Grant the vault deployer sudo to enable the oidc auth mount (#149)

## Why

The deployer identities cannot enable the `oidc` auth mount: `POST /v1/sys/auth/oidc` returns 403 because `sys/auth/<path>` (and its `/tune`) is sudo-protected, and `policies/sys/auth/admin.yaml` granted create/update/delete/read/list without `sudo`.

## How

- Add exact-path rules for `sys/auth/oidc` and `sys/auth/oidc/tune` to `policies/sys/auth/admin.yaml` with the wildcard's capability set plus `sudo` (exact match wins over the glob, so the set is repeated in full); auth block unchanged.

Merge order: apply this, then re-run the master apply so `module.auth_oidc_backend["oidc"]` can create the mount.

Reviewed-on: #149
Co-authored-by: unkin-agent <unkin-agent@unkin.net>
Co-committed-by: unkin-agent <unkin-agent@unkin.net>

Makefile

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ init:
 
 plan: init
 	@$(call vault_env) && \
-	terragrunt run --all --parallelism 4 --non-interactive plan
+	terragrunt run --all --parallelism 4 --non-interactive plan -- -lock=false
 
 apply: init
 	@$(call vault_env) && \

config/arrstack_secret_backend/arrstack.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+# Mounts the arrstack dynamic secrets engine at "arrstack" and writes its config.
+# The arrproxy admin token is sensitive and read from KV, not stored here:
+#   kv/kubernetes/namespace/arrstack/default/arrproxy-admin-token -> key "token"
+# (seeded by argocd-apps #384). arrstack.unkin.net terminates on traefik-external
+# with an internal-CA cert the OpenBao nodes already trust, so ca_cert is omitted
+# (system trust store), mirroring the gitea engine against git.unkin.net.
+description: "arrstack dynamic arrproxy API keys"
+base_url: "https://arrstack.unkin.net"
+request_timeout_seconds: 30

config/arrstack_secret_backend_role/arrstack/all.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+---
+# Mints an arrproxy API key scoped to all three arr apps.
+apps:
+  - prowlarr
+  - radarr
+  - sonarr
+ttl: 60        # seconds (1m); short-lived by design, renewed on demand
+max_ttl: 86400 # seconds (24h); the engine additionally caps renewal at the
+               # arrproxy admin token's fixed mint expiry.

config/arrstack_secret_backend_role/arrstack/mediamark.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+---
+# Mints an arrproxy API key for the mediamark kids-content marking UI, scoped to
+# Sonarr and Radarr only (no Prowlarr: mediamark never touches indexers).
+#
+# mediamark only lists series/movies and reads metadata + artwork, so its key is
+# read-only in intent. The engine role cannot express that today: an
+# arrstack_secret_backend_role carries apps/ttl/max_ttl only, and arrproxy scopes
+# machine tokens by app, not by HTTP method (the GET/HEAD restriction on the
+# cheeztv/kids tier is a grant on an OIDC *group*, not on a minted token). Until
+# the engine and arrproxy grow per-token method scoping, mediamark's read-only
+# posture is enforced by the app itself and by the arrproxy tier it routes to.
+apps:
+  - radarr
+  - sonarr
+ttl: 60        # seconds (1m); short-lived by design, renewed on demand
+max_ttl: 86400 # seconds (24h); the engine additionally caps renewal at the
+               # arrproxy admin token's fixed mint expiry.

config/arrstack_secret_backend_role/arrstack/prowlarr.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+---
+# Mints an arrproxy API key scoped to Prowlarr only.
+apps:
+  - prowlarr
+ttl: 60        # seconds (1m); short-lived by design, renewed on demand
+max_ttl: 86400 # seconds (24h); the engine additionally caps renewal at the
+               # arrproxy admin token's fixed mint expiry.

config/arrstack_secret_backend_role/arrstack/radarr.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+---
+# Mints an arrproxy API key scoped to Radarr only.
+apps:
+  - radarr
+ttl: 60        # seconds (1m); short-lived by design, renewed on demand
+max_ttl: 86400 # seconds (24h); the engine additionally caps renewal at the
+               # arrproxy admin token's fixed mint expiry.

config/arrstack_secret_backend_role/arrstack/sonarr.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+---
+# Mints an arrproxy API key scoped to Sonarr only.
+apps:
+  - sonarr
+ttl: 60        # seconds (1m); short-lived by design, renewed on demand
+max_ttl: 86400 # seconds (24h); the engine additionally caps renewal at the
+               # arrproxy admin token's fixed mint expiry.

config/auth_kubernetes_role/k8s/au/syd1/mediamark.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+---
+# Kubernetes auth role for the mediamark app: the default service account in the
+# mediamark namespace, used by VaultDynamicSecret to read arrstack/creds/mediamark.
+bound_service_account_names:
+  - default
+bound_service_account_namespaces:
+  - mediamark
+token_ttl: 600
+token_max_ttl: 600
+audience: vault

config/auth_kubernetes_role/k8s/au/syd1/repospawner.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+bound_service_account_names:
+  - repospawner
+bound_service_account_namespaces:
+  - repospawner
+token_ttl: 600
+token_max_ttl: 600
+audience: vault

config/auth_kubernetes_role/k8s/au/syd1/woodpecker_terraform_infra.yaml

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 bound_service_account_names:
-  - terraform-ipam
+  - terraform-infra
 bound_service_account_namespaces:
   - woodpecker
 token_ttl: 600

config/auth_oidc_backend/oidc.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# Authentik (OIDC) human SSO. The mount path is the filename and MUST stay
+# "oidc": the Authentik provider registers strict redirect URIs containing
+# /ui/vault/auth/oidc/oidc/callback, which encode the mount path.
+#
+# identity.unkin.net serves the public LetsEncrypt wildcard, so the OpenBao VMs
+# validate discovery against the system roots with no CA bundle work. Do not
+# swap it for identity.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net (internal CA).
+#
+# listing_visibility unauth makes OIDC the offered default on the UI login page.
+# client_id/client_secret are read from kv/service/authentik/oidc-vault.
+---
+oidc_discovery_url: "https://identity.unkin.net/application/o/vault/"
+default_role: "default"
+description: "Authentik SSO - default human login"
+listing_visibility: "unauth"
+default_lease_ttl: 24h
+max_lease_ttl: 168h

config/auth_oidc_group/oidc/akP-vault-admin.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+---
+# this file doesnt need anything in it, so this data is just to make sure yamlencode reads some yaml data
+# The filename is the Authentik group name asserted in the ak_groups claim.
+# Only akP-* permission groups may appear here; akR-* roles are grouping-only.
+description: foo

config/auth_oidc_role/oidc/default.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+# Default OIDC login role (the mount's default_role), used by both the web UI
+# and `bao login -method=oidc`.
+#
+# The role grants no policies of its own: authorization comes from the external
+# identity groups under config/auth_oidc_group, matched on the ak_groups claim.
+# ak_groups is Authentik's hierarchy-expanding claim (plain `groups` only carries
+# direct memberships), so nested akP-* permission groups resolve.
+#
+# allowed_redirect_uris must match the provider's strict URIs exactly.
+---
+user_claim: "email"
+groups_claim: "ak_groups"
+oidc_scopes:
+  - openid
+  - profile
+  - email
+  - ak_groups
+bound_audiences:
+  - vault
+allowed_redirect_uris:
+  - "http://localhost:8250/oidc/callback"
+  - "https://vault.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/ui/vault/auth/oidc/oidc/callback"
+  - "https://vault.service.consul:8200/ui/vault/auth/oidc/oidc/callback"
+token_ttl: 3600
+token_max_ttl: 28800

config/config.hcl

@@ -97,6 +97,27 @@ locals {
       })
       if startswith(file_path, "auth_ldap_group/")
     }
+    auth_oidc_backend = {
+      for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
+      trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml") => content
+      if startswith(file_path, "auth_oidc_backend/")
+    }
+    auth_oidc_role = {
+      for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
+      trimsuffix(replace(file_path, "auth_oidc_role/", ""), ".yaml") => merge(content, {
+        role_name = trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml")
+        backend   = dirname(replace(file_path, "auth_oidc_role/", ""))
+      })
+      if startswith(file_path, "auth_oidc_role/")
+    }
+    auth_oidc_group = {
+      for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
+      trimsuffix(replace(file_path, "auth_oidc_group/", ""), ".yaml") => merge(content, {
+        groupname = trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml")
+        backend   = split("/", replace(file_path, "auth_oidc_group/", ""))[0]
+      })
+      if startswith(file_path, "auth_oidc_group/")
+    }
     auth_kubernetes_backend = {
       for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
       trimsuffix(replace(file_path, "auth_kubernetes_backend/", ""), ".yaml") => content
@@ -198,6 +219,19 @@ locals {
       })
       if startswith(file_path, "litellm_secret_backend_role/")
     }
+    arrstack_secret_backend = {
+      for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
+      trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml") => content
+      if startswith(file_path, "arrstack_secret_backend/")
+    }
+    arrstack_secret_backend_role = {
+      for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
+      trimsuffix(replace(file_path, "arrstack_secret_backend_role/", ""), ".yaml") => merge(content, {
+        name    = trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml")
+        backend = dirname(replace(file_path, "arrstack_secret_backend_role/", ""))
+      })
+      if startswith(file_path, "arrstack_secret_backend_role/")
+    }
     plugins = {
       for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
       trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml") => merge(content, {
@@ -252,5 +286,32 @@ locals {
       })
       if startswith(file_path, "gitea_secret_backend_role/")
     }
+    netbox_secret_backend = {
+      for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
+      trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml") => content
+      if startswith(file_path, "netbox_secret_backend/")
+    }
+    netbox_secret_backend_role = {
+      for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
+      trimsuffix(replace(file_path, "netbox_secret_backend_role/", ""), ".yaml") => merge(content, {
+        name            = trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml")
+        netbox_username = trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml")
+        backend         = dirname(replace(file_path, "netbox_secret_backend_role/", ""))
+      })
+      if startswith(file_path, "netbox_secret_backend_role/")
+    }
+    ghp_secret_backend = {
+      for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
+      trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml") => content
+      if startswith(file_path, "ghp_secret_backend/")
+    }
+    ghp_secret_backend_role = {
+      for file_path, content in local.all_configs :
+      trimsuffix(replace(file_path, "ghp_secret_backend_role/", ""), ".yaml") => merge(content, {
+        name    = trimsuffix(basename(file_path), ".yaml")
+        backend = dirname(replace(file_path, "ghp_secret_backend_role/", ""))
+      })
+      if startswith(file_path, "ghp_secret_backend_role/")
+    }
   }
 }

config/consul_secret_backend_role/consul_root/au/syd1/terraform-infra.yaml

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 consul_roles:
-  - terraform-ipam
+  - terraform-infra
 ttl: 120
 max_ttl: 300
 datacenters: []

config/ghp_secret_backend/ghp.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# Mounts the ghp token secrets engine at "ghp" and writes its config.
+# The seeded ghp service token is sensitive and read from KV, not stored here:
+#   kv/service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/ghp/config
+#   -> key: admin_token (required) the shared ghpsvc_... service token
+#
+# admin_token is a static shared secret provisioned into KV by an operator. The
+# SAME token value must also be present in the running ghp deployment's accepted
+# service tokens (GHP_AUTH_SERVICE_TOKENS) so ghp ACCEPTS what this engine
+# PRESENTS. ghp has no rotate endpoint, so the engine never rotates it in place;
+# the mount uses ignore_changes=[admin_token], making the KV seed create-only
+# (re-reading a stale KV value never re-pushes it to a live mount).
+description: "ghp ephemeral scoped agent token engine"
+base_url: "https://ghp.unkin.net"
+tls_skip_verify: false
+request_timeout_seconds: 30

config/gitea_secret_backend_role/gitea/repospawner.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# Role minting ephemeral tokens for the repospawner service user. repospawner
+# creates and seeds Gitea repositories on demand, so it gets write on
+# repositories (create + push) and write on issues (issue/PR comments). Read is
+# implied by write. No admin/org/user-write scopes.
+# read:user is required because most API clients validate the login via
+# GET /api/v1/user, which 403s without it.
+# Reading gitea/creds/repospawner mints a lease-bound token deleted from Gitea
+# on revoke/expiry. Consumed by the repospawner pods via Kubernetes auth (see
+# policies/gitea/creds/repospawner.yaml) -- the agents AppRole is CIDR-bound to
+# Ben's workstation and cannot be used from in-cluster.
+---
+username: repospawner
+scopes:
+  - write:repository
+  - write:issue
+  - read:user
+token_name_prefix: vault-repospawner
+ttl: 3600      # 1h
+max_ttl: 14400 # 4h

config/gitea_secret_backend_role/gitea/unkin-agent.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# Role minting ephemeral tokens for the unkin-agent bot user -- the shared
+# identity Ben's AI coding agents use to submit work. The agent clones/pushes
+# code and opens pull requests, so it gets write on repositories (clone + push +
+# PR create) and write on issues (PR/issue comments). Read is implied by write.
+# No admin/org/user-write scopes, so it can never merge via API privilege; merge
+# is blocked separately by branch protection (merge whitelist = Owners).
+# read:user is required because tea (and most API clients) validate the login
+# via GET /api/v1/user, which 403s without it.
+# Reading gitea/creds/unkin-agent mints a lease-bound token deleted from Gitea
+# on revoke/expiry. Consumed by the "agents" AppRole (see
+# policies/gitea/creds/unkin-agent.yaml).
+---
+username: unkin-agent
+scopes:
+  - write:repository
+  - write:issue
+  - read:user
+token_name_prefix: vault-unkin-agent
+ttl: 3600      # 1h
+max_ttl: 14400 # 4h

config/netbox_secret_backend/netbox.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+# Mounts the netbox token secrets engine at "netbox" and writes its config.
+# The seeded NetBox admin token is sensitive and read from KV, not stored here:
+#   kv/service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/netbox/config
+#   -> key: admin_token (required) the SINGLE static admin credential
+#
+# admin_token must be a BARE NetBox token with NO scheme prefix: do not prepend
+# "Bearer " or "Token ". NetBox infers the version from the value's nbt_ prefix,
+# so one bare token authenticates under either scheme; the plugin adds the keyword
+# itself. A prefixed value yields a malformed header + 403.
+#
+# Populate admin_token with a purpose-built NetBox superuser token (add_user +
+# add_token + grant_token, or superuser) BEFORE applying, then run
+# `vault write -f netbox/config/rotate` after the first apply so only Vault holds
+# the live admin token.
+#
+# Only ONE static admin token exists. netbox_user_management does NOT re-read this
+# token; instead the engine mints it a short-lived user-admin token per apply from
+# netbox/roles/vault-user-mgmt (see user_mgmt_username below), so rotating
+# admin_token never breaks user management. Set user_mgmt_username to the
+# pre-existing NetBox superuser the static admin_token belongs to (or another
+# superuser). Leaving it unset falls back to using admin_token directly, which is
+# only a bootstrap/degraded path and breaks after rotation.
+#
+# Bootstrap ordering: the vault-user-mgmt role must exist before the netbox
+# provider is configured from its creds, so on a brand-new backend apply the mount
+# + role first (e.g. `tofu apply -target=...netbox_secret_backend
+# -target=...netbox_user_mgmt_role`) once, then apply normally.
+#
+# token_version 2 is the NetBox 4.6.5 default and requires API_TOKEN_PEPPERS to
+# be configured on the NetBox server; set token_version: 1 here if the server
+# has no peppers. token_version does NOT change how the plugin authenticates its
+# own calls (that scheme comes from the admin_token value's nbt_ prefix); it only
+# sets the version of the per-user tokens the engine mints. It must still MATCH
+# the admin_token kind: nbt_ v2 token -> token_version 2; bare v1 token -> 1.
+#
+# The mount uses ignore_changes=[token], so editing KV alone does NOT reach the
+# live mount. To push a corrected/rotated admin token into a running mount:
+#   vault write netbox/config token=<BARE_TOKEN>
+# (netbox_url/token_version are preserved on a partial update). Do NOT -replace
+# the mount to force a re-read - that recreates it and drops all roles/config.
+description: "NetBox ephemeral scoped API token engine"
+netbox_url: "https://netbox.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net"
+token_version: 2
+request_timeout_seconds: 30
+# Set to the pre-existing NetBox superuser admin_token belongs to, to mint the
+# user-management credential dynamically (recommended). Until set, user management
+# uses admin_token directly and a check block warns that rotation will break it.
+# user_mgmt_username: "vault-netbox-admin"

config/netbox_secret_backend_role/netbox/terraform-infra.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+# Single declarative source for the terraform-infra NetBox service identity. The
+# filename stem is the engine role name AND the NetBox username (1:1); config.hcl
+# derives both from it, so neither is repeated below. Creating this file creates
+# the user: the netbox_user_management module synthesizes the NetBox user + object
+# permissions from the permissions block, and the engine role mints ephemeral
+# tokens for that same user. write_enabled true because terraform-infra manages
+# NetBox IPAM/DCIM; very short TTLs because a token is minted per plan/apply and
+# revoked when the run's lease ends.
+---
+write_enabled: true
+ttl: 120     # 2m
+max_ttl: 300 # 5m
+permissions:
+  - object_types:
+      - ipam.prefix
+      - ipam.ipaddress
+      - ipam.iprange
+      - dcim.device
+      - dcim.interface
+      - dcim.macaddress
+    actions:
+      - view
+      - add
+      - change
+      - delete

config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-arrstack.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+# config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-arrstack.yaml
+# Imports (registers) the arrstack secrets plugin in the catalog. Filename =
+# catalog name = mount type. The binary is installed on the OpenBao nodes by
+# Puppet (openbao-plugin-secrets-arrstack RPM ->
+# /opt/openbao-plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-arrstack).
+#
+# sha256 pins the released v0.2.0 binary; bump it in lockstep with any RPM
+# upgrade or OpenBao will refuse to launch the plugin. Registration only
+# succeeds once the Puppet PR has installed the binary on the nodes.
+type: secret
+command: vault-plugin-secrets-arrstack
+version: "0.2.0"
+sha256: "9ea7f16013b3bcbadfcb15b08fd1545f8069893cf864bfdaa57e7e7e72612fa1"

config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-ghp.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-ghp.yaml
+# Imports (registers) the ghp secrets plugin in the catalog. Filename =
+# catalog name = mount type. The binary is installed on the OpenBao nodes by
+# Puppet (openbao-plugin-secrets-ghp RPM ->
+# /opt/openbao-plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-ghp).
+#
+# sha256 pins the released v0.1.0 binary; bump it in lockstep with any RPM
+# upgrade or OpenBao will refuse to launch the plugin.
+type: secret
+command: vault-plugin-secrets-ghp
+sha256: "85761421cd532788ed28fb57e93d3868f3577320a538289936d9ed3be5f396de"

config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-netbox.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-netbox.yaml
+# Imports (registers) the netbox secrets plugin in the catalog. Filename =
+# catalog name = mount type. The binary is installed on the OpenBao nodes by
+# Puppet (openbao-plugin-secrets-netbox RPM ->
+# /opt/openbao-plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-netbox).
+#
+# sha256 pins the released v0.1.0 binary; bump it in lockstep with any RPM
+# upgrade or OpenBao will refuse to launch the plugin.
+type: secret
+command: vault-plugin-secrets-netbox
+sha256: "362b7f6c9e21179ad51d2d810684d9387fe50e3a1887f171700122a0b2a05cef"

environments/au/syd1/terragrunt.hcl

@@ -39,6 +39,12 @@ locals {
     for backend_name, _ in local.config.consul_secret_backend :
     backend_name => replace(backend_name, "/", "_")
   }
+
+  # Same sanitized alias mapping for the NetBox providers.
+  netbox_backend_aliases = {
+    for backend_name, _ in local.config.netbox_secret_backend :
+    backend_name => replace(backend_name, "/", "_")
+  }
 }
 
 terraform {
@@ -54,6 +60,9 @@ inputs = {
   auth_approle_role              = local.config.auth_approle_role
   auth_ldap_backend              = local.config.auth_ldap_backend
   auth_ldap_group                = local.config.auth_ldap_group
+  auth_oidc_backend              = local.config.auth_oidc_backend
+  auth_oidc_role                 = local.config.auth_oidc_role
+  auth_oidc_group                = local.config.auth_oidc_group
   auth_kubernetes_backend        = local.config.auth_kubernetes_backend
   auth_kubernetes_role           = local.config.auth_kubernetes_role
   kv_secret_backend              = local.config.kv_secret_backend
@@ -70,6 +79,8 @@ inputs = {
   pki_mount_only                 = local.config.pki_mount_only
   litellm_secret_backend         = local.config.litellm_secret_backend
   litellm_secret_backend_role    = local.config.litellm_secret_backend_role
+  arrstack_secret_backend        = local.config.arrstack_secret_backend
+  arrstack_secret_backend_role   = local.config.arrstack_secret_backend_role
   plugins                        = local.config.plugins
   gpg_secret_backend             = local.config.gpg_secret_backend
   gpg_key                        = local.config.gpg_key
@@ -81,10 +92,19 @@ inputs = {
   gitea_secret_backend      = local.config.gitea_secret_backend
   gitea_secret_backend_role = local.config.gitea_secret_backend_role
 
+  netbox_secret_backend      = local.config.netbox_secret_backend
+  netbox_secret_backend_role = local.config.netbox_secret_backend_role
+
+  ghp_secret_backend      = local.config.ghp_secret_backend
+  ghp_secret_backend_role = local.config.ghp_secret_backend_role
+
   # Pass policy maps to vault_cluster module
   policy_auth_map  = local.policies.policy_auth_map
   policy_rules_map = local.policies.policy_rules_map
 
   # Pass sanitized consul backend aliases for provider configuration
   consul_backend_aliases = local.consul_backend_aliases
+
+  # Pass sanitized netbox backend aliases for provider configuration
+  netbox_backend_aliases = local.netbox_backend_aliases
 }

environments/root.hcl

@@ -29,6 +29,12 @@ provider "rancher" {
   address = local.vault_addr
 }
 
+# The arrstack (arrproxy API key) secrets engine is managed through its own
+# provider (same Vault server; token falls back to VAULT_TOKEN).
+provider "arrstack" {
+  address = local.vault_addr
+}
+
 terraform {
   backend "consul" {
     address = "https://consul.service.consul"
@@ -59,6 +65,10 @@ terraform {
       source  = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/ranchervaultsecret"
       version = "0.1.0"
     }
+    arrstack = {
+      source  = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/vault-secrets-arrstack"
+      version = "0.2.0"
+    }
   }
 }
 EOF

modules/vault_cluster/main.tf

@@ -64,6 +64,55 @@ module "auth_ldap_group" {
   depends_on = [module.auth_ldap_backend]
 }
 
+module "auth_oidc_backend" {
+  source = "./modules/auth_oidc_backend"
+
+  for_each = var.auth_oidc_backend
+
+  path                = each.key
+  description         = each.value.description
+  oidc_discovery_url  = each.value.oidc_discovery_url
+  client_secret_mount = each.value.client_secret_mount
+  client_secret_path  = each.value.client_secret_path
+  default_role        = each.value.default_role
+  listing_visibility  = each.value.listing_visibility
+  default_lease_ttl   = each.value.default_lease_ttl
+  max_lease_ttl       = each.value.max_lease_ttl
+}
+
+module "auth_oidc_role" {
+  source = "./modules/auth_oidc_role"
+
+  for_each = var.auth_oidc_role
+
+  backend               = each.value.backend
+  role_name             = each.value.role_name
+  user_claim            = each.value.user_claim
+  groups_claim          = each.value.groups_claim
+  oidc_scopes           = each.value.oidc_scopes
+  bound_audiences       = each.value.bound_audiences
+  allowed_redirect_uris = each.value.allowed_redirect_uris
+  token_ttl             = each.value.token_ttl
+  token_max_ttl         = each.value.token_max_ttl
+  # Human authorization comes from the external identity groups below, so a
+  # login role carrying no policies is the normal case.
+  token_policies = try(var.policy_auth_map[each.value.backend][each.value.role_name], [])
+
+  depends_on = [module.auth_oidc_backend]
+}
+
+module "auth_oidc_group" {
+  source = "./modules/auth_oidc_group"
+
+  for_each = var.auth_oidc_group
+
+  groupname      = each.value.groupname
+  policies       = var.policy_auth_map[each.value.backend][each.value.groupname]
+  mount_accessor = module.auth_oidc_backend[each.value.backend].accessor
+
+  depends_on = [module.auth_oidc_backend]
+}
+
 module "auth_kubernetes_backend" {
   source = "./modules/auth_kubernetes_backend"
 
@@ -347,6 +396,36 @@ module "plugin" {
   plugin_version = each.value.version
 }
 
+module "arrstack_secret_backend" {
+  source = "./modules/arrstack_secret_backend"
+
+  for_each = var.arrstack_secret_backend
+
+  path                    = each.key
+  plugin                  = each.value.plugin
+  description             = each.value.description
+  base_url                = each.value.base_url
+  ca_cert                 = each.value.ca_cert
+  request_timeout_seconds = each.value.request_timeout_seconds
+
+  depends_on = [module.plugin]
+}
+
+module "arrstack_secret_backend_role" {
+  source = "./modules/arrstack_secret_backend_role"
+
+  for_each = var.arrstack_secret_backend_role
+
+  name    = each.value.name
+  backend = each.value.backend
+  apps    = each.value.apps
+  methods = each.value.methods
+  ttl     = each.value.ttl
+  max_ttl = each.value.max_ttl
+
+  depends_on = [module.arrstack_secret_backend]
+}
+
 module "gpg_secret_backend" {
   source = "./modules/gpg_secret_backend"
 
@@ -456,6 +535,123 @@ module "gitea_secret_backend_role" {
   depends_on = [module.gitea_secret_backend]
 }
 
+module "netbox_secret_backend" {
+  source = "./modules/netbox_secret_backend"
+
+  for_each = var.netbox_secret_backend
+
+  path                    = each.key
+  plugin                  = each.value.plugin
+  description             = each.value.description
+  netbox_url              = each.value.netbox_url
+  token_version           = each.value.token_version
+  country                 = var.country
+  region                  = var.region
+  ca_cert                 = each.value.ca_cert
+  tls_skip_verify         = each.value.tls_skip_verify
+  request_timeout_seconds = each.value.request_timeout_seconds
+
+  depends_on = [module.plugin]
+}
+
+# Dedicated engine role that mints an ephemeral, user-admin-capable token for the
+# pre-existing NetBox superuser named on each backend (user_mgmt_username).
+# netbox_user_management reads netbox/creds/vault-user-mgmt from it, so it
+# authenticates with a short-lived Vault-minted token derived from the single
+# static admin token - never a second static credential, and unaffected by
+# rotation of the engine's admin seed. Created before user management so the role
+# exists when it reads creds.
+module "netbox_user_mgmt_role" {
+  source = "./modules/netbox_secret_backend_role"
+
+  for_each = { for k, v in var.netbox_secret_backend : k => v if v.user_mgmt_username != null }
+
+  backend         = each.key
+  name            = "vault-user-mgmt"
+  netbox_username = each.value.user_mgmt_username
+  write_enabled   = true
+  description     = "Ephemeral user-admin token for netbox_user_management (Vault-minted per apply)"
+  ttl             = 600
+  max_ttl         = 1200
+
+  depends_on = [module.netbox_secret_backend]
+}
+
+# Declaratively manage the NetBox service users + object permissions the engine
+# roles mint tokens for, authenticating with the Vault-minted user-admin token
+# above (mirrors consul_acl_management). Consumes the SAME role config as
+# netbox_secret_backend_role: one file per identity, filename-derived username,
+# inline permissions.
+module "netbox_user_management" {
+  source = "./modules/netbox_user_management"
+
+  country                = var.country
+  region                 = var.region
+  netbox_backends        = var.netbox_secret_backend
+  netbox_roles           = var.netbox_secret_backend_role
+  netbox_backend_aliases = var.netbox_backend_aliases
+
+  # This module declares its own netbox provider, so it is a legacy module and
+  # cannot take depends_on. Ordering vs the vault-user-mgmt role is not needed on
+  # steady state (the role pre-exists, so reading its creds succeeds regardless);
+  # on first enablement the role must be created first via the one-time targeted
+  # bootstrap documented in config/netbox_secret_backend/netbox.yaml.
+}
+
+module "netbox_secret_backend_role" {
+  source = "./modules/netbox_secret_backend_role"
+
+  for_each = var.netbox_secret_backend_role
+
+  backend         = each.value.backend
+  name            = each.value.name
+  netbox_username = each.value.netbox_username
+  netbox_user_id  = each.value.netbox_user_id
+  write_enabled   = each.value.write_enabled
+  description     = each.value.description
+  ttl             = each.value.ttl
+  max_ttl         = each.value.max_ttl
+
+  depends_on = [module.netbox_secret_backend, module.netbox_user_management]
+}
+
+module "ghp_secret_backend" {
+  source = "./modules/ghp_secret_backend"
+
+  for_each = var.ghp_secret_backend
+
+  path                    = each.key
+  plugin                  = each.value.plugin
+  description             = each.value.description
+  base_url                = each.value.base_url
+  country                 = var.country
+  region                  = var.region
+  ca_cert                 = each.value.ca_cert
+  tls_skip_verify         = each.value.tls_skip_verify
+  request_timeout_seconds = each.value.request_timeout_seconds
+
+  depends_on = [module.plugin]
+}
+
+module "ghp_secret_backend_role" {
+  source = "./modules/ghp_secret_backend_role"
+
+  for_each = var.ghp_secret_backend_role
+
+  backend         = each.value.backend
+  name            = each.value.name
+  token_type      = each.value.token_type
+  installation_id = each.value.installation_id
+  app_record_id   = each.value.app_record_id
+  repositories    = each.value.repositories
+  scopes          = each.value.scopes
+  session_prefix  = each.value.session_prefix
+  ttl             = each.value.ttl
+  max_ttl         = each.value.max_ttl
+
+  depends_on = [module.ghp_secret_backend]
+}
+
 module "vault_policy" {
   source = "./modules/vault_policy"
 

modules/vault_cluster/modules/arrstack_secret_backend/main.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# Mounts the arrstack dynamic secrets engine and writes its config via the
+# vault-secrets-arrstack provider. The plugin is registered in the catalog
+# separately (config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-arrstack.yaml). The arrproxy
+# admin token is sensitive and read from KV, not stored in git:
+#   kv/kubernetes/namespace/arrstack/default/arrproxy-admin-token -> key "token"
+# (seeded by argocd-apps #384).
+data "vault_kv_secret_v2" "admin_token" {
+  mount = "kv"
+  name  = var.admin_token_kv_name
+}
+
+resource "arrstack_secret_backend" "this" {
+  path                    = var.path
+  plugin                  = var.plugin
+  description             = var.description
+  base_url                = var.base_url
+  admin_token             = data.vault_kv_secret_v2.admin_token.data[var.admin_token_kv_key]
+  ca_cert                 = var.ca_cert
+  request_timeout_seconds = var.request_timeout_seconds
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/arrstack_secret_backend/terraform.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+terraform {
+  required_version = ">= 1.10"
+  required_providers {
+    vault = {
+      source  = "hashicorp/vault"
+      version = "5.6.0"
+    }
+    arrstack = {
+      source  = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/vault-secrets-arrstack"
+      version = "0.2.0"
+    }
+  }
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/arrstack_secret_backend/variables.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+variable "path" {
+  description = "Mount path of the arrstack secrets engine (e.g. \"arrstack\")"
+  type        = string
+}
+
+variable "plugin" {
+  description = "Registered plugin name/type to mount (the catalog name = mount type)"
+  type        = string
+  default     = "vault-plugin-secrets-arrstack"
+}
+
+variable "description" {
+  description = "Human-friendly description of the mount"
+  type        = string
+  default     = null
+}
+
+variable "base_url" {
+  description = "Base URL of the arrproxy front door (e.g. https://arrstack.unkin.net)"
+  type        = string
+}
+
+variable "admin_token_kv_name" {
+  description = "kv-v2 secret name (relative to the \"kv\" mount) holding the seeded arrproxy admin token"
+  type        = string
+  default     = "kubernetes/namespace/arrstack/default/arrproxy-admin-token"
+}
+
+variable "admin_token_kv_key" {
+  description = "Key within the KV secret that holds the arrproxy admin token"
+  type        = string
+  default     = "token"
+}
+
+variable "ca_cert" {
+  description = "PEM CA certificate that signed the arrproxy server's TLS cert (optional; omit to use the system trust store)"
+  type        = string
+  default     = null
+}
+
+variable "request_timeout_seconds" {
+  description = "HTTP timeout in seconds for calls from the plugin to arrproxy"
+  type        = number
+  default     = 30
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/arrstack_secret_backend_role/main.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+resource "arrstack_secret_backend_role" "this" {
+  backend = var.backend
+  name    = var.name
+  apps    = var.apps
+  methods = var.methods
+  ttl     = var.ttl
+  max_ttl = var.max_ttl
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/arrstack_secret_backend_role/terraform.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+terraform {
+  required_version = ">= 1.10"
+  required_providers {
+    arrstack = {
+      source  = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/vault-secrets-arrstack"
+      version = "0.2.0"
+    }
+  }
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/arrstack_secret_backend_role/variables.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+variable "name" {
+  description = "Name of the role"
+  type        = string
+}
+
+variable "backend" {
+  description = "Mount path of the arrstack secrets engine this role belongs to"
+  type        = string
+}
+
+variable "apps" {
+  description = "arr apps a generated key may access (subset of sonarr, radarr, prowlarr)"
+  type        = list(string)
+}
+
+variable "methods" {
+  description = "HTTP methods a generated key is limited to (subset of GET, HEAD, POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE, OPTIONS). Null leaves the role unrestricted"
+  type        = set(string)
+  # null, not [], so a role yaml that omits methods matches the provider's null read-back and shows no drift.
+  default = null
+}
+
+variable "ttl" {
+  description = "Default lease TTL in seconds for keys generated from this role"
+  type        = number
+  default     = null
+}
+
+variable "max_ttl" {
+  description = "Maximum lease TTL in seconds for keys generated from this role"
+  type        = number
+  default     = null
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/auth_oidc_backend/main.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Expected keys in KV secret: client_id, client_secret (generated and written by
+# terraform-authentik's oauth2 provider module, never seeded by hand).
+data "vault_kv_secret_v2" "oidc_client" {
+  mount = var.client_secret_mount
+  name  = var.client_secret_path
+}
+
+resource "vault_jwt_auth_backend" "oidc" {
+  path               = var.path
+  type               = "oidc"
+  description        = var.description
+  oidc_discovery_url = var.oidc_discovery_url
+  oidc_client_id     = data.vault_kv_secret_v2.oidc_client.data["client_id"]
+  oidc_client_secret = data.vault_kv_secret_v2.oidc_client.data["client_secret"]
+  default_role       = var.default_role
+
+  tune {
+    default_lease_ttl  = var.default_lease_ttl
+    max_lease_ttl      = var.max_lease_ttl
+    listing_visibility = var.listing_visibility
+  }
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/auth_oidc_backend/outputs.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+output "accessor" {
+  description = "Accessor of the OIDC auth mount, used to bind identity group aliases"
+  value       = vault_jwt_auth_backend.oidc.accessor
+}
+
+output "path" {
+  description = "Mount path of the OIDC auth backend"
+  value       = vault_jwt_auth_backend.oidc.path
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/auth_oidc_backend/terraform.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+terraform {
+  required_version = ">= 1.10"
+  required_providers {
+    vault = {
+      source  = "hashicorp/vault"
+      version = "5.6.0"
+    }
+  }
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/auth_oidc_backend/variables.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+variable "path" {
+  description = "Mount path of the OIDC auth backend"
+  type        = string
+  default     = "oidc"
+}
+
+variable "description" {
+  description = "Human-readable description of the auth mount"
+  type        = string
+  default     = null
+}
+
+variable "oidc_discovery_url" {
+  description = "OIDC issuer discovery URL of the identity provider"
+  type        = string
+}
+
+variable "client_secret_mount" {
+  description = "KV-v2 mount holding the OIDC client credentials"
+  type        = string
+  default     = "kv"
+}
+
+variable "client_secret_path" {
+  description = "Path within the KV-v2 mount holding client_id and client_secret"
+  type        = string
+  default     = "service/authentik/oidc-vault"
+}
+
+variable "default_role" {
+  description = "Role used when none is supplied at login (the UI/CLI default)"
+  type        = string
+  default     = "default"
+}
+
+variable "listing_visibility" {
+  description = "Specifies whether to show this mount in the UI-specific listing endpoint. Valid values are 'unauth' or 'hidden'"
+  type        = string
+  default     = null
+  validation {
+    condition     = var.listing_visibility == null || contains(["unauth", "hidden"], var.listing_visibility)
+    error_message = "listing_visibility must be either 'unauth' or 'hidden'."
+  }
+}
+
+variable "default_lease_ttl" {
+  description = "Specifies the default time-to-live. If set, this overrides the global default. Must be a valid duration string"
+  type        = string
+  default     = null
+}
+
+variable "max_lease_ttl" {
+  description = "Specifies the maximum time-to-live. If set, this overrides the global default. Must be a valid duration string"
+  type        = string
+  default     = null
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/auth_oidc_group/main.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+# External identity group: membership is asserted by the IdP through the role's
+# groups_claim, matched by the alias name below.
+resource "vault_identity_group" "group" {
+  name     = var.groupname
+  type     = "external"
+  policies = var.policies
+}
+
+resource "vault_identity_group_alias" "alias" {
+  name           = var.groupname
+  mount_accessor = var.mount_accessor
+  canonical_id   = vault_identity_group.group.id
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/auth_oidc_group/terraform.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+terraform {
+  required_version = ">= 1.10"
+  required_providers {
+    vault = {
+      source  = "hashicorp/vault"
+      version = "5.6.0"
+    }
+  }
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/auth_oidc_group/variables.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+variable "groupname" {
+  description = "Name of the IdP group, as it appears in the groups claim"
+  type        = string
+}
+
+variable "policies" {
+  description = "List of policies to assign to the identity group"
+  type        = list(string)
+}
+
+variable "mount_accessor" {
+  description = "Accessor of the OIDC auth mount the alias is bound to"
+  type        = string
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/auth_oidc_role/main.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+resource "vault_jwt_auth_backend_role" "role" {
+  backend               = var.backend
+  role_name             = var.role_name
+  role_type             = "oidc"
+  user_claim            = var.user_claim
+  groups_claim          = var.groups_claim
+  oidc_scopes           = var.oidc_scopes
+  bound_audiences       = var.bound_audiences
+  allowed_redirect_uris = var.allowed_redirect_uris
+  token_ttl             = var.token_ttl
+  token_max_ttl         = var.token_max_ttl
+  token_policies        = var.token_policies
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/auth_oidc_role/terraform.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+terraform {
+  required_version = ">= 1.10"
+  required_providers {
+    vault = {
+      source  = "hashicorp/vault"
+      version = "5.6.0"
+    }
+  }
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/auth_oidc_role/variables.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+variable "backend" {
+  description = "The unique path of the OIDC auth backend to configure"
+  type        = string
+}
+
+variable "role_name" {
+  description = "The name of the role"
+  type        = string
+}
+
+variable "user_claim" {
+  description = "Claim used as the entity alias name (the Vault identity of the human)"
+  type        = string
+  default     = "email"
+}
+
+variable "groups_claim" {
+  description = "Claim holding the caller's group memberships, matched against identity group aliases"
+  type        = string
+  default     = "ak_groups"
+}
+
+variable "oidc_scopes" {
+  description = "Scopes requested from the identity provider during the authorization request"
+  type        = list(string)
+  default     = []
+}
+
+variable "bound_audiences" {
+  description = "List of audiences (aud claim) accepted in the ID token"
+  type        = list(string)
+  default     = []
+}
+
+variable "allowed_redirect_uris" {
+  description = "Redirect URIs accepted for this role. Must match the provider's registered URIs exactly"
+  type        = list(string)
+}
+
+variable "token_ttl" {
+  description = "The TTL period of tokens issued using this role, in seconds"
+  type        = number
+  default     = 3600
+}
+
+variable "token_max_ttl" {
+  description = "The maximum lifetime for generated tokens in number of seconds. Its current value will be referenced at renewal time."
+  type        = number
+  default     = 28800
+}
+
+variable "token_policies" {
+  description = "List of policies to assign to the role (passed from policy_auth_map). Human authorization normally comes from external identity groups instead"
+  type        = list(string)
+  default     = []
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/ghp_secret_backend/main.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# Mounts the ghp secrets engine and writes its connection config via the
+# vault-secrets-ghp provider. The plugin is registered ("imported") in the
+# catalog separately (config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-ghp.yaml). The seeded
+# ghp service token is sensitive and read from KV, not stored in git:
+#   kv/service/vault/<country>/<region>/secret_backend/<path>/config
+# Expected key: admin_token (a ghpsvc_... service token that ghp accepts via its
+# GHP_AUTH_SERVICE_TOKENS list). ghp has no rotate endpoint, so this static
+# shared secret is the single credential the engine authenticates with.
+data "vault_kv_secret_v2" "config" {
+  mount = "kv"
+  name  = "service/vault/${var.country}/${var.region}/secret_backend/${var.path}/config"
+}
+
+resource "ghp_secret_backend" "this" {
+  path                    = var.path
+  plugin                  = var.plugin
+  description             = var.description
+  base_url                = var.base_url
+  admin_token             = data.vault_kv_secret_v2.config.data["admin_token"]
+  ca_cert                 = var.ca_cert
+  tls_skip_verify         = var.tls_skip_verify
+  request_timeout_seconds = var.request_timeout_seconds
+
+  lifecycle {
+    # The KV seed is a bootstrap credential consumed only when the engine config
+    # is first created. ghp has no rotate endpoint, so re-reading a (possibly
+    # stale) KV value must never re-push it into the live mount. Ignoring the
+    # token makes this module create-only for it (mirrors gitea/netbox config).
+    ignore_changes = [admin_token]
+  }
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/ghp_secret_backend/terraform.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+terraform {
+  required_version = ">= 1.10"
+  required_providers {
+    vault = {
+      source  = "hashicorp/vault"
+      version = "5.6.0"
+    }
+    ghp = {
+      source  = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/vault-secrets-ghp"
+      version = "0.1.0"
+    }
+  }
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/ghp_secret_backend/variables.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+variable "path" {
+  description = "Mount path of the ghp secrets engine (e.g. \"ghp\")"
+  type        = string
+}
+
+variable "plugin" {
+  description = "Registered plugin name to mount (the catalog name = mount type)"
+  type        = string
+  default     = "vault-plugin-secrets-ghp"
+}
+
+variable "description" {
+  description = "Human-friendly description of the mount"
+  type        = string
+  default     = null
+}
+
+variable "base_url" {
+  description = "Base URL of the ghp server (e.g. https://ghp.unkin.net)"
+  type        = string
+}
+
+variable "country" {
+  description = "Country segment of the KV path holding the seeded admin token"
+  type        = string
+}
+
+variable "region" {
+  description = "Region segment of the KV path holding the seeded admin token"
+  type        = string
+}
+
+variable "ca_cert" {
+  description = "PEM CA certificate that signed the ghp server's TLS cert (optional; omit to use the system trust store)"
+  type        = string
+  default     = null
+}
+
+variable "tls_skip_verify" {
+  description = "Skip TLS verification of the ghp server (not recommended)"
+  type        = bool
+  default     = false
+}
+
+variable "request_timeout_seconds" {
+  description = "HTTP timeout in seconds for calls from the plugin to ghp"
+  type        = number
+  default     = 30
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/ghp_secret_backend_role/main.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# A role that mints short-lived, scoped ghp tokens. Reading ghp/creds/<name>
+# produces a lease-bound token that is revoked from ghp when the lease is
+# revoked or reaches max_ttl.
+resource "ghp_secret_role" "this" {
+  backend         = var.backend
+  name            = var.name
+  token_type      = var.token_type
+  installation_id = var.installation_id
+  app_record_id   = var.app_record_id
+  repositories    = var.repositories
+  scopes          = var.scopes
+  session_prefix  = var.session_prefix
+  ttl             = var.ttl
+  max_ttl         = var.max_ttl
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/ghp_secret_backend_role/terraform.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+terraform {
+  required_version = ">= 1.10"
+  required_providers {
+    ghp = {
+      source  = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/vault-secrets-ghp"
+      version = "0.1.0"
+    }
+  }
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/ghp_secret_backend_role/variables.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+variable "backend" {
+  description = "Mount path of the ghp secrets engine this role belongs to"
+  type        = string
+}
+
+variable "name" {
+  description = "Role name (read ghp/creds/<name> to mint a token)"
+  type        = string
+}
+
+variable "token_type" {
+  description = "ghp token type to mint: \"agent\" (default) or \"proxy\""
+  type        = string
+  default     = null
+}
+
+variable "installation_id" {
+  description = "ghp App installation id the minted agent token is bound to (required when token_type is \"agent\")"
+  type        = number
+  default     = null
+}
+
+variable "app_record_id" {
+  description = "Optional ghp App record id (UUID) to pin agent tokens to; empty selects ghp's default app"
+  type        = string
+  default     = null
+}
+
+variable "repositories" {
+  description = "Optional repositories the minted token is restricted to; empty is open-scoped (all repositories)"
+  type        = list(string)
+  default     = null
+}
+
+variable "scopes" {
+  description = "Optional ghp permission:level scopes (e.g. [\"contents:read\"]); empty is open-scoped"
+  type        = list(string)
+  default     = null
+}
+
+variable "session_prefix" {
+  description = "Prefix for the ghp session id of each minted token (default \"vault\")"
+  type        = string
+  default     = null
+}
+
+variable "ttl" {
+  description = "Default lease TTL in seconds for minted tokens"
+  type        = number
+  default     = null
+}
+
+variable "max_ttl" {
+  description = "Maximum lease TTL in seconds for minted tokens"
+  type        = number
+  default     = null
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/netbox_secret_backend/main.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+# Mounts the netbox secrets engine and writes its connection config via the
+# vault-secrets-netbox provider. The plugin is registered ("imported") in the
+# catalog separately (config/plugins/vault-plugin-secrets-netbox.yaml). The
+# seeded NetBox admin token is sensitive and read from KV, not stored in git:
+#   kv/service/vault/<country>/<region>/secret_backend/<path>/config
+# Expected key: admin_token (a NetBox token with add_token + grant_token, i.e.
+# able to provision and delegate per-user API tokens).
+data "vault_kv_secret_v2" "config" {
+  mount = "kv"
+  name  = "service/vault/${var.country}/${var.region}/secret_backend/${var.path}/config"
+
+  lifecycle {
+    # The plugin builds its own Authorization header from the token VALUE, not
+    # token_version: a value starting with the nbt_ prefix is sent as
+    # "Bearer <token>" (v2), otherwise "Token <token>" (v1). So admin_token must
+    # be the BARE token - a literal `Bearer `/`Token ` scheme prefix yields a
+    # malformed three-part header and 403s on the plugin's own NetBox calls.
+    #
+    # token_version does NOT change that header; it only selects the version of
+    # the per-user tokens the engine mints for roles. It must still MATCH the
+    # admin token's kind so the mount and its minted creds line up: an nbt_ v2
+    # admin token pairs with token_version=2, a bare v1 token with token_version=1.
+    postcondition {
+      condition = nonsensitive(
+        !startswith(self.data["admin_token"], "Bearer ") &&
+        !startswith(self.data["admin_token"], "Token ") &&
+        startswith(self.data["admin_token"], "nbt_") == (var.token_version == 2)
+      )
+      error_message = "KV admin_token for netbox backend '${var.path}' must be a BARE NetBox token with no 'Bearer '/'Token ' scheme prefix, AND its version must match token_version: a v2 token (nbt_<key>.<secret>) requires token_version=2; a v1 token (bare 40-char value) requires token_version=1."
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+resource "netbox_secret_backend" "this" {
+  path                    = var.path
+  plugin                  = var.plugin
+  description             = var.description
+  netbox_url              = var.netbox_url
+  token                   = data.vault_kv_secret_v2.config.data["admin_token"]
+  token_version           = var.token_version
+  ca_cert                 = var.ca_cert
+  tls_skip_verify         = var.tls_skip_verify
+  request_timeout_seconds = var.request_timeout_seconds
+
+  lifecycle {
+    # The KV seed is a bootstrap credential: it is consumed only when the engine
+    # config is first created. After creation the live admin token is rotated in
+    # place (vault write -f netbox/config/rotate) and diverges from the seed, so
+    # re-reading the (possibly stale) KV value must never push it back. Ignoring
+    # the token makes this module create-only for it (mirrors gitea/config).
+    ignore_changes = [token]
+  }
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/netbox_secret_backend/terraform.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+terraform {
+  required_version = ">= 1.10"
+  required_providers {
+    vault = {
+      source  = "hashicorp/vault"
+      version = "5.6.0"
+    }
+    netbox = {
+      source  = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/vault-secrets-netbox"
+      version = "0.1.0"
+    }
+  }
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/netbox_secret_backend/variables.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+variable "path" {
+  description = "Mount path of the netbox secrets engine (e.g. \"netbox\")"
+  type        = string
+}
+
+variable "plugin" {
+  description = "Registered plugin name to mount (the catalog name = mount type)"
+  type        = string
+  default     = "vault-plugin-secrets-netbox"
+}
+
+variable "description" {
+  description = "Human-friendly description of the mount"
+  type        = string
+  default     = null
+}
+
+variable "netbox_url" {
+  description = "Base URL of the NetBox server (e.g. https://netbox.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net)"
+  type        = string
+}
+
+variable "token_version" {
+  description = "NetBox API token format: 2 (default, requires API_TOKEN_PEPPERS on the NetBox server) or 1 (legacy plaintext-key)."
+  type        = number
+  default     = 2
+}
+
+variable "country" {
+  description = "Country segment of the KV path holding the seeded admin token"
+  type        = string
+}
+
+variable "region" {
+  description = "Region segment of the KV path holding the seeded admin token"
+  type        = string
+}
+
+variable "ca_cert" {
+  description = "PEM CA certificate that signed the NetBox server's TLS cert (optional; omit to use the system trust store)"
+  type        = string
+  default     = null
+}
+
+variable "tls_skip_verify" {
+  description = "Skip TLS verification of the NetBox server (not recommended)"
+  type        = bool
+  default     = false
+}
+
+variable "request_timeout_seconds" {
+  description = "HTTP timeout in seconds for calls from the plugin to NetBox"
+  type        = number
+  default     = 30
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/netbox_secret_backend_role/main.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+# A role that mints short-lived, scoped NetBox tokens for a pre-existing NetBox
+# service user. Reading netbox/creds/<name> produces a lease-bound token that is
+# deleted from NetBox when the lease is revoked or reaches max_ttl.
+resource "netbox_secret_backend_role" "this" {
+  backend         = var.backend
+  name            = var.name
+  netbox_username = var.netbox_username
+  netbox_user_id  = var.netbox_user_id
+  write_enabled   = var.write_enabled
+  description     = var.description
+  ttl             = var.ttl
+  max_ttl         = var.max_ttl
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/netbox_secret_backend_role/terraform.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+terraform {
+  required_version = ">= 1.10"
+  required_providers {
+    netbox = {
+      source  = "artifactapi.k8s.syd1.au.unkin.net/terraform-unkin/vault-secrets-netbox"
+      version = "0.1.0"
+    }
+  }
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/netbox_secret_backend_role/variables.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+variable "backend" {
+  description = "Mount path of the netbox secrets engine this role belongs to"
+  type        = string
+}
+
+variable "name" {
+  description = "Role name (read netbox/creds/<name> to mint a token)"
+  type        = string
+}
+
+variable "netbox_username" {
+  description = "NetBox service username the minted tokens belong to (set this or netbox_user_id)"
+  type        = string
+  default     = null
+}
+
+variable "netbox_user_id" {
+  description = "NetBox service user id the minted tokens belong to (set this or netbox_username)"
+  type        = number
+  default     = null
+}
+
+variable "write_enabled" {
+  description = "Whether minted tokens carry NetBox write access (default read-only)"
+  type        = bool
+  default     = false
+}
+
+variable "description" {
+  description = "Human-friendly description of the role"
+  type        = string
+  default     = null
+}
+
+variable "ttl" {
+  description = "Default lease TTL in seconds for minted tokens (the token's NetBox expiry is aligned to the lease)"
+  type        = number
+  default     = null
+}
+
+variable "max_ttl" {
+  description = "Maximum lease TTL in seconds for minted tokens"
+  type        = number
+  default     = null
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/netbox_user_management/.tflint.hcl

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+rule "terraform_required_providers" {
+  enabled = false
+}
+
+rule "terraform_required_version" {
+  enabled = false
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/netbox_user_management/main.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+# netbox_user_management reconciles NetBox service users + permissions on every
+# apply, so it needs an admin credential each run. That credential is minted
+# DYNAMICALLY by the netbox engine from the SINGLE static admin token, so no
+# second static credential exists and it survives rotation of the engine seed:
+#
+#   1. module.netbox_user_mgmt_role creates netbox/roles/vault-user-mgmt, a
+#      write-enabled role for a pre-existing NetBox superuser (user_mgmt_username).
+#   2. Reading netbox/creds/vault-user-mgmt mints a short-lived, user-admin-capable
+#      token for that superuser; the e-breuninger provider uses it to CRUD users.
+#
+# The hashicorp/vault provider ships ephemeral resources for KV only, not for
+# dynamic engine creds, so the mint is read via the vault_generic_secret DATA
+# source: the short-lived token transits Terraform state (sensitive, lease-revoked)
+# and is re-minted each plan. This is the closest single-static-token shape the
+# current providers allow; move to an ephemeral resource once the vault provider
+# ships a dynamic-secret one. Ordering note: the vault-user-mgmt role must already
+# exist when this reads creds, so on a brand-new backend bootstrap the mount +
+# role first (targeted apply) - a fresh single apply cannot configure the netbox
+# provider from a role created in the same run.
+locals {
+  # Backends that mint a dynamic user-admin token (a pre-existing superuser named).
+  netbox_dynamic_backends = { for k, v in var.netbox_backends : k => v if v.user_mgmt_username != null }
+  # Backends still using the single static admin_token directly (until a superuser
+  # is named). Bootstrap/degraded path - the same one token, not a second static.
+  netbox_static_backends = { for k, v in var.netbox_backends : k => v if v.user_mgmt_username == null }
+}
+
+# Dynamic path: the engine mints a user-admin token for the superuser. Requires
+# the deployer to read netbox/creds/vault-user-mgmt (policies/netbox/creds).
+data "vault_generic_secret" "user_admin" {
+  for_each = local.netbox_dynamic_backends
+
+  path = "${each.key}/creds/vault-user-mgmt"
+}
+
+# Static fallback: the single admin_token from KV, used only until a superuser is
+# named. NetBox derives the token version from the value's `nbt_` prefix, not the
+# keyword, so the same BARE token works under either scheme; reject a value that
+# carries a literal `Bearer `/`Token ` scheme prefix (a malformed header -> 403).
+data "vault_kv_secret_v2" "netbox_backend_configs" {
+  for_each = local.netbox_static_backends
+
+  mount = "kv"
+  name  = "service/vault/${var.country}/${var.region}/secret_backend/${each.key}/config"
+
+  lifecycle {
+    postcondition {
+      condition = nonsensitive(
+        !startswith(self.data["admin_token"], "Bearer ") &&
+        !startswith(self.data["admin_token"], "Token ")
+      )
+      error_message = "KV admin_token for netbox backend '${each.key}' must be a BARE NetBox token with no 'Bearer '/'Token ' scheme prefix (v2: nbt_<key>.<secret>; v1: the 40-char value)."
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+# Warn (non-fatal) for any backend still on the static token: rotating the engine
+# admin seed would then break user management. Set user_mgmt_username to switch to
+# the dynamic, rotation-proof mint.
+check "netbox_user_mgmt_dynamic" {
+  assert {
+    condition     = length(local.netbox_static_backends) == 0
+    error_message = "A netbox backend has no user_mgmt_username, so user management uses the static admin_token directly and will break if that token is rotated (netbox/config/rotate). Set user_mgmt_username to a pre-existing NetBox superuser to mint the credential dynamically."
+  }
+}
+
+locals {
+  # Per backend: the dynamically-minted user-admin token, else the static seed.
+  netbox_admin_tokens = {
+    for k, v in var.netbox_backends : k => (
+      v.user_mgmt_username != null
+      ? data.vault_generic_secret.user_admin[k].data["token"]
+      : data.vault_kv_secret_v2.netbox_backend_configs[k].data["admin_token"]
+    )
+  }
+}
+
+# One NetBox provider instance per backend, authenticated with its (dynamic or
+# static) admin token.
+provider "netbox" {
+  alias    = "by_backend"
+  for_each = var.netbox_backend_aliases
+
+  server_url           = var.netbox_backends[each.key].netbox_url
+  api_token            = local.netbox_admin_tokens[each.key]
+  allow_insecure_https = var.netbox_backends[each.key].tls_skip_verify
+  # NetBox is internal and not always reachable at plan time; the resource CRUD
+  # calls surface any real incompatibility, so skip the startup version probe.
+  skip_version_check = true
+}
+
+# NetBox users authenticate only via Vault-minted API tokens, never the web UI,
+# so give each a random unknown password (required by the API) that no one holds.
+resource "random_password" "user" {
+  for_each = var.netbox_roles
+
+  length  = 32
+  special = true
+}
+
+# Declarative NetBox service users, one per engine role. The role's filename-
+# derived name is the username, so the engine role and its user match 1:1.
+resource "netbox_user" "users" {
+  for_each = var.netbox_roles
+
+  provider = netbox.by_backend[each.value.backend]
+
+  username = each.value.name
+  password = random_password.user[each.key].result
+  active   = each.value.active
+  staff    = each.value.staff
+  email    = each.value.email
+}
+
+locals {
+  # Flatten roles x permissions into one map keyed by "<role_path>:<index>". A
+  # permission's name defaults to the role name (the username) so a single-
+  # permission identity repeats nothing already encoded by the filename.
+  netbox_permissions = merge([
+    for role_key, role in var.netbox_roles : {
+      for idx, perm in role.permissions :
+      "${role_key}:${idx}" => {
+        backend      = role.backend
+        user         = role_key
+        name         = coalesce(perm.name, length(role.permissions) == 1 ? role.name : "${role.name}-${idx}")
+        object_types = perm.object_types
+        actions      = perm.actions
+        constraints  = perm.constraints
+        description  = perm.description
+        enabled      = perm.enabled
+      }
+    }
+  ]...)
+}
+
+# Object permissions granting each user its object-type/action scope.
+resource "netbox_permission" "perms" {
+  for_each = local.netbox_permissions
+
+  provider = netbox.by_backend[each.value.backend]
+
+  name         = each.value.name
+  object_types = each.value.object_types
+  actions      = each.value.actions
+  enabled      = each.value.enabled
+  description  = each.value.description
+  constraints  = each.value.constraints
+  users        = [tonumber(netbox_user.users[each.value.user].id)]
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/netbox_user_management/outputs.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+output "netbox_users" {
+  description = "Map of created NetBox users (id + username; password is intentionally omitted)"
+  value = {
+    for k, u in netbox_user.users : k => {
+      id       = u.id
+      username = u.username
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+output "netbox_permissions" {
+  description = "Map of created NetBox object permissions"
+  value = {
+    for k, p in netbox_permission.perms : k => {
+      id   = p.id
+      name = p.name
+    }
+  }
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/netbox_user_management/terraform.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+terraform {
+  required_version = ">= 1.10"
+  required_providers {
+    vault = {
+      source  = "hashicorp/vault"
+      version = "5.6.0"
+    }
+    netbox = {
+      source  = "e-breuninger/netbox"
+      version = "4.3.0"
+    }
+    random = {
+      source  = "hashicorp/random"
+      version = ">= 3.5"
+    }
+  }
+}

modules/vault_cluster/modules/netbox_user_management/variables.tf

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+variable "netbox_backends" {
+  description = "Map of netbox secret backends (keyed by mount path); only the URL and TLS mode are needed to reach NetBox"
+  type = map(object({
+    netbox_url      = string
+    tls_skip_verify = optional(bool, false)
+    # Pre-existing NetBox superuser the engine mints a dynamic user-admin token
+    # for; unset means fall back to the static admin_token from KV.
+    user_mgmt_username = optional(string)
+  }))
+}
+
+variable "netbox_roles" {
+  description = "Map of netbox engine roles (the netbox_secret_backend_role config). Each role's filename-derived name is the NetBox username to create, and its permissions block is the user's object-permission set. Keyed by the role's config path."
+  type = map(object({
+    name    = string
+    backend = string
+    active  = optional(bool, true)
+    staff   = optional(bool, false)
+    email   = optional(string)
+    permissions = optional(list(object({
+      name         = optional(string)
+      object_types = list(string)
+      actions      = optional(list(string), ["view", "add", "change", "delete"])
+      constraints  = optional(string)
+      description  = optional(string)
+      enabled      = optional(bool, true)
+    })), [])
+  }))
+  default = {}
+}
+
+variable "netbox_backend_aliases" {
+  description = "Map of netbox backend names to sanitized provider aliases"
+  type        = map(string)
+  default     = {}
+}
+
+variable "country" {
+  description = "Country identifier"
+  type        = string
+}
+
+variable "region" {
+  description = "Region identifier"
+  type        = string
+}

modules/vault_cluster/variables.tf

@@ -62,6 +62,46 @@ variable "auth_ldap_group" {
   default = {}
 }
 
+variable "auth_oidc_backend" {
+  description = "Map of OIDC (JWT) auth backends to create"
+  type = map(object({
+    oidc_discovery_url  = string
+    description         = optional(string)
+    client_secret_mount = optional(string, "kv")
+    client_secret_path  = optional(string, "service/authentik/oidc-vault")
+    default_role        = optional(string, "default")
+    listing_visibility  = optional(string)
+    default_lease_ttl   = optional(string)
+    max_lease_ttl       = optional(string)
+  }))
+  default = {}
+}
+
+variable "auth_oidc_role" {
+  description = "Map of OIDC auth roles to create"
+  type = map(object({
+    role_name             = string
+    backend               = string
+    allowed_redirect_uris = list(string)
+    user_claim            = optional(string, "email")
+    groups_claim          = optional(string, "ak_groups")
+    oidc_scopes           = optional(list(string), [])
+    bound_audiences       = optional(list(string), [])
+    token_ttl             = optional(number, 3600)
+    token_max_ttl         = optional(number, 28800)
+  }))
+  default = {}
+}
+
+variable "auth_oidc_group" {
+  description = "Map of external identity groups bound to an OIDC auth mount"
+  type = map(object({
+    groupname = string
+    backend   = string
+  }))
+  default = {}
+}
+
 variable "auth_kubernetes_backend" {
   description = "Map of Kubernetes auth backends to create"
   type = map(object({
@@ -316,6 +356,31 @@ variable "litellm_secret_backend_role" {
   default = {}
 }
 
+variable "arrstack_secret_backend" {
+  description = "Map of arrstack secret engines to create (mount + config). The arrproxy admin token is read from KV"
+  type = map(object({
+    plugin                  = optional(string, "vault-plugin-secrets-arrstack")
+    description             = optional(string)
+    base_url                = string
+    ca_cert                 = optional(string)
+    request_timeout_seconds = optional(number, 30)
+  }))
+  default = {}
+}
+
+variable "arrstack_secret_backend_role" {
+  description = "Map of arrstack roles to create"
+  type = map(object({
+    name    = string
+    backend = string
+    apps    = list(string)
+    methods = optional(set(string))
+    ttl     = optional(number)
+    max_ttl = optional(number)
+  }))
+  default = {}
+}
+
 variable "plugins" {
   description = "Map of plugins to import (register) in the catalog, keyed by catalog name"
   type = map(object({
@@ -416,6 +481,88 @@ variable "gitea_secret_backend_role" {
   default = {}
 }
 
+variable "netbox_secret_backend" {
+  description = "Map of netbox token secret engines to create (mount + config; seeded admin token read from KV)"
+  type = map(object({
+    plugin                  = optional(string, "vault-plugin-secrets-netbox")
+    description             = optional(string)
+    netbox_url              = string
+    token_version           = optional(number, 2)
+    ca_cert                 = optional(string)
+    tls_skip_verify         = optional(bool, false)
+    request_timeout_seconds = optional(number, 30)
+    # Pre-existing NetBox superuser (or add_user + add_token + grant_token) the
+    # engine mints an ephemeral user-admin token for, so netbox_user_management
+    # authenticates with a Vault-minted credential derived from the single static
+    # admin token instead of a second static one. Unset = use the static
+    # admin_token directly (bootstrap/degraded; breaks after admin-token rotation).
+    user_mgmt_username = optional(string)
+  }))
+  default = {}
+}
+
+variable "netbox_secret_backend_role" {
+  description = "Map of netbox engine roles; each role's filename-derived name is both the engine role and the NetBox username it mints tokens for, and its permissions block is the user's object-permission set"
+  type = map(object({
+    name            = string
+    backend         = string
+    netbox_username = optional(string)
+    netbox_user_id  = optional(number)
+    write_enabled   = optional(bool, false)
+    description     = optional(string)
+    ttl             = optional(number)
+    max_ttl         = optional(number)
+    active          = optional(bool, true)
+    staff           = optional(bool, false)
+    email           = optional(string)
+    permissions = optional(list(object({
+      name         = optional(string)
+      object_types = list(string)
+      actions      = optional(list(string), ["view", "add", "change", "delete"])
+      constraints  = optional(string)
+      description  = optional(string)
+      enabled      = optional(bool, true)
+    })), [])
+  }))
+  default = {}
+}
+
+variable "netbox_backend_aliases" {
+  description = "Map of netbox backend names to sanitized provider aliases"
+  type        = map(string)
+  default     = {}
+}
+
+variable "ghp_secret_backend" {
+  description = "Map of ghp token secret engines to create (mount + config; seeded service token read from KV)"
+  type = map(object({
+    plugin                  = optional(string, "vault-plugin-secrets-ghp")
+    description             = optional(string)
+    base_url                = string
+    ca_cert                 = optional(string)
+    tls_skip_verify         = optional(bool, false)
+    request_timeout_seconds = optional(number, 30)
+  }))
+  default = {}
+}
+
+variable "ghp_secret_backend_role" {
+  description = "Map of ghp engine roles; reading ghp/creds/<name> mints a short-lived scoped ghp token"
+  type = map(object({
+    name            = string
+    backend         = string
+    token_type      = optional(string)
+    installation_id = optional(number)
+    app_record_id   = optional(string)
+    repositories    = optional(list(string))
+    scopes          = optional(list(string))
+    session_prefix  = optional(string)
+    ttl             = optional(number)
+    max_ttl         = optional(number)
+  }))
+  default = {}
+}
+
 variable "policy_auth_map" {
   description = "Map of auth mounts -> auth roles -> policy names"
   type        = map(map(list(string)))

policies/arrstack/admin.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+# Allow management of the arrstack secrets engine (config and roles) by the
+# terraform-vault deployer.
+---
+rules:
+  - path: "arrstack/config"
+    capabilities:
+      - create
+      - update
+      - read
+      - delete
+  - path: "arrstack/roles/*"
+    capabilities:
+      - create
+      - update
+      - delete
+      - read
+      - list
+  - path: "arrstack/roles"
+    capabilities:
+      - read
+      - list
+
+auth:
+  approle:
+    - tf_vault
+  k8s/au/syd1:
+    - woodpecker_terraform_vault

policies/arrstack/creds/mediamark.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+# Allow the mediamark app to mint its own Sonarr/Radarr-scoped arrproxy key.
+# Bound to the dedicated "mediamark" k8s role only, never the shared "default"
+# role, so no other namespace can read these creds.
+---
+rules:
+  - path: "arrstack/creds/mediamark"
+    capabilities:
+      - read
+
+auth:
+  k8s/au/syd1:
+    - mediamark

policies/arrstack/creds/prowlarr.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+# Allow the terraform-prowlarr run to mint a Prowlarr-scoped arrproxy key.
+---
+rules:
+  - path: "arrstack/creds/prowlarr"
+    capabilities:
+      - read
+
+auth:
+  approle:
+    - terraform_prowlarr
+  k8s/au/syd1:
+    - woodpecker_terraform_prowlarr

policies/arrstack/creds/radarr.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+# Allow the terraform-radarr run to mint a Radarr-scoped arrproxy key.
+---
+rules:
+  - path: "arrstack/creds/radarr"
+    capabilities:
+      - read
+
+auth:
+  approle:
+    - terraform_radarr
+  k8s/au/syd1:
+    - woodpecker_terraform_radarr

policies/arrstack/creds/sonarr.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+# Allow the terraform-sonarr run to mint a Sonarr-scoped arrproxy key.
+---
+rules:
+  - path: "arrstack/creds/sonarr"
+    capabilities:
+      - read
+
+auth:
+  approle:
+    - terraform_sonarr
+  k8s/au/syd1:
+    - woodpecker_terraform_sonarr

policies/auth/oidc/admin.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# Allow full administration of the OIDC auth backend (mount config and login
+# roles), mirroring policies/auth/ldap/admin.yaml. sys/auth/* already covers
+# enabling the mount itself; this covers writing auth/oidc/config and
+# auth/oidc/role/*.
+---
+rules:
+  - path: "auth/oidc/*"
+    capabilities:
+      - create
+      - update
+      - read
+      - delete
+      - list
+
+auth:
+  approle:
+    - tf_vault
+  k8s/au/syd1:
+    - woodpecker_terraform_vault

policies/consul_root/au/syd1/creds/terraform-infra.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+---
+rules:
+  - path: "consul_root/au/syd1/creds/terraform-infra"
+    capabilities:
+      - read
+
+auth:
+  approle:
+    - terraform_infra
+  k8s/au/syd1:
+    - woodpecker_terraform_infra

policies/consul_root/au/syd1/creds/terraform-ipam.yaml

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
----
-rules:
-  - path: "consul_root/au/syd1/creds/terraform-ipam"
-    capabilities:
-      - read
-
-auth:
-  approle:
-    - terraform_ipam
-  k8s/au/syd1:
-    - woodpecker_terraform_ipam

policies/ghp/admin.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+# Allow the vault deployer to manage the ghp token secrets engine: its
+# connection config (seeded service token) and its token-minting roles.
+#
+# Scoped to ghp/* only, and deliberately excludes ghp/creds/* - minting tokens
+# is for consumers, not the deployer. ghp has NO rotate endpoint, so unlike the
+# gitea/netbox engines there is no config/rotate grant here. The plugin-catalog
+# grant needed to import the plugin is the shared, sudo-protected wildcard in
+# policies/sys/plugins/catalog/admin.yaml (already covers this plugin), and
+# mounting the engine uses the deployer's existing sys/mounts/* access, so no
+# new catalog/mount grant is added here (mirrors the gitea/netbox engines).
+---
+rules:
+  # Engine connection config (base_url, TLS, seeded service token).
+  - path: "ghp/config"
+    capabilities:
+      - create
+      - read
+      - update
+      - delete
+  # Token-minting roles.
+  - path: "ghp/roles/*"
+    capabilities:
+      - create
+      - read
+      - update
+      - delete
+      - list
+  - path: "ghp/roles"
+    capabilities:
+      - read
+      - list
+
+auth:
+  approle:
+    - tf_vault
+  k8s/au/syd1:
+    - woodpecker_terraform_vault

policies/ghp/creds/agent.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+# Lets the agents AppRole mint ephemeral ghp agent tokens, so AI coding agents
+# authenticate to ghp as their own short-lived, least-privilege identity.
+# Reading ghp/creds/agent returns a lease-bound token scoped by the role
+# (token_type agent, contents:read). Mirrors the gitea/creds/unkin-agent binding.
+---
+rules:
+  - path: "ghp/creds/agent"
+    capabilities:
+      - read
+
+auth:
+  approle:
+    - agents

policies/gitea/creds/repospawner.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# Lets the repospawner pods mint ephemeral Gitea tokens for the repospawner
+# service user, so the service authenticates to git.unkin.net as its own
+# least-privilege identity. Reading gitea/creds/repospawner returns a
+# lease-bound token scoped by the role (write:repository, write:issue,
+# read:user -- never merge/admin).
+# Kubernetes auth only: repospawner runs in-cluster and the agents AppRole is
+# CIDR-bound to Ben's workstation.
+---
+rules:
+  - path: "gitea/creds/repospawner"
+    capabilities:
+      - read
+
+auth:
+  k8s/au/syd1:
+    - repospawner

policies/gitea/creds/unkin-agent.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# Lets the agents AppRole mint ephemeral Gitea tokens for the unkin-agent bot,
+# so AI coding agents authenticate to git.unkin.net as their own least-privilege
+# identity instead of Ben's account. Reading gitea/creds/unkin-agent returns a
+# lease-bound token scoped by the role (write:repository, write:issue, read:user
+# -- never merge/admin). Mirrors the agent-* Kubernetes creds binding pattern.
+---
+rules:
+  - path: "gitea/creds/unkin-agent"
+    capabilities:
+      - read
+
+auth:
+  approle:
+    - agents

policies/global-root.yaml

@@ -10,6 +10,12 @@ rules:
       - list
       - sudo
 
+# The oidc entry is an Authentik akP-* permission group, not an LDAP group name:
+# it names the external identity group under config/auth_oidc_group, so a human
+# who logs in via Authentik SSO lands on exactly the policy the LDAP vault_admin
+# group already carries. akR-* roles are grouping-only and never named here.
 auth:
   ldap:
     - vault_admin
+  oidc:
+    - akP-vault-admin

policies/identity/group/admin.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+# Allow the deployer to manage external identity groups and their aliases, which
+# is how OIDC group membership (the ak_groups claim) maps onto Vault policies.
+# Both the collection endpoints and the per-id endpoints are needed: create posts
+# to identity/group, subsequent reads and updates address identity/group/id/<id>.
+---
+rules:
+  - path: "identity/group"
+    capabilities:
+      - create
+      - update
+  - path: "identity/group/*"
+    capabilities:
+      - create
+      - update
+      - read
+      - delete
+      - list
+  - path: "identity/group-alias"
+    capabilities:
+      - create
+      - update
+  - path: "identity/group-alias/*"
+    capabilities:
+      - create
+      - update
+      - read
+      - delete
+      - list
+  - path: "identity/lookup/group"
+    capabilities:
+      - create
+      - update
+
+auth:
+  approle:
+    - tf_vault
+  k8s/au/syd1:
+    - woodpecker_terraform_vault

policies/kv/kubernetes/namespace/arrstack/default/arrproxy-admin-token/read.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Allow the terraform-vault deployer to read the seeded arrproxy admin token so
+# the arrstack engine config module can source it. The token is seeded by
+# argocd-apps #384 at kv/kubernetes/namespace/arrstack/default/arrproxy-admin-token.
+# The deployer's existing secret_backends_read policy only covers
+# kv/data/service/vault/+/+/secret_backend/*, which does not match this
+# kubernetes/namespace path, so this adds the minimal read grant rather than
+# duplicating the secret into the litellm-style path. vault_kv_secret_v2 also
+# reads the kv-v2 metadata path on every plan/apply, so grant that too.
+---
+rules:
+  - path: "kv/data/kubernetes/namespace/arrstack/default/arrproxy-admin-token"
+    capabilities:
+      - read
+  - path: "kv/metadata/kubernetes/namespace/arrstack/default/arrproxy-admin-token"
+    capabilities:
+      - read
+
+auth:
+  approle:
+    - tf_vault
+  k8s/au/syd1:
+    - woodpecker_terraform_vault

policies/kv/service/authentik/agent-api-token/read.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# Lets the agents AppRole read a dedicated, scoped Authentik API token seeded by
+# the operator. Automation seeds OAuth2 client secrets and LDAP outpost tokens as
+# part of normal IaC workflows; fetching an outpost token requires calling the
+# Authentik API, so a scoped token (not the CI admin credential) is read here.
+# Mirrors the gitea/creds/unkin-agent agents-approle read grant pattern.
+---
+rules:
+  - path: "kv/data/service/authentik/agent-api-token"
+    capabilities:
+      - read
+
+auth:
+  approle:
+    - agents

policies/kv/service/authentik/oidc-vault/read.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# Let the terraform-vault deployer read the OpenBao OIDC client credentials that
+# Authentik's provider module generates and writes here (terraform_authentik owns
+# kv/service/authentik/* — see policies/kv/service/authentik/write.yaml). The
+# deployer consumes client_id/client_secret to configure the auth/oidc backend.
+#
+# OIDC becomes the default human auth path; approle and k8s (CI and agents) plus
+# the break-glass root path are unchanged.
+#
+# AppRole capabilities are fixed at login, so this grant must be applied before
+# the PR that adds the auth/oidc modules.
+---
+rules:
+  - path: "kv/data/service/authentik/oidc-vault"
+    capabilities:
+      - read
+
+auth:
+  approle:
+    - tf_vault
+  k8s/au/syd1:
+    - woodpecker_terraform_vault

policies/kv/service/authentik/write.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+# Let the terraform-authentik runner manage the Authentik service KV subtree as
+# IaC (vault_kv_secret_v2), starting with kv/service/authentik/agent-api-token,
+# which is currently seeded by hand.
+#
+# Scoping: the ask was to grant only *-token paths, but Vault ACL paths support
+# a trailing glob only (no infix/suffix wildcards), so the grant is the whole
+# kv/service/authentik/ subtree. That is acceptable because terraform-authentik
+# is the owner of every secret under kv/service/authentik/.
+#
+# delete is included (unlike the agents kv/kubernetes grant) so `terraform
+# destroy` and resource replacement can remove a secret and its metadata
+# cleanly; vault_kv_secret_v2 also reads the kv-v2 metadata path on every
+# plan/apply, so metadata read/list is required for the plan to succeed.
+---
+rules:
+  - path: "kv/data/service/authentik/*"
+    capabilities:
+      - create
+      - read
+      - update
+      - delete
+  - path: "kv/metadata/service/authentik/*"
+    capabilities:
+      - read
+      - list
+      - delete
+
+auth:
+  approle:
+    - terraform_authentik
+  k8s/au/syd1:
+    - woodpecker_terraform_authentik

policies/kv/service/kubernetes/au/syd1/csi/ceph-mediafs-secret/read.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Allow reading Ceph mediafs CSI secrets
+---
+rules:
+  - path: "kv/data/service/kubernetes/au/syd1/csi/ceph-mediafs-secret"
+    capabilities:
+      - read
+
+auth:
+  k8s/au/syd1:
+    - ceph-csi

policies/kv/service/terraform/infra.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+# Allow the terraform-infra runner to read the NetBox + KeaAPI tokens
+# (netbox_token / kea_token fields) used by the netbox and kea providers.
+---
+rules:
+  - path: "kv/data/service/terraform/infra"
+    capabilities:
+      - read
+  # vault_kv_secret_v2 (terraform-infra providers.tf data source) reads the kv-v2
+  # metadata path on every plan/apply; a 403 here fails the plan.
+  - path: "kv/metadata/service/terraform/infra"
+    capabilities:
+      - read
+
+auth:
+  approle:
+    - terraform_infra
+  k8s/au/syd1:
+    - woodpecker_terraform_infra

policies/kv/service/terraform/ipam.yaml

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-# Allow the Terraform IPAM runner to read the NetBox + KeaAPI tokens
-# (netbox_token / kea_token fields) used by the netbox and kea providers.
----
-rules:
-  - path: "kv/data/service/terraform/ipam"
-    capabilities:
-      - read
-
-auth:
-  approle:
-    - terraform_ipam
-  k8s/au/syd1:
-    - woodpecker_terraform_ipam

policies/kv/service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/ghp/config_write.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+# Allow the agents AppRole to seed the ghp secrets engine's admin credentials.
+# The ghp engine (managed by the tf_vault deployer) reads its ghpsvc_ service
+# token from admin_token at ghp/config creation time; that key is currently
+# unseeded, so the master apply aborts on the ghp data-source read. This grants
+# the agents AppRole scoped write here so an agent can seed the value. Deployer
+# read is already granted via policies/kv/service/vault/secret_backends_read.yaml,
+# so this only adds the write side for the agents identity.
+---
+rules:
+  # Seed value: admin_token (a ghpsvc_ service token). create/update to seed,
+  # read so the agent can verify what it wrote. No delete (least privilege).
+  - path: "kv/data/service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/ghp/config"
+    capabilities:
+      - create
+      - update
+      - read
+  # vault_kv_secret_v2 also reads the kv-v2 metadata path on every plan/apply.
+  - path: "kv/metadata/service/vault/au/syd1/secret_backend/ghp/config"
+    capabilities:
+      - read
+
+auth:
+  approle:
+    - agents

policies/netbox/admin.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+# Allow the vault deployer to manage the netbox token secrets engine: its
+# connection config (seeded admin token), in-place token rotation, and
+# token-minting roles.
+#
+# Scoped to netbox/* only, and deliberately excludes netbox/creds/* - minting
+# tokens is for consumers, not the deployer. The plugin-catalog grant needed to
+# import the plugin is the shared, sudo-protected wildcard in
+# policies/sys/plugins/catalog/admin.yaml (already covers this plugin), and
+# mounting the engine uses the deployer's existing sys/mounts/* access, so no
+# new catalog/mount grant is added here (mirrors the gitea/rancher engines).
+---
+rules:
+  # Engine connection config (NetBox URL, TLS, token_version, seeded admin token).
+  - path: "netbox/config"
+    capabilities:
+      - create
+      - read
+      - update
+      - delete
+  # In-place rotation of the seeded admin token (write-only trigger).
+  - path: "netbox/config/rotate"
+    capabilities:
+      - create
+      - update
+  # Token-minting roles.
+  - path: "netbox/roles/*"
+    capabilities:
+      - create
+      - read
+      - update
+      - delete
+      - list
+  - path: "netbox/roles"
+    capabilities:
+      - read
+      - list
+
+auth:
+  approle:
+    - tf_vault
+  k8s/au/syd1:
+    - woodpecker_terraform_vault

policies/netbox/creds/terraform-infra.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# Allow the terraform-infra runner to mint an ephemeral NetBox token from the
+# terraform-infra role (netbox/creds/terraform-infra), replacing the static
+# netbox_token it used to read from kv/service/terraform/*. The e-breuninger
+# netbox provider authenticates with the minted token; the lease revokes it when
+# the run ends.
+#
+# Bound to both the terraform-infra AppRole and its Woodpecker k8s auth role,
+# mirroring the terraform-ipam pattern. Both principals are created by the
+# terraform-infra Vault onboarding (separate from this netbox change); until
+# that onboarding lands this policy exists but attaches to nothing.
+---
+rules:
+  - path: "netbox/creds/terraform-infra"
+    capabilities:
+      - read
+
+auth:
+  approle:
+    - terraform_infra
+  k8s/au/syd1:
+    - woodpecker_terraform_infra

policies/netbox/creds/vault-user-mgmt.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+# Allow the vault deployer to mint the ephemeral user-admin token that
+# netbox_user_management authenticates with (netbox/creds/vault-user-mgmt). The
+# engine mints it from the single static admin token, so the deployer never holds
+# a second static NetBox credential.
+#
+# The netbox admin policy (policies/netbox/admin.yaml) deliberately excludes
+# netbox/creds/* - minting is normally for consumers, not the deployer. This is
+# the one deliberate exception: the deployer needs a user-admin token during the
+# run to reconcile NetBox users. Scoped to the single vault-user-mgmt role only.
+#
+# Bound to the same principals as the admin policy: the tf_vault AppRole and its
+# Woodpecker k8s auth role.
+---
+rules:
+  - path: "netbox/creds/vault-user-mgmt"
+    capabilities:
+      - read
+
+auth:
+  approle:
+    - tf_vault
+  k8s/au/syd1:
+    - woodpecker_terraform_vault

policies/rancher/creds/ci.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# Allow the terraform-rancher runner to mint an ephemeral Rancher API token
+# from the "ci" role, so its Makefile can swap
+#   vault kv get kv/service/terraform/rancher
+# for
+#   vault read -field=token rancher/creds/ci
+# and retire the static 90-day admin token. The minted token is lease-bound
+# (ttl 1h, max 8h) and deleted from Rancher on revoke; it inherits the seeded
+# admin service account's RBAC, so this is the same privilege as the static
+# token it replaces, just short-lived.
+---
+rules:
+  - path: "rancher/creds/ci"
+    capabilities:
+      - read
+
+auth:
+  approle:
+    - terraform_rancher
+  k8s/au/syd1:
+    - woodpecker_terraform_rancher

policies/sys/auth/admin.yaml

@@ -8,6 +8,24 @@ rules:
       - delete
       - read
       - list
+  # Enabling/tuning an auth mount is sudo-protected, and an exact path match
+  # wins over the wildcard above, so both rules repeat the full capability set.
+  - path: "sys/auth/oidc"
+    capabilities:
+      - create
+      - update
+      - delete
+      - read
+      - list
+      - sudo
+  - path: "sys/auth/oidc/tune"
+    capabilities:
+      - create
+      - update
+      - delete
+      - read
+      - list
+      - sudo
 
 auth:
   approle:

resources/secret_backend/consul_root/au/syd1/terraform-infra.hcl

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-key_prefix "infra/terraform/ipam/" {
+key_prefix "infra/terraform/infra/" {
   policy = "write"
 }
 

resources/secret_backend/kubernetes/au/syd1/roles/cluster-operator.yaml

@@ -22,6 +22,28 @@ rules:
       - "elasticsearch.k8s.elastic.co"
       - "kibana.k8s.elastic.co"
       - "gateway.networking.k8s.io"
+      - "apm.k8s.elastic.co"
+      - "beat.k8s.elastic.co"
+      - "agent.k8s.elastic.co"
+      - "maps.k8s.elastic.co"
+      - "enterprisesearch.k8s.elastic.co"
+      - "autoscaling.k8s.elastic.co"
+      - "stackconfigpolicy.k8s.elastic.co"
+      - "valkey.io"
+      - "ceph.unkin.net"
+      - "bind.unkin.net"
+      - "kea.unkin.net"
+      - "k8up.io"
+      - "grafana.integreatly.org"
+      - "operator.victoriametrics.com"
+      - "clickhouse.altinity.com"
+      - "clickhouse-keeper.altinity.com"
+      - "acme.cert-manager.io"
+      - "deviceplugin.intel.com"
+      - "fpga.intel.com"
+      - "autoscaling.k8s.io"
+      - "snapshot.storage.k8s.io"
+      - "groupsnapshot.storage.k8s.io"
     resources:
       - "*"
     verbs: