Grant terraform-infra kv metadata read

vault_kv_secret_v2 (terraform-infra providers.tf data source) reads the kv-v2
metadata path on every plan/apply; add read on kv/metadata/service/terraform/infra
so the plan doesn't 403 (same pattern as the terraform-git gitea config policy).

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JUoARVdmhxKQHyyyp1pxeT

Makefile

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ init:
 
 plan: init
 	@$(call vault_env) && \
-	terragrunt run --all --parallelism 4 --non-interactive plan -- -lock=false
+	terragrunt run --all --parallelism 4 --non-interactive plan
 
 apply: init
 	@$(call vault_env) && \

config/arrstack_secret_backend/arrstack.yaml

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-# Mounts the arrstack dynamic secrets engine at "arrstack" and writes its config.
-# The arrproxy admin token is sensitive and read from KV, not stored here:
-#   kv/kubernetes/namespace/arrstack/default/arrproxy-admin-token -> key "token"
-# (seeded by argocd-apps #384). arrstack.unkin.net terminates on traefik-external
-# with an internal-CA cert the OpenBao nodes already trust, so ca_cert is omitted
-# (system trust store), mirroring the gitea engine against git.unkin.net.
-description: "arrstack dynamic arrproxy API keys"
-base_url: "https://arrstack.unkin.net"
-request_timeout_seconds: 30

config/arrstack_secret_backend_role/arrstack/all.yaml

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
----
-# Mints an arrproxy API key scoped to all three arr apps.
-apps:
-  - prowlarr
-  - radarr
-  - sonarr
-ttl: 60        # seconds (1m); short-lived by design, renewed on demand
-max_ttl: 86400 # seconds (24h); the engine additionally caps renewal at the
-               # arrproxy admin token's fixed mint expiry.

config/arrstack_secret_backend_role/arrstack/mediamark.yaml

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
----
-# Mints an arrproxy API key for the mediamark kids-content marking UI, scoped to
-# Sonarr and Radarr only (no Prowlarr: mediamark never touches indexers).
-#
-# mediamark only lists series/movies and reads metadata + artwork, so its key is
-# read-only in intent. The engine role cannot express that today: an
-# arrstack_secret_backend_role carries apps/ttl/max_ttl only, and arrproxy scopes
-# machine tokens by app, not by HTTP method (the GET/HEAD restriction on the
-# cheeztv/kids tier is a grant on an OIDC *group*, not on a minted token). Until
-# the engine and arrproxy grow per-token method scoping, mediamark's read-only
-# posture is enforced by the app itself and by the arrproxy tier it routes to.
-apps:
-  - radarr
-  - sonarr
-ttl: 60        # seconds (1m); short-lived by design, renewed on demand
-max_ttl: 86400 # seconds (24h); the engine additionally caps renewal at the
-               # arrproxy admin token's fixed mint expiry.

config/arrstack_secret_backend_role/arrstack/prowlarr.yaml

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
----
-# Mints an arrproxy API key scoped to Prowlarr only.
-apps:
-  - prowlarr
-ttl: 60        # seconds (1m); short-lived by design, renewed on demand
-max_ttl: 86400 # seconds (24h); the engine additionally caps renewal at the
-               # arrproxy admin token's fixed mint expiry.

config/arrstack_secret_backend_role/arrstack/radarr.yaml

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
----
-# Mints an arrproxy API key scoped to Radarr only.
-apps:
-  - radarr
-ttl: 60        # seconds (1m); short-lived by design, renewed on demand
-max_ttl: 86400 # seconds (24h); the engine additionally caps renewal at the
-               # arrproxy admin token's fixed mint expiry.

config/arrstack_secret_backend_role/arrstack/sonarr.yaml

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
----
-# Mints an arrproxy API key scoped to Sonarr only.
-apps:
-  - sonarr
-ttl: 60        # seconds (1m); short-lived by design, renewed on demand
-max_ttl: 86400 # seconds (24h); the engine additionally caps renewal at the
-               # arrproxy admin token's fixed mint expiry.

config/auth_kubernetes_role/k8s/au/syd1/mediamark.yaml

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
----
-# Kubernetes auth role for the mediamark app: the default service account in the
-# mediamark namespace, used by VaultDynamicSecret to read arrstack/creds/mediamark.
-bound_service_account_names:
-  - default
-bound_service_account_namespaces:
-  - mediamark
-token_ttl: 600
-token_max_ttl: 600
-audience: vault

config/auth_kubernetes_role/k8s/au/syd1/repospawner.yaml

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-bound_service_account_names:
-  - repospawner
-bound_service_account_namespaces:
-  - repospawner
-token_ttl: 600
-token_max_ttl: 600
-audience: vault

config/auth_oidc_backend/oidc.yaml

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-# Authentik (OIDC) human SSO. The mount path is the filename and MUST stay
-# "oidc": the Authentik provider registers strict redirect URIs containing
-# /ui/vault/auth/oidc/oidc/callback, which encode the mount path.
-#
-# identity.unkin.net serves the public LetsEncrypt wildcard, so the OpenBao VMs
-# validate discovery against the system roots with no CA bundle work. Do not
-# swap it for identity.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net (internal CA).
-#
-# listing_visibility unauth makes OIDC the offered default on the UI login page.
-# client_id/client_secret are read from kv/service/authentik/oidc-vault.
----
-oidc_discovery_url: "https://identity.unkin.net/application/o/vault/"
-default_role: "default"
-description: "Authentik SSO - default human login"
-listing_visibility: "unauth"
-default_lease_ttl: 24h
-max_lease_ttl: 168h

config/auth_oidc_group/oidc/akP-vault-admin.yaml

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
----
-# this file doesnt need anything in it, so this data is just to make sure yamlencode reads some yaml data
-# The filename is the Authentik group name asserted in the ak_groups claim.
-# Only akP-* permission groups may appear here; akR-* roles are grouping-only.
-description: foo

config/auth_oidc_role/oidc/default.yaml

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-# Default OIDC login role (the mount's default_role), used by both the web UI
-# and `bao login -method=oidc`.
-#
-# The role grants no policies of its own: authorization comes from the external
-# identity groups under config/auth_oidc_group, matched on the ak_groups claim.
-# ak_groups is Authentik's hierarchy-expanding claim (plain `groups` only carries
-# direct memberships), so nested akP-* permission groups resolve.
-#
-# allowed_redirect_uris must match the provider's strict URIs exactly.
----
-user_claim: "email"
-groups_claim: "ak_groups"
-oidc_scopes:
-  - openid
-  - profile
-  - email
-  - ak_groups
-bound_audiences:
-  - vault
-allowed_redirect_uris:
-  - "http://localhost:8250/oidc/callback"
-  - "https://vault.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/ui/vault/auth/oidc/oidc/callback"
-  - "https://vault.service.consul:8200/ui/vault/auth/oidc/oidc/callback"
-token_ttl: 3600
-token_max_ttl: 28800

config/config.hcl

@@ -97,27 +97,6 @@ locals {
       })
       if startswith(file_path, "auth_ldap_group/")
     }
-    auth_oidc_backend = {
-      for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
-      trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml") => content
-      if startswith(file_path, "auth_oidc_backend/")
-    }
-    auth_oidc_role = {
-      for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
-      trimsuffix(replace(file_path, "auth_oidc_role/", ""), ".yaml") => merge(content, {
-        role_name = trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml")
-        backend   = dirname(replace(file_path, "auth_oidc_role/", ""))
-      })
-      if startswith(file_path, "auth_oidc_role/")
-    }
-    auth_oidc_group = {
-      for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
-      trimsuffix(replace(file_path, "auth_oidc_group/", ""), ".yaml") => merge(content, {
-        groupname = trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml")
-        backend   = split("/", replace(file_path, "auth_oidc_group/", ""))[0]
-      })
-      if startswith(file_path, "auth_oidc_group/")
-    }
     auth_kubernetes_backend = {
       for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
       trimsuffix(replace(file_path, "auth_kubernetes_backend/", ""), ".yaml") => content
@@ -219,19 +198,6 @@ locals {
       })
       if startswith(file_path, "litellm_secret_backend_role/")
     }
-    arrstack_secret_backend = {
-      for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
-      trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml") => content
-      if startswith(file_path, "arrstack_secret_backend/")
-    }
-    arrstack_secret_backend_role = {
-      for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
-      trimsuffix(replace(file_path, "arrstack_secret_backend_role/", ""), ".yaml") => merge(content, {
-        name    = trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml")
-        backend = dirname(replace(file_path, "arrstack_secret_backend_role/", ""))
-      })
-      if startswith(file_path, "arrstack_secret_backend_role/")
-    }
     plugins = {
       for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
       trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml") => merge(content, {
@@ -286,32 +252,5 @@ locals {
       })
       if startswith(file_path, "gitea_secret_backend_role/")
     }
-    netbox_secret_backend = {
-      for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
-      trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml") => content
-      if startswith(file_path, "netbox_secret_backend/")
-    }
-    netbox_secret_backend_role = {
-      for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
-      trimsuffix(replace(file_path, "netbox_secret_backend_role/", ""), ".yaml") => merge(content, {
-        name            = trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml")
-        netbox_username = trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml")
-        backend         = dirname(replace(file_path, "netbox_secret_backend_role/", ""))
-      })
-      if startswith(file_path, "netbox_secret_backend_role/")
-    }
-    ghp_secret_backend = {
-      for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
-      trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml") => content
-      if startswith(file_path, "ghp_secret_backend/")
-    }
-    ghp_secret_backend_role = {
-      for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
-      trimsuffix(replace(file_path, "ghp_secret_backend_role/", ""), ".yaml") => merge(content, {
-        name    = trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml")
-        backend = dirname(replace(file_path, "ghp_secret_backend_role/", ""))
-      })
-      if startswith(file_path, "ghp_secret_backend_role/")
-    }
   }
 }

config/ghp_secret_backend/ghp.yaml

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-# Mounts the ghp token secrets engine at "ghp" and writes its config.
-# The seeded ghp service token is sensitive and read from KV, not stored here:
-#   kv/service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/ghp/config
-#   -> key: admin_token (required) the shared ghpsvc_... service token
-#
-# admin_token is a static shared secret provisioned into KV by an operator. The
-# SAME token value must also be present in the running ghp deployment's accepted
-# service tokens (GHP_AUTH_SERVICE_TOKENS) so ghp ACCEPTS what this engine
-# PRESENTS. ghp has no rotate endpoint, so the engine never rotates it in place;
-# the mount uses ignore_changes=[admin_token], making the KV seed create-only
-# (re-reading a stale KV value never re-pushes it to a live mount).
-description: "ghp ephemeral scoped agent token engine"
-base_url: "https://ghp.unkin.net"
-tls_skip_verify: false
-request_timeout_seconds: 30

config/gitea_secret_backend_role/gitea/repospawner.yaml

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-# Role minting ephemeral tokens for the repospawner service user. repospawner
-# creates and seeds Gitea repositories on demand, so it gets write on
-# repositories (create + push) and write on issues (issue/PR comments). Read is
-# implied by write. No admin/org/user-write scopes.
-# read:user is required because most API clients validate the login via
-# GET /api/v1/user, which 403s without it.
-# Reading gitea/creds/repospawner mints a lease-bound token deleted from Gitea
-# on revoke/expiry. Consumed by the repospawner pods via Kubernetes auth (see
-# policies/gitea/creds/repospawner.yaml) -- the agents AppRole is CIDR-bound to
-# Ben's workstation and cannot be used from in-cluster.
----
-username: repospawner
-scopes:
-  - write:repository
-  - write:issue
-  - read:user
-token_name_prefix: vault-repospawner
-ttl: 3600      # 1h
-max_ttl: 14400 # 4h

config/gitea_secret_backend_role/gitea/unkin-agent.yaml

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-# Role minting ephemeral tokens for the unkin-agent bot user -- the shared
-# identity Ben's AI coding agents use to submit work. The agent clones/pushes
-# code and opens pull requests, so it gets write on repositories (clone + push +
-# PR create) and write on issues (PR/issue comments). Read is implied by write.
-# No admin/org/user-write scopes, so it can never merge via API privilege; merge
-# is blocked separately by branch protection (merge whitelist = Owners).
-# read:user is required because tea (and most API clients) validate the login
-# via GET /api/v1/user, which 403s without it.
-# Reading gitea/creds/unkin-agent mints a lease-bound token deleted from Gitea
-# on revoke/expiry. Consumed by the "agents" AppRole (see
-# policies/gitea/creds/unkin-agent.yaml).
----
-username: unkin-agent
-scopes:
-  - write:repository
-  - write:issue
-  - read:user
-token_name_prefix: vault-unkin-agent
-ttl: 3600      # 1h
-max_ttl: 14400 # 4h

config/netbox_secret_backend/netbox.yaml

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-# Mounts the netbox token secrets engine at "netbox" and writes its config.
-# The seeded NetBox admin token is sensitive and read from KV, not stored here:
-#   kv/service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/netbox/config
-#   -> key: admin_token (required) the SINGLE static admin credential
-#
-# admin_token must be a BARE NetBox token with NO scheme prefix: do not prepend
-# "Bearer " or "Token ". NetBox infers the version from the value's nbt_ prefix,
-# so one bare token authenticates under either scheme; the plugin adds the keyword
-# itself. A prefixed value yields a malformed header + 403.
-#
-# Populate admin_token with a purpose-built NetBox superuser token (add_user +
-# add_token + grant_token, or superuser) BEFORE applying, then run
-# `vault write -f netbox/config/rotate` after the first apply so only Vault holds
-# the live admin token.
-#
-# Only ONE static admin token exists. netbox_user_management does NOT re-read this
-# token; instead the engine mints it a short-lived user-admin token per apply from
-# netbox/roles/vault-user-mgmt (see user_mgmt_username below), so rotating
-# admin_token never breaks user management. Set user_mgmt_username to the
-# pre-existing NetBox superuser the static admin_token belongs to (or another
-# superuser). Leaving it unset falls back to using admin_token directly, which is
-# only a bootstrap/degraded path and breaks after rotation.
-#
-# Bootstrap ordering: the vault-user-mgmt role must exist before the netbox
-# provider is configured from its creds, so on a brand-new backend apply the mount
-# + role first (e.g. `tofu apply -target=...netbox_secret_backend
-# -target=...netbox_user_mgmt_role`) once, then apply normally.
-#
-# token_version 2 is the NetBox 4.6.5 default and requires API_TOKEN_PEPPERS to
-# be configured on the NetBox server; set token_version: 1 here if the server
-# has no peppers. token_version does NOT change how the plugin authenticates its
-# own calls (that scheme comes from the admin_token value's nbt_ prefix); it only
-# sets the version of the per-user tokens the engine mints. It must still MATCH
-# the admin_token kind: nbt_ v2 token -> token_version 2; bare v1 token -> 1.
-#
-# The mount uses ignore_changes=[token], so editing KV alone does NOT reach the
-# live mount. To push a corrected/rotated admin token into a running mount:
-#   vault write netbox/config token=<BARE_TOKEN>
-# (netbox_url/token_version are preserved on a partial update). Do NOT -replace
-# the mount to force a re-read - that recreates it and drops all roles/config.
-description: "NetBox ephemeral scoped API token engine"
-netbox_url: "https://netbox.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net"
-token_version: 2
-request_timeout_seconds: 30
-# Set to the pre-existing NetBox superuser admin_token belongs to, to mint the
-# user-management credential dynamically (recommended). Until set, user management
-# uses admin_token directly and a check block warns that rotation will break it.
-# user_mgmt_username: "vault-netbox-admin"

config/netbox_secret_backend_role/netbox/terraform-infra.yaml

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-# Single declarative source for the terraform-infra NetBox service identity. The
-# filename stem is the engine role name AND the NetBox username (1:1); config.hcl
-# derives both from it, so neither is repeated below. Creating this file creates
-# the user: the netbox_user_management module synthesizes the NetBox user + object
-# permissions from the permissions block, and the engine role mints ephemeral
-# tokens for that same user. write_enabled true because terraform-infra manages
-# NetBox IPAM/DCIM; very short TTLs because a token is minted per plan/apply and
-# revoked when the run's lease ends.
----
-write_enabled: true
-ttl: 120     # 2m
-max_ttl: 300 # 5m
-permissions:
-  - object_types:
-      - ipam.prefix
-      - ipam.ipaddress
-      - ipam.iprange
-      - dcim.device
-      - dcim.interface
-      - dcim.macaddress
-    actions:
-      - view
-      - add
-      - change
-      - delete

config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-arrstack.yaml

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-# config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-arrstack.yaml
-# Imports (registers) the arrstack secrets plugin in the catalog. Filename =
-# catalog name = mount type. The binary is installed on the OpenBao nodes by
-# Puppet (openbao-plugin-secrets-arrstack RPM ->
-# /opt/openbao-plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-arrstack).
-#
-# sha256 pins the released v0.2.0 binary; bump it in lockstep with any RPM
-# upgrade or OpenBao will refuse to launch the plugin. Registration only
-# succeeds once the Puppet PR has installed the binary on the nodes.
-type: secret
-command: vault-plugin-secrets-arrstack
-version: "0.2.0"
-sha256: "9ea7f16013b3bcbadfcb15b08fd1545f8069893cf864bfdaa57e7e7e72612fa1"

config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-ghp.yaml

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-# config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-ghp.yaml
-# Imports (registers) the ghp secrets plugin in the catalog. Filename =
-# catalog name = mount type. The binary is installed on the OpenBao nodes by
-# Puppet (openbao-plugin-secrets-ghp RPM ->
-# /opt/openbao-plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-ghp).
-#
-# sha256 pins the released v0.1.0 binary; bump it in lockstep with any RPM
-# upgrade or OpenBao will refuse to launch the plugin.
-type: secret
-command: vault-plugin-secrets-ghp
-sha256: "85761421cd532788ed28fb57e93d3868f3577320a538289936d9ed3be5f396de"

config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-netbox.yaml

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-# config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-netbox.yaml
-# Imports (registers) the netbox secrets plugin in the catalog. Filename =
-# catalog name = mount type. The binary is installed on the OpenBao nodes by
-# Puppet (openbao-plugin-secrets-netbox RPM ->
-# /opt/openbao-plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-netbox).
-#
-# sha256 pins the released v0.1.0 binary; bump it in lockstep with any RPM
-# upgrade or OpenBao will refuse to launch the plugin.
-type: secret
-command: vault-plugin-secrets-netbox
-sha256: "362b7f6c9e21179ad51d2d810684d9387fe50e3a1887f171700122a0b2a05cef"

environments/au/syd1/terragrunt.hcl

@@ -39,12 +39,6 @@ locals {
     for backend_name, _ in local.config.consul_secret_backend :
     backend_name => replace(backend_name, "/", "_")
   }
-
-  # Same sanitized alias mapping for the NetBox providers.
-  netbox_backend_aliases = {
-    for backend_name, _ in local.config.netbox_secret_backend :
-    backend_name => replace(backend_name, "/", "_")
-  }
 }
 
 terraform {
@@ -60,9 +54,6 @@ inputs = {
   auth_approle_role              = local.config.auth_approle_role
   auth_ldap_backend              = local.config.auth_ldap_backend
   auth_ldap_group                = local.config.auth_ldap_group
-  auth_oidc_backend              = local.config.auth_oidc_backend
-  auth_oidc_role                 = local.config.auth_oidc_role
-  auth_oidc_group                = local.config.auth_oidc_group
   auth_kubernetes_backend        = local.config.auth_kubernetes_backend
   auth_kubernetes_role           = local.config.auth_kubernetes_role
   kv_secret_backend              = local.config.kv_secret_backend
@@ -79,8 +70,6 @@ inputs = {
   pki_mount_only                 = local.config.pki_mount_only
   litellm_secret_backend         = local.config.litellm_secret_backend
   litellm_secret_backend_role    = local.config.litellm_secret_backend_role
-  arrstack_secret_backend        = local.config.arrstack_secret_backend
-  arrstack_secret_backend_role   = local.config.arrstack_secret_backend_role
   plugins                        = local.config.plugins
   gpg_secret_backend             = local.config.gpg_secret_backend
   gpg_key                        = local.config.gpg_key
@@ -92,19 +81,10 @@ inputs = {
   gitea_secret_backend      = local.config.gitea_secret_backend
   gitea_secret_backend_role = local.config.gitea_secret_backend_role
 
-  netbox_secret_backend      = local.config.netbox_secret_backend
-  netbox_secret_backend_role = local.config.netbox_secret_backend_role
-
-  ghp_secret_backend      = local.config.ghp_secret_backend
-  ghp_secret_backend_role = local.config.ghp_secret_backend_role
-
   # Pass policy maps to vault_cluster module
   policy_auth_map  = local.policies.policy_auth_map
   policy_rules_map = local.policies.policy_rules_map
 
   # Pass sanitized consul backend aliases for provider configuration
   consul_backend_aliases = local.consul_backend_aliases
-
-  # Pass sanitized netbox backend aliases for provider configuration
-  netbox_backend_aliases = local.netbox_backend_aliases
 }

environments/root.hcl

@@ -29,12 +29,6 @@ provider "rancher" {
   address = local.vault_addr
 }
 
-# The arrstack (arrproxy API key) secrets engine is managed through its own
-# provider (same Vault server; token falls back to VAULT_TOKEN).
-provider "arrstack" {
-  address = local.vault_addr
-}
-
 terraform {
   backend "consul" {
     address = "https://consul.service.consul"
@@ -65,10 +59,6 @@ terraform {
       source  = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/ranchervaultsecret"
       version = "0.1.0"
     }
-    arrstack = {
-      source  = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/vault-secrets-arrstack"
-      version = "0.2.0"
-    }
   }
 }
 EOF

modules/vault_cluster/main.tf

@@ -64,55 +64,6 @@ module "auth_ldap_group" {
   depends_on = [module.auth_ldap_backend]
 }
 
-module "auth_oidc_backend" {
-  source = "./modules/auth_oidc_backend"
-
-  for_each = var.auth_oidc_backend
-
-  path                = each.key
-  description         = each.value.description
-  oidc_discovery_url  = each.value.oidc_discovery_url
-  client_secret_mount = each.value.client_secret_mount
-  client_secret_path  = each.value.client_secret_path
-  default_role        = each.value.default_role
-  listing_visibility  = each.value.listing_visibility
-  default_lease_ttl   = each.value.default_lease_ttl
-  max_lease_ttl       = each.value.max_lease_ttl
-}
-
-module "auth_oidc_role" {
-  source = "./modules/auth_oidc_role"
-
-  for_each = var.auth_oidc_role
-
-  backend               = each.value.backend
-  role_name             = each.value.role_name
-  user_claim            = each.value.user_claim
-  groups_claim          = each.value.groups_claim
-  oidc_scopes           = each.value.oidc_scopes
-  bound_audiences       = each.value.bound_audiences
-  allowed_redirect_uris = each.value.allowed_redirect_uris
-  token_ttl             = each.value.token_ttl
-  token_max_ttl         = each.value.token_max_ttl
-  # Human authorization comes from the external identity groups below, so a
-  # login role carrying no policies is the normal case.
-  token_policies = try(var.policy_auth_map[each.value.backend][each.value.role_name], [])
-
-  depends_on = [module.auth_oidc_backend]
-}
-
-module "auth_oidc_group" {
-  source = "./modules/auth_oidc_group"
-
-  for_each = var.auth_oidc_group
-
-  groupname      = each.value.groupname
-  policies       = var.policy_auth_map[each.value.backend][each.value.groupname]
-  mount_accessor = module.auth_oidc_backend[each.value.backend].accessor
-
-  depends_on = [module.auth_oidc_backend]
-}
-
 module "auth_kubernetes_backend" {
   source = "./modules/auth_kubernetes_backend"
 
@@ -396,36 +347,6 @@ module "plugin" {
   plugin_version = each.value.version
 }
 
-module "arrstack_secret_backend" {
-  source = "./modules/arrstack_secret_backend"
-
-  for_each = var.arrstack_secret_backend
-
-  path                    = each.key
-  plugin                  = each.value.plugin
-  description             = each.value.description
-  base_url                = each.value.base_url
-  ca_cert                 = each.value.ca_cert
-  request_timeout_seconds = each.value.request_timeout_seconds
-
-  depends_on = [module.plugin]
-}
-
-module "arrstack_secret_backend_role" {
-  source = "./modules/arrstack_secret_backend_role"
-
-  for_each = var.arrstack_secret_backend_role
-
-  name    = each.value.name
-  backend = each.value.backend
-  apps    = each.value.apps
-  methods = each.value.methods
-  ttl     = each.value.ttl
-  max_ttl = each.value.max_ttl
-
-  depends_on = [module.arrstack_secret_backend]
-}
-
 module "gpg_secret_backend" {
   source = "./modules/gpg_secret_backend"
 
@@ -535,123 +456,6 @@ module "gitea_secret_backend_role" {
   depends_on = [module.gitea_secret_backend]
 }
 
-module "netbox_secret_backend" {
-  source = "./modules/netbox_secret_backend"
-
-  for_each = var.netbox_secret_backend
-
-  path                    = each.key
-  plugin                  = each.value.plugin
-  description             = each.value.description
-  netbox_url              = each.value.netbox_url
-  token_version           = each.value.token_version
-  country                 = var.country
-  region                  = var.region
-  ca_cert                 = each.value.ca_cert
-  tls_skip_verify         = each.value.tls_skip_verify
-  request_timeout_seconds = each.value.request_timeout_seconds
-
-  depends_on = [module.plugin]
-}
-
-# Dedicated engine role that mints an ephemeral, user-admin-capable token for the
-# pre-existing NetBox superuser named on each backend (user_mgmt_username).
-# netbox_user_management reads netbox/creds/vault-user-mgmt from it, so it
-# authenticates with a short-lived Vault-minted token derived from the single
-# static admin token - never a second static credential, and unaffected by
-# rotation of the engine's admin seed. Created before user management so the role
-# exists when it reads creds.
-module "netbox_user_mgmt_role" {
-  source = "./modules/netbox_secret_backend_role"
-
-  for_each = { for k, v in var.netbox_secret_backend : k => v if v.user_mgmt_username != null }
-
-  backend         = each.key
-  name            = "vault-user-mgmt"
-  netbox_username = each.value.user_mgmt_username
-  write_enabled   = true
-  description     = "Ephemeral user-admin token for netbox_user_management (Vault-minted per apply)"
-  ttl             = 600
-  max_ttl         = 1200
-
-  depends_on = [module.netbox_secret_backend]
-}
-
-# Declaratively manage the NetBox service users + object permissions the engine
-# roles mint tokens for, authenticating with the Vault-minted user-admin token
-# above (mirrors consul_acl_management). Consumes the SAME role config as
-# netbox_secret_backend_role: one file per identity, filename-derived username,
-# inline permissions.
-module "netbox_user_management" {
-  source = "./modules/netbox_user_management"
-
-  country                = var.country
-  region                 = var.region
-  netbox_backends        = var.netbox_secret_backend
-  netbox_roles           = var.netbox_secret_backend_role
-  netbox_backend_aliases = var.netbox_backend_aliases
-
-  # This module declares its own netbox provider, so it is a legacy module and
-  # cannot take depends_on. Ordering vs the vault-user-mgmt role is not needed on
-  # steady state (the role pre-exists, so reading its creds succeeds regardless);
-  # on first enablement the role must be created first via the one-time targeted
-  # bootstrap documented in config/netbox_secret_backend/netbox.yaml.
-}
-
-module "netbox_secret_backend_role" {
-  source = "./modules/netbox_secret_backend_role"
-
-  for_each = var.netbox_secret_backend_role
-
-  backend         = each.value.backend
-  name            = each.value.name
-  netbox_username = each.value.netbox_username
-  netbox_user_id  = each.value.netbox_user_id
-  write_enabled   = each.value.write_enabled
-  description     = each.value.description
-  ttl             = each.value.ttl
-  max_ttl         = each.value.max_ttl
-
-  depends_on = [module.netbox_secret_backend, module.netbox_user_management]
-}
-
-module "ghp_secret_backend" {
-  source = "./modules/ghp_secret_backend"
-
-  for_each = var.ghp_secret_backend
-
-  path                    = each.key
-  plugin                  = each.value.plugin
-  description             = each.value.description
-  base_url                = each.value.base_url
-  country                 = var.country
-  region                  = var.region
-  ca_cert                 = each.value.ca_cert
-  tls_skip_verify         = each.value.tls_skip_verify
-  request_timeout_seconds = each.value.request_timeout_seconds
-
-  depends_on = [module.plugin]
-}
-
-module "ghp_secret_backend_role" {
-  source = "./modules/ghp_secret_backend_role"
-
-  for_each = var.ghp_secret_backend_role
-
-  backend         = each.value.backend
-  name            = each.value.name
-  token_type      = each.value.token_type
-  installation_id = each.value.installation_id
-  app_record_id   = each.value.app_record_id
-  repositories    = each.value.repositories
-  scopes          = each.value.scopes
-  session_prefix  = each.value.session_prefix
-  ttl             = each.value.ttl
-  max_ttl         = each.value.max_ttl
-
-  depends_on = [module.ghp_secret_backend]
-}
-
 module "vault_policy" {
   source = "./modules/vault_policy"
 

modules/vault_cluster/modules/arrstack_secret_backend/main.tf

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-# Mounts the arrstack dynamic secrets engine and writes its config via the
-# vault-secrets-arrstack provider. The plugin is registered in the catalog
-# separately (config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-arrstack.yaml). The arrproxy
-# admin token is sensitive and read from KV, not stored in git:
-#   kv/kubernetes/namespace/arrstack/default/arrproxy-admin-token -> key "token"
-# (seeded by argocd-apps #384).
-data "vault_kv_secret_v2" "admin_token" {
-  mount = "kv"
-  name  = var.admin_token_kv_name
-}
-
-resource "arrstack_secret_backend" "this" {
-  path                    = var.path
-  plugin                  = var.plugin
-  description             = var.description
-  base_url                = var.base_url
-  admin_token             = data.vault_kv_secret_v2.admin_token.data[var.admin_token_kv_key]
-  ca_cert                 = var.ca_cert
-  request_timeout_seconds = var.request_timeout_seconds
-}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/arrstack_secret_backend/terraform.tf

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-terraform {
-  required_version = ">= 1.10"
-  required_providers {
-    vault = {
-      source  = "hashicorp/vault"
-      version = "5.6.0"
-    }
-    arrstack = {
-      source  = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/vault-secrets-arrstack"
-      version = "0.2.0"
-    }
-  }
-}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/arrstack_secret_backend/variables.tf

@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-variable "path" {
-  description = "Mount path of the arrstack secrets engine (e.g. \"arrstack\")"
-  type        = string
-}
-
-variable "plugin" {
-  description = "Registered plugin name/type to mount (the catalog name = mount type)"
-  type        = string
-  default     = "vault-plugin-secrets-arrstack"
-}
-
-variable "description" {
-  description = "Human-friendly description of the mount"
-  type        = string
-  default     = null
-}
-
-variable "base_url" {
-  description = "Base URL of the arrproxy front door (e.g. https://arrstack.unkin.net)"
-  type        = string
-}
-
-variable "admin_token_kv_name" {
-  description = "kv-v2 secret name (relative to the \"kv\" mount) holding the seeded arrproxy admin token"
-  type        = string
-  default     = "kubernetes/namespace/arrstack/default/arrproxy-admin-token"
-}
-
-variable "admin_token_kv_key" {
-  description = "Key within the KV secret that holds the arrproxy admin token"
-  type        = string
-  default     = "token"
-}
-
-variable "ca_cert" {
-  description = "PEM CA certificate that signed the arrproxy server's TLS cert (optional; omit to use the system trust store)"
-  type        = string
-  default     = null
-}
-
-variable "request_timeout_seconds" {
-  description = "HTTP timeout in seconds for calls from the plugin to arrproxy"
-  type        = number
-  default     = 30
-}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/arrstack_secret_backend_role/main.tf

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-resource "arrstack_secret_backend_role" "this" {
-  backend = var.backend
-  name    = var.name
-  apps    = var.apps
-  methods = var.methods
-  ttl     = var.ttl
-  max_ttl = var.max_ttl
-}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/arrstack_secret_backend_role/terraform.tf

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-terraform {
-  required_version = ">= 1.10"
-  required_providers {
-    arrstack = {
-      source  = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/vault-secrets-arrstack"
-      version = "0.2.0"
-    }
-  }
-}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/arrstack_secret_backend_role/variables.tf

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-variable "name" {
-  description = "Name of the role"
-  type        = string
-}
-
-variable "backend" {
-  description = "Mount path of the arrstack secrets engine this role belongs to"
-  type        = string
-}
-
-variable "apps" {
-  description = "arr apps a generated key may access (subset of sonarr, radarr, prowlarr)"
-  type        = list(string)
-}
-
-variable "methods" {
-  description = "HTTP methods a generated key is limited to (subset of GET, HEAD, POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE, OPTIONS). Null leaves the role unrestricted"
-  type        = set(string)
-  # null, not [], so a role yaml that omits methods matches the provider's null read-back and shows no drift.
-  default = null
-}
-
-variable "ttl" {
-  description = "Default lease TTL in seconds for keys generated from this role"
-  type        = number
-  default     = null
-}
-
-variable "max_ttl" {
-  description = "Maximum lease TTL in seconds for keys generated from this role"
-  type        = number
-  default     = null
-}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/auth_oidc_backend/main.tf

@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-# Expected keys in KV secret: client_id, client_secret (generated and written by
-# terraform-authentik's oauth2 provider module, never seeded by hand).
-data "vault_kv_secret_v2" "oidc_client" {
-  mount = var.client_secret_mount
-  name  = var.client_secret_path
-}
-
-resource "vault_jwt_auth_backend" "oidc" {
-  path               = var.path
-  type               = "oidc"
-  description        = var.description
-  oidc_discovery_url = var.oidc_discovery_url
-  oidc_client_id     = data.vault_kv_secret_v2.oidc_client.data["client_id"]
-  oidc_client_secret = data.vault_kv_secret_v2.oidc_client.data["client_secret"]
-  default_role       = var.default_role
-
-  tune {
-    default_lease_ttl  = var.default_lease_ttl
-    max_lease_ttl      = var.max_lease_ttl
-    listing_visibility = var.listing_visibility
-  }
-}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/auth_oidc_backend/outputs.tf

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-output "accessor" {
-  description = "Accessor of the OIDC auth mount, used to bind identity group aliases"
-  value       = vault_jwt_auth_backend.oidc.accessor
-}
-
-output "path" {
-  description = "Mount path of the OIDC auth backend"
-  value       = vault_jwt_auth_backend.oidc.path
-}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/auth_oidc_backend/terraform.tf

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-terraform {
-  required_version = ">= 1.10"
-  required_providers {
-    vault = {
-      source  = "hashicorp/vault"
-      version = "5.6.0"
-    }
-  }
-}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/auth_oidc_backend/variables.tf

@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-variable "path" {
-  description = "Mount path of the OIDC auth backend"
-  type        = string
-  default     = "oidc"
-}
-
-variable "description" {
-  description = "Human-readable description of the auth mount"
-  type        = string
-  default     = null
-}
-
-variable "oidc_discovery_url" {
-  description = "OIDC issuer discovery URL of the identity provider"
-  type        = string
-}
-
-variable "client_secret_mount" {
-  description = "KV-v2 mount holding the OIDC client credentials"
-  type        = string
-  default     = "kv"
-}
-
-variable "client_secret_path" {
-  description = "Path within the KV-v2 mount holding client_id and client_secret"
-  type        = string
-  default     = "service/authentik/oidc-vault"
-}
-
-variable "default_role" {
-  description = "Role used when none is supplied at login (the UI/CLI default)"
-  type        = string
-  default     = "default"
-}
-
-variable "listing_visibility" {
-  description = "Specifies whether to show this mount in the UI-specific listing endpoint. Valid values are 'unauth' or 'hidden'"
-  type        = string
-  default     = null
-  validation {
-    condition     = var.listing_visibility == null || contains(["unauth", "hidden"], var.listing_visibility)
-    error_message = "listing_visibility must be either 'unauth' or 'hidden'."
-  }
-}
-
-variable "default_lease_ttl" {
-  description = "Specifies the default time-to-live. If set, this overrides the global default. Must be a valid duration string"
-  type        = string
-  default     = null
-}
-
-variable "max_lease_ttl" {
-  description = "Specifies the maximum time-to-live. If set, this overrides the global default. Must be a valid duration string"
-  type        = string
-  default     = null
-}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/auth_oidc_group/main.tf

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-# External identity group: membership is asserted by the IdP through the role's
-# groups_claim, matched by the alias name below.
-resource "vault_identity_group" "group" {
-  name     = var.groupname
-  type     = "external"
-  policies = var.policies
-}
-
-resource "vault_identity_group_alias" "alias" {
-  name           = var.groupname
-  mount_accessor = var.mount_accessor
-  canonical_id   = vault_identity_group.group.id
-}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/auth_oidc_group/terraform.tf

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-terraform {
-  required_version = ">= 1.10"
-  required_providers {
-    vault = {
-      source  = "hashicorp/vault"
-      version = "5.6.0"
-    }
-  }
-}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/auth_oidc_group/variables.tf

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-variable "groupname" {
-  description = "Name of the IdP group, as it appears in the groups claim"
-  type        = string
-}
-
-variable "policies" {
-  description = "List of policies to assign to the identity group"
-  type        = list(string)
-}
-
-variable "mount_accessor" {
-  description = "Accessor of the OIDC auth mount the alias is bound to"
-  type        = string
-}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/auth_oidc_role/main.tf

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-resource "vault_jwt_auth_backend_role" "role" {
-  backend               = var.backend
-  role_name             = var.role_name
-  role_type             = "oidc"
-  user_claim            = var.user_claim
-  groups_claim          = var.groups_claim
-  oidc_scopes           = var.oidc_scopes
-  bound_audiences       = var.bound_audiences
-  allowed_redirect_uris = var.allowed_redirect_uris
-  token_ttl             = var.token_ttl
-  token_max_ttl         = var.token_max_ttl
-  token_policies        = var.token_policies
-}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/auth_oidc_role/terraform.tf

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-terraform {
-  required_version = ">= 1.10"
-  required_providers {
-    vault = {
-      source  = "hashicorp/vault"
-      version = "5.6.0"
-    }
-  }
-}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/auth_oidc_role/variables.tf

@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-variable "backend" {
-  description = "The unique path of the OIDC auth backend to configure"
-  type        = string
-}
-
-variable "role_name" {
-  description = "The name of the role"
-  type        = string
-}
-
-variable "user_claim" {
-  description = "Claim used as the entity alias name (the Vault identity of the human)"
-  type        = string
-  default     = "email"
-}
-
-variable "groups_claim" {
-  description = "Claim holding the caller's group memberships, matched against identity group aliases"
-  type        = string
-  default     = "ak_groups"
-}
-
-variable "oidc_scopes" {
-  description = "Scopes requested from the identity provider during the authorization request"
-  type        = list(string)
-  default     = []
-}
-
-variable "bound_audiences" {
-  description = "List of audiences (aud claim) accepted in the ID token"
-  type        = list(string)
-  default     = []
-}
-
-variable "allowed_redirect_uris" {
-  description = "Redirect URIs accepted for this role. Must match the provider's registered URIs exactly"
-  type        = list(string)
-}
-
-variable "token_ttl" {
-  description = "The TTL period of tokens issued using this role, in seconds"
-  type        = number
-  default     = 3600
-}
-
-variable "token_max_ttl" {
-  description = "The maximum lifetime for generated tokens in number of seconds. Its current value will be referenced at renewal time."
-  type        = number
-  default     = 28800
-}
-
-variable "token_policies" {
-  description = "List of policies to assign to the role (passed from policy_auth_map). Human authorization normally comes from external identity groups instead"
-  type        = list(string)
-  default     = []
-}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/ghp_secret_backend/main.tf

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-# Mounts the ghp secrets engine and writes its connection config via the
-# vault-secrets-ghp provider. The plugin is registered ("imported") in the
-# catalog separately (config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-ghp.yaml). The seeded
-# ghp service token is sensitive and read from KV, not stored in git:
-#   kv/service/vault/<country>/<region>/secret_backend/<path>/config
-# Expected key: admin_token (a ghpsvc_... service token that ghp accepts via its
-# GHP_AUTH_SERVICE_TOKENS list). ghp has no rotate endpoint, so this static
-# shared secret is the single credential the engine authenticates with.
-data "vault_kv_secret_v2" "config" {
-  mount = "kv"
-  name  = "service/vault/${var.country}/${var.region}/secret_backend/${var.path}/config"
-}
-
-resource "ghp_secret_backend" "this" {
-  path                    = var.path
-  plugin                  = var.plugin
-  description             = var.description
-  base_url                = var.base_url
-  admin_token             = data.vault_kv_secret_v2.config.data["admin_token"]
-  ca_cert                 = var.ca_cert
-  tls_skip_verify         = var.tls_skip_verify
-  request_timeout_seconds = var.request_timeout_seconds
-
-  lifecycle {
-    # The KV seed is a bootstrap credential consumed only when the engine config
-    # is first created. ghp has no rotate endpoint, so re-reading a (possibly
-    # stale) KV value must never re-push it into the live mount. Ignoring the
-    # token makes this module create-only for it (mirrors gitea/netbox config).
-    ignore_changes = [admin_token]
-  }
-}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/ghp_secret_backend/terraform.tf

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-terraform {
-  required_version = ">= 1.10"
-  required_providers {
-    vault = {
-      source  = "hashicorp/vault"
-      version = "5.6.0"
-    }
-    ghp = {
-      source  = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/vault-secrets-ghp"
-      version = "0.1.0"
-    }
-  }
-}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/ghp_secret_backend/variables.tf

@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
-variable "path" {
-  description = "Mount path of the ghp secrets engine (e.g. \"ghp\")"
-  type        = string
-}
-
-variable "plugin" {
-  description = "Registered plugin name to mount (the catalog name = mount type)"
-  type        = string
-  default     = "vault-plugin-secrets-ghp"
-}
-
-variable "description" {
-  description = "Human-friendly description of the mount"
-  type        = string
-  default     = null
-}
-
-variable "base_url" {
-  description = "Base URL of the ghp server (e.g. https://ghp.unkin.net)"
-  type        = string
-}
-
-variable "country" {
-  description = "Country segment of the KV path holding the seeded admin token"
-  type        = string
-}
-
-variable "region" {
-  description = "Region segment of the KV path holding the seeded admin token"
-  type        = string
-}
-
-variable "ca_cert" {
-  description = "PEM CA certificate that signed the ghp server's TLS cert (optional; omit to use the system trust store)"
-  type        = string
-  default     = null
-}
-
-variable "tls_skip_verify" {
-  description = "Skip TLS verification of the ghp server (not recommended)"
-  type        = bool
-  default     = false
-}
-
-variable "request_timeout_seconds" {
-  description = "HTTP timeout in seconds for calls from the plugin to ghp"
-  type        = number
-  default     = 30
-}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/ghp_secret_backend_role/main.tf

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-# A role that mints short-lived, scoped ghp tokens. Reading ghp/creds/<name>
-# produces a lease-bound token that is revoked from ghp when the lease is
-# revoked or reaches max_ttl.
-resource "ghp_secret_role" "this" {
-  backend         = var.backend
-  name            = var.name
-  token_type      = var.token_type
-  installation_id = var.installation_id
-  app_record_id   = var.app_record_id
-  repositories    = var.repositories
-  scopes          = var.scopes
-  session_prefix  = var.session_prefix
-  ttl             = var.ttl
-  max_ttl         = var.max_ttl
-}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/ghp_secret_backend_role/terraform.tf

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-terraform {
-  required_version = ">= 1.10"
-  required_providers {
-    ghp = {
-      source  = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/vault-secrets-ghp"
-      version = "0.1.0"
-    }
-  }
-}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/ghp_secret_backend_role/variables.tf

@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
-variable "backend" {
-  description = "Mount path of the ghp secrets engine this role belongs to"
-  type        = string
-}
-
-variable "name" {
-  description = "Role name (read ghp/creds/<name> to mint a token)"
-  type        = string
-}
-
-variable "token_type" {
-  description = "ghp token type to mint: \"agent\" (default) or \"proxy\""
-  type        = string
-  default     = null
-}
-
-variable "installation_id" {
-  description = "ghp App installation id the minted agent token is bound to (required when token_type is \"agent\")"
-  type        = number
-  default     = null
-}
-
-variable "app_record_id" {
-  description = "Optional ghp App record id (UUID) to pin agent tokens to; empty selects ghp's default app"
-  type        = string
-  default     = null
-}
-
-variable "repositories" {
-  description = "Optional repositories the minted token is restricted to; empty is open-scoped (all repositories)"
-  type        = list(string)
-  default     = null
-}
-
-variable "scopes" {
-  description = "Optional ghp permission:level scopes (e.g. [\"contents:read\"]); empty is open-scoped"
-  type        = list(string)
-  default     = null
-}
-
-variable "session_prefix" {
-  description = "Prefix for the ghp session id of each minted token (default \"vault\")"
-  type        = string
-  default     = null
-}
-
-variable "ttl" {
-  description = "Default lease TTL in seconds for minted tokens"
-  type        = number
-  default     = null
-}
-
-variable "max_ttl" {
-  description = "Maximum lease TTL in seconds for minted tokens"
-  type        = number
-  default     = null
-}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/netbox_secret_backend/main.tf

@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-# Mounts the netbox secrets engine and writes its connection config via the
-# vault-secrets-netbox provider. The plugin is registered ("imported") in the
-# catalog separately (config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-netbox.yaml). The
-# seeded NetBox admin token is sensitive and read from KV, not stored in git:
-#   kv/service/vault/<country>/<region>/secret_backend/<path>/config
-# Expected key: admin_token (a NetBox token with add_token + grant_token, i.e.
-# able to provision and delegate per-user API tokens).
-data "vault_kv_secret_v2" "config" {
-  mount = "kv"
-  name  = "service/vault/${var.country}/${var.region}/secret_backend/${var.path}/config"
-
-  lifecycle {
-    # The plugin builds its own Authorization header from the token VALUE, not
-    # token_version: a value starting with the nbt_ prefix is sent as
-    # "Bearer <token>" (v2), otherwise "Token <token>" (v1). So admin_token must
-    # be the BARE token - a literal `Bearer `/`Token ` scheme prefix yields a
-    # malformed three-part header and 403s on the plugin's own NetBox calls.
-    #
-    # token_version does NOT change that header; it only selects the version of
-    # the per-user tokens the engine mints for roles. It must still MATCH the
-    # admin token's kind so the mount and its minted creds line up: an nbt_ v2
-    # admin token pairs with token_version=2, a bare v1 token with token_version=1.
-    postcondition {
-      condition = nonsensitive(
-        !startswith(self.data["admin_token"], "Bearer ") &&
-        !startswith(self.data["admin_token"], "Token ") &&
-        startswith(self.data["admin_token"], "nbt_") == (var.token_version == 2)
-      )
-      error_message = "KV admin_token for netbox backend '${var.path}' must be a BARE NetBox token with no 'Bearer '/'Token ' scheme prefix, AND its version must match token_version: a v2 token (nbt_<key>.<secret>) requires token_version=2; a v1 token (bare 40-char value) requires token_version=1."
-    }
-  }
-}
-
-resource "netbox_secret_backend" "this" {
-  path                    = var.path
-  plugin                  = var.plugin
-  description             = var.description
-  netbox_url              = var.netbox_url
-  token                   = data.vault_kv_secret_v2.config.data["admin_token"]
-  token_version           = var.token_version
-  ca_cert                 = var.ca_cert
-  tls_skip_verify         = var.tls_skip_verify
-  request_timeout_seconds = var.request_timeout_seconds
-
-  lifecycle {
-    # The KV seed is a bootstrap credential: it is consumed only when the engine
-    # config is first created. After creation the live admin token is rotated in
-    # place (vault write -f netbox/config/rotate) and diverges from the seed, so
-    # re-reading the (possibly stale) KV value must never push it back. Ignoring
-    # the token makes this module create-only for it (mirrors gitea/config).
-    ignore_changes = [token]
-  }
-}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/netbox_secret_backend/terraform.tf

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-terraform {
-  required_version = ">= 1.10"
-  required_providers {
-    vault = {
-      source  = "hashicorp/vault"
-      version = "5.6.0"
-    }
-    netbox = {
-      source  = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/vault-secrets-netbox"
-      version = "0.1.0"
-    }
-  }
-}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/netbox_secret_backend/variables.tf

@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
-variable "path" {
-  description = "Mount path of the netbox secrets engine (e.g. \"netbox\")"
-  type        = string
-}
-
-variable "plugin" {
-  description = "Registered plugin name to mount (the catalog name = mount type)"
-  type        = string
-  default     = "vault-plugin-secrets-netbox"
-}
-
-variable "description" {
-  description = "Human-friendly description of the mount"
-  type        = string
-  default     = null
-}
-
-variable "netbox_url" {
-  description = "Base URL of the NetBox server (e.g. https://netbox.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net)"
-  type        = string
-}
-
-variable "token_version" {
-  description = "NetBox API token format: 2 (default, requires API_TOKEN_PEPPERS on the NetBox server) or 1 (legacy plaintext-key)."
-  type        = number
-  default     = 2
-}
-
-variable "country" {
-  description = "Country segment of the KV path holding the seeded admin token"
-  type        = string
-}
-
-variable "region" {
-  description = "Region segment of the KV path holding the seeded admin token"
-  type        = string
-}
-
-variable "ca_cert" {
-  description = "PEM CA certificate that signed the NetBox server's TLS cert (optional; omit to use the system trust store)"
-  type        = string
-  default     = null
-}
-
-variable "tls_skip_verify" {
-  description = "Skip TLS verification of the NetBox server (not recommended)"
-  type        = bool
-  default     = false
-}
-
-variable "request_timeout_seconds" {
-  description = "HTTP timeout in seconds for calls from the plugin to NetBox"
-  type        = number
-  default     = 30
-}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/netbox_secret_backend_role/main.tf

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-# A role that mints short-lived, scoped NetBox tokens for a pre-existing NetBox
-# service user. Reading netbox/creds/<name> produces a lease-bound token that is
-# deleted from NetBox when the lease is revoked or reaches max_ttl.
-resource "netbox_secret_backend_role" "this" {
-  backend         = var.backend
-  name            = var.name
-  netbox_username = var.netbox_username
-  netbox_user_id  = var.netbox_user_id
-  write_enabled   = var.write_enabled
-  description     = var.description
-  ttl             = var.ttl
-  max_ttl         = var.max_ttl
-}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/netbox_secret_backend_role/terraform.tf

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-terraform {
-  required_version = ">= 1.10"
-  required_providers {
-    netbox = {
-      source  = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/vault-secrets-netbox"
-      version = "0.1.0"
-    }
-  }
-}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/netbox_secret_backend_role/variables.tf

@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-variable "backend" {
-  description = "Mount path of the netbox secrets engine this role belongs to"
-  type        = string
-}
-
-variable "name" {
-  description = "Role name (read netbox/creds/<name> to mint a token)"
-  type        = string
-}
-
-variable "netbox_username" {
-  description = "NetBox service username the minted tokens belong to (set this or netbox_user_id)"
-  type        = string
-  default     = null
-}
-
-variable "netbox_user_id" {
-  description = "NetBox service user id the minted tokens belong to (set this or netbox_username)"
-  type        = number
-  default     = null
-}
-
-variable "write_enabled" {
-  description = "Whether minted tokens carry NetBox write access (default read-only)"
-  type        = bool
-  default     = false
-}
-
-variable "description" {
-  description = "Human-friendly description of the role"
-  type        = string
-  default     = null
-}
-
-variable "ttl" {
-  description = "Default lease TTL in seconds for minted tokens (the token's NetBox expiry is aligned to the lease)"
-  type        = number
-  default     = null
-}
-
-variable "max_ttl" {
-  description = "Maximum lease TTL in seconds for minted tokens"
-  type        = number
-  default     = null
-}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/netbox_user_management/.tflint.hcl

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-rule "terraform_required_providers" {
-  enabled = false
-}
-
-rule "terraform_required_version" {
-  enabled = false
-}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/netbox_user_management/main.tf

@@ -1,149 +0,0 @@
-# netbox_user_management reconciles NetBox service users + permissions on every
-# apply, so it needs an admin credential each run. That credential is minted
-# DYNAMICALLY by the netbox engine from the SINGLE static admin token, so no
-# second static credential exists and it survives rotation of the engine seed:
-#
-#   1. module.netbox_user_mgmt_role creates netbox/roles/vault-user-mgmt, a
-#      write-enabled role for a pre-existing NetBox superuser (user_mgmt_username).
-#   2. Reading netbox/creds/vault-user-mgmt mints a short-lived, user-admin-capable
-#      token for that superuser; the e-breuninger provider uses it to CRUD users.
-#
-# The hashicorp/vault provider ships ephemeral resources for KV only, not for
-# dynamic engine creds, so the mint is read via the vault_generic_secret DATA
-# source: the short-lived token transits Terraform state (sensitive, lease-revoked)
-# and is re-minted each plan. This is the closest single-static-token shape the
-# current providers allow; move to an ephemeral resource once the vault provider
-# ships a dynamic-secret one. Ordering note: the vault-user-mgmt role must already
-# exist when this reads creds, so on a brand-new backend bootstrap the mount +
-# role first (targeted apply) - a fresh single apply cannot configure the netbox
-# provider from a role created in the same run.
-locals {
-  # Backends that mint a dynamic user-admin token (a pre-existing superuser named).
-  netbox_dynamic_backends = { for k, v in var.netbox_backends : k => v if v.user_mgmt_username != null }
-  # Backends still using the single static admin_token directly (until a superuser
-  # is named). Bootstrap/degraded path - the same one token, not a second static.
-  netbox_static_backends = { for k, v in var.netbox_backends : k => v if v.user_mgmt_username == null }
-}
-
-# Dynamic path: the engine mints a user-admin token for the superuser. Requires
-# the deployer to read netbox/creds/vault-user-mgmt (policies/netbox/creds).
-data "vault_generic_secret" "user_admin" {
-  for_each = local.netbox_dynamic_backends
-
-  path = "${each.key}/creds/vault-user-mgmt"
-}
-
-# Static fallback: the single admin_token from KV, used only until a superuser is
-# named. NetBox derives the token version from the value's `nbt_` prefix, not the
-# keyword, so the same BARE token works under either scheme; reject a value that
-# carries a literal `Bearer `/`Token ` scheme prefix (a malformed header -> 403).
-data "vault_kv_secret_v2" "netbox_backend_configs" {
-  for_each = local.netbox_static_backends
-
-  mount = "kv"
-  name  = "service/vault/${var.country}/${var.region}/secret_backend/${each.key}/config"
-
-  lifecycle {
-    postcondition {
-      condition = nonsensitive(
-        !startswith(self.data["admin_token"], "Bearer ") &&
-        !startswith(self.data["admin_token"], "Token ")
-      )
-      error_message = "KV admin_token for netbox backend '${each.key}' must be a BARE NetBox token with no 'Bearer '/'Token ' scheme prefix (v2: nbt_<key>.<secret>; v1: the 40-char value)."
-    }
-  }
-}
-
-# Warn (non-fatal) for any backend still on the static token: rotating the engine
-# admin seed would then break user management. Set user_mgmt_username to switch to
-# the dynamic, rotation-proof mint.
-check "netbox_user_mgmt_dynamic" {
-  assert {
-    condition     = length(local.netbox_static_backends) == 0
-    error_message = "A netbox backend has no user_mgmt_username, so user management uses the static admin_token directly and will break if that token is rotated (netbox/config/rotate). Set user_mgmt_username to a pre-existing NetBox superuser to mint the credential dynamically."
-  }
-}
-
-locals {
-  # Per backend: the dynamically-minted user-admin token, else the static seed.
-  netbox_admin_tokens = {
-    for k, v in var.netbox_backends : k => (
-      v.user_mgmt_username != null
-      ? data.vault_generic_secret.user_admin[k].data["token"]
-      : data.vault_kv_secret_v2.netbox_backend_configs[k].data["admin_token"]
-    )
-  }
-}
-
-# One NetBox provider instance per backend, authenticated with its (dynamic or
-# static) admin token.
-provider "netbox" {
-  alias    = "by_backend"
-  for_each = var.netbox_backend_aliases
-
-  server_url           = var.netbox_backends[each.key].netbox_url
-  api_token            = local.netbox_admin_tokens[each.key]
-  allow_insecure_https = var.netbox_backends[each.key].tls_skip_verify
-  # NetBox is internal and not always reachable at plan time; the resource CRUD
-  # calls surface any real incompatibility, so skip the startup version probe.
-  skip_version_check = true
-}
-
-# NetBox users authenticate only via Vault-minted API tokens, never the web UI,
-# so give each a random unknown password (required by the API) that no one holds.
-resource "random_password" "user" {
-  for_each = var.netbox_roles
-
-  length  = 32
-  special = true
-}
-
-# Declarative NetBox service users, one per engine role. The role's filename-
-# derived name is the username, so the engine role and its user match 1:1.
-resource "netbox_user" "users" {
-  for_each = var.netbox_roles
-
-  provider = netbox.by_backend[each.value.backend]
-
-  username = each.value.name
-  password = random_password.user[each.key].result
-  active   = each.value.active
-  staff    = each.value.staff
-  email    = each.value.email
-}
-
-locals {
-  # Flatten roles x permissions into one map keyed by "<role_path>:<index>". A
-  # permission's name defaults to the role name (the username) so a single-
-  # permission identity repeats nothing already encoded by the filename.
-  netbox_permissions = merge([
-    for role_key, role in var.netbox_roles : {
-      for idx, perm in role.permissions :
-      "${role_key}:${idx}" => {
-        backend      = role.backend
-        user         = role_key
-        name         = coalesce(perm.name, length(role.permissions) == 1 ? role.name : "${role.name}-${idx}")
-        object_types = perm.object_types
-        actions      = perm.actions
-        constraints  = perm.constraints
-        description  = perm.description
-        enabled      = perm.enabled
-      }
-    }
-  ]...)
-}
-
-# Object permissions granting each user its object-type/action scope.
-resource "netbox_permission" "perms" {
-  for_each = local.netbox_permissions
-
-  provider = netbox.by_backend[each.value.backend]
-
-  name         = each.value.name
-  object_types = each.value.object_types
-  actions      = each.value.actions
-  enabled      = each.value.enabled
-  description  = each.value.description
-  constraints  = each.value.constraints
-  users        = [tonumber(netbox_user.users[each.value.user].id)]
-}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/netbox_user_management/outputs.tf

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-output "netbox_users" {
-  description = "Map of created NetBox users (id + username; password is intentionally omitted)"
-  value = {
-    for k, u in netbox_user.users : k => {
-      id       = u.id
-      username = u.username
-    }
-  }
-}
-
-output "netbox_permissions" {
-  description = "Map of created NetBox object permissions"
-  value = {
-    for k, p in netbox_permission.perms : k => {
-      id   = p.id
-      name = p.name
-    }
-  }
-}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/netbox_user_management/terraform.tf

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-terraform {
-  required_version = ">= 1.10"
-  required_providers {
-    vault = {
-      source  = "hashicorp/vault"
-      version = "5.6.0"
-    }
-    netbox = {
-      source  = "e-breuninger/netbox"
-      version = "4.3.0"
-    }
-    random = {
-      source  = "hashicorp/random"
-      version = ">= 3.5"
-    }
-  }
-}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/netbox_user_management/variables.tf

@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-variable "netbox_backends" {
-  description = "Map of netbox secret backends (keyed by mount path); only the URL and TLS mode are needed to reach NetBox"
-  type = map(object({
-    netbox_url      = string
-    tls_skip_verify = optional(bool, false)
-    # Pre-existing NetBox superuser the engine mints a dynamic user-admin token
-    # for; unset means fall back to the static admin_token from KV.
-    user_mgmt_username = optional(string)
-  }))
-}
-
-variable "netbox_roles" {
-  description = "Map of netbox engine roles (the netbox_secret_backend_role config). Each role's filename-derived name is the NetBox username to create, and its permissions block is the user's object-permission set. Keyed by the role's config path."
-  type = map(object({
-    name    = string
-    backend = string
-    active  = optional(bool, true)
-    staff   = optional(bool, false)
-    email   = optional(string)
-    permissions = optional(list(object({
-      name         = optional(string)
-      object_types = list(string)
-      actions      = optional(list(string), ["view", "add", "change", "delete"])
-      constraints  = optional(string)
-      description  = optional(string)
-      enabled      = optional(bool, true)
-    })), [])
-  }))
-  default = {}
-}
-
-variable "netbox_backend_aliases" {
-  description = "Map of netbox backend names to sanitized provider aliases"
-  type        = map(string)
-  default     = {}
-}
-
-variable "country" {
-  description = "Country identifier"
-  type        = string
-}
-
-variable "region" {
-  description = "Region identifier"
-  type        = string
-}

modules/vault_cluster/variables.tf

@@ -62,46 +62,6 @@ variable "auth_ldap_group" {
   default = {}
 }
 
-variable "auth_oidc_backend" {
-  description = "Map of OIDC (JWT) auth backends to create"
-  type = map(object({
-    oidc_discovery_url  = string
-    description         = optional(string)
-    client_secret_mount = optional(string, "kv")
-    client_secret_path  = optional(string, "service/authentik/oidc-vault")
-    default_role        = optional(string, "default")
-    listing_visibility  = optional(string)
-    default_lease_ttl   = optional(string)
-    max_lease_ttl       = optional(string)
-  }))
-  default = {}
-}
-
-variable "auth_oidc_role" {
-  description = "Map of OIDC auth roles to create"
-  type = map(object({
-    role_name             = string
-    backend               = string
-    allowed_redirect_uris = list(string)
-    user_claim            = optional(string, "email")
-    groups_claim          = optional(string, "ak_groups")
-    oidc_scopes           = optional(list(string), [])
-    bound_audiences       = optional(list(string), [])
-    token_ttl             = optional(number, 3600)
-    token_max_ttl         = optional(number, 28800)
-  }))
-  default = {}
-}
-
-variable "auth_oidc_group" {
-  description = "Map of external identity groups bound to an OIDC auth mount"
-  type = map(object({
-    groupname = string
-    backend   = string
-  }))
-  default = {}
-}
-
 variable "auth_kubernetes_backend" {
   description = "Map of Kubernetes auth backends to create"
   type = map(object({
@@ -356,31 +316,6 @@ variable "litellm_secret_backend_role" {
   default = {}
 }
 
-variable "arrstack_secret_backend" {
-  description = "Map of arrstack secret engines to create (mount + config). The arrproxy admin token is read from KV"
-  type = map(object({
-    plugin                  = optional(string, "vault-plugin-secrets-arrstack")
-    description             = optional(string)
-    base_url                = string
-    ca_cert                 = optional(string)
-    request_timeout_seconds = optional(number, 30)
-  }))
-  default = {}
-}
-
-variable "arrstack_secret_backend_role" {
-  description = "Map of arrstack roles to create"
-  type = map(object({
-    name    = string
-    backend = string
-    apps    = list(string)
-    methods = optional(set(string))
-    ttl     = optional(number)
-    max_ttl = optional(number)
-  }))
-  default = {}
-}
-
 variable "plugins" {
   description = "Map of plugins to import (register) in the catalog, keyed by catalog name"
   type = map(object({
@@ -481,88 +416,6 @@ variable "gitea_secret_backend_role" {
   default = {}
 }
 
-variable "netbox_secret_backend" {
-  description = "Map of netbox token secret engines to create (mount + config; seeded admin token read from KV)"
-  type = map(object({
-    plugin                  = optional(string, "vault-plugin-secrets-netbox")
-    description             = optional(string)
-    netbox_url              = string
-    token_version           = optional(number, 2)
-    ca_cert                 = optional(string)
-    tls_skip_verify         = optional(bool, false)
-    request_timeout_seconds = optional(number, 30)
-    # Pre-existing NetBox superuser (or add_user + add_token + grant_token) the
-    # engine mints an ephemeral user-admin token for, so netbox_user_management
-    # authenticates with a Vault-minted credential derived from the single static
-    # admin token instead of a second static one. Unset = use the static
-    # admin_token directly (bootstrap/degraded; breaks after admin-token rotation).
-    user_mgmt_username = optional(string)
-  }))
-  default = {}
-}
-
-variable "netbox_secret_backend_role" {
-  description = "Map of netbox engine roles; each role's filename-derived name is both the engine role and the NetBox username it mints tokens for, and its permissions block is the user's object-permission set"
-  type = map(object({
-    name            = string
-    backend         = string
-    netbox_username = optional(string)
-    netbox_user_id  = optional(number)
-    write_enabled   = optional(bool, false)
-    description     = optional(string)
-    ttl             = optional(number)
-    max_ttl         = optional(number)
-    active          = optional(bool, true)
-    staff           = optional(bool, false)
-    email           = optional(string)
-    permissions = optional(list(object({
-      name         = optional(string)
-      object_types = list(string)
-      actions      = optional(list(string), ["view", "add", "change", "delete"])
-      constraints  = optional(string)
-      description  = optional(string)
-      enabled      = optional(bool, true)
-    })), [])
-  }))
-  default = {}
-}
-
-variable "netbox_backend_aliases" {
-  description = "Map of netbox backend names to sanitized provider aliases"
-  type        = map(string)
-  default     = {}
-}
-
-variable "ghp_secret_backend" {
-  description = "Map of ghp token secret engines to create (mount + config; seeded service token read from KV)"
-  type = map(object({
-    plugin                  = optional(string, "vault-plugin-secrets-ghp")
-    description             = optional(string)
-    base_url                = string
-    ca_cert                 = optional(string)
-    tls_skip_verify         = optional(bool, false)
-    request_timeout_seconds = optional(number, 30)
-  }))
-  default = {}
-}
-
-variable "ghp_secret_backend_role" {
-  description = "Map of ghp engine roles; reading ghp/creds/<name> mints a short-lived scoped ghp token"
-  type = map(object({
-    name            = string
-    backend         = string
-    token_type      = optional(string)
-    installation_id = optional(number)
-    app_record_id   = optional(string)
-    repositories    = optional(list(string))
-    scopes          = optional(list(string))
-    session_prefix  = optional(string)
-    ttl             = optional(number)
-    max_ttl         = optional(number)
-  }))
-  default = {}
-}
-
 variable "policy_auth_map" {
   description = "Map of auth mounts -> auth roles -> policy names"
   type        = map(map(list(string)))

policies/arrstack/admin.yaml

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-# Allow management of the arrstack secrets engine (config and roles) by the
-# terraform-vault deployer.
----
-rules:
-  - path: "arrstack/config"
-    capabilities:
-      - create
-      - update
-      - read
-      - delete
-  - path: "arrstack/roles/*"
-    capabilities:
-      - create
-      - update
-      - delete
-      - read
-      - list
-  - path: "arrstack/roles"
-    capabilities:
-      - read
-      - list
-
-auth:
-  approle:
-    - tf_vault
-  k8s/au/syd1:
-    - woodpecker_terraform_vault

policies/arrstack/creds/mediamark.yaml

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-# Allow the mediamark app to mint its own Sonarr/Radarr-scoped arrproxy key.
-# Bound to the dedicated "mediamark" k8s role only, never the shared "default"
-# role, so no other namespace can read these creds.
----
-rules:
-  - path: "arrstack/creds/mediamark"
-    capabilities:
-      - read
-
-auth:
-  k8s/au/syd1:
-    - mediamark

policies/arrstack/creds/prowlarr.yaml

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-# Allow the terraform-prowlarr run to mint a Prowlarr-scoped arrproxy key.
----
-rules:
-  - path: "arrstack/creds/prowlarr"
-    capabilities:
-      - read
-
-auth:
-  approle:
-    - terraform_prowlarr
-  k8s/au/syd1:
-    - woodpecker_terraform_prowlarr

policies/arrstack/creds/radarr.yaml

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-# Allow the terraform-radarr run to mint a Radarr-scoped arrproxy key.
----
-rules:
-  - path: "arrstack/creds/radarr"
-    capabilities:
-      - read
-
-auth:
-  approle:
-    - terraform_radarr
-  k8s/au/syd1:
-    - woodpecker_terraform_radarr

policies/arrstack/creds/sonarr.yaml

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-# Allow the terraform-sonarr run to mint a Sonarr-scoped arrproxy key.
----
-rules:
-  - path: "arrstack/creds/sonarr"
-    capabilities:
-      - read
-
-auth:
-  approle:
-    - terraform_sonarr
-  k8s/au/syd1:
-    - woodpecker_terraform_sonarr

policies/auth/oidc/admin.yaml

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-# Allow full administration of the OIDC auth backend (mount config and login
-# roles), mirroring policies/auth/ldap/admin.yaml. sys/auth/* already covers
-# enabling the mount itself; this covers writing auth/oidc/config and
-# auth/oidc/role/*.
----
-rules:
-  - path: "auth/oidc/*"
-    capabilities:
-      - create
-      - update
-      - read
-      - delete
-      - list
-
-auth:
-  approle:
-    - tf_vault
-  k8s/au/syd1:
-    - woodpecker_terraform_vault

policies/ghp/admin.yaml

@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-# Allow the vault deployer to manage the ghp token secrets engine: its
-# connection config (seeded service token) and its token-minting roles.
-#
-# Scoped to ghp/* only, and deliberately excludes ghp/creds/* - minting tokens
-# is for consumers, not the deployer. ghp has NO rotate endpoint, so unlike the
-# gitea/netbox engines there is no config/rotate grant here. The plugin-catalog
-# grant needed to import the plugin is the shared, sudo-protected wildcard in
-# policies/sys/plugins/catalog/admin.yaml (already covers this plugin), and
-# mounting the engine uses the deployer's existing sys/mounts/* access, so no
-# new catalog/mount grant is added here (mirrors the gitea/netbox engines).
----
-rules:
-  # Engine connection config (base_url, TLS, seeded service token).
-  - path: "ghp/config"
-    capabilities:
-      - create
-      - read
-      - update
-      - delete
-  # Token-minting roles.
-  - path: "ghp/roles/*"
-    capabilities:
-      - create
-      - read
-      - update
-      - delete
-      - list
-  - path: "ghp/roles"
-    capabilities:
-      - read
-      - list
-
-auth:
-  approle:
-    - tf_vault
-  k8s/au/syd1:
-    - woodpecker_terraform_vault

policies/ghp/creds/agent.yaml

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-# Lets the agents AppRole mint ephemeral ghp agent tokens, so AI coding agents
-# authenticate to ghp as their own short-lived, least-privilege identity.
-# Reading ghp/creds/agent returns a lease-bound token scoped by the role
-# (token_type agent, contents:read). Mirrors the gitea/creds/unkin-agent binding.
----
-rules:
-  - path: "ghp/creds/agent"
-    capabilities:
-      - read
-
-auth:
-  approle:
-    - agents

policies/gitea/creds/repospawner.yaml

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-# Lets the repospawner pods mint ephemeral Gitea tokens for the repospawner
-# service user, so the service authenticates to git.unkin.net as its own
-# least-privilege identity. Reading gitea/creds/repospawner returns a
-# lease-bound token scoped by the role (write:repository, write:issue,
-# read:user -- never merge/admin).
-# Kubernetes auth only: repospawner runs in-cluster and the agents AppRole is
-# CIDR-bound to Ben's workstation.
----
-rules:
-  - path: "gitea/creds/repospawner"
-    capabilities:
-      - read
-
-auth:
-  k8s/au/syd1:
-    - repospawner

policies/gitea/creds/unkin-agent.yaml

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-# Lets the agents AppRole mint ephemeral Gitea tokens for the unkin-agent bot,
-# so AI coding agents authenticate to git.unkin.net as their own least-privilege
-# identity instead of Ben's account. Reading gitea/creds/unkin-agent returns a
-# lease-bound token scoped by the role (write:repository, write:issue, read:user
-# -- never merge/admin). Mirrors the agent-* Kubernetes creds binding pattern.
----
-rules:
-  - path: "gitea/creds/unkin-agent"
-    capabilities:
-      - read
-
-auth:
-  approle:
-    - agents

policies/global-root.yaml

@@ -10,12 +10,6 @@ rules:
       - list
       - sudo
 
-# The oidc entry is an Authentik akP-* permission group, not an LDAP group name:
-# it names the external identity group under config/auth_oidc_group, so a human
-# who logs in via Authentik SSO lands on exactly the policy the LDAP vault_admin
-# group already carries. akR-* roles are grouping-only and never named here.
 auth:
   ldap:
     - vault_admin
-  oidc:
-    - akP-vault-admin

policies/identity/group/admin.yaml

@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-# Allow the deployer to manage external identity groups and their aliases, which
-# is how OIDC group membership (the ak_groups claim) maps onto Vault policies.
-# Both the collection endpoints and the per-id endpoints are needed: create posts
-# to identity/group, subsequent reads and updates address identity/group/id/<id>.
----
-rules:
-  - path: "identity/group"
-    capabilities:
-      - create
-      - update
-  - path: "identity/group/*"
-    capabilities:
-      - create
-      - update
-      - read
-      - delete
-      - list
-  - path: "identity/group-alias"
-    capabilities:
-      - create
-      - update
-  - path: "identity/group-alias/*"
-    capabilities:
-      - create
-      - update
-      - read
-      - delete
-      - list
-  - path: "identity/lookup/group"
-    capabilities:
-      - create
-      - update
-
-auth:
-  approle:
-    - tf_vault
-  k8s/au/syd1:
-    - woodpecker_terraform_vault

policies/kv/kubernetes/namespace/arrstack/default/arrproxy-admin-token/read.yaml

@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-# Allow the terraform-vault deployer to read the seeded arrproxy admin token so
-# the arrstack engine config module can source it. The token is seeded by
-# argocd-apps #384 at kv/kubernetes/namespace/arrstack/default/arrproxy-admin-token.
-# The deployer's existing secret_backends_read policy only covers
-# kv/data/service/vault/+/+/secret_backend/*, which does not match this
-# kubernetes/namespace path, so this adds the minimal read grant rather than
-# duplicating the secret into the litellm-style path. vault_kv_secret_v2 also
-# reads the kv-v2 metadata path on every plan/apply, so grant that too.
----
-rules:
-  - path: "kv/data/kubernetes/namespace/arrstack/default/arrproxy-admin-token"
-    capabilities:
-      - read
-  - path: "kv/metadata/kubernetes/namespace/arrstack/default/arrproxy-admin-token"
-    capabilities:
-      - read
-
-auth:
-  approle:
-    - tf_vault
-  k8s/au/syd1:
-    - woodpecker_terraform_vault

policies/kv/service/authentik/agent-api-token/read.yaml

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-# Lets the agents AppRole read a dedicated, scoped Authentik API token seeded by
-# the operator. Automation seeds OAuth2 client secrets and LDAP outpost tokens as
-# part of normal IaC workflows; fetching an outpost token requires calling the
-# Authentik API, so a scoped token (not the CI admin credential) is read here.
-# Mirrors the gitea/creds/unkin-agent agents-approle read grant pattern.
----
-rules:
-  - path: "kv/data/service/authentik/agent-api-token"
-    capabilities:
-      - read
-
-auth:
-  approle:
-    - agents

policies/kv/service/authentik/oidc-vault/read.yaml

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-# Let the terraform-vault deployer read the OpenBao OIDC client credentials that
-# Authentik's provider module generates and writes here (terraform_authentik owns
-# kv/service/authentik/* — see policies/kv/service/authentik/write.yaml). The
-# deployer consumes client_id/client_secret to configure the auth/oidc backend.
-#
-# OIDC becomes the default human auth path; approle and k8s (CI and agents) plus
-# the break-glass root path are unchanged.
-#
-# AppRole capabilities are fixed at login, so this grant must be applied before
-# the PR that adds the auth/oidc modules.
----
-rules:
-  - path: "kv/data/service/authentik/oidc-vault"
-    capabilities:
-      - read
-
-auth:
-  approle:
-    - tf_vault
-  k8s/au/syd1:
-    - woodpecker_terraform_vault

policies/kv/service/authentik/write.yaml

@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-# Let the terraform-authentik runner manage the Authentik service KV subtree as
-# IaC (vault_kv_secret_v2), starting with kv/service/authentik/agent-api-token,
-# which is currently seeded by hand.
-#
-# Scoping: the ask was to grant only *-token paths, but Vault ACL paths support
-# a trailing glob only (no infix/suffix wildcards), so the grant is the whole
-# kv/service/authentik/ subtree. That is acceptable because terraform-authentik
-# is the owner of every secret under kv/service/authentik/.
-#
-# delete is included (unlike the agents kv/kubernetes grant) so `terraform
-# destroy` and resource replacement can remove a secret and its metadata
-# cleanly; vault_kv_secret_v2 also reads the kv-v2 metadata path on every
-# plan/apply, so metadata read/list is required for the plan to succeed.
----
-rules:
-  - path: "kv/data/service/authentik/*"
-    capabilities:
-      - create
-      - read
-      - update
-      - delete
-  - path: "kv/metadata/service/authentik/*"
-    capabilities:
-      - read
-      - list
-      - delete
-
-auth:
-  approle:
-    - terraform_authentik
-  k8s/au/syd1:
-    - woodpecker_terraform_authentik

policies/kv/service/kubernetes/au/syd1/csi/ceph-mediafs-secret/read.yaml

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-# Allow reading Ceph mediafs CSI secrets
----
-rules:
-  - path: "kv/data/service/kubernetes/au/syd1/csi/ceph-mediafs-secret"
-    capabilities:
-      - read
-
-auth:
-  k8s/au/syd1:
-    - ceph-csi

policies/kv/service/terraform/infra.yaml

@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ rules:
   - path: "kv/data/service/terraform/infra"
     capabilities:
       - read
-  # vault_kv_secret_v2 (terraform-infra providers.tf data source) reads the kv-v2
-  # metadata path on every plan/apply; a 403 here fails the plan.
+  # vault_kv_secret_v2 (providers.tf data source) reads the kv-v2 metadata path
+  # on every plan/apply; a 403 here fails the plan.
   - path: "kv/metadata/service/terraform/infra"
     capabilities:
       - read

policies/kv/service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/ghp/config_write.yaml

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-# Allow the agents AppRole to seed the ghp secrets engine's admin credentials.
-# The ghp engine (managed by the tf_vault deployer) reads its ghpsvc_ service
-# token from admin_token at ghp/config creation time; that key is currently
-# unseeded, so the master apply aborts on the ghp data-source read. This grants
-# the agents AppRole scoped write here so an agent can seed the value. Deployer
-# read is already granted via policies/kv/service/vault/secret_backends_read.yaml,
-# so this only adds the write side for the agents identity.
----
-rules:
-  # Seed value: admin_token (a ghpsvc_ service token). create/update to seed,
-  # read so the agent can verify what it wrote. No delete (least privilege).
-  - path: "kv/data/service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/ghp/config"
-    capabilities:
-      - create
-      - update
-      - read
-  # vault_kv_secret_v2 also reads the kv-v2 metadata path on every plan/apply.
-  - path: "kv/metadata/service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/ghp/config"
-    capabilities:
-      - read
-
-auth:
-  approle:
-    - agents

policies/netbox/admin.yaml

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-# Allow the vault deployer to manage the netbox token secrets engine: its
-# connection config (seeded admin token), in-place token rotation, and
-# token-minting roles.
-#
-# Scoped to netbox/* only, and deliberately excludes netbox/creds/* - minting
-# tokens is for consumers, not the deployer. The plugin-catalog grant needed to
-# import the plugin is the shared, sudo-protected wildcard in
-# policies/sys/plugins/catalog/admin.yaml (already covers this plugin), and
-# mounting the engine uses the deployer's existing sys/mounts/* access, so no
-# new catalog/mount grant is added here (mirrors the gitea/rancher engines).
----
-rules:
-  # Engine connection config (NetBox URL, TLS, token_version, seeded admin token).
-  - path: "netbox/config"
-    capabilities:
-      - create
-      - read
-      - update
-      - delete
-  # In-place rotation of the seeded admin token (write-only trigger).
-  - path: "netbox/config/rotate"
-    capabilities:
-      - create
-      - update
-  # Token-minting roles.
-  - path: "netbox/roles/*"
-    capabilities:
-      - create
-      - read
-      - update
-      - delete
-      - list
-  - path: "netbox/roles"
-    capabilities:
-      - read
-      - list
-
-auth:
-  approle:
-    - tf_vault
-  k8s/au/syd1:
-    - woodpecker_terraform_vault

policies/netbox/creds/terraform-infra.yaml

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-# Allow the terraform-infra runner to mint an ephemeral NetBox token from the
-# terraform-infra role (netbox/creds/terraform-infra), replacing the static
-# netbox_token it used to read from kv/service/terraform/*. The e-breuninger
-# netbox provider authenticates with the minted token; the lease revokes it when
-# the run ends.
-#
-# Bound to both the terraform-infra AppRole and its Woodpecker k8s auth role,
-# mirroring the terraform-ipam pattern. Both principals are created by the
-# terraform-infra Vault onboarding (separate from this netbox change); until
-# that onboarding lands this policy exists but attaches to nothing.
----
-rules:
-  - path: "netbox/creds/terraform-infra"
-    capabilities:
-      - read
-
-auth:
-  approle:
-    - terraform_infra
-  k8s/au/syd1:
-    - woodpecker_terraform_infra

policies/netbox/creds/vault-user-mgmt.yaml

@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-# Allow the vault deployer to mint the ephemeral user-admin token that
-# netbox_user_management authenticates with (netbox/creds/vault-user-mgmt). The
-# engine mints it from the single static admin token, so the deployer never holds
-# a second static NetBox credential.
-#
-# The netbox admin policy (policies/netbox/admin.yaml) deliberately excludes
-# netbox/creds/* - minting is normally for consumers, not the deployer. This is
-# the one deliberate exception: the deployer needs a user-admin token during the
-# run to reconcile NetBox users. Scoped to the single vault-user-mgmt role only.
-#
-# Bound to the same principals as the admin policy: the tf_vault AppRole and its
-# Woodpecker k8s auth role.
----
-rules:
-  - path: "netbox/creds/vault-user-mgmt"
-    capabilities:
-      - read
-
-auth:
-  approle:
-    - tf_vault
-  k8s/au/syd1:
-    - woodpecker_terraform_vault

policies/rancher/creds/ci.yaml

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-# Allow the terraform-rancher runner to mint an ephemeral Rancher API token
-# from the "ci" role, so its Makefile can swap
-#   vault kv get kv/service/terraform/rancher
-# for
-#   vault read -field=token rancher/creds/ci
-# and retire the static 90-day admin token. The minted token is lease-bound
-# (ttl 1h, max 8h) and deleted from Rancher on revoke; it inherits the seeded
-# admin service account's RBAC, so this is the same privilege as the static
-# token it replaces, just short-lived.
----
-rules:
-  - path: "rancher/creds/ci"
-    capabilities:
-      - read
-
-auth:
-  approle:
-    - terraform_rancher
-  k8s/au/syd1:
-    - woodpecker_terraform_rancher

policies/sys/auth/admin.yaml

@@ -8,24 +8,6 @@ rules:
       - delete
       - read
       - list
-  # Enabling/tuning an auth mount is sudo-protected, and an exact path match
-  # wins over the wildcard above, so both rules repeat the full capability set.
-  - path: "sys/auth/oidc"
-    capabilities:
-      - create
-      - update
-      - delete
-      - read
-      - list
-      - sudo
-  - path: "sys/auth/oidc/tune"
-    capabilities:
-      - create
-      - update
-      - delete
-      - read
-      - list
-      - sudo
 
 auth:
   approle:

resources/secret_backend/kubernetes/au/syd1/roles/cluster-operator.yaml

@@ -22,28 +22,6 @@ rules:
       - "elasticsearch.k8s.elastic.co"
       - "kibana.k8s.elastic.co"
       - "gateway.networking.k8s.io"
-      - "apm.k8s.elastic.co"
-      - "beat.k8s.elastic.co"
-      - "agent.k8s.elastic.co"
-      - "maps.k8s.elastic.co"
-      - "enterprisesearch.k8s.elastic.co"
-      - "autoscaling.k8s.elastic.co"
-      - "stackconfigpolicy.k8s.elastic.co"
-      - "valkey.io"
-      - "ceph.unkin.net"
-      - "bind.unkin.net"
-      - "kea.unkin.net"
-      - "k8up.io"
-      - "grafana.integreatly.org"
-      - "operator.victoriametrics.com"
-      - "clickhouse.altinity.com"
-      - "clickhouse-keeper.altinity.com"
-      - "acme.cert-manager.io"
-      - "deviceplugin.intel.com"
-      - "fpga.intel.com"
-      - "autoscaling.k8s.io"
-      - "snapshot.storage.k8s.io"
-      - "groupsnapshot.storage.k8s.io"
     resources:
       - "*"
     verbs: