3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
unkinben 6e7a052293 Grant terraform-infra kv metadata read
vault_kv_secret_v2 (terraform-infra providers.tf data source) reads the kv-v2
metadata path on every plan/apply; add read on kv/metadata/service/terraform/infra
so the plan doesn't 403 (same pattern as the terraform-git gitea config policy).

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JUoARVdmhxKQHyyyp1pxeT
2026-08-06 23:09:13 +10:00
unkinben ba5f49f358 ci: re-run (litellm provider transient 500 on prior plan)
ci/woodpecker/pr/plan Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/pr/pre-commit Pipeline was successful
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JUoARVdmhxKQHyyyp1pxeT
2026-08-05 00:57:52 +10:00
unkinben 92b8fdd0dd Rename terraform-ipam CI Vault access -> terraform-infra
ci/woodpecker/pr/plan Pipeline failed
ci/woodpecker/pr/pre-commit Pipeline was successful
Follows the terraform-ipam -> terraform-infra repo rename: role
woodpecker_terraform_infra, consul role/ACL policy terraform-infra
(state path infra/terraform/infra/*), creds + kv read policies.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JUoARVdmhxKQHyyyp1pxeT
2026-08-05 00:52:10 +10:00
53 changed files with 2 additions and 1473 deletions
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
# Mounts the arrstack dynamic secrets engine at "arrstack" and writes its config.
# The arrproxy admin token is sensitive and read from KV, not stored here:
# kv/kubernetes/namespace/arrstack/default/arrproxy-admin-token -> key "token"
# (seeded by argocd-apps #384). arrstack.unkin.net terminates on traefik-external
# with an internal-CA cert the OpenBao nodes already trust, so ca_cert is omitted
# (system trust store), mirroring the gitea engine against git.unkin.net.
description: "arrstack dynamic arrproxy API keys"
base_url: "https://arrstack.unkin.net"
request_timeout_seconds: 30
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
---
# Mints an arrproxy API key scoped to all three arr apps.
apps:
- sonarr
- radarr
- prowlarr
ttl: 3600 # seconds (1h)
max_ttl: 86400 # seconds (24h); the engine additionally caps renewal at the
# arrproxy admin token's fixed mint expiry.
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
---
# Mints an arrproxy API key scoped to Prowlarr only.
apps:
- prowlarr
ttl: 3600 # seconds (1h)
max_ttl: 86400 # seconds (24h); the engine additionally caps renewal at the
# arrproxy admin token's fixed mint expiry.
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
---
# Mints an arrproxy API key scoped to Radarr only.
apps:
- radarr
ttl: 3600 # seconds (1h)
max_ttl: 86400 # seconds (24h); the engine additionally caps renewal at the
# arrproxy admin token's fixed mint expiry.
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
---
# Mints an arrproxy API key scoped to Sonarr only.
apps:
- sonarr
ttl: 3600 # seconds (1h)
max_ttl: 86400 # seconds (24h); the engine additionally caps renewal at the
# arrproxy admin token's fixed mint expiry.
-40
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@@ -198,19 +198,6 @@ locals {
})
if startswith(file_path, "litellm_secret_backend_role/")
}
arrstack_secret_backend = {
for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml") => content
if startswith(file_path, "arrstack_secret_backend/")
}
arrstack_secret_backend_role = {
for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
trimsuffix(replace(file_path, "arrstack_secret_backend_role/", ""), ".yaml") => merge(content, {
name = trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml")
backend = dirname(replace(file_path, "arrstack_secret_backend_role/", ""))
})
if startswith(file_path, "arrstack_secret_backend_role/")
}
plugins = {
for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml") => merge(content, {
@@ -265,32 +252,5 @@ locals {
})
if startswith(file_path, "gitea_secret_backend_role/")
}
netbox_secret_backend = {
for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml") => content
if startswith(file_path, "netbox_secret_backend/")
}
netbox_secret_backend_role = {
for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
trimsuffix(replace(file_path, "netbox_secret_backend_role/", ""), ".yaml") => merge(content, {
name = trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml")
netbox_username = trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml")
backend = dirname(replace(file_path, "netbox_secret_backend_role/", ""))
})
if startswith(file_path, "netbox_secret_backend_role/")
}
ghp_secret_backend = {
for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml") => content
if startswith(file_path, "ghp_secret_backend/")
}
ghp_secret_backend_role = {
for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
trimsuffix(replace(file_path, "ghp_secret_backend_role/", ""), ".yaml") => merge(content, {
name = trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml")
backend = dirname(replace(file_path, "ghp_secret_backend_role/", ""))
})
if startswith(file_path, "ghp_secret_backend_role/")
}
}
}
-15
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@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
# Mounts the ghp token secrets engine at "ghp" and writes its config.
# The seeded ghp service token is sensitive and read from KV, not stored here:
# kv/service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/ghp/config
# -> key: admin_token (required) the shared ghpsvc_... service token
#
# admin_token is a static shared secret provisioned into KV by an operator. The
# SAME token value must also be present in the running ghp deployment's accepted
# service tokens (GHP_AUTH_SERVICE_TOKENS) so ghp ACCEPTS what this engine
# PRESENTS. ghp has no rotate endpoint, so the engine never rotates it in place;
# the mount uses ignore_changes=[admin_token], making the KV seed create-only
# (re-reading a stale KV value never re-pushes it to a live mount).
description: "ghp ephemeral scoped agent token engine"
base_url: "https://ghp.unkin.net"
tls_skip_verify: false
request_timeout_seconds: 30
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
# Role minting ephemeral, scoped ghp agent tokens. Reading ghp/creds/agent mints
# a lease-bound token deleted from ghp on revoke/expiry. token_type "agent" binds
# the minted token to a ghp App installation, so installation_id is REQUIRED.
#
# installation_id below is a PLACEHOLDER (0) and MUST be set to the real ghp App
# installation id before this role can mint usable tokens. scopes are ghp
# permission:level pairs; contents:read is the least-privilege default.
---
token_type: agent
installation_id: 0 # PLACEHOLDER - set to the real ghp App installation id
scopes:
- contents:read
session_prefix: vault
ttl: 3600 # 1h
max_ttl: 86400 # 24h
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
# Role minting ephemeral tokens for the unkin-agent bot user -- the shared
# identity Ben's AI coding agents use to submit work. The agent clones/pushes
# code and opens pull requests, so it gets write on repositories (clone + push +
# PR create) and write on issues (PR/issue comments). Read is implied by write.
# No admin/org/user-write scopes, so it can never merge via API privilege; merge
# is blocked separately by branch protection (merge whitelist = Owners).
# read:user is required because tea (and most API clients) validate the login
# via GET /api/v1/user, which 403s without it.
# Reading gitea/creds/unkin-agent mints a lease-bound token deleted from Gitea
# on revoke/expiry. Consumed by the "agents" AppRole (see
# policies/gitea/creds/unkin-agent.yaml).
---
username: unkin-agent
scopes:
- write:repository
- write:issue
- read:user
token_name_prefix: vault-unkin-agent
ttl: 3600 # 1h
max_ttl: 14400 # 4h
-48
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@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
# Mounts the netbox token secrets engine at "netbox" and writes its config.
# The seeded NetBox admin token is sensitive and read from KV, not stored here:
# kv/service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/netbox/config
# -> key: admin_token (required) the SINGLE static admin credential
#
# admin_token must be a BARE NetBox token with NO scheme prefix: do not prepend
# "Bearer " or "Token ". NetBox infers the version from the value's nbt_ prefix,
# so one bare token authenticates under either scheme; the plugin adds the keyword
# itself. A prefixed value yields a malformed header + 403.
#
# Populate admin_token with a purpose-built NetBox superuser token (add_user +
# add_token + grant_token, or superuser) BEFORE applying, then run
# `vault write -f netbox/config/rotate` after the first apply so only Vault holds
# the live admin token.
#
# Only ONE static admin token exists. netbox_user_management does NOT re-read this
# token; instead the engine mints it a short-lived user-admin token per apply from
# netbox/roles/vault-user-mgmt (see user_mgmt_username below), so rotating
# admin_token never breaks user management. Set user_mgmt_username to the
# pre-existing NetBox superuser the static admin_token belongs to (or another
# superuser). Leaving it unset falls back to using admin_token directly, which is
# only a bootstrap/degraded path and breaks after rotation.
#
# Bootstrap ordering: the vault-user-mgmt role must exist before the netbox
# provider is configured from its creds, so on a brand-new backend apply the mount
# + role first (e.g. `tofu apply -target=...netbox_secret_backend
# -target=...netbox_user_mgmt_role`) once, then apply normally.
#
# token_version 2 is the NetBox 4.6.5 default and requires API_TOKEN_PEPPERS to
# be configured on the NetBox server; set token_version: 1 here if the server
# has no peppers. token_version does NOT change how the plugin authenticates its
# own calls (that scheme comes from the admin_token value's nbt_ prefix); it only
# sets the version of the per-user tokens the engine mints. It must still MATCH
# the admin_token kind: nbt_ v2 token -> token_version 2; bare v1 token -> 1.
#
# The mount uses ignore_changes=[token], so editing KV alone does NOT reach the
# live mount. To push a corrected/rotated admin token into a running mount:
# vault write netbox/config token=<BARE_TOKEN>
# (netbox_url/token_version are preserved on a partial update). Do NOT -replace
# the mount to force a re-read - that recreates it and drops all roles/config.
description: "NetBox ephemeral scoped API token engine"
netbox_url: "https://netbox.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net"
token_version: 2
request_timeout_seconds: 30
# Set to the pre-existing NetBox superuser admin_token belongs to, to mint the
# user-management credential dynamically (recommended). Until set, user management
# uses admin_token directly and a check block warns that rotation will break it.
# user_mgmt_username: "vault-netbox-admin"
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
# Single declarative source for the terraform-infra NetBox service identity. The
# filename stem is the engine role name AND the NetBox username (1:1); config.hcl
# derives both from it, so neither is repeated below. Creating this file creates
# the user: the netbox_user_management module synthesizes the NetBox user + object
# permissions from the permissions block, and the engine role mints ephemeral
# tokens for that same user. write_enabled true because terraform-infra manages
# NetBox IPAM/DCIM; very short TTLs because a token is minted per plan/apply and
# revoked when the run's lease ends.
---
write_enabled: true
ttl: 120 # 2m
max_ttl: 300 # 5m
permissions:
- object_types:
- ipam.prefix
- ipam.ipaddress
- ipam.iprange
- dcim.device
- dcim.interface
- dcim.macaddress
actions:
- view
- add
- change
- delete
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
# config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-arrstack.yaml
# Imports (registers) the arrstack secrets plugin in the catalog. Filename =
# catalog name = mount type. The binary is installed on the OpenBao nodes by
# Puppet (openbao-plugin-secrets-arrstack RPM ->
# /opt/openbao-plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-arrstack).
#
# sha256 pins the released v0.1.0 binary; bump it in lockstep with any RPM
# upgrade or OpenBao will refuse to launch the plugin. Registration only
# succeeds once the Puppet PR has installed the binary on the nodes.
type: secret
command: vault-plugin-secrets-arrstack
version: "0.1.0"
sha256: "f8ee60ca7ba14819976acb7dc4cfb6799e3e8da8f871d0bb2bd18d1d9e537972"
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
# config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-ghp.yaml
# Imports (registers) the ghp secrets plugin in the catalog. Filename =
# catalog name = mount type. The binary is installed on the OpenBao nodes by
# Puppet (openbao-plugin-secrets-ghp RPM ->
# /opt/openbao-plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-ghp).
#
# sha256 pins the released v0.1.0 binary; bump it in lockstep with any RPM
# upgrade or OpenBao will refuse to launch the plugin.
type: secret
command: vault-plugin-secrets-ghp
sha256: "85761421cd532788ed28fb57e93d3868f3577320a538289936d9ed3be5f396de"
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
# config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-netbox.yaml
# Imports (registers) the netbox secrets plugin in the catalog. Filename =
# catalog name = mount type. The binary is installed on the OpenBao nodes by
# Puppet (openbao-plugin-secrets-netbox RPM ->
# /opt/openbao-plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-netbox).
#
# sha256 pins the released v0.1.0 binary; bump it in lockstep with any RPM
# upgrade or OpenBao will refuse to launch the plugin.
type: secret
command: vault-plugin-secrets-netbox
sha256: "362b7f6c9e21179ad51d2d810684d9387fe50e3a1887f171700122a0b2a05cef"
-17
View File
@@ -39,12 +39,6 @@ locals {
for backend_name, _ in local.config.consul_secret_backend :
backend_name => replace(backend_name, "/", "_")
}
# Same sanitized alias mapping for the NetBox providers.
netbox_backend_aliases = {
for backend_name, _ in local.config.netbox_secret_backend :
backend_name => replace(backend_name, "/", "_")
}
}
terraform {
@@ -76,8 +70,6 @@ inputs = {
pki_mount_only = local.config.pki_mount_only
litellm_secret_backend = local.config.litellm_secret_backend
litellm_secret_backend_role = local.config.litellm_secret_backend_role
arrstack_secret_backend = local.config.arrstack_secret_backend
arrstack_secret_backend_role = local.config.arrstack_secret_backend_role
plugins = local.config.plugins
gpg_secret_backend = local.config.gpg_secret_backend
gpg_key = local.config.gpg_key
@@ -89,19 +81,10 @@ inputs = {
gitea_secret_backend = local.config.gitea_secret_backend
gitea_secret_backend_role = local.config.gitea_secret_backend_role
netbox_secret_backend = local.config.netbox_secret_backend
netbox_secret_backend_role = local.config.netbox_secret_backend_role
ghp_secret_backend = local.config.ghp_secret_backend
ghp_secret_backend_role = local.config.ghp_secret_backend_role
# Pass policy maps to vault_cluster module
policy_auth_map = local.policies.policy_auth_map
policy_rules_map = local.policies.policy_rules_map
# Pass sanitized consul backend aliases for provider configuration
consul_backend_aliases = local.consul_backend_aliases
# Pass sanitized netbox backend aliases for provider configuration
netbox_backend_aliases = local.netbox_backend_aliases
}
-10
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@@ -29,12 +29,6 @@ provider "rancher" {
address = local.vault_addr
}
# The arrstack (arrproxy API key) secrets engine is managed through its own
# provider (same Vault server; token falls back to VAULT_TOKEN).
provider "arrstack" {
address = local.vault_addr
}
terraform {
backend "consul" {
address = "https://consul.service.consul"
@@ -65,10 +59,6 @@ terraform {
source = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/ranchervaultsecret"
version = "0.1.0"
}
arrstack = {
source = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/arrstackvaultsecret"
version = "0.1.0"
}
}
}
EOF
-146
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@@ -347,35 +347,6 @@ module "plugin" {
plugin_version = each.value.version
}
module "arrstack_secret_backend" {
source = "./modules/arrstack_secret_backend"
for_each = var.arrstack_secret_backend
path = each.key
plugin = each.value.plugin
description = each.value.description
base_url = each.value.base_url
ca_cert = each.value.ca_cert
request_timeout_seconds = each.value.request_timeout_seconds
depends_on = [module.plugin]
}
module "arrstack_secret_backend_role" {
source = "./modules/arrstack_secret_backend_role"
for_each = var.arrstack_secret_backend_role
name = each.value.name
backend = each.value.backend
apps = each.value.apps
ttl = each.value.ttl
max_ttl = each.value.max_ttl
depends_on = [module.arrstack_secret_backend]
}
module "gpg_secret_backend" {
source = "./modules/gpg_secret_backend"
@@ -485,123 +456,6 @@ module "gitea_secret_backend_role" {
depends_on = [module.gitea_secret_backend]
}
module "netbox_secret_backend" {
source = "./modules/netbox_secret_backend"
for_each = var.netbox_secret_backend
path = each.key
plugin = each.value.plugin
description = each.value.description
netbox_url = each.value.netbox_url
token_version = each.value.token_version
country = var.country
region = var.region
ca_cert = each.value.ca_cert
tls_skip_verify = each.value.tls_skip_verify
request_timeout_seconds = each.value.request_timeout_seconds
depends_on = [module.plugin]
}
# Dedicated engine role that mints an ephemeral, user-admin-capable token for the
# pre-existing NetBox superuser named on each backend (user_mgmt_username).
# netbox_user_management reads netbox/creds/vault-user-mgmt from it, so it
# authenticates with a short-lived Vault-minted token derived from the single
# static admin token - never a second static credential, and unaffected by
# rotation of the engine's admin seed. Created before user management so the role
# exists when it reads creds.
module "netbox_user_mgmt_role" {
source = "./modules/netbox_secret_backend_role"
for_each = { for k, v in var.netbox_secret_backend : k => v if v.user_mgmt_username != null }
backend = each.key
name = "vault-user-mgmt"
netbox_username = each.value.user_mgmt_username
write_enabled = true
description = "Ephemeral user-admin token for netbox_user_management (Vault-minted per apply)"
ttl = 600
max_ttl = 1200
depends_on = [module.netbox_secret_backend]
}
# Declaratively manage the NetBox service users + object permissions the engine
# roles mint tokens for, authenticating with the Vault-minted user-admin token
# above (mirrors consul_acl_management). Consumes the SAME role config as
# netbox_secret_backend_role: one file per identity, filename-derived username,
# inline permissions.
module "netbox_user_management" {
source = "./modules/netbox_user_management"
country = var.country
region = var.region
netbox_backends = var.netbox_secret_backend
netbox_roles = var.netbox_secret_backend_role
netbox_backend_aliases = var.netbox_backend_aliases
# This module declares its own netbox provider, so it is a legacy module and
# cannot take depends_on. Ordering vs the vault-user-mgmt role is not needed on
# steady state (the role pre-exists, so reading its creds succeeds regardless);
# on first enablement the role must be created first via the one-time targeted
# bootstrap documented in config/netbox_secret_backend/netbox.yaml.
}
module "netbox_secret_backend_role" {
source = "./modules/netbox_secret_backend_role"
for_each = var.netbox_secret_backend_role
backend = each.value.backend
name = each.value.name
netbox_username = each.value.netbox_username
netbox_user_id = each.value.netbox_user_id
write_enabled = each.value.write_enabled
description = each.value.description
ttl = each.value.ttl
max_ttl = each.value.max_ttl
depends_on = [module.netbox_secret_backend, module.netbox_user_management]
}
module "ghp_secret_backend" {
source = "./modules/ghp_secret_backend"
for_each = var.ghp_secret_backend
path = each.key
plugin = each.value.plugin
description = each.value.description
base_url = each.value.base_url
country = var.country
region = var.region
ca_cert = each.value.ca_cert
tls_skip_verify = each.value.tls_skip_verify
request_timeout_seconds = each.value.request_timeout_seconds
depends_on = [module.plugin]
}
module "ghp_secret_backend_role" {
source = "./modules/ghp_secret_backend_role"
for_each = var.ghp_secret_backend_role
backend = each.value.backend
name = each.value.name
token_type = each.value.token_type
installation_id = each.value.installation_id
app_record_id = each.value.app_record_id
repositories = each.value.repositories
scopes = each.value.scopes
session_prefix = each.value.session_prefix
ttl = each.value.ttl
max_ttl = each.value.max_ttl
depends_on = [module.ghp_secret_backend]
}
module "vault_policy" {
source = "./modules/vault_policy"
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
# Mounts the arrstack dynamic secrets engine and writes its config via the
# arrstackvaultsecret provider. The plugin is registered in the catalog
# separately (config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-arrstack.yaml). The arrproxy
# admin token is sensitive and read from KV, not stored in git:
# kv/kubernetes/namespace/arrstack/default/arrproxy-admin-token -> key "token"
# (seeded by argocd-apps #384).
data "vault_kv_secret_v2" "admin_token" {
mount = "kv"
name = var.admin_token_kv_name
}
resource "arrstack_secret_backend" "this" {
path = var.path
plugin = var.plugin
description = var.description
base_url = var.base_url
admin_token = data.vault_kv_secret_v2.admin_token.data[var.admin_token_kv_key]
ca_cert = var.ca_cert
request_timeout_seconds = var.request_timeout_seconds
}
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.10"
required_providers {
vault = {
source = "hashicorp/vault"
version = "5.6.0"
}
arrstack = {
source = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/arrstackvaultsecret"
version = "0.1.0"
}
}
}
@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
variable "path" {
description = "Mount path of the arrstack secrets engine (e.g. \"arrstack\")"
type = string
}
variable "plugin" {
description = "Registered plugin name/type to mount (the catalog name = mount type)"
type = string
default = "vault-plugin-secrets-arrstack"
}
variable "description" {
description = "Human-friendly description of the mount"
type = string
default = null
}
variable "base_url" {
description = "Base URL of the arrproxy front door (e.g. https://arrstack.unkin.net)"
type = string
}
variable "admin_token_kv_name" {
description = "kv-v2 secret name (relative to the \"kv\" mount) holding the seeded arrproxy admin token"
type = string
default = "kubernetes/namespace/arrstack/default/arrproxy-admin-token"
}
variable "admin_token_kv_key" {
description = "Key within the KV secret that holds the arrproxy admin token"
type = string
default = "token"
}
variable "ca_cert" {
description = "PEM CA certificate that signed the arrproxy server's TLS cert (optional; omit to use the system trust store)"
type = string
default = null
}
variable "request_timeout_seconds" {
description = "HTTP timeout in seconds for calls from the plugin to arrproxy"
type = number
default = 30
}
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
resource "arrstack_secret_backend_role" "this" {
backend = var.backend
name = var.name
apps = var.apps
ttl = var.ttl
max_ttl = var.max_ttl
}
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.10"
required_providers {
arrstack = {
source = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/arrstackvaultsecret"
version = "0.1.0"
}
}
}
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
variable "name" {
description = "Name of the role"
type = string
}
variable "backend" {
description = "Mount path of the arrstack secrets engine this role belongs to"
type = string
}
variable "apps" {
description = "arr apps a generated key may access (subset of sonarr, radarr, prowlarr)"
type = list(string)
}
variable "ttl" {
description = "Default lease TTL in seconds for keys generated from this role"
type = number
default = null
}
variable "max_ttl" {
description = "Maximum lease TTL in seconds for keys generated from this role"
type = number
default = null
}
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
# Mounts the ghp secrets engine and writes its connection config via the
# vault-secrets-ghp provider. The plugin is registered ("imported") in the
# catalog separately (config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-ghp.yaml). The seeded
# ghp service token is sensitive and read from KV, not stored in git:
# kv/service/vault/<country>/<region>/secret_backend/<path>/config
# Expected key: admin_token (a ghpsvc_... service token that ghp accepts via its
# GHP_AUTH_SERVICE_TOKENS list). ghp has no rotate endpoint, so this static
# shared secret is the single credential the engine authenticates with.
data "vault_kv_secret_v2" "config" {
mount = "kv"
name = "service/vault/${var.country}/${var.region}/secret_backend/${var.path}/config"
}
resource "ghp_secret_backend" "this" {
path = var.path
plugin = var.plugin
description = var.description
base_url = var.base_url
admin_token = data.vault_kv_secret_v2.config.data["admin_token"]
ca_cert = var.ca_cert
tls_skip_verify = var.tls_skip_verify
request_timeout_seconds = var.request_timeout_seconds
lifecycle {
# The KV seed is a bootstrap credential consumed only when the engine config
# is first created. ghp has no rotate endpoint, so re-reading a (possibly
# stale) KV value must never re-push it into the live mount. Ignoring the
# token makes this module create-only for it (mirrors gitea/netbox config).
ignore_changes = [admin_token]
}
}
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.10"
required_providers {
vault = {
source = "hashicorp/vault"
version = "5.6.0"
}
ghp = {
source = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/vault-secrets-ghp"
version = "0.1.0"
}
}
}
@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
variable "path" {
description = "Mount path of the ghp secrets engine (e.g. \"ghp\")"
type = string
}
variable "plugin" {
description = "Registered plugin name to mount (the catalog name = mount type)"
type = string
default = "vault-plugin-secrets-ghp"
}
variable "description" {
description = "Human-friendly description of the mount"
type = string
default = null
}
variable "base_url" {
description = "Base URL of the ghp server (e.g. https://ghp.unkin.net)"
type = string
}
variable "country" {
description = "Country segment of the KV path holding the seeded admin token"
type = string
}
variable "region" {
description = "Region segment of the KV path holding the seeded admin token"
type = string
}
variable "ca_cert" {
description = "PEM CA certificate that signed the ghp server's TLS cert (optional; omit to use the system trust store)"
type = string
default = null
}
variable "tls_skip_verify" {
description = "Skip TLS verification of the ghp server (not recommended)"
type = bool
default = false
}
variable "request_timeout_seconds" {
description = "HTTP timeout in seconds for calls from the plugin to ghp"
type = number
default = 30
}
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
# A role that mints short-lived, scoped ghp tokens. Reading ghp/creds/<name>
# produces a lease-bound token that is revoked from ghp when the lease is
# revoked or reaches max_ttl.
resource "ghp_secret_role" "this" {
backend = var.backend
name = var.name
token_type = var.token_type
installation_id = var.installation_id
app_record_id = var.app_record_id
repositories = var.repositories
scopes = var.scopes
session_prefix = var.session_prefix
ttl = var.ttl
max_ttl = var.max_ttl
}
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.10"
required_providers {
ghp = {
source = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/vault-secrets-ghp"
version = "0.1.0"
}
}
}
@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
variable "backend" {
description = "Mount path of the ghp secrets engine this role belongs to"
type = string
}
variable "name" {
description = "Role name (read ghp/creds/<name> to mint a token)"
type = string
}
variable "token_type" {
description = "ghp token type to mint: \"agent\" (default) or \"proxy\""
type = string
default = null
}
variable "installation_id" {
description = "ghp App installation id the minted agent token is bound to (required when token_type is \"agent\")"
type = number
default = null
}
variable "app_record_id" {
description = "Optional ghp App record id (UUID) to pin agent tokens to; empty selects ghp's default app"
type = string
default = null
}
variable "repositories" {
description = "Optional repositories the minted token is restricted to; empty is open-scoped (all repositories)"
type = list(string)
default = null
}
variable "scopes" {
description = "Optional ghp permission:level scopes (e.g. [\"contents:read\"]); empty is open-scoped"
type = list(string)
default = null
}
variable "session_prefix" {
description = "Prefix for the ghp session id of each minted token (default \"vault\")"
type = string
default = null
}
variable "ttl" {
description = "Default lease TTL in seconds for minted tokens"
type = number
default = null
}
variable "max_ttl" {
description = "Maximum lease TTL in seconds for minted tokens"
type = number
default = null
}
@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
# Mounts the netbox secrets engine and writes its connection config via the
# vault-secrets-netbox provider. The plugin is registered ("imported") in the
# catalog separately (config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-netbox.yaml). The
# seeded NetBox admin token is sensitive and read from KV, not stored in git:
# kv/service/vault/<country>/<region>/secret_backend/<path>/config
# Expected key: admin_token (a NetBox token with add_token + grant_token, i.e.
# able to provision and delegate per-user API tokens).
data "vault_kv_secret_v2" "config" {
mount = "kv"
name = "service/vault/${var.country}/${var.region}/secret_backend/${var.path}/config"
lifecycle {
# The plugin builds its own Authorization header from the token VALUE, not
# token_version: a value starting with the nbt_ prefix is sent as
# "Bearer <token>" (v2), otherwise "Token <token>" (v1). So admin_token must
# be the BARE token - a literal `Bearer `/`Token ` scheme prefix yields a
# malformed three-part header and 403s on the plugin's own NetBox calls.
#
# token_version does NOT change that header; it only selects the version of
# the per-user tokens the engine mints for roles. It must still MATCH the
# admin token's kind so the mount and its minted creds line up: an nbt_ v2
# admin token pairs with token_version=2, a bare v1 token with token_version=1.
postcondition {
condition = nonsensitive(
!startswith(self.data["admin_token"], "Bearer ") &&
!startswith(self.data["admin_token"], "Token ") &&
startswith(self.data["admin_token"], "nbt_") == (var.token_version == 2)
)
error_message = "KV admin_token for netbox backend '${var.path}' must be a BARE NetBox token with no 'Bearer '/'Token ' scheme prefix, AND its version must match token_version: a v2 token (nbt_<key>.<secret>) requires token_version=2; a v1 token (bare 40-char value) requires token_version=1."
}
}
}
resource "netbox_secret_backend" "this" {
path = var.path
plugin = var.plugin
description = var.description
netbox_url = var.netbox_url
token = data.vault_kv_secret_v2.config.data["admin_token"]
token_version = var.token_version
ca_cert = var.ca_cert
tls_skip_verify = var.tls_skip_verify
request_timeout_seconds = var.request_timeout_seconds
lifecycle {
# The KV seed is a bootstrap credential: it is consumed only when the engine
# config is first created. After creation the live admin token is rotated in
# place (vault write -f netbox/config/rotate) and diverges from the seed, so
# re-reading the (possibly stale) KV value must never push it back. Ignoring
# the token makes this module create-only for it (mirrors gitea/config).
ignore_changes = [token]
}
}
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.10"
required_providers {
vault = {
source = "hashicorp/vault"
version = "5.6.0"
}
netbox = {
source = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/vault-secrets-netbox"
version = "0.1.0"
}
}
}
@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
variable "path" {
description = "Mount path of the netbox secrets engine (e.g. \"netbox\")"
type = string
}
variable "plugin" {
description = "Registered plugin name to mount (the catalog name = mount type)"
type = string
default = "vault-plugin-secrets-netbox"
}
variable "description" {
description = "Human-friendly description of the mount"
type = string
default = null
}
variable "netbox_url" {
description = "Base URL of the NetBox server (e.g. https://netbox.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net)"
type = string
}
variable "token_version" {
description = "NetBox API token format: 2 (default, requires API_TOKEN_PEPPERS on the NetBox server) or 1 (legacy plaintext-key)."
type = number
default = 2
}
variable "country" {
description = "Country segment of the KV path holding the seeded admin token"
type = string
}
variable "region" {
description = "Region segment of the KV path holding the seeded admin token"
type = string
}
variable "ca_cert" {
description = "PEM CA certificate that signed the NetBox server's TLS cert (optional; omit to use the system trust store)"
type = string
default = null
}
variable "tls_skip_verify" {
description = "Skip TLS verification of the NetBox server (not recommended)"
type = bool
default = false
}
variable "request_timeout_seconds" {
description = "HTTP timeout in seconds for calls from the plugin to NetBox"
type = number
default = 30
}
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
# A role that mints short-lived, scoped NetBox tokens for a pre-existing NetBox
# service user. Reading netbox/creds/<name> produces a lease-bound token that is
# deleted from NetBox when the lease is revoked or reaches max_ttl.
resource "netbox_secret_backend_role" "this" {
backend = var.backend
name = var.name
netbox_username = var.netbox_username
netbox_user_id = var.netbox_user_id
write_enabled = var.write_enabled
description = var.description
ttl = var.ttl
max_ttl = var.max_ttl
}
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.10"
required_providers {
netbox = {
source = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/vault-secrets-netbox"
version = "0.1.0"
}
}
}
@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
variable "backend" {
description = "Mount path of the netbox secrets engine this role belongs to"
type = string
}
variable "name" {
description = "Role name (read netbox/creds/<name> to mint a token)"
type = string
}
variable "netbox_username" {
description = "NetBox service username the minted tokens belong to (set this or netbox_user_id)"
type = string
default = null
}
variable "netbox_user_id" {
description = "NetBox service user id the minted tokens belong to (set this or netbox_username)"
type = number
default = null
}
variable "write_enabled" {
description = "Whether minted tokens carry NetBox write access (default read-only)"
type = bool
default = false
}
variable "description" {
description = "Human-friendly description of the role"
type = string
default = null
}
variable "ttl" {
description = "Default lease TTL in seconds for minted tokens (the token's NetBox expiry is aligned to the lease)"
type = number
default = null
}
variable "max_ttl" {
description = "Maximum lease TTL in seconds for minted tokens"
type = number
default = null
}
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
rule "terraform_required_providers" {
enabled = false
}
rule "terraform_required_version" {
enabled = false
}
@@ -1,149 +0,0 @@
# netbox_user_management reconciles NetBox service users + permissions on every
# apply, so it needs an admin credential each run. That credential is minted
# DYNAMICALLY by the netbox engine from the SINGLE static admin token, so no
# second static credential exists and it survives rotation of the engine seed:
#
# 1. module.netbox_user_mgmt_role creates netbox/roles/vault-user-mgmt, a
# write-enabled role for a pre-existing NetBox superuser (user_mgmt_username).
# 2. Reading netbox/creds/vault-user-mgmt mints a short-lived, user-admin-capable
# token for that superuser; the e-breuninger provider uses it to CRUD users.
#
# The hashicorp/vault provider ships ephemeral resources for KV only, not for
# dynamic engine creds, so the mint is read via the vault_generic_secret DATA
# source: the short-lived token transits Terraform state (sensitive, lease-revoked)
# and is re-minted each plan. This is the closest single-static-token shape the
# current providers allow; move to an ephemeral resource once the vault provider
# ships a dynamic-secret one. Ordering note: the vault-user-mgmt role must already
# exist when this reads creds, so on a brand-new backend bootstrap the mount +
# role first (targeted apply) - a fresh single apply cannot configure the netbox
# provider from a role created in the same run.
locals {
# Backends that mint a dynamic user-admin token (a pre-existing superuser named).
netbox_dynamic_backends = { for k, v in var.netbox_backends : k => v if v.user_mgmt_username != null }
# Backends still using the single static admin_token directly (until a superuser
# is named). Bootstrap/degraded path - the same one token, not a second static.
netbox_static_backends = { for k, v in var.netbox_backends : k => v if v.user_mgmt_username == null }
}
# Dynamic path: the engine mints a user-admin token for the superuser. Requires
# the deployer to read netbox/creds/vault-user-mgmt (policies/netbox/creds).
data "vault_generic_secret" "user_admin" {
for_each = local.netbox_dynamic_backends
path = "${each.key}/creds/vault-user-mgmt"
}
# Static fallback: the single admin_token from KV, used only until a superuser is
# named. NetBox derives the token version from the value's `nbt_` prefix, not the
# keyword, so the same BARE token works under either scheme; reject a value that
# carries a literal `Bearer `/`Token ` scheme prefix (a malformed header -> 403).
data "vault_kv_secret_v2" "netbox_backend_configs" {
for_each = local.netbox_static_backends
mount = "kv"
name = "service/vault/${var.country}/${var.region}/secret_backend/${each.key}/config"
lifecycle {
postcondition {
condition = nonsensitive(
!startswith(self.data["admin_token"], "Bearer ") &&
!startswith(self.data["admin_token"], "Token ")
)
error_message = "KV admin_token for netbox backend '${each.key}' must be a BARE NetBox token with no 'Bearer '/'Token ' scheme prefix (v2: nbt_<key>.<secret>; v1: the 40-char value)."
}
}
}
# Warn (non-fatal) for any backend still on the static token: rotating the engine
# admin seed would then break user management. Set user_mgmt_username to switch to
# the dynamic, rotation-proof mint.
check "netbox_user_mgmt_dynamic" {
assert {
condition = length(local.netbox_static_backends) == 0
error_message = "A netbox backend has no user_mgmt_username, so user management uses the static admin_token directly and will break if that token is rotated (netbox/config/rotate). Set user_mgmt_username to a pre-existing NetBox superuser to mint the credential dynamically."
}
}
locals {
# Per backend: the dynamically-minted user-admin token, else the static seed.
netbox_admin_tokens = {
for k, v in var.netbox_backends : k => (
v.user_mgmt_username != null
? data.vault_generic_secret.user_admin[k].data["token"]
: data.vault_kv_secret_v2.netbox_backend_configs[k].data["admin_token"]
)
}
}
# One NetBox provider instance per backend, authenticated with its (dynamic or
# static) admin token.
provider "netbox" {
alias = "by_backend"
for_each = var.netbox_backend_aliases
server_url = var.netbox_backends[each.key].netbox_url
api_token = local.netbox_admin_tokens[each.key]
allow_insecure_https = var.netbox_backends[each.key].tls_skip_verify
# NetBox is internal and not always reachable at plan time; the resource CRUD
# calls surface any real incompatibility, so skip the startup version probe.
skip_version_check = true
}
# NetBox users authenticate only via Vault-minted API tokens, never the web UI,
# so give each a random unknown password (required by the API) that no one holds.
resource "random_password" "user" {
for_each = var.netbox_roles
length = 32
special = true
}
# Declarative NetBox service users, one per engine role. The role's filename-
# derived name is the username, so the engine role and its user match 1:1.
resource "netbox_user" "users" {
for_each = var.netbox_roles
provider = netbox.by_backend[each.value.backend]
username = each.value.name
password = random_password.user[each.key].result
active = each.value.active
staff = each.value.staff
email = each.value.email
}
locals {
# Flatten roles x permissions into one map keyed by "<role_path>:<index>". A
# permission's name defaults to the role name (the username) so a single-
# permission identity repeats nothing already encoded by the filename.
netbox_permissions = merge([
for role_key, role in var.netbox_roles : {
for idx, perm in role.permissions :
"${role_key}:${idx}" => {
backend = role.backend
user = role_key
name = coalesce(perm.name, length(role.permissions) == 1 ? role.name : "${role.name}-${idx}")
object_types = perm.object_types
actions = perm.actions
constraints = perm.constraints
description = perm.description
enabled = perm.enabled
}
}
]...)
}
# Object permissions granting each user its object-type/action scope.
resource "netbox_permission" "perms" {
for_each = local.netbox_permissions
provider = netbox.by_backend[each.value.backend]
name = each.value.name
object_types = each.value.object_types
actions = each.value.actions
enabled = each.value.enabled
description = each.value.description
constraints = each.value.constraints
users = [tonumber(netbox_user.users[each.value.user].id)]
}
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
output "netbox_users" {
description = "Map of created NetBox users (id + username; password is intentionally omitted)"
value = {
for k, u in netbox_user.users : k => {
id = u.id
username = u.username
}
}
}
output "netbox_permissions" {
description = "Map of created NetBox object permissions"
value = {
for k, p in netbox_permission.perms : k => {
id = p.id
name = p.name
}
}
}
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.10"
required_providers {
vault = {
source = "hashicorp/vault"
version = "5.6.0"
}
netbox = {
source = "e-breuninger/netbox"
version = "4.3.0"
}
random = {
source = "hashicorp/random"
version = ">= 3.5"
}
}
}
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
variable "netbox_backends" {
description = "Map of netbox secret backends (keyed by mount path); only the URL and TLS mode are needed to reach NetBox"
type = map(object({
netbox_url = string
tls_skip_verify = optional(bool, false)
# Pre-existing NetBox superuser the engine mints a dynamic user-admin token
# for; unset means fall back to the static admin_token from KV.
user_mgmt_username = optional(string)
}))
}
variable "netbox_roles" {
description = "Map of netbox engine roles (the netbox_secret_backend_role config). Each role's filename-derived name is the NetBox username to create, and its permissions block is the user's object-permission set. Keyed by the role's config path."
type = map(object({
name = string
backend = string
active = optional(bool, true)
staff = optional(bool, false)
email = optional(string)
permissions = optional(list(object({
name = optional(string)
object_types = list(string)
actions = optional(list(string), ["view", "add", "change", "delete"])
constraints = optional(string)
description = optional(string)
enabled = optional(bool, true)
})), [])
}))
default = {}
}
variable "netbox_backend_aliases" {
description = "Map of netbox backend names to sanitized provider aliases"
type = map(string)
default = {}
}
variable "country" {
description = "Country identifier"
type = string
}
variable "region" {
description = "Region identifier"
type = string
}
-106
View File
@@ -316,30 +316,6 @@ variable "litellm_secret_backend_role" {
default = {}
}
variable "arrstack_secret_backend" {
description = "Map of arrstack secret engines to create (mount + config). The arrproxy admin token is read from KV"
type = map(object({
plugin = optional(string, "vault-plugin-secrets-arrstack")
description = optional(string)
base_url = string
ca_cert = optional(string)
request_timeout_seconds = optional(number, 30)
}))
default = {}
}
variable "arrstack_secret_backend_role" {
description = "Map of arrstack roles to create"
type = map(object({
name = string
backend = string
apps = list(string)
ttl = optional(number)
max_ttl = optional(number)
}))
default = {}
}
variable "plugins" {
description = "Map of plugins to import (register) in the catalog, keyed by catalog name"
type = map(object({
@@ -440,88 +416,6 @@ variable "gitea_secret_backend_role" {
default = {}
}
variable "netbox_secret_backend" {
description = "Map of netbox token secret engines to create (mount + config; seeded admin token read from KV)"
type = map(object({
plugin = optional(string, "vault-plugin-secrets-netbox")
description = optional(string)
netbox_url = string
token_version = optional(number, 2)
ca_cert = optional(string)
tls_skip_verify = optional(bool, false)
request_timeout_seconds = optional(number, 30)
# Pre-existing NetBox superuser (or add_user + add_token + grant_token) the
# engine mints an ephemeral user-admin token for, so netbox_user_management
# authenticates with a Vault-minted credential derived from the single static
# admin token instead of a second static one. Unset = use the static
# admin_token directly (bootstrap/degraded; breaks after admin-token rotation).
user_mgmt_username = optional(string)
}))
default = {}
}
variable "netbox_secret_backend_role" {
description = "Map of netbox engine roles; each role's filename-derived name is both the engine role and the NetBox username it mints tokens for, and its permissions block is the user's object-permission set"
type = map(object({
name = string
backend = string
netbox_username = optional(string)
netbox_user_id = optional(number)
write_enabled = optional(bool, false)
description = optional(string)
ttl = optional(number)
max_ttl = optional(number)
active = optional(bool, true)
staff = optional(bool, false)
email = optional(string)
permissions = optional(list(object({
name = optional(string)
object_types = list(string)
actions = optional(list(string), ["view", "add", "change", "delete"])
constraints = optional(string)
description = optional(string)
enabled = optional(bool, true)
})), [])
}))
default = {}
}
variable "netbox_backend_aliases" {
description = "Map of netbox backend names to sanitized provider aliases"
type = map(string)
default = {}
}
variable "ghp_secret_backend" {
description = "Map of ghp token secret engines to create (mount + config; seeded service token read from KV)"
type = map(object({
plugin = optional(string, "vault-plugin-secrets-ghp")
description = optional(string)
base_url = string
ca_cert = optional(string)
tls_skip_verify = optional(bool, false)
request_timeout_seconds = optional(number, 30)
}))
default = {}
}
variable "ghp_secret_backend_role" {
description = "Map of ghp engine roles; reading ghp/creds/<name> mints a short-lived scoped ghp token"
type = map(object({
name = string
backend = string
token_type = optional(string)
installation_id = optional(number)
app_record_id = optional(string)
repositories = optional(list(string))
scopes = optional(list(string))
session_prefix = optional(string)
ttl = optional(number)
max_ttl = optional(number)
}))
default = {}
}
variable "policy_auth_map" {
description = "Map of auth mounts -> auth roles -> policy names"
type = map(map(list(string)))
-27
View File
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
# Allow management of the arrstack secrets engine (config and roles) by the
# terraform-vault deployer.
---
rules:
- path: "arrstack/config"
capabilities:
- create
- update
- read
- delete
- path: "arrstack/roles/*"
capabilities:
- create
- update
- delete
- read
- list
- path: "arrstack/roles"
capabilities:
- read
- list
auth:
approle:
- tf_vault
k8s/au/syd1:
- woodpecker_terraform_vault
-12
View File
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
# Allow the terraform-prowlarr run to mint a Prowlarr-scoped arrproxy key.
---
rules:
- path: "arrstack/creds/prowlarr"
capabilities:
- read
auth:
approle:
- terraform_prowlarr
k8s/au/syd1:
- woodpecker_terraform_prowlarr
-12
View File
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
# Allow the terraform-radarr run to mint a Radarr-scoped arrproxy key.
---
rules:
- path: "arrstack/creds/radarr"
capabilities:
- read
auth:
approle:
- terraform_radarr
k8s/au/syd1:
- woodpecker_terraform_radarr
-12
View File
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
# Allow the terraform-sonarr run to mint a Sonarr-scoped arrproxy key.
---
rules:
- path: "arrstack/creds/sonarr"
capabilities:
- read
auth:
approle:
- terraform_sonarr
k8s/au/syd1:
- woodpecker_terraform_sonarr
-37
View File
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
# Allow the vault deployer to manage the ghp token secrets engine: its
# connection config (seeded service token) and its token-minting roles.
#
# Scoped to ghp/* only, and deliberately excludes ghp/creds/* - minting tokens
# is for consumers, not the deployer. ghp has NO rotate endpoint, so unlike the
# gitea/netbox engines there is no config/rotate grant here. The plugin-catalog
# grant needed to import the plugin is the shared, sudo-protected wildcard in
# policies/sys/plugins/catalog/admin.yaml (already covers this plugin), and
# mounting the engine uses the deployer's existing sys/mounts/* access, so no
# new catalog/mount grant is added here (mirrors the gitea/netbox engines).
---
rules:
# Engine connection config (base_url, TLS, seeded service token).
- path: "ghp/config"
capabilities:
- create
- read
- update
- delete
# Token-minting roles.
- path: "ghp/roles/*"
capabilities:
- create
- read
- update
- delete
- list
- path: "ghp/roles"
capabilities:
- read
- list
auth:
approle:
- tf_vault
k8s/au/syd1:
- woodpecker_terraform_vault
-13
View File
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
# Lets the agents AppRole mint ephemeral ghp agent tokens, so AI coding agents
# authenticate to ghp as their own short-lived, least-privilege identity.
# Reading ghp/creds/agent returns a lease-bound token scoped by the role
# (token_type agent, contents:read). Mirrors the gitea/creds/unkin-agent binding.
---
rules:
- path: "ghp/creds/agent"
capabilities:
- read
auth:
approle:
- agents
-14
View File
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
# Lets the agents AppRole mint ephemeral Gitea tokens for the unkin-agent bot,
# so AI coding agents authenticate to git.unkin.net as their own least-privilege
# identity instead of Ben's account. Reading gitea/creds/unkin-agent returns a
# lease-bound token scoped by the role (write:repository, write:issue, read:user
# -- never merge/admin). Mirrors the agent-* Kubernetes creds binding pattern.
---
rules:
- path: "gitea/creds/unkin-agent"
capabilities:
- read
auth:
approle:
- agents
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
# Allow the terraform-vault deployer to read the seeded arrproxy admin token so
# the arrstack engine config module can source it. The token is seeded by
# argocd-apps #384 at kv/kubernetes/namespace/arrstack/default/arrproxy-admin-token.
# The deployer's existing secret_backends_read policy only covers
# kv/data/service/vault/+/+/secret_backend/*, which does not match this
# kubernetes/namespace path, so this adds the minimal read grant rather than
# duplicating the secret into the litellm-style path. vault_kv_secret_v2 also
# reads the kv-v2 metadata path on every plan/apply, so grant that too.
---
rules:
- path: "kv/data/kubernetes/namespace/arrstack/default/arrproxy-admin-token"
capabilities:
- read
- path: "kv/metadata/kubernetes/namespace/arrstack/default/arrproxy-admin-token"
capabilities:
- read
auth:
approle:
- tf_vault
k8s/au/syd1:
- woodpecker_terraform_vault
+2 -2
View File
@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ rules:
- path: "kv/data/service/terraform/infra"
capabilities:
- read
# vault_kv_secret_v2 (terraform-infra providers.tf data source) reads the kv-v2
# metadata path on every plan/apply; a 403 here fails the plan.
# vault_kv_secret_v2 (providers.tf data source) reads the kv-v2 metadata path
# on every plan/apply; a 403 here fails the plan.
- path: "kv/metadata/service/terraform/infra"
capabilities:
- read
-42
View File
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
# Allow the vault deployer to manage the netbox token secrets engine: its
# connection config (seeded admin token), in-place token rotation, and
# token-minting roles.
#
# Scoped to netbox/* only, and deliberately excludes netbox/creds/* - minting
# tokens is for consumers, not the deployer. The plugin-catalog grant needed to
# import the plugin is the shared, sudo-protected wildcard in
# policies/sys/plugins/catalog/admin.yaml (already covers this plugin), and
# mounting the engine uses the deployer's existing sys/mounts/* access, so no
# new catalog/mount grant is added here (mirrors the gitea/rancher engines).
---
rules:
# Engine connection config (NetBox URL, TLS, token_version, seeded admin token).
- path: "netbox/config"
capabilities:
- create
- read
- update
- delete
# In-place rotation of the seeded admin token (write-only trigger).
- path: "netbox/config/rotate"
capabilities:
- create
- update
# Token-minting roles.
- path: "netbox/roles/*"
capabilities:
- create
- read
- update
- delete
- list
- path: "netbox/roles"
capabilities:
- read
- list
auth:
approle:
- tf_vault
k8s/au/syd1:
- woodpecker_terraform_vault
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
# Allow the terraform-infra runner to mint an ephemeral NetBox token from the
# terraform-infra role (netbox/creds/terraform-infra), replacing the static
# netbox_token it used to read from kv/service/terraform/*. The e-breuninger
# netbox provider authenticates with the minted token; the lease revokes it when
# the run ends.
#
# Bound to both the terraform-infra AppRole and its Woodpecker k8s auth role,
# mirroring the terraform-ipam pattern. Both principals are created by the
# terraform-infra Vault onboarding (separate from this netbox change); until
# that onboarding lands this policy exists but attaches to nothing.
---
rules:
- path: "netbox/creds/terraform-infra"
capabilities:
- read
auth:
approle:
- terraform_infra
k8s/au/syd1:
- woodpecker_terraform_infra
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
# Allow the vault deployer to mint the ephemeral user-admin token that
# netbox_user_management authenticates with (netbox/creds/vault-user-mgmt). The
# engine mints it from the single static admin token, so the deployer never holds
# a second static NetBox credential.
#
# The netbox admin policy (policies/netbox/admin.yaml) deliberately excludes
# netbox/creds/* - minting is normally for consumers, not the deployer. This is
# the one deliberate exception: the deployer needs a user-admin token during the
# run to reconcile NetBox users. Scoped to the single vault-user-mgmt role only.
#
# Bound to the same principals as the admin policy: the tf_vault AppRole and its
# Woodpecker k8s auth role.
---
rules:
- path: "netbox/creds/vault-user-mgmt"
capabilities:
- read
auth:
approle:
- tf_vault
k8s/au/syd1:
- woodpecker_terraform_vault