management
# uses admin_token directly and a check block warns that rotation will break it.
# user_mgmt_username: "vault-netbox-admin"
config/netbox_secret_backend_role/netbox/terraform-infra.yaml
-25
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@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
# Single declarative source for the terraform-infra NetBox service identity. The
# filename stem is the engine role name AND the NetBox username (1:1); config.hcl
# derives both from it, so neither is repeated below. Creating this file creates
# the user: the netbox_user_management module synthesizes the NetBox user + object
# permissions from the permissions block, and the engine role mints ephemeral
# tokens for that same user. write_enabled true because terraform-infra manages
# NetBox IPAM/DCIM; very short TTLs because a token is minted per plan/apply and
# revoked when the run's lease ends.
---
write_enabled: true
ttl: 120 # 2m
max_ttl: 300 # 5m
permissions:
- object_types:
- ipam.prefix
- ipam.ipaddress
- ipam.iprange
- dcim.device
- dcim.interface
- dcim.macaddress
actions:
- view
- add
- change
- delete
config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-gitea.yaml
-11
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@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
# config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-gitea.yaml
# Imports (registers) the gitea secrets plugin in the catalog. Filename =
# catalog name = mount type. The binary is installed on the OpenBao nodes by
# Puppet (openbao-plugin-secrets-gitea RPM ->
# /opt/openbao-plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-gitea).
#
# sha256 pins the released v0.1.0 binary; bump it in lockstep with any RPM
# upgrade or OpenBao will refuse to launch the plugin.
type: secret
command: vault-plugin-secrets-gitea
sha256: "8f67fbc216effada5fd7399888a710b62fad83be0b31761a439e7dec3d56509b"
config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-gpg.yaml
-10
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@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
# config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-gpg.yaml
# Imports (registers) the gpg secrets plugin in the catalog. Filename = catalog
# name = mount type. The binary is installed on the OpenBao nodes by Puppet
# (openbao-plugin-secrets-gpg RPM -> /opt/openbao-plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-gpg).
#
# sha256 pins the released v0.1.0 binary; bump it in lockstep with any RPM
# upgrade or OpenBao will refuse to launch the plugin.
type: secret
command: vault-plugin-secrets-gpg
sha256: "0e92d7408795688badb55789bc1604e8f1dd4d71998656c7f831991fce9a7b20"
config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-litellm.yaml
-13
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@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
# config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-litellm.yaml
# Imports (registers) the litellm secrets plugin in the catalog. This plugin was
# registered manually before terraform managed the catalog, so its state must be
# imported before the first apply (see the PR description) — otherwise apply
# tries to create an entry that already exists.
#
# sha256 is the released v0.1.1 openbao binary
# (openbao-plugin-secrets-litellm RPM -> /opt/openbao-plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-litellm),
# which Puppet installs floating. Verify against the live catalog during import
# (`bao read sys/plugins/catalog/secret/vault-plugin-secrets-litellm`).
type: secret
command: vault-plugin-secrets-litellm
sha256: "2263ebcb3498877a87ddcf31a9cbc6efca6b81702a5faecf7fe7e40200ca7a1f"
config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-netbox.yaml
-11
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@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
# config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-netbox.yaml
# Imports (registers) the netbox secrets plugin in the catalog. Filename =
# catalog name = mount type. The binary is installed on the OpenBao nodes by
# Puppet (openbao-plugin-secrets-netbox RPM ->
# /opt/openbao-plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-netbox).
#
# sha256 pins the released v0.1.0 binary; bump it in lockstep with any RPM
# upgrade or OpenBao will refuse to launch the plugin.
type: secret
command: vault-plugin-secrets-netbox
sha256: "362b7f6c9e21179ad51d2d810684d9387fe50e3a1887f171700122a0b2a05cef"
config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-rancher.yaml
-11
View File
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
# config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-rancher.yaml
# Imports (registers) the rancher secrets plugin in the catalog. Filename =
# catalog name = mount type. The binary is installed on the OpenBao nodes by
# Puppet (openbao-plugin-secrets-rancher RPM ->
# /opt/openbao-plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-rancher).
#
# sha256 pins the released v0.1.1 binary; bump it in lockstep with any RPM
# upgrade or OpenBao will refuse to launch the plugin.
type: secret
command: vault-plugin-secrets-rancher
sha256: "9e597cd9512a0629f940141dc6611bf95eaf165abcb52470eee027bf467d5955"
config/rancher_secret_backend/rancher.yaml
-8
View File
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
# Mounts the rancher token secrets engine at "rancher" and writes its config.
# The plugin is registered in the catalog separately (see
# config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-rancher.yaml). Seeded service-account
# tokens live under config/rancher_secret_backend_service_account/rancher/ and
# roles under config/rancher_secret_backend_role/rancher/.
description: "Rancher API token engine (seeded root rotation + dynamic scoped creds)"
rancher_url: "https://rancher.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net"
request_timeout_seconds: 30
config/rancher_secret_backend_role/rancher/ci.yaml
-9
View File
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
# A role that mints short-lived Rancher tokens from the "admin" service account.
# Reading rancher/creds/ci returns a lease-bound token deleted from Rancher on
# revoke. Minted tokens inherit the admin service account's RBAC; only cluster
# and TTL are scoped per-token.
---
service_account: admin
description: "CI/CD ephemeral Rancher token"
ttl: 3600 # seconds (1h)
max_ttl: 28800 # seconds (8h)
config/rancher_secret_backend_service_account/rancher/admin.yaml
-8
View File
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
# A seeded, auto-rotated Rancher service-account token on the "rancher" engine.
# The seed token itself is sensitive and read from KV (not stored here):
# kv/service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/rancher/service_account/admin
# -> keys: token (required), token_name (optional)
# Populate that KV path with a live Rancher admin token BEFORE applying; the
# engine then rotates it (mints a fresh 90d token every 45d) so it never lapses.
token_ttl: 7776000 # 90d in seconds
rotation_period: 3888000 # 45d in seconds
environments/au/syd1/terragrunt.hcl
-22
View File
@@ -39,12 +39,6 @@ locals {
for backend_name, _ in local.config.consul_secret_backend :
backend_name => replace(backend_name, "/", "_")
}
# Same sanitized alias mapping for the NetBox providers.
netbox_backend_aliases = {
for backend_name, _ in local.config.netbox_secret_backend :
backend_name => replace(backend_name, "/", "_")
}
}
terraform {
@@ -76,19 +70,6 @@ inputs = {
pki_mount_only = local.config.pki_mount_only
litellm_secret_backend = local.config.litellm_secret_backend
litellm_secret_backend_role = local.config.litellm_secret_backend_role
plugins = local.config.plugins
gpg_secret_backend = local.config.gpg_secret_backend
gpg_key = local.config.gpg_key
rancher_secret_backend = local.config.rancher_secret_backend
rancher_secret_backend_service_account = local.config.rancher_secret_backend_service_account
rancher_secret_backend_role = local.config.rancher_secret_backend_role
gitea_secret_backend = local.config.gitea_secret_backend
gitea_secret_backend_role = local.config.gitea_secret_backend_role
netbox_secret_backend = local.config.netbox_secret_backend
netbox_secret_backend_role = local.config.netbox_secret_backend_role
# Pass policy maps to vault_cluster module
policy_auth_map = local.policies.policy_auth_map
@@ -96,7 +77,4 @@ inputs = {
# Pass sanitized consul backend aliases for provider configuration
consul_backend_aliases = local.consul_backend_aliases
# Pass sanitized netbox backend aliases for provider configuration
netbox_backend_aliases = local.netbox_backend_aliases
}
environments/root.hcl
-20
View File
@@ -17,18 +17,6 @@ provider "litellm" {
address = local.vault_addr
}
# The gpg secrets engine's keys are managed through its own provider (same Vault
# server; token falls back to VAULT_TOKEN).
provider "gpg" {
address = local.vault_addr
}
# The rancher token secrets engine is managed through its own provider (same
# Vault server; token falls back to VAULT_TOKEN).
provider "rancher" {
address = local.vault_addr
}
terraform {
backend "consul" {
address = "https://consul.service.consul"
@@ -51,14 +39,6 @@ terraform {
source = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/litellmvaultsecret"
version = "0.1.0"
}
gpg = {
source = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/gpgvaultsecret"
version = "0.1.0"
}
rancher = {
source = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/ranchervaultsecret"
version = "0.1.0"
}
}
}
EOF
modules/vault_cluster/main.tf
-202
View File
@@ -299,7 +299,6 @@ module "kubernetes_secret_backend_role" {
allowed_kubernetes_namespaces = each.value.allowed_kubernetes_namespaces
kubernetes_role_type = each.value.kubernetes_role_type
extra_labels = each.value.extra_labels
service_account_name = each.value.service_account_name
depends_on = [module.kubernetes_secret_backend]
}
@@ -335,207 +334,6 @@ module "litellm_secret_backend_role" {
depends_on = [module.litellm_secret_backend]
}
module "plugin" {
source = "./modules/plugin"
for_each = var.plugins
name = each.value.name
type = each.value.type
command = each.value.command
sha256 = each.value.sha256
plugin_version = each.value.version
}
module "gpg_secret_backend" {
source = "./modules/gpg_secret_backend"
for_each = var.gpg_secret_backend
path = each.key
plugin = each.value.plugin
description = each.value.description
depends_on = [module.plugin]
}
module "gpg_key" {
source = "./modules/gpg_key"
for_each = var.gpg_key
backend = each.value.backend
name = each.value.name
algorithm = each.value.algorithm
identity = each.value.identity
exportable = each.value.exportable
deletion_allowed = each.value.deletion_allowed
min_decryption_version = each.value.min_decryption_version
depends_on = [module.gpg_secret_backend]
}
module "rancher_secret_backend" {
source = "./modules/rancher_secret_backend"
for_each = var.rancher_secret_backend
path = each.key
plugin = each.value.plugin
description = each.value.description
rancher_url = each.value.rancher_url
ca_cert = each.value.ca_cert
tls_skip_verify = each.value.tls_skip_verify
request_timeout_seconds = each.value.request_timeout_seconds
depends_on = [module.plugin]
}
module "rancher_secret_backend_service_account" {
source = "./modules/rancher_secret_backend_service_account"
for_each = var.rancher_secret_backend_service_account
backend = each.value.backend
name = each.value.name
country = var.country
region = var.region
token_ttl = each.value.token_ttl
rotation_period = each.value.rotation_period
depends_on = [module.rancher_secret_backend]
}
module "rancher_secret_backend_role" {
source = "./modules/rancher_secret_backend_role"
for_each = var.rancher_secret_backend_role
backend = each.value.backend
name = each.value.name
service_account = each.value.service_account
cluster_name = each.value.cluster_name
description = each.value.description
ttl = each.value.ttl
max_ttl = each.value.max_ttl
depends_on = [module.rancher_secret_backend_service_account]
}
module "gitea_secret_backend" {
source = "./modules/gitea_secret_backend"
for_each = var.gitea_secret_backend
path = each.key
plugin = each.value.plugin
description = each.value.description
gitea_url = each.value.gitea_url
country = var.country
region = var.region
ca_cert = each.value.ca_cert
tls_skip_verify = each.value.tls_skip_verify
request_timeout_seconds = each.value.request_timeout_seconds
depends_on = [module.plugin]
}
module "gitea_secret_backend_role" {
source = "./modules/gitea_secret_backend_role"
for_each = var.gitea_secret_backend_role
backend = each.value.backend
name = each.value.name
username = each.value.username
scopes = each.value.scopes
token_name_prefix = each.value.token_name_prefix
ttl = each.value.ttl
max_ttl = each.value.max_ttl
depends_on = [module.gitea_secret_backend]
}
module "netbox_secret_backend" {
source = "./modules/netbox_secret_backend"
for_each = var.netbox_secret_backend
path = each.key
plugin = each.value.plugin
description = each.value.description
netbox_url = each.value.netbox_url
token_version = each.value.token_version
country = var.country
region = var.region
ca_cert = each.value.ca_cert
tls_skip_verify = each.value.tls_skip_verify
request_timeout_seconds = each.value.request_timeout_seconds
depends_on = [module.plugin]
}
# Dedicated engine role that mints an ephemeral, user-admin-capable token for the
# pre-existing NetBox superuser named on each backend (user_mgmt_username).
# netbox_user_management reads netbox/creds/vault-user-mgmt from it, so it
# authenticates with a short-lived Vault-minted token derived from the single
# static admin token - never a second static credential, and unaffected by
# rotation of the engine's admin seed. Created before user management so the role
# exists when it reads creds.
module "netbox_user_mgmt_role" {
source = "./modules/netbox_secret_backend_role"
for_each = { for k, v in var.netbox_secret_backend : k => v if v.user_mgmt_username != null }
backend = each.key
name = "vault-user-mgmt"
netbox_username = each.value.user_mgmt_username
write_enabled = true
description = "Ephemeral user-admin token for netbox_user_management (Vault-minted per apply)"
ttl = 600
max_ttl = 1200
depends_on = [module.netbox_secret_backend]
}
# Declaratively manage the NetBox service users + object permissions the engine
# roles mint tokens for, authenticating with the Vault-minted user-admin token
# above (mirrors consul_acl_management). Consumes the SAME role config as
# netbox_secret_backend_role: one file per identity, filename-derived username,
# inline permissions.
module "netbox_user_management" {
source = "./modules/netbox_user_management"
country = var.country
region = var.region
netbox_backends = var.netbox_secret_backend
netbox_roles = var.netbox_secret_backend_role
netbox_backend_aliases = var.netbox_backend_aliases
# This module declares its own netbox provider, so it is a legacy module and
# cannot take depends_on. Ordering vs the vault-user-mgmt role is not needed on
# steady state (the role pre-exists, so reading its creds succeeds regardless);
# on first enablement the role must be created first via the one-time targeted
# bootstrap documented in config/netbox_secret_backend/netbox.yaml.
}
module "netbox_secret_backend_role" {
source = "./modules/netbox_secret_backend_role"
for_each = var.netbox_secret_backend_role
backend = each.value.backend
name = each.value.name
netbox_username = each.value.netbox_username
netbox_user_id = each.value.netbox_user_id
write_enabled = each.value.write_enabled
description = each.value.description
ttl = each.value.ttl
max_ttl = each.value.max_ttl
depends_on = [module.netbox_secret_backend, module.netbox_user_management]
}
module "vault_policy" {
source = "./modules/vault_policy"
modules/vault_cluster/modules/gitea_secret_backend/main.tf
-34
View File
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
# Mounts the gitea secrets engine and writes its connection config via the
# giteavaultsecret provider. The plugin is registered ("imported") in the
# catalog separately (config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-gitea.yaml). The
# seeded site-admin credentials are sensitive and read from KV, not stored in
# git:
# kv/service/vault/<country>/<region>/secret_backend/<path>/config
# Expected keys: admin_username (required), admin_password (required).
data "vault_kv_secret_v2" "config" {
mount = "kv"
name = "service/vault/${var.country}/${var.region}/secret_backend/${var.path}/config"
}
resource "gitea_secret_backend" "this" {
path = var.path
plugin = var.plugin
description = var.description
gitea_url = var.gitea_url
admin_username = data.vault_kv_secret_v2.config.data["admin_username"]
admin_password = data.vault_kv_secret_v2.config.data["admin_password"]
ca_cert = var.ca_cert
tls_skip_verify = var.tls_skip_verify
request_timeout_seconds = var.request_timeout_seconds
lifecycle {
# The KV seed is a bootstrap credential: it is consumed only when the engine
# config is first created. After creation the live admin password is rotated
# in place (vault write -f gitea/config/rotate-root) and diverges from the
# seed, so re-reading the (possibly stale) KV value must never push it back.
# Ignoring the credential attributes makes this module create-only for them.
# (The sibling rancher/litellm seed modules do not yet do this and would
# re-push their seed on a subsequent apply.)
ignore_changes = [admin_username, admin_password]
}
}
modules/vault_cluster/modules/gitea_secret_backend/terraform.tf
-13
View File
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.10"
required_providers {
vault = {
source = "hashicorp/vault"
version = "5.6.0"
}
gitea = {
source = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/giteavaultsecret"
version = "0.1.0"
}
}
}
modules/vault_cluster/modules/gitea_secret_backend/variables.tf
-49
View File
@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
variable "path" {
description = "Mount path of the gitea secrets engine (e.g. \"gitea\")"
type = string
}
variable "plugin" {
description = "Registered plugin name to mount (the catalog name = mount type)"
type = string
default = "vault-plugin-secrets-gitea"
}
variable "description" {
description = "Human-friendly description of the mount"
type = string
default = null
}
variable "gitea_url" {
description = "Base URL of the Gitea server (e.g. https://git.unkin.net)"
type = string
}
variable "country" {
description = "Country segment of the KV path holding the seeded admin credentials"
type = string
}
variable "region" {
description = "Region segment of the KV path holding the seeded admin credentials"
type = string
}
variable "ca_cert" {
description = "PEM CA certificate that signed the Gitea server's TLS cert (optional; omit to use the system trust store)"
type = string
default = null
}
variable "tls_skip_verify" {
description = "Skip TLS verification of the Gitea server (not recommended)"
type = bool
default = false
}
variable "request_timeout_seconds" {
description = "HTTP timeout in seconds for calls from the plugin to Gitea"
type = number
default = 30
}
modules/vault_cluster/modules/gitea_secret_backend_role/main.tf
-12
View File
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
# A role that mints short-lived, scoped gitea tokens for a target Gitea user.
# Reading gitea/creds/<name> produces a lease-bound token that is deleted from
# Gitea when the lease is revoked or reaches max_ttl.
resource "gitea_secret_backend_role" "this" {
backend = var.backend
name = var.name
username = var.username
scopes = var.scopes
token_name_prefix = var.token_name_prefix
ttl = var.ttl
max_ttl = var.max_ttl
}
modules/vault_cluster/modules/gitea_secret_backend_role/terraform.tf
-9
View File
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.10"
required_providers {
gitea = {
source = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/giteavaultsecret"
version = "0.1.0"
}
}
}
modules/vault_cluster/modules/gitea_secret_backend_role/variables.tf
-37
View File
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
variable "backend" {
description = "Mount path of the gitea secrets engine this role belongs to"
type = string
}
variable "name" {
description = "Role name (read gitea/creds/<name> to mint a token)"
type = string
}
variable "username" {
description = "Target Gitea username the minted tokens belong to"
type = string
}
variable "scopes" {
description = "Gitea access-token scopes granted to minted tokens (write: implies read:)"
type = list(string)
}
variable "token_name_prefix" {
description = "Prefix for the generated Gitea token name (optional)"
type = string
default = null
}
variable "ttl" {
description = "Default lease TTL in seconds for minted tokens"
type = number
default = null
}
variable "max_ttl" {
description = "Maximum lease TTL in seconds for minted tokens"
type = number
default = null
}
modules/vault_cluster/modules/gpg_key/main.tf
-12
View File
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
# Manages an OpenPGP key inside a gpg secrets engine mount, via the
# gpgvaultsecret provider. The private key never leaves Vault; consumers use the
# exported public_key to encrypt and delegate decryption back to the engine.
resource "gpg_key" "this" {
backend = var.backend
name = var.name
algorithm = var.algorithm
identity = var.identity
exportable = var.exportable
deletion_allowed = var.deletion_allowed
min_decryption_version = var.min_decryption_version
}
modules/vault_cluster/modules/gpg_key/terraform.tf
-9
View File
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.10"
required_providers {
gpg = {
source = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/gpgvaultsecret"
version = "0.1.0"
}
}
}
modules/vault_cluster/modules/gpg_key/variables.tf
-39
View File
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
variable "backend" {
description = "Mount path of the gpg secrets engine (e.g. \"gpg\")"
type = string
}
variable "name" {
description = "Name of the key"
type = string
}
variable "algorithm" {
description = "Key algorithm: rsa-2048, rsa-3072, rsa-4096 or ed25519"
type = string
default = "rsa-3072"
}
variable "identity" {
description = "OpenPGP User ID (defaults to the key name)"
type = string
default = null
}
variable "exportable" {
description = "Allow exporting the private key (enable-only)"
type = bool
default = false
}
variable "deletion_allowed" {
description = "Whether the key may be deleted"
type = bool
default = false
}
variable "min_decryption_version" {
description = "Minimum key version usable for decryption/verification"
type = number
default = null
}
modules/vault_cluster/modules/gpg_secret_backend/main.tf
-8
View File
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
# Mounts the gpg secrets engine. The plugin is registered ("imported") in the
# catalog separately via the config/plugins/ discovery and the plugin module;
# this module just enables a mount of the already-registered plugin type.
resource "vault_mount" "this" {
path = var.path
type = var.plugin
description = var.description
}
modules/vault_cluster/modules/gpg_secret_backend/terraform.tf
-9
View File
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.10"
required_providers {
vault = {
source = "hashicorp/vault"
version = "5.6.0"
}
}
}
modules/vault_cluster/modules/gpg_secret_backend/variables.tf
-16
View File
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
variable "path" {
description = "Mount path of the GPG secrets engine (e.g. \"gpg\")"
type = string
}
variable "plugin" {
description = "Registered plugin name to mount (the catalog name = mount type)"
type = string
default = "vault-plugin-secrets-gpg"
}
variable "description" {
description = "Human-friendly description of the mount"
type = string
default = null
}
modules/vault_cluster/modules/kubernetes_secret_backend_role/main.tf
+2 -7
View File
@@ -2,10 +2,6 @@ locals {
# Auto-generate role rules path: resources/secret_backend/{backend_path}/roles/{role_name}.yaml
role_rules_file = "resources/secret_backend/${var.backend}/roles/${var.name}.yaml"
# service_account_name mode mints tokens for a pre-existing SA, so the
# generated_role_rules / kubernetes_role_type binding fields must be unset.
use_service_account = var.service_account_name != null
# Auto-generate extra labels based on country/region and role name
auto_labels = merge(var.extra_labels, {
vault-region = "${var.country}-${var.region}"
@@ -17,8 +13,7 @@ resource "vault_kubernetes_secret_backend_role" "role" {
backend = var.backend
name = var.name
allowed_kubernetes_namespaces = var.allowed_kubernetes_namespaces
kubernetes_role_type = local.use_service_account ? null : var.kubernetes_role_type
generated_role_rules = local.use_service_account ? null : file("${path.module}/../../../../../../../../${local.role_rules_file}")
service_account_name = var.service_account_name
kubernetes_role_type = var.kubernetes_role_type
generated_role_rules = file("${path.module}/../../../../../../../../${local.role_rules_file}")
extra_labels = local.auto_labels
}
modules/vault_cluster/modules/kubernetes_secret_backend_role/variables.tf
-6
View File
@@ -34,10 +34,4 @@ variable "extra_labels" {
description = "Additional labels to apply to generated Kubernetes objects"
type = map(string)
default = {}
}
variable "service_account_name" {
description = "Pre-existing service account to mint tokens for. When set, RBAC comes from that SA's own bindings instead of generated_role_rules."
type = string
default = null
}
modules/vault_cluster/modules/netbox_secret_backend/main.tf
-53
View File
@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
# Mounts the netbox secrets engine and writes its connection config via the
# vault-secrets-netbox provider. The plugin is registered ("imported") in the
# catalog separately (config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-netbox.yaml). The
# seeded NetBox admin token is sensitive and read from KV, not stored in git:
# kv/service/vault/<country>/<region>/secret_backend/<path>/config
# Expected key: admin_token (a NetBox token with add_token + grant_token, i.e.
# able to provision and delegate per-user API tokens).
data "vault_kv_secret_v2" "config" {
mount = "kv"
name = "service/vault/${var.country}/${var.region}/secret_backend/${var.path}/config"
lifecycle {
# The plugin builds its own Authorization header from the token VALUE, not
# token_version: a value starting with the nbt_ prefix is sent as
# "Bearer <token>" (v2), otherwise "Token <token>" (v1). So admin_token must
# be the BARE token - a literal `Bearer `/`Token ` scheme prefix yields a
# malformed three-part header and 403s on the plugin's own NetBox calls.
#
# token_version does NOT change that header; it only selects the version of
# the per-user tokens the engine mints for roles. It must still MATCH the
# admin token's kind so the mount and its minted creds line up: an nbt_ v2
# admin token pairs with token_version=2, a bare v1 token with token_version=1.
postcondition {
condition = nonsensitive(
!startswith(self.data["admin_token"], "Bearer ") &&
!startswith(self.data["admin_token"], "Token ") &&
startswith(self.data["admin_token"], "nbt_") == (var.token_version == 2)
)
error_message = "KV admin_token for netbox backend '${var.path}' must be a BARE NetBox token with no 'Bearer '/'Token ' scheme prefix, AND its version must match token_version: a v2 token (nbt_<key>.<secret>) requires token_version=2; a v1 token (bare 40-char value) requires token_version=1."
}
}
}
resource "netbox_secret_backend" "this" {
path = var.path
plugin = var.plugin
description = var.description
netbox_url = var.netbox_url
token = data.vault_kv_secret_v2.config.data["admin_token"]
token_version = var.token_version
ca_cert = var.ca_cert
tls_skip_verify = var.tls_skip_verify
request_timeout_seconds = var.request_timeout_seconds
lifecycle {
# The KV seed is a bootstrap credential: it is consumed only when the engine
# config is first created. After creation the live admin token is rotated in
# place (vault write -f netbox/config/rotate) and diverges from the seed, so
# re-reading the (possibly stale) KV value must never push it back. Ignoring
# the token makes this module create-only for it (mirrors gitea/config).
ignore_changes = [token]
}
}
modules/vault_cluster/modules/netbox_secret_backend/terraform.tf
-13
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@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.10"
required_providers {
vault = {
source = "hashicorp/vault"
version = "5.6.0"
}
netbox = {
source = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/vault-secrets-netbox"
version = "0.1.0"
}
}
}
modules/vault_cluster/modules/netbox_secret_backend/variables.tf
-55
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@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
variable "path" {
description = "Mount path of the netbox secrets engine (e.g. \"netbox\")"
type = string
}
variable "plugin" {
description = "Registered plugin name to mount (the catalog name = mount type)"
type = string
default = "vault-plugin-secrets-netbox"
}
variable "description" {
description = "Human-friendly description of the mount"
type = string
default = null
}
variable "netbox_url" {
description = "Base URL of the NetBox server (e.g. https://netbox.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net)"
type = string
}
variable "token_version" {
description = "NetBox API token format: 2 (default, requires API_TOKEN_PEPPERS on the NetBox server) or 1 (legacy plaintext-key)."
type = number
default = 2
}
variable "country" {
description = "Country segment of the KV path holding the seeded admin token"
type = string
}
variable "region" {
description = "Region segment of the KV path holding the seeded admin token"
type = string
}
variable "ca_cert" {
description = "PEM CA certificate that signed the NetBox server's TLS cert (optional; omit to use the system trust store)"
type = string
default = null
}
variable "tls_skip_verify" {
description = "Skip TLS verification of the NetBox server (not recommended)"
type = bool
default = false
}
variable "request_timeout_seconds" {
description = "HTTP timeout in seconds for calls from the plugin to NetBox"
type = number
default = 30
}
modules/vault_cluster/modules/netbox_secret_backend_role/main.tf
-13
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@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
# A role that mints short-lived, scoped NetBox tokens for a pre-existing NetBox
# service user. Reading netbox/creds/<name> produces a lease-bound token that is
# deleted from NetBox when the lease is revoked or reaches max_ttl.
resource "netbox_secret_backend_role" "this" {
backend = var.backend
name = var.name
netbox_username = var.netbox_username
netbox_user_id = var.netbox_user_id
write_enabled = var.write_enabled
description = var.description
ttl = var.ttl
max_ttl = var.max_ttl
}
modules/vault_cluster/modules/netbox_secret_backend_role/terraform.tf
-9
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@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.10"
required_providers {
netbox = {
source = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/vault-secrets-netbox"
version = "0.1.0"
}
}
}
modules/vault_cluster/modules/netbox_secret_backend_role/variables.tf
-45
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@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
variable "backend" {
description = "Mount path of the netbox secrets engine this role belongs to"
type = string
}
variable "name" {
description = "Role name (read netbox/creds/<name> to mint a token)"
type = string
}
variable "netbox_username" {
description = "NetBox service username the minted tokens belong to (set this or netbox_user_id)"
type = string
default = null
}
variable "netbox_user_id" {
description = "NetBox service user id the minted tokens belong to (set this or netbox_username)"
type = number
default = null
}
variable "write_enabled" {
description = "Whether minted tokens carry NetBox write access (default read-only)"
type = bool
default = false
}
variable "description" {
description = "Human-friendly description of the role"
type = string
default = null
}
variable "ttl" {
description = "Default lease TTL in seconds for minted tokens (the token's NetBox expiry is aligned to the lease)"
type = number
default = null
}
variable "max_ttl" {
description = "Maximum lease TTL in seconds for minted tokens"
type = number
default = null
}
modules/vault_cluster/modules/netbox_user_management/.tflint.hcl
-7
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@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
rule "terraform_required_providers" {
enabled = false
}
rule "terraform_required_version" {
enabled = false
}
modules/vault_cluster/modules/netbox_user_management/main.tf
-149
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@@ -1,149 +0,0 @@
# netbox_user_management reconciles NetBox service users + permissions on every
# apply, so it needs an admin credential each run. That credential is minted
# DYNAMICALLY by the netbox engine from the SINGLE static admin token, so no
# second static credential exists and it survives rotation of the engine seed:
#
# 1. module.netbox_user_mgmt_role creates netbox/roles/vault-user-mgmt, a
# write-enabled role for a pre-existing NetBox superuser (user_mgmt_username).
# 2. Reading netbox/creds/vault-user-mgmt mints a short-lived, user-admin-capable
# token for that superuser; the e-breuninger provider uses it to CRUD users.
#
# The hashicorp/vault provider ships ephemeral resources for KV only, not for
# dynamic engine creds, so the mint is read via the vault_generic_secret DATA
# source: the short-lived token transits Terraform state (sensitive, lease-revoked)
# and is re-minted each plan. This is the closest single-static-token shape the
# current providers allow; move to an ephemeral resource once the vault provider
# ships a dynamic-secret one. Ordering note: the vault-user-mgmt role must already
# exist when this reads creds, so on a brand-new backend bootstrap the mount +
# role first (targeted apply) - a fresh single apply cannot configure the netbox
# provider from a role created in the same run.
locals {
# Backends that mint a dynamic user-admin token (a pre-existing superuser named).
netbox_dynamic_backends = { for k, v in var.netbox_backends : k => v if v.user_mgmt_username != null }
# Backends still using the single static admin_token directly (until a superuser
# is named). Bootstrap/degraded path - the same one token, not a second static.
netbox_static_backends = { for k, v in var.netbox_backends : k => v if v.user_mgmt_username == null }
}
# Dynamic path: the engine mints a user-admin token for the superuser. Requires
# the deployer to read netbox/creds/vault-user-mgmt (policies/netbox/creds).
data "vault_generic_secret" "user_admin" {
for_each = local.netbox_dynamic_backends
path = "${each.key}/creds/vault-user-mgmt"
}
# Static fallback: the single admin_token from KV, used only until a superuser is
# named. NetBox derives the token version from the value's `nbt_` prefix, not the
# keyword, so the same BARE token works under either scheme; reject a value that
# carries a literal `Bearer `/`Token ` scheme prefix (a malformed header -> 403).
data "vault_kv_secret_v2" "netbox_backend_configs" {
for_each = local.netbox_static_backends
mount = "kv"
name = "service/vault/${var.country}/${var.region}/secret_backend/${each.key}/config"
lifecycle {
postcondition {
condition = nonsensitive(
!startswith(self.data["admin_token"], "Bearer ") &&
!startswith(self.data["admin_token"], "Token ")
)
error_message = "KV admin_token for netbox backend '${each.key}' must be a BARE NetBox token with no 'Bearer '/'Token ' scheme prefix (v2: nbt_<key>.<secret>; v1: the 40-char value)."
}
}
}
# Warn (non-fatal) for any backend still on the static token: rotating the engine
# admin seed would then break user management. Set user_mgmt_username to switch to
# the dynamic, rotation-proof mint.
check "netbox_user_mgmt_dynamic" {
assert {
condition = length(local.netbox_static_backends) == 0
error_message = "A netbox backend has no user_mgmt_username, so user management uses the static admin_token directly and will break if that token is rotated (netbox/config/rotate). Set user_mgmt_username to a pre-existing NetBox superuser to mint the credential dynamically."
}
}
locals {
# Per backend: the dynamically-minted user-admin token, else the static seed.
netbox_admin_tokens = {
for k, v in var.netbox_backends : k => (
v.user_mgmt_username != null
? data.vault_generic_secret.user_admin[k].data["token"]
: data.vault_kv_secret_v2.netbox_backend_configs[k].data["admin_token"]
)
}
}
# One NetBox provider instance per backend, authenticated with its (dynamic or
# static) admin token.
provider "netbox" {
alias = "by_backend"
for_each = var.netbox_backend_aliases
server_url = var.netbox_backends[each.key].netbox_url
api_token = local.netbox_admin_tokens[each.key]
allow_insecure_https = var.netbox_backends[each.key].tls_skip_verify
# NetBox is internal and not always reachable at plan time; the resource CRUD
# calls surface any real incompatibility, so skip the startup version probe.
skip_version_check = true
}
# NetBox users authenticate only via Vault-minted API tokens, never the web UI,
# so give each a random unknown password (required by the API) that no one holds.
resource "random_password" "user" {
for_each = var.netbox_roles
length = 32
special = true
}
# Declarative NetBox service users, one per engine role. The role's filename-
# derived name is the username, so the engine role and its user match 1:1.
resource "netbox_user" "users" {
for_each = var.netbox_roles
provider = netbox.by_backend[each.value.backend]
username = each.value.name
password = random_password.user[each.key].result
active = each.value.active
staff = each.value.staff
email = each.value.email
}
locals {
# Flatten roles x permissions into one map keyed by "<role_path>:<index>". A
# permission's name defaults to the role name (the username) so a single-
# permission identity repeats nothing already encoded by the filename.
netbox_permissions = merge([
for role_key, role in var.netbox_roles : {
for idx, perm in role.permissions :
"${role_key}:${idx}" => {
backend = role.backend
user = role_key
name = coalesce(perm.name, length(role.permissions) == 1 ? role.name : "${role.name}-${idx}")
object_types = perm.object_types
actions = perm.actions
constraints = perm.constraints
description = perm.description
enabled = perm.enabled
}
}
]...)
}
# Object permissions granting each user its object-type/action scope.
resource "netbox_permission" "perms" {
for_each = local.netbox_permissions
provider = netbox.by_backend[each.value.backend]
name = each.value.name
object_types = each.value.object_types
actions = each.value.actions
enabled = each.value.enabled
description = each.value.description
constraints = each.value.constraints
users = [tonumber(netbox_user.users[each.value.user].id)]
}
modules/vault_cluster/modules/netbox_user_management/outputs.tf
-19
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@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
output "netbox_users" {
description = "Map of created NetBox users (id + username; password is intentionally omitted)"
value = {
for k, u in netbox_user.users : k => {
id = u.id
username = u.username
}
}
}
output "netbox_permissions" {
description = "Map of created NetBox object permissions"
value = {
for k, p in netbox_permission.perms : k => {
id = p.id
name = p.name
}
}
}
modules/vault_cluster/modules/netbox_user_management/terraform.tf
-17
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@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.10"
required_providers {
vault = {
source = "hashicorp/vault"
version = "5.6.0"
}
netbox = {
source = "e-breuninger/netbox"
version = "4.3.0"
}
random = {
source = "hashicorp/random"
version = ">= 3.5"
}
}
}
modules/vault_cluster/modules/netbox_user_management/variables.tf
-46
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@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
variable "netbox_backends" {
description = "Map of netbox secret backends (keyed by mount path); only the URL and TLS mode are needed to reach NetBox"
type = map(object({
netbox_url = string
tls_skip_verify = optional(bool, false)
# Pre-existing NetBox superuser the engine mints a dynamic user-admin token
# for; unset means fall back to the static admin_token from KV.
user_mgmt_username = optional(string)
}))
}
variable "netbox_roles" {
description = "Map of netbox engine roles (the netbox_secret_backend_role config). Each role's filename-derived name is the NetBox username to create, and its permissions block is the user's object-permission set. Keyed by the role's config path."
type = map(object({
name = string
backend = string
active = optional(bool, true)
staff = optional(bool, false)
email = optional(string)
permissions = optional(list(object({
name = optional(string)
object_types = list(string)
actions = optional(list(string), ["view", "add", "change", "delete"])
constraints = optional(string)
description = optional(string)
enabled = optional(bool, true)
})), [])
}))
default = {}
}
variable "netbox_backend_aliases" {
description = "Map of netbox backend names to sanitized provider aliases"
type = map(string)
default = {}
}
variable "country" {
description = "Country identifier"
type = string
}
variable "region" {
description = "Region identifier"
type = string
}
modules/vault_cluster/modules/plugin/main.tf
-12
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@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
# Registers ("imports") a plugin binary in the Vault/OpenBao plugin catalog so
# it can be mounted. The binary must already exist in the server
# plugin_directory (installed out of band, e.g. by Puppet); `command` is its
# filename there. The sha256 must match the on-disk binary or the server refuses
# to launch the plugin.
resource "vault_plugin" "this" {
type = var.type
name = var.name
command = coalesce(var.command, var.name)
sha256 = var.sha256
version = var.plugin_version
}
modules/vault_cluster/modules/plugin/terraform.tf
-9
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@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.10"
required_providers {
vault = {
source = "hashicorp/vault"
version = "5.6.0"
}
}
}
modules/vault_cluster/modules/plugin/variables.tf
-27
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@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
variable "name" {
description = "Name to register the plugin under in the catalog (also the mount type)"
type = string
}
variable "type" {
description = "Plugin type: secret, auth or database"
type = string
default = "secret"
}
variable "command" {
description = "Plugin binary filename relative to the server plugin_directory. Defaults to the plugin name."
type = string
default = null
}
variable "sha256" {
description = "SHA-256 of the installed plugin binary; must match the on-disk binary"
type = string
}
variable "plugin_version" {
description = "Optional plugin version to register the catalog entry under"
type = string
default = null
}
modules/vault_cluster/modules/rancher_secret_backend/main.tf
-13
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@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
# Mounts the rancher secrets engine and writes its connection config via the
# ranchervaultsecret provider. The plugin is registered ("imported") in the
# catalog separately (config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-rancher.yaml). Seeded
# service-account tokens and roles are managed by the sibling modules.
resource "rancher_secret_backend" "this" {
path = var.path
plugin = var.plugin
description = var.description
rancher_url = var.rancher_url
ca_cert = var.ca_cert
tls_skip_verify = var.tls_skip_verify
request_timeout_seconds = var.request_timeout_seconds
}
modules/vault_cluster/modules/rancher_secret_backend/terraform.tf
-9
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@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.10"
required_providers {
rancher = {
source = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/ranchervaultsecret"
version = "0.1.0"
}
}
}
modules/vault_cluster/modules/rancher_secret_backend/variables.tf
-39
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@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
variable "path" {
description = "Mount path of the rancher secrets engine (e.g. \"rancher\")"
type = string
}
variable "plugin" {
description = "Registered plugin name to mount (the catalog name = mount type)"
type = string
default = "vault-plugin-secrets-rancher"
}
variable "description" {
description = "Human-friendly description of the mount"
type = string
default = null
}
variable "rancher_url" {
description = "Base URL of the Rancher server (e.g. https://rancher.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net)"
type = string
}
variable "ca_cert" {
description = "PEM CA certificate that signed the Rancher server's TLS cert (optional; omit to use the system trust store)"
type = string
default = null
}
variable "tls_skip_verify" {
description = "Skip TLS verification of the Rancher server (not recommended)"
type = bool
default = false
}
variable "request_timeout_seconds" {
description = "HTTP timeout in seconds for calls from the plugin to Rancher"
type = number
default = 30
}
modules/vault_cluster/modules/rancher_secret_backend_role/main.tf
-11
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@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
# A role that mints short-lived, optionally cluster-scoped rancher tokens from a
# service account. Reading rancher/creds/<name> produces a lease-bound token.
resource "rancher_secret_backend_role" "this" {
backend = var.backend
name = var.name
service_account = var.service_account
cluster_name = var.cluster_name
description = var.description
ttl = var.ttl
max_ttl = var.max_ttl
}
modules/vault_cluster/modules/rancher_secret_backend_role/terraform.tf
-9
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@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.10"
required_providers {
rancher = {
source = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/ranchervaultsecret"
version = "0.1.0"
}
}
}
modules/vault_cluster/modules/rancher_secret_backend_role/variables.tf
-38
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@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
variable "backend" {
description = "Mount path of the rancher secrets engine this role lives on"
type = string
}
variable "name" {
description = "Role name"
type = string
}
variable "service_account" {
description = "Service account (seeded token) used to mint credentials; its user's RBAC is inherited by minted tokens"
type = string
}
variable "cluster_name" {
description = "Downstream cluster to scope minted tokens to (empty = full Rancher-server scope)"
type = string
default = null
}
variable "description" {
description = "Description applied to each minted Rancher token"
type = string
default = null
}
variable "ttl" {
description = "Default lease TTL in seconds for tokens minted from this role"
type = number
default = null
}
variable "max_ttl" {
description = "Maximum lease TTL in seconds for tokens minted from this role"
type = number
default = null
}
modules/vault_cluster/modules/rancher_secret_backend_service_account/main.tf
-18
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@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
# Seeds an auto-rotated rancher service-account token. The seed token is
# sensitive and read from KV, not stored in git:
# kv/service/vault/<country>/<region>/secret_backend/<backend>/service_account/<name>
# Expected keys: token (required), token_name (optional, the ext.cattle.io Token
# metadata.name so the engine can delete the seed after the first rotation).
data "vault_kv_secret_v2" "seed" {
mount = "kv"
name = "service/vault/${var.country}/${var.region}/secret_backend/${var.backend}/service_account/${var.name}"
}
resource "rancher_secret_backend_service_account" "this" {
backend = var.backend
name = var.name
token = data.vault_kv_secret_v2.seed.data["token"]
token_name = lookup(data.vault_kv_secret_v2.seed.data, "token_name", null)
token_ttl = var.token_ttl
rotation_period = var.rotation_period
}
modules/vault_cluster/modules/rancher_secret_backend_service_account/terraform.tf
-13
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@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.10"
required_providers {
vault = {
source = "hashicorp/vault"
version = "5.6.0"
}
rancher = {
source = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/ranchervaultsecret"
version = "0.1.0"
}
}
}
modules/vault_cluster/modules/rancher_secret_backend_service_account/variables.tf
-31
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@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
variable "backend" {
description = "Mount path of the rancher secrets engine this service account lives on"
type = string
}
variable "name" {
description = "Service-account name"
type = string
}
variable "country" {
description = "Country code, used to locate the seed token in KV"
type = string
}
variable "region" {
description = "Region code, used to locate the seed token in KV"
type = string
}
variable "token_ttl" {
description = "Lifetime in seconds requested for each rotated replacement token (default: engine default, 90d)"
type = number
default = null
}
variable "rotation_period" {
description = "Seconds a token is used before rotation (default: engine default, 45d). Must be < token_ttl"
type = number
default = null
}
modules/vault_cluster/variables.tf
-153
View File
@@ -285,7 +285,6 @@ variable "kubernetes_secret_backend_role" {
allowed_kubernetes_namespaces = optional(list(string), ["*"])
kubernetes_role_type = optional(string, "Role")
extra_labels = optional(map(string), {})
service_account_name = optional(string)
}))
default = {}
}
@@ -316,158 +315,6 @@ variable "litellm_secret_backend_role" {
default = {}
}
variable "plugins" {
description = "Map of plugins to import (register) in the catalog, keyed by catalog name"
type = map(object({
name = string
type = optional(string, "secret")
command = optional(string)
sha256 = string
version = optional(string)
}))
default = {}
}
variable "gpg_secret_backend" {
description = "Map of GPG/OpenPGP secret engines to mount (path => registered plugin + description). The plugin is registered separately via config/plugins."
type = map(object({
plugin = optional(string, "vault-plugin-secrets-gpg")
description = optional(string)
}))
default = {}
}
variable "gpg_key" {
description = "Map of OpenPGP keys to manage in a gpg engine mount"
type = map(object({
name = string
backend = string
algorithm = optional(string, "rsa-3072")
identity = optional(string)
exportable = optional(bool, false)
deletion_allowed = optional(bool, false)
min_decryption_version = optional(number)
}))
default = {}
}
variable "rancher_secret_backend" {
description = "Map of rancher token secret engines to create (mount + config)"
type = map(object({
plugin = optional(string, "vault-plugin-secrets-rancher")
description = optional(string)
rancher_url = string
ca_cert = optional(string)
tls_skip_verify = optional(bool, false)
request_timeout_seconds = optional(number, 30)
}))
default = {}
}
variable "rancher_secret_backend_service_account" {
description = "Map of seeded, auto-rotated rancher service-account tokens (seed token read from KV)"
type = map(object({
name = string
backend = string
token_ttl = optional(number)
rotation_period = optional(number)
}))
default = {}
}
variable "rancher_secret_backend_role" {
description = "Map of rancher token-minting roles to create"
type = map(object({
name = string
backend = string
service_account = string
cluster_name = optional(string)
description = optional(string)
ttl = optional(number)
max_ttl = optional(number)
}))
default = {}
}
variable "gitea_secret_backend" {
description = "Map of gitea token secret engines to create (mount + config; seeded admin creds read from KV)"
type = map(object({
plugin = optional(string, "vault-plugin-secrets-gitea")
description = optional(string)
gitea_url = string
ca_cert = optional(string)
tls_skip_verify = optional(bool, false)
request_timeout_seconds = optional(number, 30)
}))
default = {}
}
variable "gitea_secret_backend_role" {
description = "Map of gitea token-minting roles to create"
type = map(object({
name = string
backend = string
username = string
scopes = list(string)
token_name_prefix = optional(string)
ttl = optional(number)
max_ttl = optional(number)
}))
default = {}
}
variable "netbox_secret_backend" {
description = "Map of netbox token secret engines to create (mount + config; seeded admin token read from KV)"
type = map(object({
plugin = optional(string, "vault-plugin-secrets-netbox")
description = optional(string)
netbox_url = string
token_version = optional(number, 2)
ca_cert = optional(string)
tls_skip_verify = optional(bool, false)
request_timeout_seconds = optional(number, 30)
# Pre-existing NetBox superuser (or add_user + add_token + grant_token) the
# engine mints an ephemeral user-admin token for, so netbox_user_management
# authenticates with a Vault-minted credential derived from the single static
# admin token instead of a second static one. Unset = use the static
# admin_token directly (bootstrap/degraded; breaks after admin-token rotation).
user_mgmt_username = optional(string)
}))
default = {}
}
variable "netbox_secret_backend_role" {
description = "Map of netbox engine roles; each role's filename-derived name is both the engine role and the NetBox username it mints tokens for, and its permissions block is the user's object-permission set"
type = map(object({
name = string
backend = string
netbox_username = optional(string)
netbox_user_id = optional(number)
write_enabled = optional(bool, false)
description = optional(string)
ttl = optional(number)
max_ttl = optional(number)
active = optional(bool, true)
staff = optional(bool, false)
email = optional(string)
permissions = optional(list(object({
name = optional(string)
object_types = list(string)
actions = optional(list(string), ["view", "add", "change", "delete"])
constraints = optional(string)
description = optional(string)
enabled = optional(bool, true)
})), [])
}))
default = {}
}
variable "netbox_backend_aliases" {
description = "Map of netbox backend names to sanitized provider aliases"
type = map(string)
default = {}
}
variable "policy_auth_map" {
description = "Map of auth mounts -> auth roles -> policy names"
type = map(map(list(string)))
policies/consul_root/au/syd1/creds/terraform-enc.yaml
-14
View File
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
# Allow the terragrunt-enc runner to generate credentials for the
# terraform-enc role in consul (used to lock/write its terragrunt state under
# infra/terraform/enc/ on the consul backend).
---
rules:
- path: "consul_root/au/syd1/creds/terraform-enc"
capabilities:
- read
auth:
approle:
- terraform_enc
k8s/au/syd1:
- woodpecker_terraform_enc
policies/consul_root/au/syd1/creds/terraform-infra.yaml
-11
View File
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
---
rules:
- path: "consul_root/au/syd1/creds/terraform-infra"
capabilities:
- read
auth:
approle:
- terraform_infra
k8s/au/syd1:
- woodpecker_terraform_infra
policies/consul_root/au/syd1/creds/terraform-rancher.yaml
-11
View File
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
---
rules:
- path: "consul_root/au/syd1/creds/terraform-rancher"
capabilities:
- read
auth:
approle:
- terraform_rancher
k8s/au/syd1:
- woodpecker_terraform_rancher
policies/gitea/admin.yaml
-42
View File
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
# Allow the vault deployer to manage the gitea token secrets engine: its
# connection config (seeded admin credentials), in-place root rotation, and
# token-minting roles.
#
# Scoped to gitea/* only, and deliberately excludes gitea/creds/* — minting
# tokens is for consumers, not the deployer. The plugin-catalog grant needed to
# import the plugin is the shared, sudo-protected wildcard in
# policies/sys/plugins/catalog/admin.yaml (already covers this plugin), and
# mounting the engine uses the deployer's existing sys/mounts/* access, so no
# new catalog/mount grant is added here (mirrors the rancher engine).
---
rules:
# Engine connection config (Gitea URL, TLS, seeded admin username/password).
- path: "gitea/config"
capabilities:
- create
- read
- update
- delete
# In-place rotation of the seeded admin password (write-only trigger).
- path: "gitea/config/rotate-root"
capabilities:
- create
- update
# Token-minting roles.
- path: "gitea/roles/*"
capabilities:
- create
- read
- update
- delete
- list
- path: "gitea/roles"
capabilities:
- read
- list
auth:
approle:
- tf_vault
k8s/au/syd1:
- woodpecker_terraform_vault
policies/gitea/creds/unkin-agent.yaml
-14
View File
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
# Lets the agents AppRole mint ephemeral Gitea tokens for the unkin-agent bot,
# so AI coding agents authenticate to git.unkin.net as their own least-privilege
# identity instead of Ben's account. Reading gitea/creds/unkin-agent returns a
# lease-bound token scoped by the role (write:repository, write:issue, read:user
# -- never merge/admin). Mirrors the agent-* Kubernetes creds binding pattern.
---
rules:
- path: "gitea/creds/unkin-agent"
capabilities:
- read
auth:
approle:
- agents
policies/gpg/admin.yaml
-35
View File
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
# Allow the vault deployer to import the gpg plugin and manage its OpenPGP keys.
#
# terraform-vault registers the plugin itself (vault_plugin -> sys/plugins/catalog,
# a sudo-protected path) and manages keys via the gpgvaultsecret provider, so the
# deployer needs catalog access on top of the mount access it already has
# (sys/mounts/*). Without this, apply 403s on the plugin registration and on
# gpg/keys writes.
---
rules:
# Import / register (and deregister) the gpg plugin in the catalog.
- path: "sys/plugins/catalog/secret/vault-plugin-secrets-gpg"
capabilities:
- create
- read
- update
- delete
- sudo
# Manage keys (create/rotate/config/delete) in the gpg mount.
- path: "gpg/keys/*"
capabilities:
- create
- read
- update
- delete
- list
- path: "gpg/keys"
capabilities:
- read
- list
auth:
approle:
- tf_vault
k8s/au/syd1:
- woodpecker_terraform_vault
policies/gpg/logarchive_public_read.yaml
-12
View File
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
# Allow the logarchiver service (logging namespace, SA logarchiver) to read the
# logarchive public key. A plain read on gpg/keys/logarchive returns the armored
# public_key; no decrypt/export capability is granted (decrypt stays operator-only).
---
rules:
- path: "gpg/keys/logarchive"
capabilities:
- read
auth:
k8s/au/syd1:
- logging_logarchiver
policies/kubernetes/au/syd1/creds/agent-certs.yaml
-12
View File
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
# Allow access to agent-certs Kubernetes credentials
---
rules:
- path: "kubernetes/au/syd1/creds/agent-certs"
capabilities:
- update
auth:
ldap:
- kubernetes_au_syd1_cluster_operator
approle:
- agents
policies/kubernetes/au/syd1/creds/agent-dhcp.yaml
-12
View File
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
# Allow access to agent-dhcp Kubernetes credentials
---
rules:
- path: "kubernetes/au/syd1/creds/agent-dhcp"
capabilities:
- update
auth:
ldap:
- kubernetes_au_syd1_cluster_operator
approle:
- agents
policies/kubernetes/au/syd1/creds/agent-dns.yaml
-12
View File
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
# Allow access to agent-dns Kubernetes credentials
---
rules:
- path: "kubernetes/au/syd1/creds/agent-dns"
capabilities:
- update
auth:
ldap:
- kubernetes_au_syd1_cluster_operator
approle:
- agents
policies/kubernetes/au/syd1/creds/agent-storage.yaml
-12
View File
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
# Allow access to agent-storage Kubernetes credentials
---
rules:
- path: "kubernetes/au/syd1/creds/agent-storage"
capabilities:
- update
auth:
ldap:
- kubernetes_au_syd1_cluster_operator
approle:
- agents
policies/kv/kubernetes/agents.yaml
-17
View File
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
# Allow the agents AppRole to manage the kubernetes KV subtree (no delete)
---
rules:
- path: "kv/data/kubernetes/*"
capabilities:
- create
- read
- update
- list
- path: "kv/metadata/kubernetes/*"
capabilities:
- read
- list
auth:
approle:
- agents
policies/kv/kubernetes/ghp/read.yaml
-17
View File
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
# Allow ghp to read its GitHub App credentials and encryption key
#
# kv/kubernetes/ghp/github-app (app_id/client_id/client_secret/private_key)
# kv/kubernetes/ghp/app (encryption_key)
---
rules:
- path: "kv/data/kubernetes/ghp/*"
capabilities:
- read
- path: "kv/metadata/kubernetes/ghp/*"
capabilities:
- read
- list
auth:
k8s/au/syd1:
- ghp
policies/kv/service/terraform/enc-encapi-environment.yaml
-14
View File
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
# Allow the terragrunt-enc runner to read the encapi environment secret
# (ENCAPI_WRITE_TOKEN), so `make apply` can write ENC data (statuses, roles,
# nodes) to encapi via the encapi Terraform provider.
---
rules:
- path: "kv/data/kubernetes/namespace/encapi/default/environment"
capabilities:
- read
auth:
approle:
- terraform_enc
k8s/au/syd1:
- woodpecker_terraform_enc
policies/kv/service/terraform/infra.yaml
-18
View File
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
# Allow the terraform-infra runner to read the NetBox + KeaAPI tokens
# (netbox_token / kea_token fields) used by the netbox and kea providers.
---
rules:
- path: "kv/data/service/terraform/infra"
capabilities:
- read
# vault_kv_secret_v2 (terraform-infra providers.tf data source) reads the kv-v2
# metadata path on every plan/apply; a 403 here fails the plan.
- path: "kv/metadata/service/terraform/infra"
capabilities:
- read
auth:
approle:
- terraform_infra
k8s/au/syd1:
- woodpecker_terraform_infra
policies/kv/service/terraform/rancher.yaml
-18
View File
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
# Allow the Terraform Rancher runner to read:
# - its own Rancher admin API token (rancher2 provider auth), and
# - the OAuth2/OIDC client secret backing the Rancher keycloakoidc AuthConfig
# (same secret Authentik sets on the provider).
---
rules:
- path: "kv/data/service/terraform/rancher"
capabilities:
- read
- path: "kv/data/kubernetes/namespace/cattle-system/default/oauth-credentials"
capabilities:
- read
auth:
approle:
- terraform_rancher
k8s/au/syd1:
- woodpecker_terraform_rancher
policies/kv/service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/gitea/config_write.yaml
-31
View File
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
# Allow terraform-git to seed (write once) the gitea secrets engine's admin
# credentials. terraform-git creates the gitea-vault-admin site-admin bot and
# writes its generated password here as admin_username + admin_password; the
# vault gitea engine (managed by the tf_vault deployer) reads it at gitea/config
# creation time. Read is already granted to the deployer via
# policies/kv/service/vault/secret_backends_read.yaml, so this only adds the
# write side for terraform-git's own identity.
---
rules:
# delete is required for taint recovery and destroy (the resource got tainted
# by pipeline 107's failed post-create read and replace = delete+create).
# The seed's write-once semantics are enforced by lifecycle ignore_changes in
# terraform-git, not by withholding delete here.
- path: "kv/data/service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/gitea/config"
capabilities:
- create
- read
- update
- delete
# vault_kv_secret_v2 also reads the kv-v2 metadata path on every plan/apply
# (403 here broke the terraform-git main apply, pipeline 107).
- path: "kv/metadata/service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/gitea/config"
capabilities:
- read
- delete
auth:
approle:
- terraform_git
k8s/au/syd1:
- woodpecker_terraform_git
policies/netbox/admin.yaml
-42
View File
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
# Allow the vault deployer to manage the netbox token secrets engine: its
# connection config (seeded admin token), in-place token rotation, and
# token-minting roles.
#
# Scoped to netbox/* only, and deliberately excludes netbox/creds/* - minting
# tokens is for consumers, not the deployer. The plugin-catalog grant needed to
# import the plugin is the shared, sudo-protected wildcard in
# policies/sys/plugins/catalog/admin.yaml (already covers this plugin), and
# mounting the engine uses the deployer's existing sys/mounts/* access, so no
# new catalog/mount grant is added here (mirrors the gitea/rancher engines).
---
rules:
# Engine connection config (NetBox URL, TLS, token_version, seeded admin token).
- path: "netbox/config"
capabilities:
- create
- read
- update
- delete
# In-place rotation of the seeded admin token (write-only trigger).
- path: "netbox/config/rotate"
capabilities:
- create
- update
# Token-minting roles.
- path: "netbox/roles/*"
capabilities:
- create
- read
- update
- delete
- list
- path: "netbox/roles"
capabilities:
- read
- list
auth:
approle:
- tf_vault
k8s/au/syd1:
- woodpecker_terraform_vault
policies/netbox/creds/terraform-infra.yaml
-21
View File
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
# Allow the terraform-infra runner to mint an ephemeral NetBox token from the
# terraform-infra role (netbox/creds/terraform-infra), replacing the static
# netbox_token it used to read from kv/service/terraform/*. The e-breuninger
# netbox provider authenticates with the minted token; the lease revokes it when
# the run ends.
#
# Bound to both the terraform-infra AppRole and its Woodpecker k8s auth role,
# mirroring the terraform-ipam pattern. Both principals are created by the
# terraform-infra Vault onboarding (separate from this netbox change); until
# that onboarding lands this policy exists but attaches to nothing.
---
rules:
- path: "netbox/creds/terraform-infra"
capabilities:
- read
auth:
approle:
- terraform_infra
k8s/au/syd1:
- woodpecker_terraform_infra
policies/netbox/creds/vault-user-mgmt.yaml
-23
View File
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
# Allow the vault deployer to mint the ephemeral user-admin token that
# netbox_user_management authenticates with (netbox/creds/vault-user-mgmt). The
# engine mints it from the single static admin token, so the deployer never holds
# a second static NetBox credential.
#
# The netbox admin policy (policies/netbox/admin.yaml) deliberately excludes
# netbox/creds/* - minting is normally for consumers, not the deployer. This is
# the one deliberate exception: the deployer needs a user-admin token during the
# run to reconcile NetBox users. Scoped to the single vault-user-mgmt role only.
#
# Bound to the same principals as the admin policy: the tf_vault AppRole and its
# Woodpecker k8s auth role.
---
rules:
- path: "netbox/creds/vault-user-mgmt"
capabilities:
- read
auth:
approle:
- tf_vault
k8s/au/syd1:
- woodpecker_terraform_vault
policies/rancher/admin.yaml
-45
View File
@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
# Allow the vault deployer to manage the rancher secrets engine: its connection
# config, seeded (auto-rotated) service-account tokens, and token-minting roles.
#
# Scoped to rancher/* only. The plugin-catalog grant needed to import the plugin
# lives under policies/sys/plugins/catalog/ so a code owner of this policy path
# cannot grant themselves access outside the rancher mount.
---
rules:
# Engine connection config.
- path: "rancher/config"
capabilities:
- create
- read
- update
- delete
# Seeded, auto-rotated service-account tokens (+ manual rotate).
- path: "rancher/service-accounts/*"
capabilities:
- create
- read
- update
- delete
- list
- path: "rancher/service-accounts"
capabilities:
- read
- list
# Token-minting roles.
- path: "rancher/roles/*"
capabilities:
- create
- read
- update
- delete
- list
- path: "rancher/roles"
capabilities:
- read
- list
auth:
approle:
- tf_vault
k8s/au/syd1:
- woodpecker_terraform_vault
policies/sys/plugins/catalog/admin.yaml
-16
View File
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
# Allow the vault deployer to import (register/deregister) plugin in the catalog
---
rules:
- path: "sys/plugins/catalog/*"
capabilities:
- create
- read
- update
- delete
- sudo
auth:
approle:
- tf_vault
k8s/au/syd1:
- woodpecker_terraform_vault

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