Grant the vault deployer sudo to enable the oidc auth mount (#149)

## Why

The deployer identities cannot enable the `oidc` auth mount: `POST /v1/sys/auth/oidc` returns 403 because `sys/auth/<path>` (and its `/tune`) is sudo-protected, and `policies/sys/auth/admin.yaml` granted create/update/delete/read/list without `sudo`.

## How

- Add exact-path rules for `sys/auth/oidc` and `sys/auth/oidc/tune` to `policies/sys/auth/admin.yaml` with the wildcard's capability set plus `sudo` (exact match wins over the glob, so the set is repeated in full); auth block unchanged.

Merge order: apply this, then re-run the master apply so `module.auth_oidc_backend["oidc"]` can create the mount.

Reviewed-on: #149
Co-authored-by: unkin-agent <unkin-agent@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: unkin-agent <unkin-agent@unkin.net>

Makefile

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ init:
 
 plan: init
 	@$(call vault_env) && \
-	terragrunt run --all --parallelism 4 --non-interactive plan
+	terragrunt run --all --parallelism 4 --non-interactive plan -- -lock=false
 
 apply: init
 	@$(call vault_env) && \

config/arrstack_secret_backend_role/arrstack/all.yaml

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 ---
 # Mints an arrproxy API key scoped to all three arr apps.
 apps:
-  - sonarr
-  - radarr
   - prowlarr
-ttl: 3600      # seconds (1h)
+  - radarr
+  - sonarr
+ttl: 60        # seconds (1m); short-lived by design, renewed on demand
 max_ttl: 86400 # seconds (24h); the engine additionally caps renewal at the
                # arrproxy admin token's fixed mint expiry.

config/arrstack_secret_backend_role/arrstack/mediamark.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+---
+# Mints an arrproxy API key for the mediamark kids-content marking UI, scoped to
+# Sonarr and Radarr only (no Prowlarr: mediamark never touches indexers).
+#
+# mediamark only lists series/movies and reads metadata + artwork, so its key is
+# read-only in intent. The engine role cannot express that today: an
+# arrstack_secret_backend_role carries apps/ttl/max_ttl only, and arrproxy scopes
+# machine tokens by app, not by HTTP method (the GET/HEAD restriction on the
+# cheeztv/kids tier is a grant on an OIDC *group*, not on a minted token). Until
+# the engine and arrproxy grow per-token method scoping, mediamark's read-only
+# posture is enforced by the app itself and by the arrproxy tier it routes to.
+apps:
+  - radarr
+  - sonarr
+ttl: 60        # seconds (1m); short-lived by design, renewed on demand
+max_ttl: 86400 # seconds (24h); the engine additionally caps renewal at the
+               # arrproxy admin token's fixed mint expiry.

config/arrstack_secret_backend_role/arrstack/prowlarr.yaml

@@ -2,6 +2,6 @@
 # Mints an arrproxy API key scoped to Prowlarr only.
 apps:
   - prowlarr
-ttl: 3600      # seconds (1h)
+ttl: 60        # seconds (1m); short-lived by design, renewed on demand
 max_ttl: 86400 # seconds (24h); the engine additionally caps renewal at the
                # arrproxy admin token's fixed mint expiry.

config/arrstack_secret_backend_role/arrstack/radarr.yaml

@@ -2,6 +2,6 @@
 # Mints an arrproxy API key scoped to Radarr only.
 apps:
   - radarr
-ttl: 3600      # seconds (1h)
+ttl: 60        # seconds (1m); short-lived by design, renewed on demand
 max_ttl: 86400 # seconds (24h); the engine additionally caps renewal at the
                # arrproxy admin token's fixed mint expiry.

config/arrstack_secret_backend_role/arrstack/sonarr.yaml

@@ -2,6 +2,6 @@
 # Mints an arrproxy API key scoped to Sonarr only.
 apps:
   - sonarr
-ttl: 3600      # seconds (1h)
+ttl: 60        # seconds (1m); short-lived by design, renewed on demand
 max_ttl: 86400 # seconds (24h); the engine additionally caps renewal at the
                # arrproxy admin token's fixed mint expiry.

config/auth_kubernetes_role/k8s/au/syd1/mediamark.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+---
+# Kubernetes auth role for the mediamark app: the default service account in the
+# mediamark namespace, used by VaultDynamicSecret to read arrstack/creds/mediamark.
+bound_service_account_names:
+  - default
+bound_service_account_namespaces:
+  - mediamark
+token_ttl: 600
+token_max_ttl: 600
+audience: vault

config/auth_kubernetes_role/k8s/au/syd1/repospawner.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+bound_service_account_names:
+  - repospawner
+bound_service_account_namespaces:
+  - repospawner
+token_ttl: 600
+token_max_ttl: 600
+audience: vault

config/auth_oidc_backend/oidc.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# Authentik (OIDC) human SSO. The mount path is the filename and MUST stay
+# "oidc": the Authentik provider registers strict redirect URIs containing
+# /ui/vault/auth/oidc/oidc/callback, which encode the mount path.
+#
+# identity.unkin.net serves the public LetsEncrypt wildcard, so the OpenBao VMs
+# validate discovery against the system roots with no CA bundle work. Do not
+# swap it for identity.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net (internal CA).
+#
+# listing_visibility unauth makes OIDC the offered default on the UI login page.
+# client_id/client_secret are read from kv/service/authentik/oidc-vault.
+---
+oidc_discovery_url: "https://identity.unkin.net/application/o/vault/"
+default_role: "default"
+description: "Authentik SSO - default human login"
+listing_visibility: "unauth"
+default_lease_ttl: 24h
+max_lease_ttl: 168h

config/auth_oidc_group/oidc/akP-vault-admin.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+---
+# this file doesnt need anything in it, so this data is just to make sure yamlencode reads some yaml data
+# The filename is the Authentik group name asserted in the ak_groups claim.
+# Only akP-* permission groups may appear here; akR-* roles are grouping-only.
+description: foo

config/auth_oidc_role/oidc/default.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+# Default OIDC login role (the mount's default_role), used by both the web UI
+# and `bao login -method=oidc`.
+#
+# The role grants no policies of its own: authorization comes from the external
+# identity groups under config/auth_oidc_group, matched on the ak_groups claim.
+# ak_groups is Authentik's hierarchy-expanding claim (plain `groups` only carries
+# direct memberships), so nested akP-* permission groups resolve.
+#
+# allowed_redirect_uris must match the provider's strict URIs exactly.
+---
+user_claim: "email"
+groups_claim: "ak_groups"
+oidc_scopes:
+  - openid
+  - profile
+  - email
+  - ak_groups
+bound_audiences:
+  - vault
+allowed_redirect_uris:
+  - "http://localhost:8250/oidc/callback"
+  - "https://vault.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/ui/vault/auth/oidc/oidc/callback"
+  - "https://vault.service.consul:8200/ui/vault/auth/oidc/oidc/callback"
+token_ttl: 3600
+token_max_ttl: 28800

config/config.hcl

@@ -97,6 +97,27 @@ locals {
       })
       if startswith(file_path, "auth_ldap_group/")
     }
+    auth_oidc_backend = {
+      for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
+      trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml") => content
+      if startswith(file_path, "auth_oidc_backend/")
+    }
+    auth_oidc_role = {
+      for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
+      trimsuffix(replace(file_path, "auth_oidc_role/", ""), ".yaml") => merge(content, {
+        role_name = trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml")
+        backend   = dirname(replace(file_path, "auth_oidc_role/", ""))
+      })
+      if startswith(file_path, "auth_oidc_role/")
+    }
+    auth_oidc_group = {
+      for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
+      trimsuffix(replace(file_path, "auth_oidc_group/", ""), ".yaml") => merge(content, {
+        groupname = trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml")
+        backend   = split("/", replace(file_path, "auth_oidc_group/", ""))[0]
+      })
+      if startswith(file_path, "auth_oidc_group/")
+    }
     auth_kubernetes_backend = {
       for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
       trimsuffix(replace(file_path, "auth_kubernetes_backend/", ""), ".yaml") => content

config/ghp_secret_backend_role/ghp/agent.yaml

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-# Role minting ephemeral, scoped ghp agent tokens. Reading ghp/creds/agent mints
-# a lease-bound token deleted from ghp on revoke/expiry. token_type "agent" binds
-# the minted token to a ghp App installation, so installation_id is REQUIRED.
-#
-# installation_id below is a PLACEHOLDER (0) and MUST be set to the real ghp App
-# installation id before this role can mint usable tokens. scopes are ghp
-# permission:level pairs; contents:read is the least-privilege default.
----
-token_type: agent
-installation_id: 0 # PLACEHOLDER - set to the real ghp App installation id
-scopes:
-  - contents:read
-session_prefix: vault
-ttl: 3600      # 1h
-max_ttl: 86400 # 24h

config/gitea_secret_backend_role/gitea/repospawner.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# Role minting ephemeral tokens for the repospawner service user. repospawner
+# creates and seeds Gitea repositories on demand, so it gets write on
+# repositories (create + push) and write on issues (issue/PR comments). Read is
+# implied by write. No admin/org/user-write scopes.
+# read:user is required because most API clients validate the login via
+# GET /api/v1/user, which 403s without it.
+# Reading gitea/creds/repospawner mints a lease-bound token deleted from Gitea
+# on revoke/expiry. Consumed by the repospawner pods via Kubernetes auth (see
+# policies/gitea/creds/repospawner.yaml) -- the agents AppRole is CIDR-bound to
+# Ben's workstation and cannot be used from in-cluster.
+---
+username: repospawner
+scopes:
+  - write:repository
+  - write:issue
+  - read:user
+token_name_prefix: vault-repospawner
+ttl: 3600      # 1h
+max_ttl: 14400 # 4h

config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-arrstack.yaml

@@ -4,10 +4,10 @@
 # Puppet (openbao-plugin-secrets-arrstack RPM ->
 # /opt/openbao-plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-arrstack).
 #
-# sha256 pins the released v0.1.0 binary; bump it in lockstep with any RPM
+# sha256 pins the released v0.2.0 binary; bump it in lockstep with any RPM
 # upgrade or OpenBao will refuse to launch the plugin. Registration only
 # succeeds once the Puppet PR has installed the binary on the nodes.
 type: secret
 command: vault-plugin-secrets-arrstack
-version: "0.1.0"
-sha256: "f8ee60ca7ba14819976acb7dc4cfb6799e3e8da8f871d0bb2bd18d1d9e537972"
+version: "0.2.0"
+sha256: "9ea7f16013b3bcbadfcb15b08fd1545f8069893cf864bfdaa57e7e7e72612fa1"

environments/au/syd1/terragrunt.hcl

@@ -60,6 +60,9 @@ inputs = {
   auth_approle_role              = local.config.auth_approle_role
   auth_ldap_backend              = local.config.auth_ldap_backend
   auth_ldap_group                = local.config.auth_ldap_group
+  auth_oidc_backend              = local.config.auth_oidc_backend
+  auth_oidc_role                 = local.config.auth_oidc_role
+  auth_oidc_group                = local.config.auth_oidc_group
   auth_kubernetes_backend        = local.config.auth_kubernetes_backend
   auth_kubernetes_role           = local.config.auth_kubernetes_role
   kv_secret_backend              = local.config.kv_secret_backend

environments/root.hcl

@@ -66,8 +66,8 @@ terraform {
       version = "0.1.0"
     }
     arrstack = {
-      source  = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/arrstackvaultsecret"
-      version = "0.1.0"
+      source  = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/vault-secrets-arrstack"
+      version = "0.2.0"
     }
   }
 }

modules/vault_cluster/main.tf

@@ -64,6 +64,55 @@ module "auth_ldap_group" {
   depends_on = [module.auth_ldap_backend]
 }
 
+module "auth_oidc_backend" {
+  source = "./modules/auth_oidc_backend"
+
+  for_each = var.auth_oidc_backend
+
+  path                = each.key
+  description         = each.value.description
+  oidc_discovery_url  = each.value.oidc_discovery_url
+  client_secret_mount = each.value.client_secret_mount
+  client_secret_path  = each.value.client_secret_path
+  default_role        = each.value.default_role
+  listing_visibility  = each.value.listing_visibility
+  default_lease_ttl   = each.value.default_lease_ttl
+  max_lease_ttl       = each.value.max_lease_ttl
+}
+
+module "auth_oidc_role" {
+  source = "./modules/auth_oidc_role"
+
+  for_each = var.auth_oidc_role
+
+  backend               = each.value.backend
+  role_name             = each.value.role_name
+  user_claim            = each.value.user_claim
+  groups_claim          = each.value.groups_claim
+  oidc_scopes           = each.value.oidc_scopes
+  bound_audiences       = each.value.bound_audiences
+  allowed_redirect_uris = each.value.allowed_redirect_uris
+  token_ttl             = each.value.token_ttl
+  token_max_ttl         = each.value.token_max_ttl
+  # Human authorization comes from the external identity groups below, so a
+  # login role carrying no policies is the normal case.
+  token_policies = try(var.policy_auth_map[each.value.backend][each.value.role_name], [])
+
+  depends_on = [module.auth_oidc_backend]
+}
+
+module "auth_oidc_group" {
+  source = "./modules/auth_oidc_group"
+
+  for_each = var.auth_oidc_group
+
+  groupname      = each.value.groupname
+  policies       = var.policy_auth_map[each.value.backend][each.value.groupname]
+  mount_accessor = module.auth_oidc_backend[each.value.backend].accessor
+
+  depends_on = [module.auth_oidc_backend]
+}
+
 module "auth_kubernetes_backend" {
   source = "./modules/auth_kubernetes_backend"
 
@@ -370,6 +419,7 @@ module "arrstack_secret_backend_role" {
   name    = each.value.name
   backend = each.value.backend
   apps    = each.value.apps
+  methods = each.value.methods
   ttl     = each.value.ttl
   max_ttl = each.value.max_ttl
 

modules/vault_cluster/modules/arrstack_secret_backend/main.tf

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # Mounts the arrstack dynamic secrets engine and writes its config via the
-# arrstackvaultsecret provider. The plugin is registered in the catalog
+# vault-secrets-arrstack provider. The plugin is registered in the catalog
 # separately (config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-arrstack.yaml). The arrproxy
 # admin token is sensitive and read from KV, not stored in git:
 #   kv/kubernetes/namespace/arrstack/default/arrproxy-admin-token -> key "token"

modules/vault_cluster/modules/arrstack_secret_backend/terraform.tf

@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ terraform {
       version = "5.6.0"
     }
     arrstack = {
-      source  = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/arrstackvaultsecret"
-      version = "0.1.0"
+      source  = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/vault-secrets-arrstack"
+      version = "0.2.0"
     }
   }
 }

modules/vault_cluster/modules/arrstack_secret_backend_role/main.tf

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ resource "arrstack_secret_backend_role" "this" {
   backend = var.backend
   name    = var.name
   apps    = var.apps
+  methods = var.methods
   ttl     = var.ttl
   max_ttl = var.max_ttl
 }

modules/vault_cluster/modules/arrstack_secret_backend_role/terraform.tf

@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@ terraform {
   required_version = ">= 1.10"
   required_providers {
     arrstack = {
-      source  = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/arrstackvaultsecret"
-      version = "0.1.0"
+      source  = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/vault-secrets-arrstack"
+      version = "0.2.0"
     }
   }
 }

modules/vault_cluster/modules/arrstack_secret_backend_role/variables.tf

@@ -13,6 +13,13 @@ variable "apps" {
   type        = list(string)
 }
 
+variable "methods" {
+  description = "HTTP methods a generated key is limited to (subset of GET, HEAD, POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE, OPTIONS). Null leaves the role unrestricted"
+  type        = set(string)
+  # null, not [], so a role yaml that omits methods matches the provider's null read-back and shows no drift.
+  default = null
+}
+
 variable "ttl" {
   description = "Default lease TTL in seconds for keys generated from this role"
   type        = number

modules/vault_cluster/modules/auth_oidc_backend/main.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Expected keys in KV secret: client_id, client_secret (generated and written by
+# terraform-authentik's oauth2 provider module, never seeded by hand).
+data "vault_kv_secret_v2" "oidc_client" {
+  mount = var.client_secret_mount
+  name  = var.client_secret_path
+}
+
+resource "vault_jwt_auth_backend" "oidc" {
+  path               = var.path
+  type               = "oidc"
+  description        = var.description
+  oidc_discovery_url = var.oidc_discovery_url
+  oidc_client_id     = data.vault_kv_secret_v2.oidc_client.data["client_id"]
+  oidc_client_secret = data.vault_kv_secret_v2.oidc_client.data["client_secret"]
+  default_role       = var.default_role
+
+  tune {
+    default_lease_ttl  = var.default_lease_ttl
+    max_lease_ttl      = var.max_lease_ttl
+    listing_visibility = var.listing_visibility
+  }
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/auth_oidc_backend/outputs.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+output "accessor" {
+  description = "Accessor of the OIDC auth mount, used to bind identity group aliases"
+  value       = vault_jwt_auth_backend.oidc.accessor
+}
+
+output "path" {
+  description = "Mount path of the OIDC auth backend"
+  value       = vault_jwt_auth_backend.oidc.path
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/auth_oidc_backend/terraform.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+terraform {
+  required_version = ">= 1.10"
+  required_providers {
+    vault = {
+      source  = "hashicorp/vault"
+      version = "5.6.0"
+    }
+  }
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/auth_oidc_backend/variables.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+variable "path" {
+  description = "Mount path of the OIDC auth backend"
+  type        = string
+  default     = "oidc"
+}
+
+variable "description" {
+  description = "Human-readable description of the auth mount"
+  type        = string
+  default     = null
+}
+
+variable "oidc_discovery_url" {
+  description = "OIDC issuer discovery URL of the identity provider"
+  type        = string
+}
+
+variable "client_secret_mount" {
+  description = "KV-v2 mount holding the OIDC client credentials"
+  type        = string
+  default     = "kv"
+}
+
+variable "client_secret_path" {
+  description = "Path within the KV-v2 mount holding client_id and client_secret"
+  type        = string
+  default     = "service/authentik/oidc-vault"
+}
+
+variable "default_role" {
+  description = "Role used when none is supplied at login (the UI/CLI default)"
+  type        = string
+  default     = "default"
+}
+
+variable "listing_visibility" {
+  description = "Specifies whether to show this mount in the UI-specific listing endpoint. Valid values are 'unauth' or 'hidden'"
+  type        = string
+  default     = null
+  validation {
+    condition     = var.listing_visibility == null || contains(["unauth", "hidden"], var.listing_visibility)
+    error_message = "listing_visibility must be either 'unauth' or 'hidden'."
+  }
+}
+
+variable "default_lease_ttl" {
+  description = "Specifies the default time-to-live. If set, this overrides the global default. Must be a valid duration string"
+  type        = string
+  default     = null
+}
+
+variable "max_lease_ttl" {
+  description = "Specifies the maximum time-to-live. If set, this overrides the global default. Must be a valid duration string"
+  type        = string
+  default     = null
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/auth_oidc_group/main.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+# External identity group: membership is asserted by the IdP through the role's
+# groups_claim, matched by the alias name below.
+resource "vault_identity_group" "group" {
+  name     = var.groupname
+  type     = "external"
+  policies = var.policies
+}
+
+resource "vault_identity_group_alias" "alias" {
+  name           = var.groupname
+  mount_accessor = var.mount_accessor
+  canonical_id   = vault_identity_group.group.id
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/auth_oidc_group/terraform.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+terraform {
+  required_version = ">= 1.10"
+  required_providers {
+    vault = {
+      source  = "hashicorp/vault"
+      version = "5.6.0"
+    }
+  }
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/auth_oidc_group/variables.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+variable "groupname" {
+  description = "Name of the IdP group, as it appears in the groups claim"
+  type        = string
+}
+
+variable "policies" {
+  description = "List of policies to assign to the identity group"
+  type        = list(string)
+}
+
+variable "mount_accessor" {
+  description = "Accessor of the OIDC auth mount the alias is bound to"
+  type        = string
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/auth_oidc_role/main.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+resource "vault_jwt_auth_backend_role" "role" {
+  backend               = var.backend
+  role_name             = var.role_name
+  role_type             = "oidc"
+  user_claim            = var.user_claim
+  groups_claim          = var.groups_claim
+  oidc_scopes           = var.oidc_scopes
+  bound_audiences       = var.bound_audiences
+  allowed_redirect_uris = var.allowed_redirect_uris
+  token_ttl             = var.token_ttl
+  token_max_ttl         = var.token_max_ttl
+  token_policies        = var.token_policies
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/auth_oidc_role/terraform.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+terraform {
+  required_version = ">= 1.10"
+  required_providers {
+    vault = {
+      source  = "hashicorp/vault"
+      version = "5.6.0"
+    }
+  }
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/auth_oidc_role/variables.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+variable "backend" {
+  description = "The unique path of the OIDC auth backend to configure"
+  type        = string
+}
+
+variable "role_name" {
+  description = "The name of the role"
+  type        = string
+}
+
+variable "user_claim" {
+  description = "Claim used as the entity alias name (the Vault identity of the human)"
+  type        = string
+  default     = "email"
+}
+
+variable "groups_claim" {
+  description = "Claim holding the caller's group memberships, matched against identity group aliases"
+  type        = string
+  default     = "ak_groups"
+}
+
+variable "oidc_scopes" {
+  description = "Scopes requested from the identity provider during the authorization request"
+  type        = list(string)
+  default     = []
+}
+
+variable "bound_audiences" {
+  description = "List of audiences (aud claim) accepted in the ID token"
+  type        = list(string)
+  default     = []
+}
+
+variable "allowed_redirect_uris" {
+  description = "Redirect URIs accepted for this role. Must match the provider's registered URIs exactly"
+  type        = list(string)
+}
+
+variable "token_ttl" {
+  description = "The TTL period of tokens issued using this role, in seconds"
+  type        = number
+  default     = 3600
+}
+
+variable "token_max_ttl" {
+  description = "The maximum lifetime for generated tokens in number of seconds. Its current value will be referenced at renewal time."
+  type        = number
+  default     = 28800
+}
+
+variable "token_policies" {
+  description = "List of policies to assign to the role (passed from policy_auth_map). Human authorization normally comes from external identity groups instead"
+  type        = list(string)
+  default     = []
+}

modules/vault_cluster/variables.tf

@@ -62,6 +62,46 @@ variable "auth_ldap_group" {
   default = {}
 }
 
+variable "auth_oidc_backend" {
+  description = "Map of OIDC (JWT) auth backends to create"
+  type = map(object({
+    oidc_discovery_url  = string
+    description         = optional(string)
+    client_secret_mount = optional(string, "kv")
+    client_secret_path  = optional(string, "service/authentik/oidc-vault")
+    default_role        = optional(string, "default")
+    listing_visibility  = optional(string)
+    default_lease_ttl   = optional(string)
+    max_lease_ttl       = optional(string)
+  }))
+  default = {}
+}
+
+variable "auth_oidc_role" {
+  description = "Map of OIDC auth roles to create"
+  type = map(object({
+    role_name             = string
+    backend               = string
+    allowed_redirect_uris = list(string)
+    user_claim            = optional(string, "email")
+    groups_claim          = optional(string, "ak_groups")
+    oidc_scopes           = optional(list(string), [])
+    bound_audiences       = optional(list(string), [])
+    token_ttl             = optional(number, 3600)
+    token_max_ttl         = optional(number, 28800)
+  }))
+  default = {}
+}
+
+variable "auth_oidc_group" {
+  description = "Map of external identity groups bound to an OIDC auth mount"
+  type = map(object({
+    groupname = string
+    backend   = string
+  }))
+  default = {}
+}
+
 variable "auth_kubernetes_backend" {
   description = "Map of Kubernetes auth backends to create"
   type = map(object({
@@ -334,6 +374,7 @@ variable "arrstack_secret_backend_role" {
     name    = string
     backend = string
     apps    = list(string)
+    methods = optional(set(string))
     ttl     = optional(number)
     max_ttl = optional(number)
   }))

policies/arrstack/creds/mediamark.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+# Allow the mediamark app to mint its own Sonarr/Radarr-scoped arrproxy key.
+# Bound to the dedicated "mediamark" k8s role only, never the shared "default"
+# role, so no other namespace can read these creds.
+---
+rules:
+  - path: "arrstack/creds/mediamark"
+    capabilities:
+      - read
+
+auth:
+  k8s/au/syd1:
+    - mediamark

policies/auth/oidc/admin.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# Allow full administration of the OIDC auth backend (mount config and login
+# roles), mirroring policies/auth/ldap/admin.yaml. sys/auth/* already covers
+# enabling the mount itself; this covers writing auth/oidc/config and
+# auth/oidc/role/*.
+---
+rules:
+  - path: "auth/oidc/*"
+    capabilities:
+      - create
+      - update
+      - read
+      - delete
+      - list
+
+auth:
+  approle:
+    - tf_vault
+  k8s/au/syd1:
+    - woodpecker_terraform_vault

policies/gitea/creds/repospawner.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# Lets the repospawner pods mint ephemeral Gitea tokens for the repospawner
+# service user, so the service authenticates to git.unkin.net as its own
+# least-privilege identity. Reading gitea/creds/repospawner returns a
+# lease-bound token scoped by the role (write:repository, write:issue,
+# read:user -- never merge/admin).
+# Kubernetes auth only: repospawner runs in-cluster and the agents AppRole is
+# CIDR-bound to Ben's workstation.
+---
+rules:
+  - path: "gitea/creds/repospawner"
+    capabilities:
+      - read
+
+auth:
+  k8s/au/syd1:
+    - repospawner

policies/global-root.yaml

@@ -10,6 +10,12 @@ rules:
       - list
       - sudo
 
+# The oidc entry is an Authentik akP-* permission group, not an LDAP group name:
+# it names the external identity group under config/auth_oidc_group, so a human
+# who logs in via Authentik SSO lands on exactly the policy the LDAP vault_admin
+# group already carries. akR-* roles are grouping-only and never named here.
 auth:
   ldap:
     - vault_admin
+  oidc:
+    - akP-vault-admin

policies/identity/group/admin.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+# Allow the deployer to manage external identity groups and their aliases, which
+# is how OIDC group membership (the ak_groups claim) maps onto Vault policies.
+# Both the collection endpoints and the per-id endpoints are needed: create posts
+# to identity/group, subsequent reads and updates address identity/group/id/<id>.
+---
+rules:
+  - path: "identity/group"
+    capabilities:
+      - create
+      - update
+  - path: "identity/group/*"
+    capabilities:
+      - create
+      - update
+      - read
+      - delete
+      - list
+  - path: "identity/group-alias"
+    capabilities:
+      - create
+      - update
+  - path: "identity/group-alias/*"
+    capabilities:
+      - create
+      - update
+      - read
+      - delete
+      - list
+  - path: "identity/lookup/group"
+    capabilities:
+      - create
+      - update
+
+auth:
+  approle:
+    - tf_vault
+  k8s/au/syd1:
+    - woodpecker_terraform_vault

policies/kv/service/authentik/agent-api-token/read.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# Lets the agents AppRole read a dedicated, scoped Authentik API token seeded by
+# the operator. Automation seeds OAuth2 client secrets and LDAP outpost tokens as
+# part of normal IaC workflows; fetching an outpost token requires calling the
+# Authentik API, so a scoped token (not the CI admin credential) is read here.
+# Mirrors the gitea/creds/unkin-agent agents-approle read grant pattern.
+---
+rules:
+  - path: "kv/data/service/authentik/agent-api-token"
+    capabilities:
+      - read
+
+auth:
+  approle:
+    - agents

policies/kv/service/authentik/oidc-vault/read.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# Let the terraform-vault deployer read the OpenBao OIDC client credentials that
+# Authentik's provider module generates and writes here (terraform_authentik owns
+# kv/service/authentik/* — see policies/kv/service/authentik/write.yaml). The
+# deployer consumes client_id/client_secret to configure the auth/oidc backend.
+#
+# OIDC becomes the default human auth path; approle and k8s (CI and agents) plus
+# the break-glass root path are unchanged.
+#
+# AppRole capabilities are fixed at login, so this grant must be applied before
+# the PR that adds the auth/oidc modules.
+---
+rules:
+  - path: "kv/data/service/authentik/oidc-vault"
+    capabilities:
+      - read
+
+auth:
+  approle:
+    - tf_vault
+  k8s/au/syd1:
+    - woodpecker_terraform_vault

policies/kv/service/authentik/write.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+# Let the terraform-authentik runner manage the Authentik service KV subtree as
+# IaC (vault_kv_secret_v2), starting with kv/service/authentik/agent-api-token,
+# which is currently seeded by hand.
+#
+# Scoping: the ask was to grant only *-token paths, but Vault ACL paths support
+# a trailing glob only (no infix/suffix wildcards), so the grant is the whole
+# kv/service/authentik/ subtree. That is acceptable because terraform-authentik
+# is the owner of every secret under kv/service/authentik/.
+#
+# delete is included (unlike the agents kv/kubernetes grant) so `terraform
+# destroy` and resource replacement can remove a secret and its metadata
+# cleanly; vault_kv_secret_v2 also reads the kv-v2 metadata path on every
+# plan/apply, so metadata read/list is required for the plan to succeed.
+---
+rules:
+  - path: "kv/data/service/authentik/*"
+    capabilities:
+      - create
+      - read
+      - update
+      - delete
+  - path: "kv/metadata/service/authentik/*"
+    capabilities:
+      - read
+      - list
+      - delete
+
+auth:
+  approle:
+    - terraform_authentik
+  k8s/au/syd1:
+    - woodpecker_terraform_authentik

policies/kv/service/kubernetes/au/syd1/csi/ceph-mediafs-secret/read.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Allow reading Ceph mediafs CSI secrets
+---
+rules:
+  - path: "kv/data/service/kubernetes/au/syd1/csi/ceph-mediafs-secret"
+    capabilities:
+      - read
+
+auth:
+  k8s/au/syd1:
+    - ceph-csi

policies/kv/service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/ghp/config_write.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+# Allow the agents AppRole to seed the ghp secrets engine's admin credentials.
+# The ghp engine (managed by the tf_vault deployer) reads its ghpsvc_ service
+# token from admin_token at ghp/config creation time; that key is currently
+# unseeded, so the master apply aborts on the ghp data-source read. This grants
+# the agents AppRole scoped write here so an agent can seed the value. Deployer
+# read is already granted via policies/kv/service/vault/secret_backends_read.yaml,
+# so this only adds the write side for the agents identity.
+---
+rules:
+  # Seed value: admin_token (a ghpsvc_ service token). create/update to seed,
+  # read so the agent can verify what it wrote. No delete (least privilege).
+  - path: "kv/data/service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/ghp/config"
+    capabilities:
+      - create
+      - update
+      - read
+  # vault_kv_secret_v2 also reads the kv-v2 metadata path on every plan/apply.
+  - path: "kv/metadata/service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/ghp/config"
+    capabilities:
+      - read
+
+auth:
+  approle:
+    - agents

policies/rancher/creds/ci.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# Allow the terraform-rancher runner to mint an ephemeral Rancher API token
+# from the "ci" role, so its Makefile can swap
+#   vault kv get kv/service/terraform/rancher
+# for
+#   vault read -field=token rancher/creds/ci
+# and retire the static 90-day admin token. The minted token is lease-bound
+# (ttl 1h, max 8h) and deleted from Rancher on revoke; it inherits the seeded
+# admin service account's RBAC, so this is the same privilege as the static
+# token it replaces, just short-lived.
+---
+rules:
+  - path: "rancher/creds/ci"
+    capabilities:
+      - read
+
+auth:
+  approle:
+    - terraform_rancher
+  k8s/au/syd1:
+    - woodpecker_terraform_rancher

policies/sys/auth/admin.yaml

@@ -8,6 +8,24 @@ rules:
       - delete
       - read
       - list
+  # Enabling/tuning an auth mount is sudo-protected, and an exact path match
+  # wins over the wildcard above, so both rules repeat the full capability set.
+  - path: "sys/auth/oidc"
+    capabilities:
+      - create
+      - update
+      - delete
+      - read
+      - list
+      - sudo
+  - path: "sys/auth/oidc/tune"
+    capabilities:
+      - create
+      - update
+      - delete
+      - read
+      - list
+      - sudo
 
 auth:
   approle:

resources/secret_backend/kubernetes/au/syd1/roles/cluster-operator.yaml

@@ -22,6 +22,28 @@ rules:
       - "elasticsearch.k8s.elastic.co"
       - "kibana.k8s.elastic.co"
       - "gateway.networking.k8s.io"
+      - "apm.k8s.elastic.co"
+      - "beat.k8s.elastic.co"
+      - "agent.k8s.elastic.co"
+      - "maps.k8s.elastic.co"
+      - "enterprisesearch.k8s.elastic.co"
+      - "autoscaling.k8s.elastic.co"
+      - "stackconfigpolicy.k8s.elastic.co"
+      - "valkey.io"
+      - "ceph.unkin.net"
+      - "bind.unkin.net"
+      - "kea.unkin.net"
+      - "k8up.io"
+      - "grafana.integreatly.org"
+      - "operator.victoriametrics.com"
+      - "clickhouse.altinity.com"
+      - "clickhouse-keeper.altinity.com"
+      - "acme.cert-manager.io"
+      - "deviceplugin.intel.com"
+      - "fpga.intel.com"
+      - "autoscaling.k8s.io"
+      - "snapshot.storage.k8s.io"
+      - "groupsnapshot.storage.k8s.io"
     resources:
       - "*"
     verbs: