33 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
unkin-agent 1dace21b37 vault: add ghp k8s auth role + kv read policy
ci/woodpecker/pr/plan Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/pr/pre-commit Pipeline was successful
ghp (a GitHub proxy) reads its GitHub App credentials and encryption key from kv/kubernetes/ghp/*; it uses the postgres storage backend so it only needs read access to those kv secrets.

- add k8s/au/syd1 auth role ghp bound to ServiceAccount ghp in namespace ghp (ttl 600s, audience vault)
- add read-only kv policy granting read on kv/data/kubernetes/ghp/* and read+list on kv/metadata/kubernetes/ghp/*
- mirrors the artifactapi / logging_logarchiver per-app pattern (app-SA-bound k8s role + single kv read policy consumed by VSO)
2026-08-13 19:31:46 +10:00
unkinben 9e7687fccb Mint the netbox user-management credential dynamically from the single admin token (#119)
ci/woodpecker/push/apply Pipeline was successful
## Why

netbox_user_management authenticates to NetBox to reconcile service users + permissions on every apply. It must not depend on a second static admin token, and it must not break when the engine rotates its admin seed (`netbox/config/rotate` mints a fresh admin token and deletes the old one). The durable shape: keep exactly ONE static admin token, and have the netbox engine mint an ephemeral, user-admin-capable token that the e-breuninger provider uses to manage users.

## How

- `module.netbox_user_mgmt_role` creates `netbox/roles/vault-user-mgmt`, a write-enabled role for a pre-existing NetBox superuser named by `user_mgmt_username`. Minted tokens authenticate AS that superuser (NetBox tokens carry no scope beyond `write_enabled`; the user's permissions apply), so they can create users.
- `netbox_user_management` reads `netbox/creds/vault-user-mgmt` and configures the netbox provider with the minted token. When `user_mgmt_username` is unset it falls back to the single static `admin_token` (a `check` block warns that rotation would then break it) - a bootstrap/degraded path, never a second static token.
- Grant the deployer `read` on `netbox/creds/vault-user-mgmt` (the one deliberate exception to the admin policy's `netbox/creds/*` exclusion).
- Keep the bare-token + `token_version`-match postconditions on the single static admin token.

## Feasibility constraints (worked through, documented in-module)

1. **The engine CAN mint a user-admin token** - roles map to a pre-existing user with only a `write_enabled` gate (`vault-plugin-secrets-netbox` `path_roles.go`, `client.go` `MintToken`); point it at a superuser and minted tokens can manage users.
2. **Token transits state.** The hashicorp/vault provider (5.6.0) exposes ephemeral resources for KV only, not dynamic engine creds, so the mint is read via the `vault_generic_secret` DATA source: the short-lived token is written to state (sensitive, lease-revoked) and re-minted each plan. Migrate to an ephemeral resource once the vault provider ships a dynamic-secret one.
3. **A clean single fresh apply is not possible.** A provider cannot be configured from a role created in the same run (data sources don't defer; OpenTofu 1.11 defers only ephemeral resources, which the vault provider doesn't offer here). So enabling the dynamic path on a backend needs a one-time targeted bootstrap of the mount + role, then normal applies. Documented in `config/netbox_secret_backend/netbox.yaml`.

## Operator follow-up

- Repair the live mount first (unchanged): `vault write netbox/config token=<BARE>` (the mount uses `ignore_changes=[token]`), keep `token_version=2`.
- To enable dynamic minting: set `user_mgmt_username` to the pre-existing superuser, apply the deployer creds policy, then bootstrap once: `tofu apply -target=...netbox_secret_backend -target=...netbox_user_mgmt_role`, then apply normally. Until then user management stays on the static token (non-breaking, with a warning).

Reviewed-on: #119
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
2026-08-12 00:03:13 +10:00
unkinben 8ccc5f1393 Add the netbox backend and terraform-infra role (#117)
ci/woodpecker/push/apply Pipeline was successful
## Why

- The netbox engine modules stand ready but mount nothing and create no identity until backend and role data exist, so terraform-infra still reads a static NetBox token instead of minting ephemeral scoped tokens.

## How

- Add `config/netbox_secret_backend/netbox.yaml` to mount the engine at `netbox` and point it at the syd1 NetBox URL; the admin token is read from KV, not stored here.
- Add `config/netbox_secret_backend_role/netbox/terraform-infra.yaml` as the single declarative source for the terraform-infra identity: filename-derived role name and NetBox username, write access, short TTLs, and an inline permissions block. Nothing in the file repeats the filename.
- Scope terraform-infra to view/add/change/delete on the IPAM/DCIM objects it manages: prefixes, ip-addresses, ip-ranges, devices, interfaces, mac addresses.
- Add `policies/netbox/creds/terraform-infra.yaml` letting the terraform-infra AppRole and its Woodpecker k8s role read `netbox/creds/terraform-infra`; it attaches to nothing until the separate terraform-infra Vault onboarding lands.

## Dependency order

- Stacked on the modules PR (#115), which stacks on the plugin registration PR. Merge order: plugin -> #115 -> this.

## CI note

- The plan step is red only on the external admin_token KV seed at `kv/data/service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/netbox/config` (a NetBox token with add_token + grant_token / superuser). Seeding that path is an environmental prerequisite, not a code defect; everything else validates.

---------

Co-authored-by: BenVincent <benvin@main.unkin.net>
Reviewed-on: #117
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
2026-08-11 20:43:04 +10:00
unkinben 521ef4f0f3 Add the netbox secrets engine modules and wiring (#115)
ci/woodpecker/push/apply Pipeline was successful
## Why

- Managing NetBox from Vault needs three capabilities the repo does not yet have: mounting the netbox engine, minting scoped tokens through roles, and creating the NetBox service users those roles mint tokens for. Landing the modules and config scaffolding before any backend or role data lets each concrete identity be added as pure data later.

## How

- Add three modules under `modules/vault_cluster/modules`: `netbox_secret_backend` (mount + engine config, admin token read from KV), `netbox_secret_backend_role` (mint ephemeral scoped tokens for a filename-derived NetBox username), and `netbox_user_management` (mirror consul_acl_management: read the seeded admin token, drive one e-breuninger/netbox provider per backend, and synthesize the NetBox user + object permissions from the role map's inline permissions).
- Derive the `netbox_secret_backend` and `netbox_secret_backend_role` maps in `config.hcl`, deriving each role's name and netbox_username from its filename so the engine role and NetBox username match by construction.
- Wire the three module blocks and their variables through `vault_cluster` and the syd1 terragrunt inputs, reusing the sanitized backend-alias pattern the Consul providers use.
- Leave the backend and role maps empty: the modules stand ready and create nothing until backend and role config data are added.

## Dependency order

- Stacked on the plugin registration PR (branch `benvin/netbox-plugin`); merge that first, then this, then the backend + role PR (#117). Plans clean with empty netbox maps.

---------

Co-authored-by: BenVincent <benvin@main.unkin.net>
Reviewed-on: #115
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
2026-08-09 16:36:18 +10:00
unkinben d080279728 Register the netbox secrets plugin in the catalog (#118)
ci/woodpecker/push/apply Pipeline was successful
## Why

- The netbox secrets engine cannot be mounted until its plugin binary is registered in the OpenBao catalog, so the catalog entry must land before any engine mount or role config references it.

## How

- Add `config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-netbox.yaml` registering the plugin as a secret plugin, pinned to the released v0.1.0 binary sha256 that Puppet installs on the OpenBao nodes. Bump the sha in lockstep with any RPM upgrade.

## Dependency order

- First of three stacked PRs: this plugin registration, then the netbox modules + wiring (#115), then the netbox backend + terraform-infra role (#117). Merges to master independently.

Reviewed-on: #118
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
2026-08-09 16:30:06 +10:00
unkinben 03dc436a89 Add netbox engine admin policy (#116)
ci/woodpecker/push/apply Pipeline was successful
## Why
- The netbox secrets engine mount + roles land in a follow-up PR (#115); its manage policy must exist first so the deployer can create the engine config and roles the moment that PR applies (policy-first split).

## How
- Add `policies/netbox/admin.yaml` granting the deployer `netbox/config`, `netbox/config/rotate` and `netbox/roles/*` (deliberately excludes `netbox/creds/*`), bound to the `tf_vault` AppRole and `woodpecker_terraform_vault` k8s role, mirroring the gpg/gitea admin policies.

Land this before #115 (the engine mount + roles).

Reviewed-on: #116
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
2026-08-09 12:02:13 +10:00
unkinben c20e7e4664 Let the agents AppRole mint unkin-agent Gitea tokens (#114)
ci/woodpecker/push/apply Pipeline was successful
Why: AI coding agents authenticate to Gitea as Ben using Ben's token. With the unkin-agent identity now in place (terraform-git PR #59), the agents AppRole should issue that account's tokens directly so agent commits and PRs are attributable and carry only least-privilege scopes.

How:
- add a gitea secrets-engine role minting ephemeral tokens for unkin-agent scoped to write:repository, write:issue, read:user — push branches and open PRs, never merge or administer
- add a policy granting read on gitea/creds/unkin-agent, bound to the agents AppRole, mirroring the agent-* Kubernetes creds bindings

Depends on terraform-git PR #59: the unkin-agent Gitea account must exist before minted tokens work. The vault-plugin-secrets-gitea engine is already live (plugin v0.1.0 registered, gitea mount configured), so no engine/plugin change is needed here.

Reviewed-on: #114
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
2026-08-08 23:41:53 +10:00
unkinben aac651a5e4 Grant terraform-infra kv metadata read (#113)
ci/woodpecker/push/apply Pipeline was successful
Follow-up to the merged #111 (which shipped `kv/data/service/terraform/infra` read only).

`terraform-infra`'s providers.tf uses a `vault_kv_secret_v2` **data source**, which reads the kv-v2 **metadata** path on every plan/apply (same behaviour that 403'd a prior terraform-git apply — see `policies/kv/service/vault/.../gitea/config_write.yaml`). Add `kv/metadata/service/terraform/infra` read so the plan doesn't 403 once the secret is seeded.

Verified against terraform-infra PR #5: `skip_child_token` cleared the child-token 403 and the data-read policy works (plan now reaches "no secret found"); metadata read is the remaining policy gap before a seeded plan can pass.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01JUoARVdmhxKQHyyyp1pxeT
Reviewed-on: #113
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
2026-08-06 23:17:35 +10:00
unkinben 95927202ba Rename terraform-ipam CI Vault access -> terraform-infra (#111)
ci/woodpecker/push/apply Pipeline was successful
Follows the `terraform-ipam` -> `terraform-infra` repo rename. Renames the k8s auth role (`woodpecker_terraform_infra`), consul secret-backend role + ACL policy (`terraform-infra`, state path `infra/terraform/infra/*`), consul creds read policy, and kv read policy (`kv/service/terraform/infra`).

https://claude.ai/code/session_01JUoARVdmhxKQHyyyp1pxeT
Reviewed-on: #111
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
2026-08-06 22:25:38 +10:00
unkinben d61e985ef2 Add terraform-ipam CI Vault access (#110)
ci/woodpecker/push/apply Pipeline was successful
Grants the `terraform-ipam` Woodpecker pipeline its Vault footprint, mirroring the `terraform-artifactapi` set plus a KV read for provider tokens.

- k8s auth role `woodpecker_terraform_ipam` (SA `terraform-ipam`, ns `woodpecker`)
- consul secret backend role `terraform-ipam` + ACL policy writing `infra/terraform/ipam/*`
- consul creds read policy
- kv read policy for `kv/service/terraform/ipam` (`netbox_token` + `kea_token`)

The KV secret itself still needs seeding before the pipeline can auth to NetBox/Kea.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01JUoARVdmhxKQHyyyp1pxeT
Reviewed-on: #110
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
2026-08-03 00:16:34 +10:00
unkinben 0e6da5cdd3 Add Vault-scoped agent kubernetes roles + agents AppRole (#109)
ci/woodpecker/push/apply Pipeline was successful
## Why
Agentic workloads currently need cluster-admin/root kubeconfig contexts to do routine per-domain work. This adds domain-scoped, Vault-issued kubernetes credentials plus an `agents` AppRole so agents get least-privilege access instead of escalating.

## Changes
- Add `kubernetes_secret_backend_role` configs `agent-dhcp`, `agent-dns`, `agent-certs`, `agent-storage` (au/syd1):
  - **agent-dhcp** (Role, ns `dhcp-system`): full verbs on `kea.unkin.net` CRDs; get/list/watch pods/services/configmaps/events + pods/log.
  - **agent-dns** (`service_account_name` mode): mints tokens for the static `agent-dns` SA (argocd-apps#332) whose per-namespace RoleBindings confine access to bind-system/bind-internal/bind-external/externaldns. `allowed_kubernetes_namespaces: [bind-system]` (the SA's namespace).
  - **agent-certs** (Role, ns `cert-manager`): full verbs on `cert-manager.io` + `acme.cert-manager.io` (closes the orders/challenges debugging gap); get/list/watch/delete secrets; get/list/watch pods + pods/log. Secret delete confined to `cert-manager`.
  - **agent-storage** (Role, ns `cephrgw-system`): full verbs on `ceph.unkin.net` CRDs (buckets/bucketaccesses/objectstoreusers); get/list/watch pods + pods/log.
- Extend the `kubernetes_secret_backend_role` module with an optional `service_account_name`; when set, `generated_role_rules`/`kubernetes_role_type` are omitted (the SA's own bindings supply RBAC).
- Add creds policies for each role, bound to the `kubernetes_au_syd1_cluster_operator` ldap group (human kubectl use) and the `agents` AppRole (programmatic use).
- Add the `agents` AppRole (mirrors the certmanager approle schema): `bind_secret_id: false` (role_id-only login), `token_bound_cidrs: [10.10.12.200/32]` (agent workstation wg0 addr), deterministic role_id, 1h/4h TTLs.
- Add `policies/kv/kubernetes/agents.yaml` granting the AppRole create/read/update/list on `kv/data/kubernetes/*` + read/list on `kv/metadata/kubernetes/*` (no delete).

## Ordering
argocd-apps#332 (the `agent-dns` SA + ClusterRole + per-namespace RoleBindings) must sync **before** the `agent-dns` creds here are usable — Vault mints tokens for a service account that must already exist.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01JUoARVdmhxKQHyyyp1pxeT
Reviewed-on: #109
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
2026-08-02 21:55:05 +10:00
unkinben c0cc74927c Add logarchive gpg key + logging_logarchiver read access (#106)
ci/woodpecker/push/apply Pipeline was successful
## Why

logarchiver encrypts archived logs to an OpenPGP key held in Vault's gpg engine so the private key never leaves Vault (retrieval delegates decryption to `gpg/decrypt/logarchive`, operator-only). This provisions the key and lets the service read only its public key.

## Changes

- Create gpg key `logarchive` (rsa-4096, non-exportable) in the `gpg` mount.
- Add k8s auth role `logging_logarchiver` bound to SA `logarchiver` in the `logging` namespace.
- Add policy granting `read` on `gpg/keys/logarchive` to that role (public key only; no decrypt/export).

Cross-repo: this must apply before the argocd-apps logarchiver Deployment (unkin/argocd-apps) can fetch the key.

https://claude.ai/code/session_015ur3i7D2azsMAWTSVABApv
---------

Co-authored-by: benvin <neotheo@gmail.com>
Reviewed-on: #106
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
2026-07-29 20:39:41 +10:00
unkinben 31f32aba0f gitea roles: add read:user scope for API login validation (#105)
ci/woodpecker/push/apply Pipeline was successful
End-to-end verification of the freshly-applied gitea engine (mint → API call → revoke) surfaced that tokens without read:user get 403 from GET /api/v1/user — the endpoint tea and most Gitea API clients use to validate a login. teabot's personalities would fail their auth check with the current scope sets, while in-scope calls (repo/issue) already work and lease revocation correctly kills tokens (verified 401 after revoke).

- add read:user to the teabot-implementer role scopes
- add read:user to the teabot-reviewer role scopes

Reviewed-on: #105
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
2026-07-28 18:07:29 +10:00
unkinben 96a6a7d728 gitea: add the gitea token secrets engine (mount, config, teabot roles) (#101)
ci/woodpecker/push/apply Pipeline was successful
## Why

teabot's implementer and reviewer bot users should mint **ephemeral, scoped Gitea tokens** on demand rather than holding standing personal access tokens — Gitea tokens never expire on their own, so a leak lasts until someone notices. This registers and mounts the new `vault-plugin-secrets-gitea` engine (released v0.1.0) and declares its roles, mirroring the rancher engine wiring.

## Change

- Register the plugin in the catalog (`config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-gitea.yaml`), pinned to the released v0.1.0 binary `sha256 8f67fbc216effada5fd7399888a710b62fad83be0b31761a439e7dec3d56509b` (sha256 of `/opt/openbao-plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-gitea` from the released `openbao-plugin-secrets-gitea-0.1.0` RPM).
- Add `gitea_secret_backend` + `gitea_secret_backend_role` modules and wire them through `config.hcl`, `environments/au/syd1/terragrunt.hcl`, and `modules/vault_cluster` variables/main, using the `giteavaultsecret` provider from the `terraform-unkin` registry (v0.1.0).
- Mount the engine at `gitea/` against `https://git.unkin.net`; seeded site-admin credentials are read from KV (`service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/gitea/config`, keys `admin_username`/`admin_password`) — not stored in git.
- **The seed is consumed create-only**: `lifecycle ignore_changes` on `admin_username`/`admin_password` means the engine reads the KV seed only when first creating `gitea/config`. After `rotate-root` diverges the live password from the seed, a later apply never pushes the stale seed back.
- Add roles with conservative, minimal scopes (write: implies read:):
  - `teabot-implementer` — `write:repository`, `write:issue` (clone/push, open PRs, comment).
  - `teabot-reviewer` — `read:repository`, `write:issue` (read diffs, post PR reviews/comments).
- TTLs: `ttl` 1h / `max_ttl` 4h on both roles.

## The site-admin bot + KV seed are now provisioned by Terraform (no manual gap)

Per Ben's review, creating the site-admin bot and seeding its credential is no longer a manual step:

- **terraform-git #46** creates the `gitea-vault-admin` site-admin bot and writes its generated password **once** to `kv/service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/gitea/config` (create-only KV write; never updated).
- **terraform-vault #102** grants terraform-git write access to that KV path.

## Ordering (merge + apply)

1. **puppet-prod #498** — installs the plugin binary on the vault nodes (Puppet must run).
2. **terraform-vault #100** (`benvin/gitea-deployer-access`) — deployer access to the gitea mount.
3. **terraform-vault #102** (`benvin/gitea-kv-writer`) — terraform-git KV write grant.
4. **terraform-git #46** (`benvin/gitea-vault-admin`) — creates the bot + seeds KV.
5. **This PR** — mounts the engine (reads the seed) and declares roles.

Files here are disjoint from #100 and #102 (no conflict).

**CI note:** the plan for this PR may hard-fail in CI if the plugin isn't yet registered/installed or the KV seed isn't present in the plan's target. If CI plan fails for that ordering reason, that is expected — do not force; apply only once steps 1–4 are live.

## Remaining manual step (one, ordered)

After this PR's first apply, run `vault write -f gitea/config/rotate-root` so the standing seed password is replaced by one only Vault holds. (On future binary upgrades, bump the RPM version in puppet-prod and the catalog `sha256` here together, then `vault write sys/plugins/reload/backend plugin=vault-plugin-secrets-gitea`.)

https://claude.ai/code/session_015ur3i7D2azsMAWTSVABApv
Reviewed-on: #101
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
2026-07-27 23:42:13 +10:00
unkinben bf9c785281 policies: allow terraform-git to delete the gitea config seed for taint recovery (#104)
ci/woodpecker/push/apply Pipeline was successful
terraform-git's apply (pipeline 108) still fails: pipeline 107 actually wrote the seed but the post-create metadata read 403'd, so terraform tainted the resource — recovery is replace (delete+create), and delete was deliberately not granted. Withholding delete doesn't provide the write-once property anyway (that's lifecycle ignore_changes in terraform-git); it just breaks taint recovery and destroy.

- add delete on the kv data path for the gitea config seed
- add delete on the matching kv metadata path (full destroy support)

After merge+apply, restart the terraform-git apply once more — it will replace the tainted seed and go green, unblocking #101.

Reviewed-on: #104
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
2026-07-27 23:36:53 +10:00
unkinben d82580f1af policies: grant terraform-git read on the gitea config KV metadata path (#103)
ci/woodpecker/push/apply Pipeline was successful
terraform-git's main apply still fails after the skip_child_token fix (tfgit #48): the vault_kv_secret_v2 seed resource reads the kv-v2 metadata path during plan/apply, and the grant added in #102 covered kv/data only — Vault returns 403 on GET kv/metadata/.../secret_backend/gitea/config (terraform-git pipeline 107). This is the last blocker before the KV seed lands and terraform-vault #101 can apply.

- add read on kv/metadata/service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/gitea/config to the terraform-git seed policy

Reviewed-on: #103
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
2026-07-27 23:21:43 +10:00
unkinben 2c27395613 policies: let terraform-git seed the gitea engine admin credential to KV (#102)
ci/woodpecker/push/apply Pipeline was successful
## Why

terraform-git now provisions the `gitea-vault-admin` site-admin bot and writes its generated password to `kv/service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/gitea/config` (as `admin_username` + `admin_password`) so the gitea secrets engine can consume it at creation time. The `woodpecker_terraform_git` / `terraform_git` identity has no write access to that KV path, so its apply would 403 without this grant.

The deployer that *reads* the seed already has read access via `policies/kv/service/vault/secret_backends_read.yaml` (`kv/data/service/vault/+/+/secret_backend/*`), so only the write side is added here.

## Change

- Add `policies/kv/service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/gitea/config_write.yaml` granting `create`/`read`/`update` on the gitea config KV path to the `terraform_git` approle and `woodpecker_terraform_git` k8s role.

## Ordering

Merge + apply this before the terraform-git `benvin/gitea-vault-admin` PR applies (which performs the write). Files are disjoint from the other gitea terraform-vault PRs (#100, #101).

https://claude.ai/code/session_015ur3i7D2azsMAWTSVABApv
Reviewed-on: #102
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
2026-07-27 20:22:40 +10:00
unkinben d289775e38 policies: grant the vault deployer access to the gitea secrets engine (#100)
ci/woodpecker/push/apply Pipeline was successful
## Why

The forthcoming `gitea_secret_backend` + role configuration (separate PR, `benvin/gitea-secret-engine`) is applied by terraform-vault under the deployment identity (`tf_vault` approle / `woodpecker_terraform_vault` k8s role). That identity has no access to the `gitea/` mount yet, so writing the engine's config and roles would 403. This mirrors `policies/rancher/admin.yaml`.

## Change

- Add `policies/gitea/admin.yaml` granting the deployer:
  - create/read/update/delete on `gitea/config`
  - create/update on `gitea/config/rotate-root` (write-only rotation trigger)
  - full manage + list on `gitea/roles/*` (and list on `gitea/roles`)
- Deliberately excludes `gitea/creds/*` — minting tokens is for consumers, not the deployer.
- No new catalog or mount grant: plugin registration is already covered by the shared, sudo-protected wildcard in `policies/sys/plugins/catalog/admin.yaml`, and mounting uses the deployer's existing `sys/mounts/*` access — same as the rancher engine.

## Order

Merge and apply this **before** the `benvin/gitea-secret-engine` PR, so the deployer can write the engine config/roles on that apply.

https://claude.ai/code/session_015ur3i7D2azsMAWTSVABApv
Reviewed-on: #100
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
2026-07-27 19:10:21 +10:00
unkinben 31424ea6ff ci: fetch vault from artifactapi instead of dnf install (#99)
ci/woodpecker/push/apply Pipeline was successful
## Why

CI installs vault by shelling out to `dnf install vault -y`. That reads
metadata for every enabled repo (appstream/baseos/crb/epel/ha) and downloads
the 169MB vendored vault RPM from the `unkin` repo on **every** plan/apply run
(~39s per job measured in `almalinux9-opentofu:20260606`).

## Change

- Replace `dnf install vault -y` with a pinned `curl` of the upstream vault zip
  from the artifactapi `hashicorp-releases` remote proxy, extracted with the
  image's `python3` (`python3 -m zipfile`) to `/usr/local/bin/vault`.
- Pin the version via a new `VAULT_VERSION` env var (`1.20.0`); bump the var to
  upgrade.

## Speedup

Measured in `git.unkin.net/unkin/almalinux9-opentofu:20260606`:

| approach | time |
|---|---|
| `dnf install vault -y` (current) | ~39s |
| `dnf --disablerepo='*' --enablerepo=unkin` (still pulls 169MB RPM) | ~9s |
| curl zip from artifactapi + python extract (this PR) | ~6.6s |

~32s saved per plan/apply job. The zip is cached by artifactapi after first
fetch (warm ~3s).

## Caveats

- Assumes the `almalinux9-opentofu` image ships `curl` + `python3` (both
  present in `:20260606`).
- Relies on the existing artifactapi `hashicorp-releases` generic remote whose
  patterns already allow `vault/.*vault_.*_linux_amd64.zip`.

---------

Co-authored-by: benvin <neotheo@gmail.com>
Reviewed-on: #99
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
2026-07-25 09:47:34 +10:00
unkinben 1fa5900787 Add terraform-enc Vault/Consul plumbing + encapi token grant (#98)
ci/woodpecker/push/apply Pipeline was successful
The new **terragrunt-enc** repo manages all encapi ENC data (statuses, roles, node classifications) via Terraform/Terragrunt and needs its own Vault/Consul plumbing, mirroring terraform-git and terraform-incus. This supersedes the dual-write approach in terraform-incus PR #39; the equivalent terraform-incus grant (PR #97) is being closed, so the encapi-token grant is created fresh here for the new approle.

Changes:
- Add approle role `terraform_enc` and k8s auth role `woodpecker_terraform_enc` (bound to the `terraform-enc` ServiceAccount in the `woodpecker` namespace) for CI auth.
- Add consul secret backend role `terraform-enc` plus its ACL rules granting `write` on `infra/terraform/enc/` (its terragrunt state prefix), and a policy letting both auth roles read `consul_root/au/syd1/creds/terraform-enc`.
- Grant both auth roles read on `kv/data/kubernetes/namespace/encapi/default/environment` (the ENCAPI_WRITE_TOKEN) so `make apply` can write to encapi via the encapi provider.

Reviewed-on: #98
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
2026-07-24 23:18:56 +10:00
unkinben dcc73131a4 Bump rancher plugin catalog to v0.1.1 (bearerToken fix) (#96)
ci/woodpecker/push/apply Pipeline was successful
## Why

v0.1.0 of the rancher plugin minted non-functional tokens — it returned `status.value` (the secret fragment) instead of `status.bearerToken` (`ext/<name>:<secret>`), so every cred and every root rotation 401'd against Rancher. Fixed in plugin v0.1.1 (PR #2, released).

## Changes

- `config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-rancher.yaml` sha256 → v0.1.1 binary `9e597cd9…d5955` (verified against both v0.1.1 RPMs). Re-registers the catalog entry so OpenBao launches the fixed binary.

## Deploy coordination

1. Puppet installs the v0.1.1 RPM on the vault nodes (separate puppet-prod PR).
2. Merge this → apply re-registers the catalog with the new sha.
3. `vault plugin reload -plugin=vault-plugin-secrets-rancher` so the running plugin swaps to v0.1.1 (its sha must match this catalog entry).

---------

Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <neotheo@gmail.com>
Reviewed-on: #96
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
2026-07-18 22:59:35 +10:00
unkinben 87e3ada14f Mount the rancher secrets engine + seed a service account + roles (#93)
ci/woodpecker/push/apply Pipeline was successful
## Why

Deploy the new Rancher token secrets engine into the cluster (the last of the 4 wiring PRs), mirroring the litellm/gpg pattern. Users can then `vault read rancher/creds/<role>` for short-lived, cluster-scoped Rancher tokens, backed by a seeded admin token the engine auto-rotates before Rancher's 90-day cap.

## Changes

- Add `rancher_secret_backend` module — mount + config via the ranchervaultsecret provider (rancher_url `https://rancher.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net`).
- Add `rancher_secret_backend_service_account` module — seeds an auto-rotated token (90d TTL / 45d rotation); the seed token is read from KV, not git.
- Add `rancher_secret_backend_role` module + a `ci` role (1h/8h, cluster+TTL scoped).
- Wire `config.hcl` discovery, module variables, `main.tf` blocks, terragrunt inputs, and the `rancher` provider in `root.hcl`.
- Config: `config/rancher_secret_backend/rancher.yaml`, `.../service_account/rancher/admin.yaml`, `.../role/rancher/ci.yaml`.

## Prerequisite

Populate `kv/service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/rancher/service_account/admin` with a live Rancher admin token (keys: `token`, optional `token_name`) **before** apply, exactly as litellm's `master_key` is seeded in KV.

## Merge order

Part 4 of 4 (last). Requires: puppet install (#483) → deployer policy (#91) → plugin import (#92) → this. The `plan` needs the KV seed present, so seed KV first.

---------

Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <neotheo@gmail.com>
Reviewed-on: #93
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
2026-07-18 16:16:54 +10:00
unkinben 193c17d1bc Manage the litellm plugin via config/plugins (import existing registration) (#90)
ci/woodpecker/push/apply Pipeline was successful
Bring the litellm plugin under terraform management like the gpg one, using the new plugin-import module (#89).

## Why
The litellm plugin was registered **manually** before terraform owned the catalog. If we just add it to `config/plugins/`, the first apply tries to *create* a catalog entry that already exists and fails. So its state must be imported first.

## Changes
- Add `config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-litellm.yaml` (`sha256` = released **v0.1.1** openbao binary from the RPM Puppet installs).

## Manual pre-step (before apply)
Import the existing registration into state, and verify the sha matches the live catalog:
```sh
cd environments/au/syd1
# confirm the live sha first:
bao read sys/plugins/catalog/secret/vault-plugin-secrets-litellm
# import into state:
terragrunt import \
  'module.plugin["vault-plugin-secrets-litellm"].vault_plugin.this' \
  secret/vault-plugin-secrets-litellm
```
If the live sha differs from the yaml, update the yaml to match (or expect a benign re-register to the on-disk v0.1.1 sha). Needs the deployer's plugin-catalog access (#88, already merged).

Reviewed-on: #90
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
2026-07-18 14:55:33 +10:00
unkinben 03e9baf17f Register the rancher plugin in the catalog (import) (#92)
ci/woodpecker/push/apply Pipeline was successful
## Why

Register the released v0.1.0 rancher secrets plugin so the engine can be mounted. Uses the existing config/plugins discovery + plugin module (added for gpg in #89). Mirrors #90 (litellm import).

## Changes

- Add `config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-rancher.yaml` (`type: secret`, `command: vault-plugin-secrets-rancher`, `sha256` pinned to the released binary `d2b17f45…ec574a`, verified against both the vault and openbao v0.1.0 RPMs).

## Merge order

Part 2 of 4. Requires the binary on disk (puppet-prod install) and the deployer policy (#91). Merge before the backend PR.

---------

Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <neotheo@gmail.com>
Reviewed-on: #92
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
2026-07-18 14:47:08 +10:00
benvin b825fdebf7 chore: setup access to enable all plugins, designated to tf-vault user (#94)
ci/woodpecker/push/apply Pipeline was successful
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Reviewed-on: #94
2026-07-18 14:42:02 +10:00
unkinben 7da23d47fe Grant vault deployer access to import + manage the rancher engine (#91)
ci/woodpecker/push/apply Pipeline was successful
## Why

Wiring the new Rancher token secrets engine into Vault. The deployer registers the plugin (sudo-protected `sys/plugins/catalog`) and configures the engine via the ranchervaultsecret provider, so it needs catalog + engine-path access. Mirrors #88 (gpg).

## Changes

- Add `policies/rancher/admin.yaml` granting the `tf_vault` approle and `woodpecker_terraform_vault` k8s role: catalog sudo on `vault-plugin-secrets-rancher`, and manage on `rancher/{config,service-accounts,roles}`.

## Merge order

Part 1 of 4. Merge before the plugin-import and backend PRs so apply doesn't 403. (Puppet install + this policy first, then import, then backend.)

---------

Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <neotheo@gmail.com>
Reviewed-on: #91
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
2026-07-18 14:34:54 +10:00
unkinben 933de177fa Register + mount the GPG secrets engine at gpg/ (#87)
ci/woodpecker/push/apply Pipeline was successful
Complete the deploy of the [vault-plugin-secrets-gpg](https://git.unkin.net/unkin/vault-plugin-secrets-gpg) engine. Puppet ([puppet-prod #480](unkin/puppet-prod#480)) installs the `openbao-plugin-secrets-gpg` RPM onto the OpenBao nodes; this registers that binary in the plugin catalog and enables the secrets engine so `gpg/` is actually usable.

- Add a `gpg_secret_backend` module using the standard `hashicorp/vault` provider (already required at 5.6.0): `vault_plugin` (catalog register with a pinned sha256) + `vault_mount` (enable at the mount path).
- Wire it through `vault_cluster` (new `gpg_secret_backend` variable + module block) and the config discovery (`config.hcl` group + syd1 terragrunt input), mirroring `litellm_secret_backend`.
- Add `config/gpg_secret_backend/gpg.yaml` mounting at `gpg/` and pinning the released v0.1.0 binary sha256 (`0e92d740…a7b20`, extracted from the published RPM). Puppet installs the RPM floating, so this sha must be bumped in lockstep on any plugin upgrade or OpenBao rejects the binary.

Validated locally with `tofu validate` + `tofu fmt`. Granting non-root access to `gpg/*` (auth roles + policies) is a follow-up scoped to whoever consumes the engine (e.g. passv from CI).

Reviewed-on: #87
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
2026-07-17 23:19:38 +10:00
unkinben ce1185deba Grant vault deployer access to import + manage the gpg engine (#88)
ci/woodpecker/push/apply Pipeline was successful
## Why
Applying the gpg mount (#87) needs two grants the deployer (`tf_vault` approle / `woodpecker_terraform_vault` k8s role) doesn't have. terraform-vault **registers the plugin itself** (`vault_plugin` → `sys/plugins/catalog`, a sudo-protected path) and **manages keys** via the gpgvaultsecret provider (`gpg/keys/*`). The deployer already has `sys/mounts/*` but neither of these, so apply would 403 on the plugin registration and on `gpg/keys` writes — the same failure mode as #84.

## Changes
- Add `policies/gpg/admin.yaml` granting:
  - `create/read/update/delete/sudo` on `sys/plugins/catalog/secret/vault-plugin-secrets-gpg` — to **import** (register/deregister) the plugin.
  - full management of `gpg/keys/*` (+ `gpg/keys` list) — to **manage keys**.
  - assigned to `tf_vault` (approle) + `woodpecker_terraform_vault` (k8s/au/syd1), mirroring `policies/litellm/admin.yaml` (#84).

Should merge/apply **before** #87 so the deployer can register the plugin and create the `pass` key.

Reviewed-on: #88
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
2026-07-17 23:09:31 +10:00
unkinben 3d59758324 Add a plugin-import module + config/plugins for catalog registration (#89)
ci/woodpecker/push/apply Pipeline was canceled
Split plugin catalog registration out of the per-engine backend modules into its own concern (previously bundled into #87's gpg_secret_backend).

## Changes
- New generic `plugin` module (`vault_plugin`: type/name/command/sha256/plugin_version) that imports a binary into the catalog.
- New `config/plugins/` discovery group (filename = catalog name = mount type), wired through `vault_cluster` (`plugins` variable + module) and the syd1 environment.
- `config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-gpg.yaml` pins the released v0.1.0 binary sha256 (`0e92d740…a7b20`, from the published RPM). Puppet installs the RPM floating, so bump this in lockstep on upgrade.

Any engine now registers its plugin by dropping a file in `config/plugins/`; its `*_secret_backend` module just mounts the registered type.

Needs the deployer's plugin-catalog access (#88). Merge order: **#88 → this → #87**.

Reviewed-on: #89
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
2026-07-17 23:08:04 +10:00
unkinben 8bb071ae46 Add auth and state access for terraform-rancher (#86)
ci/woodpecker/push/apply Pipeline was successful
## Why

The new `terraform-rancher` repo (manages Rancher's Authentik OIDC auth via the rancher2 provider) needs Vault auth + Consul state, mirroring the terraform-authentik runner (#78/#81/#82).

## Change

- `AppRole/terraform_rancher` + k8s auth role `woodpecker_terraform_rancher` (SA terraform-rancher in the woodpecker ns).
- Consul secret-backend role + ACL policy (`resources/secret_backend/consul_root/au/syd1/terraform-rancher.hcl`) granting write to the `infra/terraform/rancher/` state prefix.
- Vault policies: read the Rancher admin API token (`kv/service/terraform/rancher`) and the keycloakoidc client secret (`kv/kubernetes/namespace/cattle-system/default/oauth-credentials`), plus the consul_root state creds.

Scoped the OAuth read to the `cattle-system` path specifically (rather than the `+` wildcard the authentik policy uses) since the Rancher runner only needs its own app's secret.

## Validation

pre-commit (terragrunt-hcl-fmt + yamllint) passed. CI plan will confirm.

Reviewed-on: #86
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
2026-07-15 21:37:45 +10:00
benvin 0dba5e00a6 chore: update litellm address (#85)
ci/woodpecker/push/apply Pipeline was successful
- update litellm address
- add a test role

---------

Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Reviewed-on: #85
2026-07-09 23:47:32 +10:00
unkinben a400e5dc7e fix: grant vault deployer access to manage the litellm engine (#84)
ci/woodpecker/push/apply Pipeline was successful
## Why
Applying the newly-merged litellm mount (#83) failed at apply time with:

```
Error: failed to write litellm config
URL: PUT https://vault.service.consul:8200/v1/litellm/config
Code: 403. * permission denied
```

The deployer identity (`tf_vault` approle / `woodpecker_terraform_vault` k8s role) can enable the mount via `sys/mounts/admin`, but no policy grants it access to the engine's own data paths, so writing the config and roles is denied.

## Changes
- Add `policies/litellm/admin.yaml` granting `create`/`read`/`update`/`delete` on `litellm/config` and `litellm/roles/*` (plus `read`/`list` on `litellm/roles`), assigned to the same auth roles as the other secret-engine admin policies (`tf_vault`, `woodpecker_terraform_vault`).

## Note
The policy attaches to the deployer's auth roles, so it takes effect on the next token issuance — a re-run of the apply (fresh Vault login) will have the permission and can write `litellm/config` and the roles.

Reviewed-on: #84
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
2026-07-07 20:10:43 +10:00
unkinben 95e7a81b2e feat: manage litellm secrets engine via terraform-provider-litellmvaultsecret (#83)
ci/woodpecker/push/apply Pipeline failed
## Why
The `vault-plugin-secrets-litellm` engine (mints LiteLLM virtual keys) is registered in Vault, but nothing in this repo declared its mount, config, or roles. This wires in the companion `litellm` provider (`git.unkin.net/unkin/litellmvaultsecret`) so the mount is managed as code alongside the other secret backends.

## Changes
- Add `litellm_secret_backend` module that mounts the engine and writes its config (`base_url`, `request_timeout_seconds`); reads the sensitive `master_key` from KV at `kv/service/vault/<country>/<region>/secret_backend/<path>`, matching the consul/kubernetes backend convention.
- Add `litellm_secret_backend_role` module that manages roles (`models`, `max_budget`, `key_alias_prefix`, `ttl`/`max_ttl` in seconds, `metadata`).
- Register both modules in `vault_cluster` `main.tf` and add typed variables in `variables.tf`.
- Discover `litellm_secret_backend[_role]` YAML in `config.hcl` and pass the maps through the terragrunt inputs.
- Declare the `litellm` provider (pinned `0.1.0`) and a `provider "litellm"` block in the generated root `backend.tf`.
- Add example config for the `litellm` mount and a sample `team-a` role.

## Notes
- Requires the `master_key` KV secret to exist at `kv/service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/litellm` before apply (the module reads it, does not create it).
- Assumes provider `git.unkin.net/unkin/litellmvaultsecret` `0.1.0` is published to the artifactapi `terraform-unkin` registry.

Reviewed-on: #83
Co-authored-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: Ben Vincent <ben@unkin.net>
2026-07-07 00:18:29 +10:00
114 changed files with 2525 additions and 4 deletions
+2 -1
View File
@@ -7,8 +7,9 @@ steps:
image: git.unkin.net/unkin/almalinux9-opentofu:20260606
environment:
VAULT_AUTH_METHOD: kubernetes
VAULT_VERSION: "1.20.0"
commands:
- dnf install vault -y
- curl -fsSL -o /tmp/vault.zip "https://artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/api/v1/remote/hashicorp-releases/vault/$${VAULT_VERSION}/vault_$${VAULT_VERSION}_linux_amd64.zip" && python3 -m zipfile -e /tmp/vault.zip /tmp/ && install -m0755 /tmp/vault /usr/local/bin/vault && rm -f /tmp/vault.zip /tmp/vault /tmp/LICENSE.txt
- make plan
- make apply
backend_options:
+2 -1
View File
@@ -6,8 +6,9 @@ steps:
image: git.unkin.net/unkin/almalinux9-opentofu:20260606
environment:
VAULT_AUTH_METHOD: kubernetes
VAULT_VERSION: "1.20.0"
commands:
- dnf install vault -y
- curl -fsSL -o /tmp/vault.zip "https://artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/api/v1/remote/hashicorp-releases/vault/$${VAULT_VERSION}/vault_$${VAULT_VERSION}_linux_amd64.zip" && python3 -m zipfile -e /tmp/vault.zip /tmp/ && install -m0755 /tmp/vault /usr/local/bin/vault && rm -f /tmp/vault.zip /tmp/vault /tmp/LICENSE.txt
- make plan
backend_options:
kubernetes:
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
token_ttl: 3600
token_max_ttl: 14400
bind_secret_id: false
token_bound_cidrs:
- "10.10.12.200/32"
use_deterministic_role_id: true
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
token_ttl: 120
token_max_ttl: 120
bind_secret_id: false
token_bound_cidrs:
- "10.10.12.200/32"
- "198.18.25.102/32"
- "198.18.26.91/32"
- "198.18.27.40/32"
use_deterministic_role_id: true
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
token_ttl: 120
token_max_ttl: 120
bind_secret_id: false
token_bound_cidrs:
- "10.10.12.200/32"
- "198.18.25.102/32"
- "198.18.26.91/32"
- "198.18.27.40/32"
use_deterministic_role_id: true
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
bound_service_account_names:
- ghp
bound_service_account_namespaces:
- ghp
token_ttl: 600
token_max_ttl: 600
audience: vault
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
bound_service_account_names:
- logarchiver
bound_service_account_namespaces:
- logging
token_ttl: 600
token_max_ttl: 600
audience: vault
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
bound_service_account_names:
- terraform-enc
bound_service_account_namespaces:
- woodpecker
token_ttl: 600
token_max_ttl: 600
audience: https://kubernetes.default.svc.cluster.local
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
bound_service_account_names:
- terraform-infra
bound_service_account_namespaces:
- woodpecker
token_ttl: 600
token_max_ttl: 600
audience: https://kubernetes.default.svc.cluster.local
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
bound_service_account_names:
- terraform-rancher
bound_service_account_namespaces:
- woodpecker
token_ttl: 600
token_max_ttl: 600
audience: https://kubernetes.default.svc.cluster.local
+81
View File
@@ -185,5 +185,86 @@ locals {
trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml") => content
if startswith(file_path, "pki_mount_only/")
}
litellm_secret_backend = {
for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml") => content
if startswith(file_path, "litellm_secret_backend/")
}
litellm_secret_backend_role = {
for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
trimsuffix(replace(file_path, "litellm_secret_backend_role/", ""), ".yaml") => merge(content, {
name = trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml")
backend = dirname(replace(file_path, "litellm_secret_backend_role/", ""))
})
if startswith(file_path, "litellm_secret_backend_role/")
}
plugins = {
for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml") => merge(content, {
name = trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml")
})
if startswith(file_path, "plugins/")
}
gpg_secret_backend = {
for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml") => content
if startswith(file_path, "gpg_secret_backend/")
}
gpg_key = {
for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
trimsuffix(replace(file_path, "gpg_key/", ""), ".yaml") => merge(content, {
name = trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml")
backend = dirname(replace(file_path, "gpg_key/", ""))
})
if startswith(file_path, "gpg_key/")
}
rancher_secret_backend = {
for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml") => content
if startswith(file_path, "rancher_secret_backend/")
}
rancher_secret_backend_service_account = {
for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
trimsuffix(replace(file_path, "rancher_secret_backend_service_account/", ""), ".yaml") => merge(content, {
name = trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml")
backend = dirname(replace(file_path, "rancher_secret_backend_service_account/", ""))
})
if startswith(file_path, "rancher_secret_backend_service_account/")
}
rancher_secret_backend_role = {
for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
trimsuffix(replace(file_path, "rancher_secret_backend_role/", ""), ".yaml") => merge(content, {
name = trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml")
backend = dirname(replace(file_path, "rancher_secret_backend_role/", ""))
})
if startswith(file_path, "rancher_secret_backend_role/")
}
gitea_secret_backend = {
for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml") => content
if startswith(file_path, "gitea_secret_backend/")
}
gitea_secret_backend_role = {
for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
trimsuffix(replace(file_path, "gitea_secret_backend_role/", ""), ".yaml") => merge(content, {
name = trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml")
backend = dirname(replace(file_path, "gitea_secret_backend_role/", ""))
})
if startswith(file_path, "gitea_secret_backend_role/")
}
netbox_secret_backend = {
for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml") => content
if startswith(file_path, "netbox_secret_backend/")
}
netbox_secret_backend_role = {
for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
trimsuffix(replace(file_path, "netbox_secret_backend_role/", ""), ".yaml") => merge(content, {
name = trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml")
netbox_username = trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml")
backend = dirname(replace(file_path, "netbox_secret_backend_role/", ""))
})
if startswith(file_path, "netbox_secret_backend_role/")
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
consul_roles:
- terraform-enc
ttl: 120
max_ttl: 300
datacenters: []
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
consul_roles:
- terraform-infra
ttl: 120
max_ttl: 300
datacenters: []
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
consul_roles:
- terraform-rancher
ttl: 120
max_ttl: 300
datacenters: []
+11
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
# Mounts the gitea token secrets engine at "gitea" and writes its config.
# The seeded site-admin credentials are sensitive and read from KV, not stored
# here:
# kv/service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/gitea/config
# -> keys: admin_username (required), admin_password (required)
# Populate that KV path with a purpose-built Gitea site-admin bot (2FA disabled)
# BEFORE applying, then run `vault write -f gitea/config/rotate-root` after the
# first apply so only Vault holds the admin password.
description: "Gitea ephemeral scoped access token engine"
gitea_url: "https://git.unkin.net"
request_timeout_seconds: 30
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
# Role minting ephemeral tokens for the teabot-implementer bot user.
# The implementer clones/pushes code and opens pull requests, so it gets write
# on repositories (clone + push + PR create) and write on issues (PR/issue
# comments). Read is implied by write. No admin/org/user-write scopes.
# read:user is required because tea (and most API clients) validate the login
# via GET /api/v1/user, which 403s without it (verified against a minted token).
# Reading gitea/creds/teabot-implementer mints a lease-bound token deleted from
# Gitea on revoke/expiry.
---
username: teabot-implementer
scopes:
- write:repository
- write:issue
- read:user
token_name_prefix: vault-teabot-implementer
ttl: 3600 # 1h
max_ttl: 14400 # 4h
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
# Role minting ephemeral tokens for the teabot-reviewer bot user.
# The reviewer reads code and posts pull-request reviews/comments, so it gets
# read on repositories (fetch diffs) and write on issues (PR reviews + issue/PR
# comments). No repository-write, admin, org, or user-write scopes.
# read:user is required because tea (and most API clients) validate the login
# via GET /api/v1/user, which 403s without it (verified against a minted token).
# Reading gitea/creds/teabot-reviewer mints a lease-bound token deleted from
# Gitea on revoke/expiry.
---
username: teabot-reviewer
scopes:
- read:repository
- write:issue
- read:user
token_name_prefix: vault-teabot-reviewer
ttl: 3600 # 1h
max_ttl: 14400 # 4h
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
# Role minting ephemeral tokens for the unkin-agent bot user -- the shared
# identity Ben's AI coding agents use to submit work. The agent clones/pushes
# code and opens pull requests, so it gets write on repositories (clone + push +
# PR create) and write on issues (PR/issue comments). Read is implied by write.
# No admin/org/user-write scopes, so it can never merge via API privilege; merge
# is blocked separately by branch protection (merge whitelist = Owners).
# read:user is required because tea (and most API clients) validate the login
# via GET /api/v1/user, which 403s without it.
# Reading gitea/creds/unkin-agent mints a lease-bound token deleted from Gitea
# on revoke/expiry. Consumed by the "agents" AppRole (see
# policies/gitea/creds/unkin-agent.yaml).
---
username: unkin-agent
scopes:
- write:repository
- write:issue
- read:user
token_name_prefix: vault-unkin-agent
ttl: 3600 # 1h
max_ttl: 14400 # 4h
+8
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
# config/gpg_key/gpg/logarchive.yaml
# OpenPGP key in the gpg engine for the logarchiver service. The private key
# stays in Vault; logarchiver reads only the exported public key
# (gpg/keys/logarchive) to encrypt archived logs, and retrieval delegates
# decryption back to gpg/decrypt/logarchive. Key name = "logarchive", backend = "gpg".
algorithm: rsa-4096
identity: "logarchive <logarchive@unkin.net>"
exportable: false
+7
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
# config/gpg_key/gpg/pass.yaml
# An OpenPGP key in the gpg engine for password-store (passv). The private key
# stays in Vault; clients import the exported public key to encrypt and delegate
# decryption to gpg/decrypt/pass. Key name = "pass", backend = "gpg".
algorithm: rsa-4096
identity: "pass <pass@unkin.net>"
exportable: false
+4
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
# config/gpg_secret_backend/gpg.yaml
# Mounts the gpg secrets engine at "gpg". The plugin itself is registered in the
# catalog separately (see config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-gpg.yaml).
description: "GPG/OpenPGP secrets engine (sign/verify/encrypt/decrypt)"
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
allowed_kubernetes_namespaces:
- "cert-manager"
kubernetes_role_type: "Role"
extra_labels: {}
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
allowed_kubernetes_namespaces:
- "dhcp-system"
kubernetes_role_type: "Role"
extra_labels: {}
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
allowed_kubernetes_namespaces:
- "bind-system"
service_account_name: "agent-dns"
extra_labels: {}
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
allowed_kubernetes_namespaces:
- "cephrgw-system"
kubernetes_role_type: "Role"
extra_labels: {}
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
# Mounts the LiteLLM dynamic secrets engine at "litellm" and writes its config.
# The master key is sensitive and read from KV, not stored here:
# kv/service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/litellm -> key "master_key"
description: "LiteLLM dynamic virtual keys"
base_url: "https://litellm.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net"
request_timeout_seconds: 30
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
---
models:
- claude-opus-4-7
max_budget: 5
ttl: 3600 # seconds (1h)
max_ttl: 86400 # seconds (24h)
metadata:
team: testuser
env: prod
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
---
models:
- claude-haiku-4-5
- claude-sonnet-4-6
max_budget: 50
ttl: 3600 # seconds (1h)
max_ttl: 86400 # seconds (24h)
metadata:
team: mailfiltering
env: prod
+48
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
# Mounts the netbox token secrets engine at "netbox" and writes its config.
# The seeded NetBox admin token is sensitive and read from KV, not stored here:
# kv/service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/netbox/config
# -> key: admin_token (required) the SINGLE static admin credential
#
# admin_token must be a BARE NetBox token with NO scheme prefix: do not prepend
# "Bearer " or "Token ". NetBox infers the version from the value's nbt_ prefix,
# so one bare token authenticates under either scheme; the plugin adds the keyword
# itself. A prefixed value yields a malformed header + 403.
#
# Populate admin_token with a purpose-built NetBox superuser token (add_user +
# add_token + grant_token, or superuser) BEFORE applying, then run
# `vault write -f netbox/config/rotate` after the first apply so only Vault holds
# the live admin token.
#
# Only ONE static admin token exists. netbox_user_management does NOT re-read this
# token; instead the engine mints it a short-lived user-admin token per apply from
# netbox/roles/vault-user-mgmt (see user_mgmt_username below), so rotating
# admin_token never breaks user management. Set user_mgmt_username to the
# pre-existing NetBox superuser the static admin_token belongs to (or another
# superuser). Leaving it unset falls back to using admin_token directly, which is
# only a bootstrap/degraded path and breaks after rotation.
#
# Bootstrap ordering: the vault-user-mgmt role must exist before the netbox
# provider is configured from its creds, so on a brand-new backend apply the mount
# + role first (e.g. `tofu apply -target=...netbox_secret_backend
# -target=...netbox_user_mgmt_role`) once, then apply normally.
#
# token_version 2 is the NetBox 4.6.5 default and requires API_TOKEN_PEPPERS to
# be configured on the NetBox server; set token_version: 1 here if the server
# has no peppers. token_version does NOT change how the plugin authenticates its
# own calls (that scheme comes from the admin_token value's nbt_ prefix); it only
# sets the version of the per-user tokens the engine mints. It must still MATCH
# the admin_token kind: nbt_ v2 token -> token_version 2; bare v1 token -> 1.
#
# The mount uses ignore_changes=[token], so editing KV alone does NOT reach the
# live mount. To push a corrected/rotated admin token into a running mount:
# vault write netbox/config token=<BARE_TOKEN>
# (netbox_url/token_version are preserved on a partial update). Do NOT -replace
# the mount to force a re-read - that recreates it and drops all roles/config.
description: "NetBox ephemeral scoped API token engine"
netbox_url: "https://netbox.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net"
token_version: 2
request_timeout_seconds: 30
# Set to the pre-existing NetBox superuser admin_token belongs to, to mint the
# user-management credential dynamically (recommended). Until set, user management
# uses admin_token directly and a check block warns that rotation will break it.
# user_mgmt_username: "vault-netbox-admin"
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
# Single declarative source for the terraform-infra NetBox service identity. The
# filename stem is the engine role name AND the NetBox username (1:1); config.hcl
# derives both from it, so neither is repeated below. Creating this file creates
# the user: the netbox_user_management module synthesizes the NetBox user + object
# permissions from the permissions block, and the engine role mints ephemeral
# tokens for that same user. write_enabled true because terraform-infra manages
# NetBox IPAM/DCIM; very short TTLs because a token is minted per plan/apply and
# revoked when the run's lease ends.
---
write_enabled: true
ttl: 120 # 2m
max_ttl: 300 # 5m
permissions:
- object_types:
- ipam.prefix
- ipam.ipaddress
- ipam.iprange
- dcim.device
- dcim.interface
- dcim.macaddress
actions:
- view
- add
- change
- delete
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
# config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-gitea.yaml
# Imports (registers) the gitea secrets plugin in the catalog. Filename =
# catalog name = mount type. The binary is installed on the OpenBao nodes by
# Puppet (openbao-plugin-secrets-gitea RPM ->
# /opt/openbao-plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-gitea).
#
# sha256 pins the released v0.1.0 binary; bump it in lockstep with any RPM
# upgrade or OpenBao will refuse to launch the plugin.
type: secret
command: vault-plugin-secrets-gitea
sha256: "8f67fbc216effada5fd7399888a710b62fad83be0b31761a439e7dec3d56509b"
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
# config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-gpg.yaml
# Imports (registers) the gpg secrets plugin in the catalog. Filename = catalog
# name = mount type. The binary is installed on the OpenBao nodes by Puppet
# (openbao-plugin-secrets-gpg RPM -> /opt/openbao-plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-gpg).
#
# sha256 pins the released v0.1.0 binary; bump it in lockstep with any RPM
# upgrade or OpenBao will refuse to launch the plugin.
type: secret
command: vault-plugin-secrets-gpg
sha256: "0e92d7408795688badb55789bc1604e8f1dd4d71998656c7f831991fce9a7b20"
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
# config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-litellm.yaml
# Imports (registers) the litellm secrets plugin in the catalog. This plugin was
# registered manually before terraform managed the catalog, so its state must be
# imported before the first apply (see the PR description) — otherwise apply
# tries to create an entry that already exists.
#
# sha256 is the released v0.1.1 openbao binary
# (openbao-plugin-secrets-litellm RPM -> /opt/openbao-plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-litellm),
# which Puppet installs floating. Verify against the live catalog during import
# (`bao read sys/plugins/catalog/secret/vault-plugin-secrets-litellm`).
type: secret
command: vault-plugin-secrets-litellm
sha256: "2263ebcb3498877a87ddcf31a9cbc6efca6b81702a5faecf7fe7e40200ca7a1f"
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
# config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-netbox.yaml
# Imports (registers) the netbox secrets plugin in the catalog. Filename =
# catalog name = mount type. The binary is installed on the OpenBao nodes by
# Puppet (openbao-plugin-secrets-netbox RPM ->
# /opt/openbao-plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-netbox).
#
# sha256 pins the released v0.1.0 binary; bump it in lockstep with any RPM
# upgrade or OpenBao will refuse to launch the plugin.
type: secret
command: vault-plugin-secrets-netbox
sha256: "362b7f6c9e21179ad51d2d810684d9387fe50e3a1887f171700122a0b2a05cef"
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
# config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-rancher.yaml
# Imports (registers) the rancher secrets plugin in the catalog. Filename =
# catalog name = mount type. The binary is installed on the OpenBao nodes by
# Puppet (openbao-plugin-secrets-rancher RPM ->
# /opt/openbao-plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-rancher).
#
# sha256 pins the released v0.1.1 binary; bump it in lockstep with any RPM
# upgrade or OpenBao will refuse to launch the plugin.
type: secret
command: vault-plugin-secrets-rancher
sha256: "9e597cd9512a0629f940141dc6611bf95eaf165abcb52470eee027bf467d5955"
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
# Mounts the rancher token secrets engine at "rancher" and writes its config.
# The plugin is registered in the catalog separately (see
# config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-rancher.yaml). Seeded service-account
# tokens live under config/rancher_secret_backend_service_account/rancher/ and
# roles under config/rancher_secret_backend_role/rancher/.
description: "Rancher API token engine (seeded root rotation + dynamic scoped creds)"
rancher_url: "https://rancher.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net"
request_timeout_seconds: 30
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
# A role that mints short-lived Rancher tokens from the "admin" service account.
# Reading rancher/creds/ci returns a lease-bound token deleted from Rancher on
# revoke. Minted tokens inherit the admin service account's RBAC; only cluster
# and TTL are scoped per-token.
---
service_account: admin
description: "CI/CD ephemeral Rancher token"
ttl: 3600 # seconds (1h)
max_ttl: 28800 # seconds (8h)
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
# A seeded, auto-rotated Rancher service-account token on the "rancher" engine.
# The seed token itself is sensitive and read from KV (not stored here):
# kv/service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/rancher/service_account/admin
# -> keys: token (required), token_name (optional)
# Populate that KV path with a live Rancher admin token BEFORE applying; the
# engine then rotates it (mints a fresh 90d token every 45d) so it never lapses.
token_ttl: 7776000 # 90d in seconds
rotation_period: 3888000 # 45d in seconds
+24
View File
@@ -39,6 +39,12 @@ locals {
for backend_name, _ in local.config.consul_secret_backend :
backend_name => replace(backend_name, "/", "_")
}
# Same sanitized alias mapping for the NetBox providers.
netbox_backend_aliases = {
for backend_name, _ in local.config.netbox_secret_backend :
backend_name => replace(backend_name, "/", "_")
}
}
terraform {
@@ -68,6 +74,21 @@ inputs = {
kubernetes_secret_backend = local.config.kubernetes_secret_backend
kubernetes_secret_backend_role = local.config.kubernetes_secret_backend_role
pki_mount_only = local.config.pki_mount_only
litellm_secret_backend = local.config.litellm_secret_backend
litellm_secret_backend_role = local.config.litellm_secret_backend_role
plugins = local.config.plugins
gpg_secret_backend = local.config.gpg_secret_backend
gpg_key = local.config.gpg_key
rancher_secret_backend = local.config.rancher_secret_backend
rancher_secret_backend_service_account = local.config.rancher_secret_backend_service_account
rancher_secret_backend_role = local.config.rancher_secret_backend_role
gitea_secret_backend = local.config.gitea_secret_backend
gitea_secret_backend_role = local.config.gitea_secret_backend_role
netbox_secret_backend = local.config.netbox_secret_backend
netbox_secret_backend_role = local.config.netbox_secret_backend_role
# Pass policy maps to vault_cluster module
policy_auth_map = local.policies.policy_auth_map
@@ -75,4 +96,7 @@ inputs = {
# Pass sanitized consul backend aliases for provider configuration
consul_backend_aliases = local.consul_backend_aliases
# Pass sanitized netbox backend aliases for provider configuration
netbox_backend_aliases = local.netbox_backend_aliases
}
+30
View File
@@ -11,6 +11,24 @@ provider "vault" {
address = local.vault_addr
}
# The LiteLLM secrets engine is managed through its own provider, which talks to
# the same Vault server. Token falls back to the VAULT_TOKEN environment variable.
provider "litellm" {
address = local.vault_addr
}
# The gpg secrets engine's keys are managed through its own provider (same Vault
# server; token falls back to VAULT_TOKEN).
provider "gpg" {
address = local.vault_addr
}
# The rancher token secrets engine is managed through its own provider (same
# Vault server; token falls back to VAULT_TOKEN).
provider "rancher" {
address = local.vault_addr
}
terraform {
backend "consul" {
address = "https://consul.service.consul"
@@ -29,6 +47,18 @@ terraform {
source = "hashicorp/consul"
version = "2.23.0"
}
litellm = {
source = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/litellmvaultsecret"
version = "0.1.0"
}
gpg = {
source = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/gpgvaultsecret"
version = "0.1.0"
}
rancher = {
source = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/ranchervaultsecret"
version = "0.1.0"
}
}
}
EOF
+233
View File
@@ -299,10 +299,243 @@ module "kubernetes_secret_backend_role" {
allowed_kubernetes_namespaces = each.value.allowed_kubernetes_namespaces
kubernetes_role_type = each.value.kubernetes_role_type
extra_labels = each.value.extra_labels
service_account_name = each.value.service_account_name
depends_on = [module.kubernetes_secret_backend]
}
module "litellm_secret_backend" {
source = "./modules/litellm_secret_backend"
for_each = var.litellm_secret_backend
country = var.country
region = var.region
path = each.key
plugin = each.value.plugin
description = each.value.description
base_url = each.value.base_url
request_timeout_seconds = each.value.request_timeout_seconds
}
module "litellm_secret_backend_role" {
source = "./modules/litellm_secret_backend_role"
for_each = var.litellm_secret_backend_role
name = each.value.name
backend = each.value.backend
models = each.value.models
max_budget = each.value.max_budget
key_alias_prefix = each.value.key_alias_prefix
ttl = each.value.ttl
max_ttl = each.value.max_ttl
metadata = each.value.metadata
depends_on = [module.litellm_secret_backend]
}
module "plugin" {
source = "./modules/plugin"
for_each = var.plugins
name = each.value.name
type = each.value.type
command = each.value.command
sha256 = each.value.sha256
plugin_version = each.value.version
}
module "gpg_secret_backend" {
source = "./modules/gpg_secret_backend"
for_each = var.gpg_secret_backend
path = each.key
plugin = each.value.plugin
description = each.value.description
depends_on = [module.plugin]
}
module "gpg_key" {
source = "./modules/gpg_key"
for_each = var.gpg_key
backend = each.value.backend
name = each.value.name
algorithm = each.value.algorithm
identity = each.value.identity
exportable = each.value.exportable
deletion_allowed = each.value.deletion_allowed
min_decryption_version = each.value.min_decryption_version
depends_on = [module.gpg_secret_backend]
}
module "rancher_secret_backend" {
source = "./modules/rancher_secret_backend"
for_each = var.rancher_secret_backend
path = each.key
plugin = each.value.plugin
description = each.value.description
rancher_url = each.value.rancher_url
ca_cert = each.value.ca_cert
tls_skip_verify = each.value.tls_skip_verify
request_timeout_seconds = each.value.request_timeout_seconds
depends_on = [module.plugin]
}
module "rancher_secret_backend_service_account" {
source = "./modules/rancher_secret_backend_service_account"
for_each = var.rancher_secret_backend_service_account
backend = each.value.backend
name = each.value.name
country = var.country
region = var.region
token_ttl = each.value.token_ttl
rotation_period = each.value.rotation_period
depends_on = [module.rancher_secret_backend]
}
module "rancher_secret_backend_role" {
source = "./modules/rancher_secret_backend_role"
for_each = var.rancher_secret_backend_role
backend = each.value.backend
name = each.value.name
service_account = each.value.service_account
cluster_name = each.value.cluster_name
description = each.value.description
ttl = each.value.ttl
max_ttl = each.value.max_ttl
depends_on = [module.rancher_secret_backend_service_account]
}
module "gitea_secret_backend" {
source = "./modules/gitea_secret_backend"
for_each = var.gitea_secret_backend
path = each.key
plugin = each.value.plugin
description = each.value.description
gitea_url = each.value.gitea_url
country = var.country
region = var.region
ca_cert = each.value.ca_cert
tls_skip_verify = each.value.tls_skip_verify
request_timeout_seconds = each.value.request_timeout_seconds
depends_on = [module.plugin]
}
module "gitea_secret_backend_role" {
source = "./modules/gitea_secret_backend_role"
for_each = var.gitea_secret_backend_role
backend = each.value.backend
name = each.value.name
username = each.value.username
scopes = each.value.scopes
token_name_prefix = each.value.token_name_prefix
ttl = each.value.ttl
max_ttl = each.value.max_ttl
depends_on = [module.gitea_secret_backend]
}
module "netbox_secret_backend" {
source = "./modules/netbox_secret_backend"
for_each = var.netbox_secret_backend
path = each.key
plugin = each.value.plugin
description = each.value.description
netbox_url = each.value.netbox_url
token_version = each.value.token_version
country = var.country
region = var.region
ca_cert = each.value.ca_cert
tls_skip_verify = each.value.tls_skip_verify
request_timeout_seconds = each.value.request_timeout_seconds
depends_on = [module.plugin]
}
# Dedicated engine role that mints an ephemeral, user-admin-capable token for the
# pre-existing NetBox superuser named on each backend (user_mgmt_username).
# netbox_user_management reads netbox/creds/vault-user-mgmt from it, so it
# authenticates with a short-lived Vault-minted token derived from the single
# static admin token - never a second static credential, and unaffected by
# rotation of the engine's admin seed. Created before user management so the role
# exists when it reads creds.
module "netbox_user_mgmt_role" {
source = "./modules/netbox_secret_backend_role"
for_each = { for k, v in var.netbox_secret_backend : k => v if v.user_mgmt_username != null }
backend = each.key
name = "vault-user-mgmt"
netbox_username = each.value.user_mgmt_username
write_enabled = true
description = "Ephemeral user-admin token for netbox_user_management (Vault-minted per apply)"
ttl = 600
max_ttl = 1200
depends_on = [module.netbox_secret_backend]
}
# Declaratively manage the NetBox service users + object permissions the engine
# roles mint tokens for, authenticating with the Vault-minted user-admin token
# above (mirrors consul_acl_management). Consumes the SAME role config as
# netbox_secret_backend_role: one file per identity, filename-derived username,
# inline permissions.
module "netbox_user_management" {
source = "./modules/netbox_user_management"
country = var.country
region = var.region
netbox_backends = var.netbox_secret_backend
netbox_roles = var.netbox_secret_backend_role
netbox_backend_aliases = var.netbox_backend_aliases
# This module declares its own netbox provider, so it is a legacy module and
# cannot take depends_on. Ordering vs the vault-user-mgmt role is not needed on
# steady state (the role pre-exists, so reading its creds succeeds regardless);
# on first enablement the role must be created first via the one-time targeted
# bootstrap documented in config/netbox_secret_backend/netbox.yaml.
}
module "netbox_secret_backend_role" {
source = "./modules/netbox_secret_backend_role"
for_each = var.netbox_secret_backend_role
backend = each.value.backend
name = each.value.name
netbox_username = each.value.netbox_username
netbox_user_id = each.value.netbox_user_id
write_enabled = each.value.write_enabled
description = each.value.description
ttl = each.value.ttl
max_ttl = each.value.max_ttl
depends_on = [module.netbox_secret_backend, module.netbox_user_management]
}
module "vault_policy" {
source = "./modules/vault_policy"
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
# Mounts the gitea secrets engine and writes its connection config via the
# giteavaultsecret provider. The plugin is registered ("imported") in the
# catalog separately (config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-gitea.yaml). The
# seeded site-admin credentials are sensitive and read from KV, not stored in
# git:
# kv/service/vault/<country>/<region>/secret_backend/<path>/config
# Expected keys: admin_username (required), admin_password (required).
data "vault_kv_secret_v2" "config" {
mount = "kv"
name = "service/vault/${var.country}/${var.region}/secret_backend/${var.path}/config"
}
resource "gitea_secret_backend" "this" {
path = var.path
plugin = var.plugin
description = var.description
gitea_url = var.gitea_url
admin_username = data.vault_kv_secret_v2.config.data["admin_username"]
admin_password = data.vault_kv_secret_v2.config.data["admin_password"]
ca_cert = var.ca_cert
tls_skip_verify = var.tls_skip_verify
request_timeout_seconds = var.request_timeout_seconds
lifecycle {
# The KV seed is a bootstrap credential: it is consumed only when the engine
# config is first created. After creation the live admin password is rotated
# in place (vault write -f gitea/config/rotate-root) and diverges from the
# seed, so re-reading the (possibly stale) KV value must never push it back.
# Ignoring the credential attributes makes this module create-only for them.
# (The sibling rancher/litellm seed modules do not yet do this and would
# re-push their seed on a subsequent apply.)
ignore_changes = [admin_username, admin_password]
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.10"
required_providers {
vault = {
source = "hashicorp/vault"
version = "5.6.0"
}
gitea = {
source = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/giteavaultsecret"
version = "0.1.0"
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
variable "path" {
description = "Mount path of the gitea secrets engine (e.g. \"gitea\")"
type = string
}
variable "plugin" {
description = "Registered plugin name to mount (the catalog name = mount type)"
type = string
default = "vault-plugin-secrets-gitea"
}
variable "description" {
description = "Human-friendly description of the mount"
type = string
default = null
}
variable "gitea_url" {
description = "Base URL of the Gitea server (e.g. https://git.unkin.net)"
type = string
}
variable "country" {
description = "Country segment of the KV path holding the seeded admin credentials"
type = string
}
variable "region" {
description = "Region segment of the KV path holding the seeded admin credentials"
type = string
}
variable "ca_cert" {
description = "PEM CA certificate that signed the Gitea server's TLS cert (optional; omit to use the system trust store)"
type = string
default = null
}
variable "tls_skip_verify" {
description = "Skip TLS verification of the Gitea server (not recommended)"
type = bool
default = false
}
variable "request_timeout_seconds" {
description = "HTTP timeout in seconds for calls from the plugin to Gitea"
type = number
default = 30
}
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
# A role that mints short-lived, scoped gitea tokens for a target Gitea user.
# Reading gitea/creds/<name> produces a lease-bound token that is deleted from
# Gitea when the lease is revoked or reaches max_ttl.
resource "gitea_secret_backend_role" "this" {
backend = var.backend
name = var.name
username = var.username
scopes = var.scopes
token_name_prefix = var.token_name_prefix
ttl = var.ttl
max_ttl = var.max_ttl
}
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.10"
required_providers {
gitea = {
source = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/giteavaultsecret"
version = "0.1.0"
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
variable "backend" {
description = "Mount path of the gitea secrets engine this role belongs to"
type = string
}
variable "name" {
description = "Role name (read gitea/creds/<name> to mint a token)"
type = string
}
variable "username" {
description = "Target Gitea username the minted tokens belong to"
type = string
}
variable "scopes" {
description = "Gitea access-token scopes granted to minted tokens (write: implies read:)"
type = list(string)
}
variable "token_name_prefix" {
description = "Prefix for the generated Gitea token name (optional)"
type = string
default = null
}
variable "ttl" {
description = "Default lease TTL in seconds for minted tokens"
type = number
default = null
}
variable "max_ttl" {
description = "Maximum lease TTL in seconds for minted tokens"
type = number
default = null
}
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
# Manages an OpenPGP key inside a gpg secrets engine mount, via the
# gpgvaultsecret provider. The private key never leaves Vault; consumers use the
# exported public_key to encrypt and delegate decryption back to the engine.
resource "gpg_key" "this" {
backend = var.backend
name = var.name
algorithm = var.algorithm
identity = var.identity
exportable = var.exportable
deletion_allowed = var.deletion_allowed
min_decryption_version = var.min_decryption_version
}
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.10"
required_providers {
gpg = {
source = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/gpgvaultsecret"
version = "0.1.0"
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
variable "backend" {
description = "Mount path of the gpg secrets engine (e.g. \"gpg\")"
type = string
}
variable "name" {
description = "Name of the key"
type = string
}
variable "algorithm" {
description = "Key algorithm: rsa-2048, rsa-3072, rsa-4096 or ed25519"
type = string
default = "rsa-3072"
}
variable "identity" {
description = "OpenPGP User ID (defaults to the key name)"
type = string
default = null
}
variable "exportable" {
description = "Allow exporting the private key (enable-only)"
type = bool
default = false
}
variable "deletion_allowed" {
description = "Whether the key may be deleted"
type = bool
default = false
}
variable "min_decryption_version" {
description = "Minimum key version usable for decryption/verification"
type = number
default = null
}
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
# Mounts the gpg secrets engine. The plugin is registered ("imported") in the
# catalog separately via the config/plugins/ discovery and the plugin module;
# this module just enables a mount of the already-registered plugin type.
resource "vault_mount" "this" {
path = var.path
type = var.plugin
description = var.description
}
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.10"
required_providers {
vault = {
source = "hashicorp/vault"
version = "5.6.0"
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
variable "path" {
description = "Mount path of the GPG secrets engine (e.g. \"gpg\")"
type = string
}
variable "plugin" {
description = "Registered plugin name to mount (the catalog name = mount type)"
type = string
default = "vault-plugin-secrets-gpg"
}
variable "description" {
description = "Human-friendly description of the mount"
type = string
default = null
}
@@ -2,6 +2,10 @@ locals {
# Auto-generate role rules path: resources/secret_backend/{backend_path}/roles/{role_name}.yaml
role_rules_file = "resources/secret_backend/${var.backend}/roles/${var.name}.yaml"
# service_account_name mode mints tokens for a pre-existing SA, so the
# generated_role_rules / kubernetes_role_type binding fields must be unset.
use_service_account = var.service_account_name != null
# Auto-generate extra labels based on country/region and role name
auto_labels = merge(var.extra_labels, {
vault-region = "${var.country}-${var.region}"
@@ -13,7 +17,8 @@ resource "vault_kubernetes_secret_backend_role" "role" {
backend = var.backend
name = var.name
allowed_kubernetes_namespaces = var.allowed_kubernetes_namespaces
kubernetes_role_type = var.kubernetes_role_type
generated_role_rules = file("${path.module}/../../../../../../../../${local.role_rules_file}")
kubernetes_role_type = local.use_service_account ? null : var.kubernetes_role_type
generated_role_rules = local.use_service_account ? null : file("${path.module}/../../../../../../../../${local.role_rules_file}")
service_account_name = var.service_account_name
extra_labels = local.auto_labels
}
@@ -34,4 +34,10 @@ variable "extra_labels" {
description = "Additional labels to apply to generated Kubernetes objects"
type = map(string)
default = {}
}
variable "service_account_name" {
description = "Pre-existing service account to mint tokens for. When set, RBAC comes from that SA's own bindings instead of generated_role_rules."
type = string
default = null
}
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
# Expected keys in KV secret: master_key
data "vault_kv_secret_v2" "secret_backend_config" {
mount = "kv"
name = "service/vault/${var.country}/${var.region}/secret_backend/${var.path}"
}
resource "litellm_secret_backend" "this" {
path = var.path
plugin = var.plugin
description = var.description
base_url = var.base_url
master_key = data.vault_kv_secret_v2.secret_backend_config.data["master_key"]
request_timeout_seconds = var.request_timeout_seconds
}
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.10"
required_providers {
vault = {
source = "hashicorp/vault"
version = "5.6.0"
}
litellm = {
source = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/litellmvaultsecret"
version = "0.1.0"
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
variable "country" {
description = "Country identifier (used to locate the KV secret holding the master key)"
type = string
}
variable "region" {
description = "Region identifier (used to locate the KV secret holding the master key)"
type = string
}
variable "path" {
description = "Mount path of the LiteLLM secrets engine"
type = string
}
variable "plugin" {
description = "Registered plugin name/type to mount"
type = string
default = "vault-plugin-secrets-litellm"
}
variable "description" {
description = "Human-friendly description of the mount"
type = string
default = null
}
variable "base_url" {
description = "Base URL of the LiteLLM proxy (e.g. http://litellm.litellm.svc:4000)"
type = string
}
variable "request_timeout_seconds" {
description = "HTTP timeout in seconds for calls from the plugin to the LiteLLM proxy"
type = number
default = 30
}
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
resource "litellm_secret_backend_role" "this" {
backend = var.backend
name = var.name
models = var.models
max_budget = var.max_budget
key_alias_prefix = var.key_alias_prefix
ttl = var.ttl
max_ttl = var.max_ttl
metadata = var.metadata
}
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.10"
required_providers {
litellm = {
source = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/litellmvaultsecret"
version = "0.1.0"
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
variable "name" {
description = "Name of the role"
type = string
}
variable "backend" {
description = "Mount path of the LiteLLM secrets engine this role belongs to"
type = string
}
variable "models" {
description = "Models a generated key may access. Empty means unrestricted"
type = list(string)
default = null
}
variable "max_budget" {
description = "Spending limit applied to each generated key. 0 means unlimited"
type = number
default = null
}
variable "key_alias_prefix" {
description = "Prefix for the auto-generated key alias"
type = string
default = null
}
variable "ttl" {
description = "Default lease TTL in seconds for keys generated from this role"
type = number
default = null
}
variable "max_ttl" {
description = "Maximum lease TTL in seconds for keys generated from this role"
type = number
default = null
}
variable "metadata" {
description = "Metadata attached to each generated key"
type = map(string)
default = null
}
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
# Mounts the netbox secrets engine and writes its connection config via the
# vault-secrets-netbox provider. The plugin is registered ("imported") in the
# catalog separately (config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-netbox.yaml). The
# seeded NetBox admin token is sensitive and read from KV, not stored in git:
# kv/service/vault/<country>/<region>/secret_backend/<path>/config
# Expected key: admin_token (a NetBox token with add_token + grant_token, i.e.
# able to provision and delegate per-user API tokens).
data "vault_kv_secret_v2" "config" {
mount = "kv"
name = "service/vault/${var.country}/${var.region}/secret_backend/${var.path}/config"
lifecycle {
# The plugin builds its own Authorization header from the token VALUE, not
# token_version: a value starting with the nbt_ prefix is sent as
# "Bearer <token>" (v2), otherwise "Token <token>" (v1). So admin_token must
# be the BARE token - a literal `Bearer `/`Token ` scheme prefix yields a
# malformed three-part header and 403s on the plugin's own NetBox calls.
#
# token_version does NOT change that header; it only selects the version of
# the per-user tokens the engine mints for roles. It must still MATCH the
# admin token's kind so the mount and its minted creds line up: an nbt_ v2
# admin token pairs with token_version=2, a bare v1 token with token_version=1.
postcondition {
condition = nonsensitive(
!startswith(self.data["admin_token"], "Bearer ") &&
!startswith(self.data["admin_token"], "Token ") &&
startswith(self.data["admin_token"], "nbt_") == (var.token_version == 2)
)
error_message = "KV admin_token for netbox backend '${var.path}' must be a BARE NetBox token with no 'Bearer '/'Token ' scheme prefix, AND its version must match token_version: a v2 token (nbt_<key>.<secret>) requires token_version=2; a v1 token (bare 40-char value) requires token_version=1."
}
}
}
resource "netbox_secret_backend" "this" {
path = var.path
plugin = var.plugin
description = var.description
netbox_url = var.netbox_url
token = data.vault_kv_secret_v2.config.data["admin_token"]
token_version = var.token_version
ca_cert = var.ca_cert
tls_skip_verify = var.tls_skip_verify
request_timeout_seconds = var.request_timeout_seconds
lifecycle {
# The KV seed is a bootstrap credential: it is consumed only when the engine
# config is first created. After creation the live admin token is rotated in
# place (vault write -f netbox/config/rotate) and diverges from the seed, so
# re-reading the (possibly stale) KV value must never push it back. Ignoring
# the token makes this module create-only for it (mirrors gitea/config).
ignore_changes = [token]
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.10"
required_providers {
vault = {
source = "hashicorp/vault"
version = "5.6.0"
}
netbox = {
source = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/vault-secrets-netbox"
version = "0.1.0"
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
variable "path" {
description = "Mount path of the netbox secrets engine (e.g. \"netbox\")"
type = string
}
variable "plugin" {
description = "Registered plugin name to mount (the catalog name = mount type)"
type = string
default = "vault-plugin-secrets-netbox"
}
variable "description" {
description = "Human-friendly description of the mount"
type = string
default = null
}
variable "netbox_url" {
description = "Base URL of the NetBox server (e.g. https://netbox.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net)"
type = string
}
variable "token_version" {
description = "NetBox API token format: 2 (default, requires API_TOKEN_PEPPERS on the NetBox server) or 1 (legacy plaintext-key)."
type = number
default = 2
}
variable "country" {
description = "Country segment of the KV path holding the seeded admin token"
type = string
}
variable "region" {
description = "Region segment of the KV path holding the seeded admin token"
type = string
}
variable "ca_cert" {
description = "PEM CA certificate that signed the NetBox server's TLS cert (optional; omit to use the system trust store)"
type = string
default = null
}
variable "tls_skip_verify" {
description = "Skip TLS verification of the NetBox server (not recommended)"
type = bool
default = false
}
variable "request_timeout_seconds" {
description = "HTTP timeout in seconds for calls from the plugin to NetBox"
type = number
default = 30
}
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
# A role that mints short-lived, scoped NetBox tokens for a pre-existing NetBox
# service user. Reading netbox/creds/<name> produces a lease-bound token that is
# deleted from NetBox when the lease is revoked or reaches max_ttl.
resource "netbox_secret_backend_role" "this" {
backend = var.backend
name = var.name
netbox_username = var.netbox_username
netbox_user_id = var.netbox_user_id
write_enabled = var.write_enabled
description = var.description
ttl = var.ttl
max_ttl = var.max_ttl
}
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.10"
required_providers {
netbox = {
source = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/vault-secrets-netbox"
version = "0.1.0"
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
variable "backend" {
description = "Mount path of the netbox secrets engine this role belongs to"
type = string
}
variable "name" {
description = "Role name (read netbox/creds/<name> to mint a token)"
type = string
}
variable "netbox_username" {
description = "NetBox service username the minted tokens belong to (set this or netbox_user_id)"
type = string
default = null
}
variable "netbox_user_id" {
description = "NetBox service user id the minted tokens belong to (set this or netbox_username)"
type = number
default = null
}
variable "write_enabled" {
description = "Whether minted tokens carry NetBox write access (default read-only)"
type = bool
default = false
}
variable "description" {
description = "Human-friendly description of the role"
type = string
default = null
}
variable "ttl" {
description = "Default lease TTL in seconds for minted tokens (the token's NetBox expiry is aligned to the lease)"
type = number
default = null
}
variable "max_ttl" {
description = "Maximum lease TTL in seconds for minted tokens"
type = number
default = null
}
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
rule "terraform_required_providers" {
enabled = false
}
rule "terraform_required_version" {
enabled = false
}
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
# netbox_user_management reconciles NetBox service users + permissions on every
# apply, so it needs an admin credential each run. That credential is minted
# DYNAMICALLY by the netbox engine from the SINGLE static admin token, so no
# second static credential exists and it survives rotation of the engine seed:
#
# 1. module.netbox_user_mgmt_role creates netbox/roles/vault-user-mgmt, a
# write-enabled role for a pre-existing NetBox superuser (user_mgmt_username).
# 2. Reading netbox/creds/vault-user-mgmt mints a short-lived, user-admin-capable
# token for that superuser; the e-breuninger provider uses it to CRUD users.
#
# The hashicorp/vault provider ships ephemeral resources for KV only, not for
# dynamic engine creds, so the mint is read via the vault_generic_secret DATA
# source: the short-lived token transits Terraform state (sensitive, lease-revoked)
# and is re-minted each plan. This is the closest single-static-token shape the
# current providers allow; move to an ephemeral resource once the vault provider
# ships a dynamic-secret one. Ordering note: the vault-user-mgmt role must already
# exist when this reads creds, so on a brand-new backend bootstrap the mount +
# role first (targeted apply) - a fresh single apply cannot configure the netbox
# provider from a role created in the same run.
locals {
# Backends that mint a dynamic user-admin token (a pre-existing superuser named).
netbox_dynamic_backends = { for k, v in var.netbox_backends : k => v if v.user_mgmt_username != null }
# Backends still using the single static admin_token directly (until a superuser
# is named). Bootstrap/degraded path - the same one token, not a second static.
netbox_static_backends = { for k, v in var.netbox_backends : k => v if v.user_mgmt_username == null }
}
# Dynamic path: the engine mints a user-admin token for the superuser. Requires
# the deployer to read netbox/creds/vault-user-mgmt (policies/netbox/creds).
data "vault_generic_secret" "user_admin" {
for_each = local.netbox_dynamic_backends
path = "${each.key}/creds/vault-user-mgmt"
}
# Static fallback: the single admin_token from KV, used only until a superuser is
# named. NetBox derives the token version from the value's `nbt_` prefix, not the
# keyword, so the same BARE token works under either scheme; reject a value that
# carries a literal `Bearer `/`Token ` scheme prefix (a malformed header -> 403).
data "vault_kv_secret_v2" "netbox_backend_configs" {
for_each = local.netbox_static_backends
mount = "kv"
name = "service/vault/${var.country}/${var.region}/secret_backend/${each.key}/config"
lifecycle {
postcondition {
condition = nonsensitive(
!startswith(self.data["admin_token"], "Bearer ") &&
!startswith(self.data["admin_token"], "Token ")
)
error_message = "KV admin_token for netbox backend '${each.key}' must be a BARE NetBox token with no 'Bearer '/'Token ' scheme prefix (v2: nbt_<key>.<secret>; v1: the 40-char value)."
}
}
}
# Warn (non-fatal) for any backend still on the static token: rotating the engine
# admin seed would then break user management. Set user_mgmt_username to switch to
# the dynamic, rotation-proof mint.
check "netbox_user_mgmt_dynamic" {
assert {
condition = length(local.netbox_static_backends) == 0
error_message = "A netbox backend has no user_mgmt_username, so user management uses the static admin_token directly and will break if that token is rotated (netbox/config/rotate). Set user_mgmt_username to a pre-existing NetBox superuser to mint the credential dynamically."
}
}
locals {
# Per backend: the dynamically-minted user-admin token, else the static seed.
netbox_admin_tokens = {
for k, v in var.netbox_backends : k => (
v.user_mgmt_username != null
? data.vault_generic_secret.user_admin[k].data["token"]
: data.vault_kv_secret_v2.netbox_backend_configs[k].data["admin_token"]
)
}
}
# One NetBox provider instance per backend, authenticated with its (dynamic or
# static) admin token.
provider "netbox" {
alias = "by_backend"
for_each = var.netbox_backend_aliases
server_url = var.netbox_backends[each.key].netbox_url
api_token = local.netbox_admin_tokens[each.key]
allow_insecure_https = var.netbox_backends[each.key].tls_skip_verify
# NetBox is internal and not always reachable at plan time; the resource CRUD
# calls surface any real incompatibility, so skip the startup version probe.
skip_version_check = true
}
# NetBox users authenticate only via Vault-minted API tokens, never the web UI,
# so give each a random unknown password (required by the API) that no one holds.
resource "random_password" "user" {
for_each = var.netbox_roles
length = 32
special = true
}
# Declarative NetBox service users, one per engine role. The role's filename-
# derived name is the username, so the engine role and its user match 1:1.
resource "netbox_user" "users" {
for_each = var.netbox_roles
provider = netbox.by_backend[each.value.backend]
username = each.value.name
password = random_password.user[each.key].result
active = each.value.active
staff = each.value.staff
email = each.value.email
}
locals {
# Flatten roles x permissions into one map keyed by "<role_path>:<index>". A
# permission's name defaults to the role name (the username) so a single-
# permission identity repeats nothing already encoded by the filename.
netbox_permissions = merge([
for role_key, role in var.netbox_roles : {
for idx, perm in role.permissions :
"${role_key}:${idx}" => {
backend = role.backend
user = role_key
name = coalesce(perm.name, length(role.permissions) == 1 ? role.name : "${role.name}-${idx}")
object_types = perm.object_types
actions = perm.actions
constraints = perm.constraints
description = perm.description
enabled = perm.enabled
}
}
]...)
}
# Object permissions granting each user its object-type/action scope.
resource "netbox_permission" "perms" {
for_each = local.netbox_permissions
provider = netbox.by_backend[each.value.backend]
name = each.value.name
object_types = each.value.object_types
actions = each.value.actions
enabled = each.value.enabled
description = each.value.description
constraints = each.value.constraints
users = [tonumber(netbox_user.users[each.value.user].id)]
}
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
output "netbox_users" {
description = "Map of created NetBox users (id + username; password is intentionally omitted)"
value = {
for k, u in netbox_user.users : k => {
id = u.id
username = u.username
}
}
}
output "netbox_permissions" {
description = "Map of created NetBox object permissions"
value = {
for k, p in netbox_permission.perms : k => {
id = p.id
name = p.name
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.10"
required_providers {
vault = {
source = "hashicorp/vault"
version = "5.6.0"
}
netbox = {
source = "e-breuninger/netbox"
version = "4.3.0"
}
random = {
source = "hashicorp/random"
version = ">= 3.5"
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
variable "netbox_backends" {
description = "Map of netbox secret backends (keyed by mount path); only the URL and TLS mode are needed to reach NetBox"
type = map(object({
netbox_url = string
tls_skip_verify = optional(bool, false)
# Pre-existing NetBox superuser the engine mints a dynamic user-admin token
# for; unset means fall back to the static admin_token from KV.
user_mgmt_username = optional(string)
}))
}
variable "netbox_roles" {
description = "Map of netbox engine roles (the netbox_secret_backend_role config). Each role's filename-derived name is the NetBox username to create, and its permissions block is the user's object-permission set. Keyed by the role's config path."
type = map(object({
name = string
backend = string
active = optional(bool, true)
staff = optional(bool, false)
email = optional(string)
permissions = optional(list(object({
name = optional(string)
object_types = list(string)
actions = optional(list(string), ["view", "add", "change", "delete"])
constraints = optional(string)
description = optional(string)
enabled = optional(bool, true)
})), [])
}))
default = {}
}
variable "netbox_backend_aliases" {
description = "Map of netbox backend names to sanitized provider aliases"
type = map(string)
default = {}
}
variable "country" {
description = "Country identifier"
type = string
}
variable "region" {
description = "Region identifier"
type = string
}
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
# Registers ("imports") a plugin binary in the Vault/OpenBao plugin catalog so
# it can be mounted. The binary must already exist in the server
# plugin_directory (installed out of band, e.g. by Puppet); `command` is its
# filename there. The sha256 must match the on-disk binary or the server refuses
# to launch the plugin.
resource "vault_plugin" "this" {
type = var.type
name = var.name
command = coalesce(var.command, var.name)
sha256 = var.sha256
version = var.plugin_version
}
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.10"
required_providers {
vault = {
source = "hashicorp/vault"
version = "5.6.0"
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
variable "name" {
description = "Name to register the plugin under in the catalog (also the mount type)"
type = string
}
variable "type" {
description = "Plugin type: secret, auth or database"
type = string
default = "secret"
}
variable "command" {
description = "Plugin binary filename relative to the server plugin_directory. Defaults to the plugin name."
type = string
default = null
}
variable "sha256" {
description = "SHA-256 of the installed plugin binary; must match the on-disk binary"
type = string
}
variable "plugin_version" {
description = "Optional plugin version to register the catalog entry under"
type = string
default = null
}
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
# Mounts the rancher secrets engine and writes its connection config via the
# ranchervaultsecret provider. The plugin is registered ("imported") in the
# catalog separately (config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-rancher.yaml). Seeded
# service-account tokens and roles are managed by the sibling modules.
resource "rancher_secret_backend" "this" {
path = var.path
plugin = var.plugin
description = var.description
rancher_url = var.rancher_url
ca_cert = var.ca_cert
tls_skip_verify = var.tls_skip_verify
request_timeout_seconds = var.request_timeout_seconds
}
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.10"
required_providers {
rancher = {
source = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/ranchervaultsecret"
version = "0.1.0"
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
variable "path" {
description = "Mount path of the rancher secrets engine (e.g. \"rancher\")"
type = string
}
variable "plugin" {
description = "Registered plugin name to mount (the catalog name = mount type)"
type = string
default = "vault-plugin-secrets-rancher"
}
variable "description" {
description = "Human-friendly description of the mount"
type = string
default = null
}
variable "rancher_url" {
description = "Base URL of the Rancher server (e.g. https://rancher.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net)"
type = string
}
variable "ca_cert" {
description = "PEM CA certificate that signed the Rancher server's TLS cert (optional; omit to use the system trust store)"
type = string
default = null
}
variable "tls_skip_verify" {
description = "Skip TLS verification of the Rancher server (not recommended)"
type = bool
default = false
}
variable "request_timeout_seconds" {
description = "HTTP timeout in seconds for calls from the plugin to Rancher"
type = number
default = 30
}
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
# A role that mints short-lived, optionally cluster-scoped rancher tokens from a
# service account. Reading rancher/creds/<name> produces a lease-bound token.
resource "rancher_secret_backend_role" "this" {
backend = var.backend
name = var.name
service_account = var.service_account
cluster_name = var.cluster_name
description = var.description
ttl = var.ttl
max_ttl = var.max_ttl
}
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.10"
required_providers {
rancher = {
source = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/ranchervaultsecret"
version = "0.1.0"
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
variable "backend" {
description = "Mount path of the rancher secrets engine this role lives on"
type = string
}
variable "name" {
description = "Role name"
type = string
}
variable "service_account" {
description = "Service account (seeded token) used to mint credentials; its user's RBAC is inherited by minted tokens"
type = string
}
variable "cluster_name" {
description = "Downstream cluster to scope minted tokens to (empty = full Rancher-server scope)"
type = string
default = null
}
variable "description" {
description = "Description applied to each minted Rancher token"
type = string
default = null
}
variable "ttl" {
description = "Default lease TTL in seconds for tokens minted from this role"
type = number
default = null
}
variable "max_ttl" {
description = "Maximum lease TTL in seconds for tokens minted from this role"
type = number
default = null
}
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
# Seeds an auto-rotated rancher service-account token. The seed token is
# sensitive and read from KV, not stored in git:
# kv/service/vault/<country>/<region>/secret_backend/<backend>/service_account/<name>
# Expected keys: token (required), token_name (optional, the ext.cattle.io Token
# metadata.name so the engine can delete the seed after the first rotation).
data "vault_kv_secret_v2" "seed" {
mount = "kv"
name = "service/vault/${var.country}/${var.region}/secret_backend/${var.backend}/service_account/${var.name}"
}
resource "rancher_secret_backend_service_account" "this" {
backend = var.backend
name = var.name
token = data.vault_kv_secret_v2.seed.data["token"]
token_name = lookup(data.vault_kv_secret_v2.seed.data, "token_name", null)
token_ttl = var.token_ttl
rotation_period = var.rotation_period
}
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.10"
required_providers {
vault = {
source = "hashicorp/vault"
version = "5.6.0"
}
rancher = {
source = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/ranchervaultsecret"
version = "0.1.0"
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
variable "backend" {
description = "Mount path of the rancher secrets engine this service account lives on"
type = string
}
variable "name" {
description = "Service-account name"
type = string
}
variable "country" {
description = "Country code, used to locate the seed token in KV"
type = string
}
variable "region" {
description = "Region code, used to locate the seed token in KV"
type = string
}
variable "token_ttl" {
description = "Lifetime in seconds requested for each rotated replacement token (default: engine default, 90d)"
type = number
default = null
}
variable "rotation_period" {
description = "Seconds a token is used before rotation (default: engine default, 45d). Must be < token_ttl"
type = number
default = null
}
+179
View File
@@ -285,10 +285,189 @@ variable "kubernetes_secret_backend_role" {
allowed_kubernetes_namespaces = optional(list(string), ["*"])
kubernetes_role_type = optional(string, "Role")
extra_labels = optional(map(string), {})
service_account_name = optional(string)
}))
default = {}
}
variable "litellm_secret_backend" {
description = "Map of LiteLLM secret engines to create (mount + config). The master key is read from KV"
type = map(object({
plugin = optional(string, "vault-plugin-secrets-litellm")
description = optional(string)
base_url = string
request_timeout_seconds = optional(number, 30)
}))
default = {}
}
variable "litellm_secret_backend_role" {
description = "Map of LiteLLM roles to create"
type = map(object({
name = string
backend = string
models = optional(list(string))
max_budget = optional(number)
key_alias_prefix = optional(string)
ttl = optional(number)
max_ttl = optional(number)
metadata = optional(map(string))
}))
default = {}
}
variable "plugins" {
description = "Map of plugins to import (register) in the catalog, keyed by catalog name"
type = map(object({
name = string
type = optional(string, "secret")
command = optional(string)
sha256 = string
version = optional(string)
}))
default = {}
}
variable "gpg_secret_backend" {
description = "Map of GPG/OpenPGP secret engines to mount (path => registered plugin + description). The plugin is registered separately via config/plugins."
type = map(object({
plugin = optional(string, "vault-plugin-secrets-gpg")
description = optional(string)
}))
default = {}
}
variable "gpg_key" {
description = "Map of OpenPGP keys to manage in a gpg engine mount"
type = map(object({
name = string
backend = string
algorithm = optional(string, "rsa-3072")
identity = optional(string)
exportable = optional(bool, false)
deletion_allowed = optional(bool, false)
min_decryption_version = optional(number)
}))
default = {}
}
variable "rancher_secret_backend" {
description = "Map of rancher token secret engines to create (mount + config)"
type = map(object({
plugin = optional(string, "vault-plugin-secrets-rancher")
description = optional(string)
rancher_url = string
ca_cert = optional(string)
tls_skip_verify = optional(bool, false)
request_timeout_seconds = optional(number, 30)
}))
default = {}
}
variable "rancher_secret_backend_service_account" {
description = "Map of seeded, auto-rotated rancher service-account tokens (seed token read from KV)"
type = map(object({
name = string
backend = string
token_ttl = optional(number)
rotation_period = optional(number)
}))
default = {}
}
variable "rancher_secret_backend_role" {
description = "Map of rancher token-minting roles to create"
type = map(object({
name = string
backend = string
service_account = string
cluster_name = optional(string)
description = optional(string)
ttl = optional(number)
max_ttl = optional(number)
}))
default = {}
}
variable "gitea_secret_backend" {
description = "Map of gitea token secret engines to create (mount + config; seeded admin creds read from KV)"
type = map(object({
plugin = optional(string, "vault-plugin-secrets-gitea")
description = optional(string)
gitea_url = string
ca_cert = optional(string)
tls_skip_verify = optional(bool, false)
request_timeout_seconds = optional(number, 30)
}))
default = {}
}
variable "gitea_secret_backend_role" {
description = "Map of gitea token-minting roles to create"
type = map(object({
name = string
backend = string
username = string
scopes = list(string)
token_name_prefix = optional(string)
ttl = optional(number)
max_ttl = optional(number)
}))
default = {}
}
variable "netbox_secret_backend" {
description = "Map of netbox token secret engines to create (mount + config; seeded admin token read from KV)"
type = map(object({
plugin = optional(string, "vault-plugin-secrets-netbox")
description = optional(string)
netbox_url = string
token_version = optional(number, 2)
ca_cert = optional(string)
tls_skip_verify = optional(bool, false)
request_timeout_seconds = optional(number, 30)
# Pre-existing NetBox superuser (or add_user + add_token + grant_token) the
# engine mints an ephemeral user-admin token for, so netbox_user_management
# authenticates with a Vault-minted credential derived from the single static
# admin token instead of a second static one. Unset = use the static
# admin_token directly (bootstrap/degraded; breaks after admin-token rotation).
user_mgmt_username = optional(string)
}))
default = {}
}
variable "netbox_secret_backend_role" {
description = "Map of netbox engine roles; each role's filename-derived name is both the engine role and the NetBox username it mints tokens for, and its permissions block is the user's object-permission set"
type = map(object({
name = string
backend = string
netbox_username = optional(string)
netbox_user_id = optional(number)
write_enabled = optional(bool, false)
description = optional(string)
ttl = optional(number)
max_ttl = optional(number)
active = optional(bool, true)
staff = optional(bool, false)
email = optional(string)
permissions = optional(list(object({
name = optional(string)
object_types = list(string)
actions = optional(list(string), ["view", "add", "change", "delete"])
constraints = optional(string)
description = optional(string)
enabled = optional(bool, true)
})), [])
}))
default = {}
}
variable "netbox_backend_aliases" {
description = "Map of netbox backend names to sanitized provider aliases"
type = map(string)
default = {}
}
variable "policy_auth_map" {
description = "Map of auth mounts -> auth roles -> policy names"
type = map(map(list(string)))
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
# Allow the terragrunt-enc runner to generate credentials for the
# terraform-enc role in consul (used to lock/write its terragrunt state under
# infra/terraform/enc/ on the consul backend).
---
rules:
- path: "consul_root/au/syd1/creds/terraform-enc"
capabilities:
- read
auth:
approle:
- terraform_enc
k8s/au/syd1:
- woodpecker_terraform_enc
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
---
rules:
- path: "consul_root/au/syd1/creds/terraform-infra"
capabilities:
- read
auth:
approle:
- terraform_infra
k8s/au/syd1:
- woodpecker_terraform_infra
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
---
rules:
- path: "consul_root/au/syd1/creds/terraform-rancher"
capabilities:
- read
auth:
approle:
- terraform_rancher
k8s/au/syd1:
- woodpecker_terraform_rancher
+42
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
# Allow the vault deployer to manage the gitea token secrets engine: its
# connection config (seeded admin credentials), in-place root rotation, and
# token-minting roles.
#
# Scoped to gitea/* only, and deliberately excludes gitea/creds/* — minting
# tokens is for consumers, not the deployer. The plugin-catalog grant needed to
# import the plugin is the shared, sudo-protected wildcard in
# policies/sys/plugins/catalog/admin.yaml (already covers this plugin), and
# mounting the engine uses the deployer's existing sys/mounts/* access, so no
# new catalog/mount grant is added here (mirrors the rancher engine).
---
rules:
# Engine connection config (Gitea URL, TLS, seeded admin username/password).
- path: "gitea/config"
capabilities:
- create
- read
- update
- delete
# In-place rotation of the seeded admin password (write-only trigger).
- path: "gitea/config/rotate-root"
capabilities:
- create
- update
# Token-minting roles.
- path: "gitea/roles/*"
capabilities:
- create
- read
- update
- delete
- list
- path: "gitea/roles"
capabilities:
- read
- list
auth:
approle:
- tf_vault
k8s/au/syd1:
- woodpecker_terraform_vault
+14
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
# Lets the agents AppRole mint ephemeral Gitea tokens for the unkin-agent bot,
# so AI coding agents authenticate to git.unkin.net as their own least-privilege
# identity instead of Ben's account. Reading gitea/creds/unkin-agent returns a
# lease-bound token scoped by the role (write:repository, write:issue, read:user
# -- never merge/admin). Mirrors the agent-* Kubernetes creds binding pattern.
---
rules:
- path: "gitea/creds/unkin-agent"
capabilities:
- read
auth:
approle:
- agents
+35
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
# Allow the vault deployer to import the gpg plugin and manage its OpenPGP keys.
#
# terraform-vault registers the plugin itself (vault_plugin -> sys/plugins/catalog,
# a sudo-protected path) and manages keys via the gpgvaultsecret provider, so the
# deployer needs catalog access on top of the mount access it already has
# (sys/mounts/*). Without this, apply 403s on the plugin registration and on
# gpg/keys writes.
---
rules:
# Import / register (and deregister) the gpg plugin in the catalog.
- path: "sys/plugins/catalog/secret/vault-plugin-secrets-gpg"
capabilities:
- create
- read
- update
- delete
- sudo
# Manage keys (create/rotate/config/delete) in the gpg mount.
- path: "gpg/keys/*"
capabilities:
- create
- read
- update
- delete
- list
- path: "gpg/keys"
capabilities:
- read
- list
auth:
approle:
- tf_vault
k8s/au/syd1:
- woodpecker_terraform_vault
+12
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
# Allow the logarchiver service (logging namespace, SA logarchiver) to read the
# logarchive public key. A plain read on gpg/keys/logarchive returns the armored
# public_key; no decrypt/export capability is granted (decrypt stays operator-only).
---
rules:
- path: "gpg/keys/logarchive"
capabilities:
- read
auth:
k8s/au/syd1:
- logging_logarchiver
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
# Allow access to agent-certs Kubernetes credentials
---
rules:
- path: "kubernetes/au/syd1/creds/agent-certs"
capabilities:
- update
auth:
ldap:
- kubernetes_au_syd1_cluster_operator
approle:
- agents
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
# Allow access to agent-dhcp Kubernetes credentials
---
rules:
- path: "kubernetes/au/syd1/creds/agent-dhcp"
capabilities:
- update
auth:
ldap:
- kubernetes_au_syd1_cluster_operator
approle:
- agents
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
# Allow access to agent-dns Kubernetes credentials
---
rules:
- path: "kubernetes/au/syd1/creds/agent-dns"
capabilities:
- update
auth:
ldap:
- kubernetes_au_syd1_cluster_operator
approle:
- agents
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
# Allow access to agent-storage Kubernetes credentials
---
rules:
- path: "kubernetes/au/syd1/creds/agent-storage"
capabilities:
- update
auth:
ldap:
- kubernetes_au_syd1_cluster_operator
approle:
- agents
+17
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
# Allow the agents AppRole to manage the kubernetes KV subtree (no delete)
---
rules:
- path: "kv/data/kubernetes/*"
capabilities:
- create
- read
- update
- list
- path: "kv/metadata/kubernetes/*"
capabilities:
- read
- list
auth:
approle:
- agents
+17
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
# Allow ghp to read its GitHub App credentials and encryption key
#
# kv/kubernetes/ghp/github-app (app_id/client_id/client_secret/private_key)
# kv/kubernetes/ghp/app (encryption_key)
---
rules:
- path: "kv/data/kubernetes/ghp/*"
capabilities:
- read
- path: "kv/metadata/kubernetes/ghp/*"
capabilities:
- read
- list
auth:
k8s/au/syd1:
- ghp
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
# Allow the terragrunt-enc runner to read the encapi environment secret
# (ENCAPI_WRITE_TOKEN), so `make apply` can write ENC data (statuses, roles,
# nodes) to encapi via the encapi Terraform provider.
---
rules:
- path: "kv/data/kubernetes/namespace/encapi/default/environment"
capabilities:
- read
auth:
approle:
- terraform_enc
k8s/au/syd1:
- woodpecker_terraform_enc
+18
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
# Allow the terraform-infra runner to read the NetBox + KeaAPI tokens
# (netbox_token / kea_token fields) used by the netbox and kea providers.
---
rules:
- path: "kv/data/service/terraform/infra"
capabilities:
- read
# vault_kv_secret_v2 (terraform-infra providers.tf data source) reads the kv-v2
# metadata path on every plan/apply; a 403 here fails the plan.
- path: "kv/metadata/service/terraform/infra"
capabilities:
- read
auth:
approle:
- terraform_infra
k8s/au/syd1:
- woodpecker_terraform_infra

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